ORDER
K.B. Siddappa, J.
1. This Writ Appeal is directed against the judgment passed in WPNo.l4018 of 1993.
2. The Writ Petition was filed for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus seeking direction to the 1st respondent not to collect Court Fee from the petitioner on the Letters of Administration to,be issued in pursuance to the order dated 27-4-1993 in OP No.172 of 1993 on the file of Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in excess of the Court Fee prescribed under Article l(c)(viii) of the 1st Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1956.
3. Stated briefly, the relevant facts are the following:
The petitioner filed OP No.172 of 1993 under Section 232 of Indian Succession Act to grant letters of Administration for the last Will and Testament dated 29-11-1985 executed by his father who died on I -6-1991. The brothers and the only sisler of the petitioner who were impleaded filed affidavits and in their evidence stated that they have no objection for grant of Letter of Administration to the petitioner. The 1st respondent decreed the OP on 27-4-1993. The Superintendent of the Court of the 1st respondent demanded for payment of Court Fee as per Article 6 of Schedule I of the Act at 5% on the value ofthe estate to secure Letter of Administration. The value of the estate is Rs.18.77,303/-. If the Court Fee is calculated as demanded, it comes to Rs.85,000/-. This demand is questioned in the Writ Petition.
4. The main contention of the Petitioner is that prescribing 5% ad valorem Court fee on the Letter of Administration is ultra vires. It suffers from hostile discrimination and offending Articles 14 and 39A of the Constitution of India. It is his contention that if an ordinary suit is filed, the Court Fee payable on the value of Rs. 18,00,000/- and odd, is only Rs.20,426/-. Further, there is no nexus for demanding abnormal amount of Rs.85,000/- towards Court Fee. As per Article 11(k) of Schedule II of the Act, in the event of contest the maximum Court Fee payable is only half of the amount payable on the plaint filed in a suit concerning the same value of the property and it comes to Rs.10,213/- only. He further contended that the present demand partakes the character of tax or duty and it is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. Further, the issuance of Letter of Administration is only an administrative act. Charging of additional Court Fee for that purpose is bad.
5. In support of his various contentions, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Judgment of Bombay High Court rendered in Mrs. Jyoti Nikul Jariwaia and another v. State of Maharashtra and another, : AIR1988Bom123 . In that case, it was held that there must be a broad corrclalion between the services rendered and the fee imposed and that if reckoned the Court fee payable by the seekers of probate and letters of administration as compared to those wanting relief through the medium of civil suits, writ petitions etc., is exorbitant and the service rendered is minimal, and that the fee paid by the other class is, comparatively speaking, far less though the strain upon the resources of the State, whether considered on the anvil of timespent or persons engaged in the performance of the task, is far more, and that even the long suffering plaintiff i.e., the person seeking relief by means of a civil suit has relief in the form of an upper limit of Rs. 15,000/- in the fee payable and no such relief is available to (he seekers of probates for the higher value of estate, the higher is the fee that he has to pay. It was also held that in the matter of granting of letters of administration, there is no upper limit. In those circumstances, the Court held that the discrimination is a piece of class legislation prohibiled by the guarantee of equal protection of laws embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution.
6. This view of the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court was approved by the Supreme Court in the Judgment rendered in P.M. Aswathanarayana Setty & others v. State of Karnataka and others, : AIR1989SC100 . In that case, Section 20, Schedule I, Article 1 of Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, was under consideration of the Supreme Court. Their Lordships held that if the essential character of the impost is that some special service is intended or envisaged as a quid pro quo to the class of citizens which is intended to be benefited by the service and there is a broad and general correlation between the amount so raised and the expenses involved in providing the service, (he impost would partake the character of a 'fee' notwithstanding the circumstance that the identity of the amount so raised is not always kept distinguished but is merged in the general revenues of the State and notwithstanding the fact that such special services, for which the amount is raised, are as they do, incidentally or indirectly benefit the general public also. Their Lordships also held that the test is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose it is intended to achieve. It was further held that quid pro quo cannot be ascertained with any accurate arithmetical equivalence or precision in the matter ofcorrelation. It is sufficient if there is a broad and general correlation between the amounts raised and the expenses involved in providing the service. It was also held that the test of correlation is not in the context of individual contributors but the test is on the comprehensive level of the totality of the services, set-off against the totality of the receipts. Dealing with the upper limit fixed for a civil suit, the Court held:
'....If in respect of all other suits of whatever nature and complexity an upper limit of Rs. 15,000/- on the Court-fee is fixed, there is no logical justification for singling out the proceeding for grant of probate and letters of administration for an ad valorem impost without the benefit of some upper limit prescribed by the same statute respecting all other litigants. The discrimination brought about by the statute fails to pass the constitutional muster'.
The Supreme Court suggested that the Government may rationalise the fee structure in respect of the suits in paragraph 37 of its Judgment.
7. Apart from the above two authorities, the learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision rendered in Secretary to Government of Madras and another v. P.R. Sriramulu and another, AIR 1996 SC 676. In that case, the Supreme Court held that if the amount collected is to be described as fee, some special services as quid pro quo should be intended to a class of citizens. The Supreme Court also ordained that the general correlation between the amount collected and the expenses incurred in providing the services should exist, and that the amount collected incidentally or indirectly benefiting the general public is also not material.
8. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in the Secretary,Government of Madras, Home Department and another v. Zeitily Lamps and Electrical Ltd., : [1973]2SCR973 . In that case also it was held that there should be a correlation between the amount collected and the services rendered to characterise the collection as fees. The Supreme Court observed that 'one thing the Legislature is not competent to do is to make litigants contribute to the increase of genera! public revenue'. It was also held that if the State Legislature generally increases the fees it must establish that it is necessary to increase the Court fee in order to meet the cost of administration of civil justice and the State must justify the enhancement.
9. The ratio of the Judgment in Om Prakash Agarwal etc. v. Giri Raj Kishori and others etc., : [1987]164ITR376(SC) , also is more or less the same.
10. The law laid down by the above judgments is not in dispute. It is consistently held that the Court fee charged by various States under Court Fees and Suits Valuation Acts is a Court fee and not a tax. There is general agreement among the authorities cited above that a kind of special service should be rendered to the litigant public when they contribute in the way of Court fee. It is not the case that the Legislature is making profit out of Court fee and there is no allegation that the amount raised is spent for other works like construction of roads, buildings etc. The stand of the State is that the Court fee charged is less than the expenditure on maintenance of Courts, law officers and the Judicial Department as a whole. There is broadly no dispute in respect of this fact. Therefore, the Courts have upheld the collection of amounts in the way of Court fees. There is no element of tax attached to the amounts paid as Court fees.
11. In this case the main point urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the collection of 5% ad valorem Court feeon the letter of administration is bad. Even if the suit is filed the Court fee payable when the amount exceeds Rs.1,00,000/- for every Rs.10,000/- or part thereof in excess of Rs.1,00,000/-, is Rs.100/-, by virtue of Schedule I, Article 1(c)(viii) of the A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956. In the instant case, if the amount is calculated as per Schedule I, Article 1(c)(viii) the fee comes to Rs.20,426/-. But an amount of Rs.85,000/- is demanded under Article 6 of Schedule I of the Act. This is highly discriminatory.
12. We are not convinced with tin's argument. The proceedings in the form of suit and issuance of letter of administration, are different in nature. The State can certainly lake advantage of this difference in the nature of proceedings and fix different rates of Court fees. In the decision cited (1) supra, in the matter of civil suit, the upper limit of Court fee was fixed at Rs.15,000/-. There is no such limit in respect of Court fee payable on letter of administration. This was held bad. This Judgment was approved by the Supreme Court in the decision cited (2) supra. The facts of the case on hand are distinguishable as is rightly held by the learned single Judge. In the A.F. Court Fee and Suits Valuation Act, no upper limit is fixed for the suits even. Therefore, the appellant cannot complain of discrimination. As earlier observed, the suit proceedings and the proceedings of issuance of letter of administration in the matter of probate etc., are different in character and amplitude. Such distinction certainly enables the State to charge different rates of Court fee.
13. In the above circumstances, we do not see any reason to interfere with the Judgment of the learned single Judge.
14. The Writ Appeal is dismissed and in the circumstances, without costs.