Judgment:
ORDER
1. This contempt case has been filed for initiating proceedings against the sole respondent viz. Sri S. V. S. Prasad, I.A.S., who was the Vice-Chairman and the Managing Director of A.P. Dairy Development Co-operative Federation Limited, Lalapet, Hyderabad for gross violation of the order of this Court passed in W.P. No. 6720/84 dated 21-4-1987 and to punish him for the same.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy arising in this matter it would be necessary to reproduce the operative portion of the order of the single Judge in W.P. No. 6720 of 1984 which is in the following terms :
'....... In this view of the matter Writ petition No. 6720 of 1984 is allowed and a mandamus will issue to the respondent to treat petitioners 1 to 21 as the employees of the respondent-Federation and to fix appropriate regular scale of pay as applicable to the employees of the Federation. But in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.'
3. The matter was carried by the respondents in appeal in W.A. Nos. 881 and 882 of 1987. It is on record that the order of the single Judge was suspended for sometime. However, at the time of the final hearing of the Writ appeals, the order in W.P. No. 6720 of 1984 was confirmed in the following terms :
'Therefore, we agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the workers that they are the employees of the Federation. The workers also wanted that a direction may be given to the Federation to fix suitable pay scales for them. It is for the Federation to fix their pay taking into consideration the nature of work done by them and the pay given to similar categories of employees. The two appeals are dismissed, no costs.'
4. The crux of the matter is to consider the point whether the respondent herein has committed contempt of the order passed in W.P. No. 6720/84 by not granting regular scales of pay to the petitioners and instead of that granting only the minimum wages which are far lower as compared to the regular scales of pay.
5. Sri G. Bikshapathi, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued strenuously that the order in W.P. No. 6720/84 which is alleged to have been violated, has been confirmed in appeal by the Division Bench and therefore it is incumbent upon the respondent to pay regular scales of pay to the petitioners, who are the Canteen Workers, directed by the learned single Judge. It would be in the fitness of things to test the merit of this submission in juxtaposition to the order passed by the Division Bench while confirming the order of the single Judge. A reading of the above extracted passage, which forms the operative portion of the judgment of the Division Bench, reveals a deviation albeit microscopically from the direction given by the single Judge in so far as the question of payment of regular scales of pay to the petitioners is concerned. It is significant to note that after agreeing with the contention that the petitioners, who are the erstwhile canteen workers, are the employees of the Federation, the Division Bench has stated that 'it is for the Federation to fix their pay taking into consideration the nature of work done by them and the pay given to similar categories of employees.' A fair interpretation of the above sentence occurring in the judgment of the Division Bench shows that it is not the same thing as saying that the petitioners shall be granted regular scales of pay as directed by the single Judge. If the intention of the Division Bench was to affirm this aspect of the order of the single Judge, then there was no need whatsoever for the Division Bench to observe that it is for the Federation to fix their pay taking into consideration the nature of work done by them and the pay given to similar categories of employees. It is, therefore, clear that to the extent of this observation the order of the single Judge seems to have been modified by the Division Bench and it is axiomatic that an order of a single Judge, which has been modified, in whatever form it may be, cannot be a subject-matter of contempt. Secondly, there is a lot of substance in the submission made by Sri C. Ramakrishna, learned Standing Counsel for APDDC that under no circumstance it could be held that there has been a wilful disobedience of the order in the writ petition by the respondent. A case of contempt, to my mind, is a fragile matter which should be handled with care. It is undoubtedly true that a wilful disobedience of an order passed by the court is a sine qua non for determining the element of contempt in such an order. Can it be said in view of this acute controversy that the respondent has deliberately violated the order of the single Judge. The answer to this question is in the negative. There is an element of doubt as to whether the direction of the single Judge has been upheld in its entirety on the question of fixation of pay scales and if a doubt exists, which may be well founded or at least has got a semblance of justification in it, then it would be difficult to say that contempt of order has been committed.
6. Sri C. Ramakrishna learned standing counsel for the respondent has also endeavoured to put forth the argument that the order in W.P. No. 6720/84 was passed on 21-4-1987 and the contempt case was filed on 2-7-1990 and notice in the contempt case was issued by the single Judge on 23-11-1990. The object of this analysis of dates is to establish the fact that cognizance of contempt case has not been taken within a period of one year as ordained in S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Indeed, the fulcrum of the argument made by the learned counsel for the respondent in this regard seems to be that the term 'taking cognizance' would materialise for the purpose of this case only when the court handled the matter and issued notice to the other side. This is not an argument to be considered at this stage in this case and I leave that question open for a better occasion so that the nebulous state of law may be crystallised on this aspect of the problem. In view of the fact that this court has come to the conclusion that the order of the single judge has not been unheld in its entirety on the question of pay scales by the Division Bench, there is no wilful disobedience of the order passed in W.P. No. 6720/84.
7. Sri C. Ramakrishna, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has also relied on a decision reported in Workmen of Nagammal Mills Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madurai, 1988 (73) FJR 308, in which a similar view has been expressed with regard to the difficulty of equating the cateen workers with other employees of Textile Corporation for the purpose of determining their scales of pay. Perhaps, the respondent-Federation in this case also was faced with that problem in this matter as well but it may not be necessary to go into the substratum of this statement for the reason that the Contempt case fails on the points indicated above.
8. Sri C. Ramakrishna, learned counsel for the respondent has made a statement that the Federation is prepared to honour its obligation with regard to payment of back wages to the petitioners from 21-4-1987. This is a statement which remains on record and there is every reason to believe that this statement would be honoured by the Federation, preferably within four weeks from the date of receipt of this order.
9. Sri G. Bikshapathi, learned counsel for the petitioners has very rightly stressed the point that nothing in this order shall come in the way of the petitioners to seek a clarification from the Division Bench of the order made by them. I grant this request accordingly.
10. For the above reasons, the contempt case is dismissed. No costs.
11. Petition dismissed.