G. Radhakrishna Rao, J.
1. This is a petition filed under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the accused in C.C. 202 of 1992 on the file of the XV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad requesting that the order of the XV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, dated 26-6-1992 taking cognizance of the private complaint filed by the 1st respondent (complainant) in C.C. No. 202 of 1992, on his file may be quashed.
2. A private complaint has been filed by the 1st respondent herein (complainant) against the petitioners (accused 1 and 2) for offences under Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code with the following allegations :-
The complainant and M. Gopal Singh, M. Dilip Singh, M. Vinod Singh, and M. Vikram Singh (LWs 1 to 4) are the absolute owners of land in Survey Nos. 169, 170, 172, 173, 190 and 191 of Gaganmahal village, Hyderabad. All of them have entered into an agreement of sale with the Legislator's Co-operative Housing Society Limited represented by the then President on 14-12-1980. On 17-6-1992 the complainant received a letter from one M. Bal Reddy (LW 5) stating that the accused had filed petitions before the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Housing), Basheerbagh, Hyderabad claiming that they had entered into an agreement with the complainant, LWs 1 to 4 and the President of the said Society. It is stated in the complainant that the complainant does not know who the accused persons are and that he and LWs 1 to 4 never entered into any agreement in respect of the above said land with any one except with the Legislator's Co-operative Housing Society Limited. It is the case of the complainant that the sale agreements were forged with an intention to claim 400 square yards of complainant's land, the value of which is around Rs. 2,000/- per square yard, which comes to around Rs. 8 lakhs. The acts of accused 1 and 2 are deliberate and made with an intention to grab the valuable land of the complainant and in furtherance of their ill-motives they have produced the forged documents before the Registrar of Co-operative (Housing) Societies, Basheerbagh. It is further stated in the complaint that the complainant gave a complaint to the S.H.O., Saifabad P.S. but as the accused, being very influential, have managed the police and they have refused to entertain the complaint given by the complainant.
3. The case was taken on file by the XV Metropolitan Magistrate, under Section 467, I.P.C.
4. The present petition is filed by the accused under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stating that the Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the complaint filed by the complainant and the private complaint is not maintainable under S. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the Co-operative Sub-Registrar/Arbitrator is a court and that that court alone is competent to file a complaint under S. 195 as admittedly the documents were produced in the arbitration proceedings.
5. The main controversy arising for consideration is whether the Co-operative Sub-Registrar/Arbitrator, on whose file the arbitration cases A.R.C. Nos. 26 and 25 of 1992 are pending, is a court or not.
6. Originally this petition has come up before a learned single Judge of this court. The learned single Judge referred the matter to a Division Bench stating that there are conflicting judgments in regard to the point as to whether the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies is a court coming within the purview of S. 195(2) (ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure stating that while it was held by the Madras High Court in Thadi Subbi Reddi v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Mad 869 : (32 Cri LJ 219) that the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies is a court, a contra view was taken by the same High Court in another judgment reported in Chaparala Krishna v. Govardhanaiah, : [1954]25ITR407(Mad) . In the above two cases, referred to by the learned single Judge, Section 195, of the old Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 came up for consideration. In the second case, viz., Krishna v. Govardhanaiah, S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code (old Code of 1898), so far as it was material to that case, was extracted in that case. It is also extracted here to have a clear understanding of the decision which is in the following terms :
'(1) No court shall take cognizance -
xx xx xx (c) of any offence described in S. 463 or punishable under S. 471, S. 475 or S. 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such court, or of some other court to which such court is subordinate.
(2) In clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1), the term 'Court' includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877.'
While extracting the above provision, the Madras High Court, referring to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, held as follows :
'In the Code of 1872 the word 'Court' was defined as including a civil or criminal court. In the Code of 1882, this was altered and the words 'any court' was substituted. In 1898 the term 'Court' was defined as 'meaning' a civil, revenue or criminal court. By the amendment made in 1923 the word 'mean' was deleted and in its place the word 'includes' was substituted. The result of this amendment made in 1923 is, said Mr. Jayarama Aiyar, substantially to restore the position as it stood in 1882. If, therefore, it can be shown, continued Mr. Jayarama Iyer, that the Income-tax Officer is a court, even though he may not fall within the conventional categories of a civil court, a revenue court or a criminal court, the prohibition laid down in S. 195(1), Criminal P.C. would be attracted and the present complaints would be incompetent.
In respect of this argument one may agree without necessarily committing oneself to the position that the amendment made in 1923 restored the position to what it was in 1882 that if the Income-tax Officer is a Court a complaint by him is necessary. The question, however, remains whether he is a court.
Mr. Jayarama Aiyar proceeded : Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines the word 'Court' in these terms :
'Court includes all Judges and Magistrates and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence.'
Section 37 of the Income-tax Act confers on the Income-tax Officer the powers of a Civil Court when trying a suit to enforce the attendance of any person and to examine him on oath. He has also the power to compel the production of documents and to issue commissions for the examination of witnesses. An Income-tax Officer is therefore a court within the meaning of the Evidence Act. The Evidence Act, the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code all from part of one series, and it is perfectly legitimate to transfer to the Criminal Procedure Code the definition of the word 'Court' appearing in the Evidence Act.
In Atchayya v. Gangayya, 15 Mad 138 (FB) the meaning of the word 'Court' was examined. On page 148 Parker J. observed :
'The word 'Court' in S. 195 is used strictly with reference to offence of fabrication of evidence and of documents used in evidence, and, therefore, it seems not unreasonable to hold that the term is used - like the term 'evidence' - in the same sense as in the Indian Evidence Act.'
It seems to be that there is fallacy in this reasoning of Mr. Jayarama Aiyar. No doubt, when we have to ascertain what a particular word used in a statute means, as also the scope of its content, it would be legitimate to examine the sense in which it is used in other enactments. Therefore, when we have to construe the word 'Court' in the Criminal Procedure Code, it would not be improper to look into the Evidence Act and try to find out in what sense the word is used in that Act. And, if the context and the circumstances justify it one may assume that the word is used in the same sense but not otherwise. I can see no warrant whatsoever for the general assumption that the word 'Court' in the Criminal Procedure Code is used in the same sense in which it is used in the Evidence Act. For, after all, the Evidence Act is not the General Clauses Act. I may further observe that the word 'Court' is not used in the same sense throughout even in the Criminal Procedure Code. The observations of Parker, J. must be understood in the context in which he made them. He had in mind the giving of false evidence which could only be done before a person legally authorised to take evidence.'
It is necessary to extract S. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to the extent it is necessary for the purpose of this petition :
'Section 195 :- Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence
(1) No Court shall take cognizance -
(a) xx xx xx (b)(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 - 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 - 211 (both inclusive) and 228 when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or
(ii) of any offence described in S. 463, or punishable under S. 471, S. 475 or S. 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that court or of some other Court to which that court is subordinate.
(2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of sub-section (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the court; and upon its receipt by the court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint;
Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded.
(3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term 'Court' means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section.
xx xx xx' In view of the latest provision contained in S. 195(3), Cr.P.C. we have to consider the question whether the Co-operative Sub-Registrar/Arbitrator can be held to be a 'Court' within the meaning of Section 195(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S. 195, no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, Sections 193 - 196, 199, 200, 206 - 211 and 228 when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court except on the complaint in writing of that Court or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. This aspect of the case has been dealt with, in detail, in Raghunath v. Satyabadi, 1988 Cri LJ 1554. Identical question came up for consideration before the Orissa High Court in the above decision, and it was observed as follows (at page 1557) 'Section 195(3), Cr.P.C. states that the court means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purpose of the Section. In view of this definition the Assistant Registrar under the Co-operative Societies Act cannot be held to be either a civil or revenue or a criminal court and if at all it will be a tribunal under the State Act. If that be so, then unless and until the State Act declares the authority to be a court for the purpose of Section 195, Cr.P.C., then the Tribunal will not be a Court for the purpose of Criminal Procedure Code. The Orissa Co-operative Societies Act does not state that the Assistant Registrar deciding disputes between the parties is a 'Court' for the purpose of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Accordingly it must be held that it is not a 'Court' for the said section. Consequently, the bar contained in Section 195(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply and a Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence under section 467, I.P.C. alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence by a party to any proceeding before the said Assistant Registrar without a complaint in writing by the said Assistant Registrar.'
7. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, relying upon the provisions of S. 195(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and S. 70(2) of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 with regard to the execution of orders or decisions made under S. 60, S. 71, S. 76, S. 77 or S. 78 of the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, contended that since the orders that have been passed by the Registrar or any person authorised by him have been treated for certain purposes as a civil court or for collection or recovery of any amount as a revenue court appeal provision also has been made, it must be deemed that the Co-operative Sub-Registrar/Arbitrator is a 'Court'. In the first breath it may appear that it is a court. But, if we see S. 121 of the Co-operative Societies Act there is bar of jurisdiction of court. When there is bar of jurisdiction of court and limited powers are given under S. 121, it does not mean that the requirement with regard to the application of S. 195, Cr.P.C. has been taken away particularly when sub-section (3) of S. 195 contemplates that the term 'court' means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act. The leading case on this point is Ramarao v. Narayan, : 1969CriLJ1064 . In that case, one of the questions came up for consideration is whether the nominee of the Registrar appointed under S. 95 of the Maharashtra Co operative Societies Act, 1960 was a 'Court' within the meaning of S. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a complaint for offences under Sections 465 and 471, I.P.C. alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceedings in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding cannot be entertained except on a complaint in writing of such court or of a court to which it is subordinate. The Supreme Court observed as follows (at page 1068)
'Section 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts that the term. 'Court' includes a Civil Revenue or Criminal Court but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. The expression 'Court' is not restricted to courts Civil, Revenue or Criminal; it includes other Tribunals. The expression 'court' is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under S. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act 'Court' is defined as including 'all Judges and Magistrates and all persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take evidence.' But this definition is devised for the purpose of the Evidence Act and will not necessarily apply to the Code of Criminal Procedure. The expression 'Court of Justice' is defined in the Indian Penal Code by S. 20 as denoting 'a Judge who is empowered by law to act judicially as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges is acting judicially. That again is not a definition of the expression 'Court' as used in the Criminal Procedure Code. The expression 'Court' in ordinary parlance is a generic expression and in the context in which it occurs may mean a 'body or organization' invested with power, authority or dignity.
In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 9, Article 809 at page 342 it is stated :
'Originally the term 'Court' meant, among other meanings, the Sovereign's place; it has acquired the meaning of the place where justice is administered and, further, has come to mean the persons who exercise judicial functions under authority derived either immediately or mediately from the sovereign. All tribunals, however, are not courts, in the sense in which the term is here employed, namely, to denote such tribunals as exercise jurisdiction over persons by reason of the sanction of the law, and not merely by reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction. Thus, arbitrators, committees of clubs and the like, although they may be tribunals exercising judicial functions, are not 'Courts' in this sense of that term. On the other hand, a tribunal may be a 'court' in the strict sense of the term although the chief part of its duties is not judicial. Parliament is a Court. Its duties are mainly deliberative and legislative; the judicial duties are only part of its functions.' In Article 810 it is stated :
'In determining whether a tribunal is a judicial body the facts that it has been appointed by a non-judicial authority, that it has no power to administer an oath that the chairman has a casting vote, and that third parties have power to intervene are immaterial, especially if the statute setting it up prescribes a penalty for making false statements; elements to be considered are (1) the requirement for a public hearing, subject to a power to exclude the public in a proper case, and (2) a provision that a member of the tribunal shall not take part in any decision in which he is personally interested or unless he has been present throughout the proceedings.' It was further held in the Halsbury's Laws of England, extracted in the above decision :
'A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in the strict sense of exercising judicial power because (1) it gives a final decision; (2) hears witnesses on oath; (3) two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide; (4) it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects; (5) there is an appeal to a court; and (6) it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. Many bodies are not court although they have to decide questions, and in so doing have to act judicially, in the sense that the proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartially, such as the former assessment committees, the former court of referees which was constituted under the Unemployment Insurance Acts, the benches of the Inns of Court when considering the conduct of one of their members, the Disciplinary Committee of the General Medical Council when considering questions affecting the conduct of a medical man, a trade union when exercising disciplinary jurisdiction over its members, or the chief officer of a force exercising discipline over members of the force.' The Supreme Court, after quoting the above Article in Halsbury's Laws of England, held that a body required to act judicially in the sense that its proceedings must be conducted with fairness and impartially may not therefore necessarily be regarded as a court. Ultimately, after considering the judgment of the Madras High Court in Thadi Subbi Reddy v. Emperor, referred to above, the Supreme Court held as follows
'After carefully considering, the powers conferred and the source of authority of the nominee, we have no doubt that the nominee exercising power to make an award under section 96 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, derives his authority not from the statute but from investment by the Registrar in his individual discretion. The power so invested is liable to be suspended and may be withdrawn. He is, therefore, not entrusted with the judicial power of the State; he is merely an arbitrator authorised within the limits of the power conferred to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to him.' The Orissa High Court, after considering the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Ramarao v. Narayan (supra) held as follows
'It may also be noted that S. 195(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 is somewhat different from S. 195(3) of the present Code. Section 195(2) of 1878 Code was to the effect under clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) the term 'Court' includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court but does not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. It was an inclusive definition and was of a general nature without defining what the term 'court' would mean and necessarily therefore, the decision had been based on examining the powers and duties which a particular tribunal was exercising. But the present provision with which we are concerned, namely, S. 195(3) Cr.P.C. states that the Court means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court and includes a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by the Act to be a Court for the purpose of the section. In view of this definition of Assistant Registrar under the Co-operative Societies Act cannot be held to be either a civil or revenue or criminal (Court ?) and if at all it will be a tribunal under the State Act. If that be so, then unless and until the State Act declares the authority to be a Court for the purpose of S. 195, Cr.P.C., then the tribunal will not be a Court for the purpose of Criminal Procedure Code.' The argument that the other courts have not considered the impact of S. 195(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code has no effect as sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of S. 195 have to be read together and if we read together it has to be said that unless and until the State Act declares the authority to be a court for the purpose of S. 195, Cr.P.C., the Co-operative Sub-Registrar/Arbitrator cannot be termed as a Court. There is no inconsistency with regard to sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of S. 195 and an harmoneous construction has to be made.
8. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the Co-operative Sub-Registrar/Arbitrator is not a court within the meaning of S. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently we hold that the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the private complaint filed by the 1st respondent herein under S. 467 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be quashed.
9. In the result, the criminal petition is dismissed.
10. Petition dismissed.