Bhaskar Rao, J.
1. These two are petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus quashing the two orders dated 12-3-1991 passed by the 2nd respondent and for setting one M. Ramulu (husband of the petitioner in W.P. 4534/91) and another M. Vasudev (husband of the petitioner in W.P. 4555/91) at liberty forthwith. In exercise of the powers conferred upon him under Section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the 2nd respondent directed detention of two detenus in the Central Prison, Hyderabad. Pursuant thereto, both the detenus were arrested and lodged in the Central Prison.
2. The two detention orders reveal that the two detenus, who are partners and transport contractors of Indian Oil Corporation and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation, Sanathnagar, Hyderabad, had indulged in large scale clandestine business in petroleum products by illegally decanting diesel meant for various consignees from their tankers by unscrewing the nuts and bolts of the lids of the tankers without tampering the seals in a scheduled place at Balanagar, Hyderabad, on 31-7-1990 and also on previous occasions and sold the decanted diesel by despatching it in their empty tankers intended for transportation of furnace oil so as to make it believe as light diesel oil for pecuniary gain without any license under the A.P. Petroleum Products (Licensing and Regulation of Supplies) Order, 1980 and thus acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of diesel, a commodity essential to the community. It is with a view to prevent them from further acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodity essential to the community, the 2nd respondent invoked the powers under Section 3 of the Act and directed their detention in prison.
3. Mr. B. Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, sought to assail the continuance of detention of the two detenus on more than one count, but in the view are taking, we confine ourselves to the prime contention, viz., the non-consideration of the case of the detenus in the light of S. 14(1) of the Act whether or not to revoke or modify the orders of detention by the Central Government resulted in contravention of the rule of procedural fairness culminating in violation of Art. 22 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel submitted that the Central Government (3rd respondent) did not file any counter, though more than two months have elapsed from the date of filing of these two writ petitions, stating that the cases of the detenus were considered for purposes of revocation or modification of the orders of detention and therefore the assertion of the petitioners that the cases were not considered remains uncontroverted so as to form basis for the contention noted supra. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General submitted that the Central Government was apprised of the fact of detention of the two detenus by the State Government through the letter dt. 18-3-1991 within the stipulated time enclosing thereto the grounds of detention and other documents having bearing on the necessity for passing and approving the orders of detention as envisaged by S. 3(4) of the Act. He contended that it is not necessary for the Central Government to satisfy this Court that the cases of the detenus were considered for revocation or modification of the orders of detention on receipt of the report u/S. 3(4) of the Act from the State Government and that non-consideration of their cases does not give rise to infringement of any right under Art. 22 of the Constitution to call for intervention by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. According to the learned Advocate-General, S. 14(1) of the Act clothes the Central Government with the power to revoke or modify the orders of detention and non-exercise of that power does not render the orders of detention vitiated.
4. In view of the rival contentions, the important question that falls for decision in these two writ petitions is, whether the Central Government is under a bounden duty to consider the cases of detenus under S. 14(1) of the Act whether or not to revoke or modify the orders of detention, on receipt of the report from the State Government u/S. 3(4) of the Act.
5. It is necessary, at the outset, to have a look at Ss. 3(4) and 14(1) of the Act. S. 3(4) reads as under :
'3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons :- (1) .......... (2) .......... (3) ..........
(4) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section or when any order is made under this section by an officer of the State Government not below the rank of Secretary to that Government specially empowered under sub-sec. (1), the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order.
Section 14(1) reads thus :
'14. Revocation of detention orders : (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of S. 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified -
(a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State Government, by that State Government or by the Central Government;
(b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Central Government or by a State Government, by the Central Government.'
6. Adverting to S. 3(4) of the Act, the learned Advocate General submitted that the orders of detention dt. 12-3-1991 passed by the District Magistrate, Rangareddy District, were approved by the State Government on 18-3-1991 and within seven days thereafter the said fact was reported by the State Government to the Central Government in terms of the said provision, and therefore the procedural mandate has been complied with calling for no interference by this Court. Mr. Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that his stress on the question of violation of the procedural mandate envisaged by S. 3(4) of the Act is not to point out that it has been violated in the present case, but only to have it viewed in the background while appraising the procedural fairness contemplated by S. 14(1) of the Act. The learned counsel took me through a decision of the Supreme Court in Sher Mohammad v. State of W.B. : [1975]3SCR154 wherein question regarding the infringement of procedural safeguard envisaged by S. 3(4) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, which is exactly in pari materia with S. 3(4) of the Act, arose for consideration. There, though the fact regarding approval of the detention order was communicated to the Central Government, that was done not within seven days prescribed by S. 3(4) but a little later and therefore it was held that there was an infringement of the procedural safeguard and accordingly the detention order was held to be invalid. Even the learned Advocate General did not dispute that non-compliance of this procedural mandate results in vitiation of the detention order. But, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, this consequence also has a material and substantial bearing on the pursuant safeguard envisaged by S. 14(1) of the Act, in that, consideration of the cases of the detenus for revocation of the detention orders by the Central Government is a mandatory requirement since liberty of the citizen is a priceless freedom sedulously secured by the Constitution and that can be curtailed only in strict compliance with the statutory formalities. In support of his contention, Mr. Kumar place reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Sabir Ahmed v. Union of India : [1980]3SCR738 . There, the detenu made a representation to the Central Government for revocation of the order of detention u/S. 11 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the COFEPOSA) and that was not dealt with by that Government). It is this inaction that was challenged before the Supreme Court. S. 11(1) of COFEPOSA is exactly in pari materia with S. 14(1) of the Act. So much so, S. 3(2) of COFEPOSA corresponds to S. 3(4) of the Act. Dealing with that case, the Supreme Court held in para 12 (at page 298) :
'12. It is true that S. 3(2) of COFEPOSA mandates the State Government to send a report to the Central Government. Whether or not the detenu has u/S. 11 a legal right to make a representation to the Central Government is not the real question. The nub of the matter is whether the power conferred by S. 11 on the Central Government, carries with it a duty to consider any representation made by the detenu, expeditiously. The power u/S. 11 may either be exercised on information received by the Central Government from its own sources including that supplied u/S. 3 by the State Government, or, from the detenu in the form of a petition or representation. Whether or not the Central Government on such petition/representation revokes the detention is a matter of discretion. But this discretion is coupled with a duty. That duty is inherent in the very nature of jurisdiction. The power u/S. 11 is a supervisory power. It is intended to be an additional check or safeguard against the improper exercise of its power of detention by the detaining authority or the State Government. If this statutory safeguard is to retain its meaning and efficacy, the Central Government must discharge its supervisory responsibility with constant vigilance and watchful care. The report received u/S. 3, or any communication or petition received from the detenu must be considered with reasonable expedition ........'
Keeping in view the pari materia nature of the provisions it can safely be held that the discretion conferred on the Central Government, whether or not to revoke the order of detention, u/S. 14(1) of the Act carries with it a duty intended as a measure of additional check or safeguard against the improper exercise of the power of detention to consider the case for such revocation. This duty must be discharged not only with constant vigilance and watchful care but also with reasonable expedition.
7. It is contended by the learned Advocate General that u/S. 14(1) of the Act there is unfettered discretion conferred on the Central Government to revoke or not to revoke the orders of detention and that therefore it may or may not revoke them. This discretion, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted, is with reference to the disposal of the report sent by the State Government u/S. 3(4) of the Act, and not one for purposes of consideration of the case for revocation. The learned counsel invited my attention to an English decision in Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture (1968) AC 997. The question that arose there was, whether action need be taken on a complaint. The Agriculture Marketing Act, 1958, provided for the reference of certain complaints to a Committee of Investigation 'if the Minister in any case directs.' The Minister refused to act on a complaint by a group of milk producers against the Milk Marketing Board. The question at issue therefore was, whether the Minister was duty bound to consider the complaint for purposes of deciding whether or not to refer the same to the Committee. The contention advanced on behalf of the Minister was that the Minister was given an unfettered discretion with regard to every complaint either to refer or not to refer it to the Committee. The House of Lords held that though there is discretion vested in the Minister under the Act whether or not to refer the complaint, that discretion cannot be used so as to frustrate the policy and objects of the Act. It was also held that where there was a relevant and substantial complaint the Minister had a duty as well as power to refer it to the Committee of Investigation. Otherwise, the House of Lords cautioned, he would be rendering nugatory a safeguard provided by the Act and depriving the producers of a remedy which Parliament intended them to have. Viewing the present issue in this light, as submitted by the learned Counsel, the Central Government is duty bound to consider the cases under S. 14(1) of the Act for purposes of revocation or modification of the detention orders.
8. The learned Advocate-General took us through two decisions of the Supreme Court in John Martin v. State of W.B., : 1975CriLJ637 and Mohd Dhana Ali Khan v. State of W.B., : 1976CriLJ622 in support of his submission that failure to revoke or modify the orders of detention orders is no proof that the Central Government did not consider the cases u/S. 14(1) of the Act. No doubt, it is laid down in the above decisions that failure to act, viz. revoke or modify the detention orders, is no proof to hold that the Central Government has not considered the cases u/S. 14(1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. It is crucial to notice that in both the cases cited, the Central Government was not made a party. In the cases on hand, the Central Government is made a party and no counter is filed stating that the Central Government has considered the cases u/S. 14(1) of the Act. This failure necessarily gives rise to an inference that the cases were not considered by the Central Government u/S. 14(1) of the Act. Thus, the two decisions are distinguishable from the two on hand.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioners prefacing his submission in the light of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India also contended that in matters of preventive detention depriving the detenu of his personal liberty, the corresponding obligation on the part of the Central Government pursuant to the receipt of the report sent by the State Government u/S. 3(4) of the Act is inherent by itself, and it is more so by virtue of the specific provision covered by S. 14(1) of the Act. He took us through a decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar v. State of J & K, : [1982]3SCR522 . The one on hand, according to the learned counsel, is a fortiori in nature. There, the learned counsel submitted, even in the absence of a specific and corresponding provision obligating the Government to deal with the representation, if and when made, as expeditiously as possible; the Supreme Court held that as soon after the detenu is deprived of his personal liberty, the statute makes it obligatory on the authorities concerned to afford him an earliest opportunity to represent his side of the case and that there is corresponding obligation inherent on the authority concerned to consider the same as expeditiously as possible. Thus, when the obligation is inherent it is much more so in a case where the statute specifies a provision vesting power in the Central Government to revoke or modify the order of detention. I find sufficient force in this submission of the learned counsel. The learned counsel also endeavoured to fortify this submission by making a reference to the observations of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh v. State of M.P. : [1973]1SCR691 as under (at page 2217) :
'As the law relating to preventive detention, which has to conform to the limits imposed in Art. 22 of the Constitution of India is a restriction on the fundamental right of the freedom of a citizen, it has necessarily to be construed in a manner which will not restrict that right to any extent greater than is necessary to effectuate the object of that provision.'
10. There is yet another decision to which our attention is drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioners to support his contention that the very purpose of sending the report u/S. 3(4) of the Act by the State Government is with a view to have it considered and not to have it thrown unread into the waste paper basket. The question of law referred to the Full Bench of the Assam High Court in Hitendra Nath Goswami v. State of Assam 1984 Cri LJ 1558 is, whether on the report from the State Government under S. 3(5) National Security Act, 1980, the Central Government has the discretion coupled with duty u/S. 14(1) thereof to consider the question of revocation of detention order expeditiously, irrespective of the fact that there is no representation/petition from the detenu to the Central Government for the purpose. S. 3(5) of the National Security Act, 1980 corresponds to S. 3(4) of the present Act while S. 14(1) of that Act is the same as one u/S. 14(1) of the present Act. Dealing with that question, the majority view of the Full Bench runs (at page 1566) :
'Parliament has invested the Central Government with supervisory power to revoke or modify, at any time, the detention order made by the State Government or officer of the State Government specifically empowered in that behalf in exercise of its power u/S. 14(1). S. 3(5) which obligates the State Government to report the fact of detention along with the grounds of detention and other particulars bearing on it, within a stipulated period, implies a corresponding duty in the Central Government that the Central Government is to consider the report with reasonable expedition, notwithstanding that no representation has been made by the detenu to the Central Government. It has to apply its mind to it, keeping in view the policy and objects of the Act. Parliament intended that Central Government should always keep a vigilant eye in the matter of life or liberty of the citizens guaranteed by Art. 21. It is for the Central Government to revoke or not the detention order in exercise of its discretionary power u/S. 14(1) on receipt of the report from the State Government; but the Central Government cannot 'throw it unread into the waste paper basket' ....... As such non-consideration of the report by the Central Government with expedition would be a breach of the procedural safeguard provided by the Act, as an additional check against the improper exercise of power of detention by the detaining authority and thereby violate Art. 21.'
It is also observed by the majority of the learned Judges in para 27 thus :
'.... Where the Central Government does not apply its mind to the report with reasonable expedition and exercise its power under S. 14(1) either rejecting or revoking the order of detention, consistent with the policy and objects of the Act, or where it failed to exercise the supervisory power u/S. 14(1) even though the report prima facie reveals mala fide or abuse of power on the part of the detaining authority or non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of law, it is an act on the part of the Central Government which would defeat the intention of the Parliament. This is never intended by the Act, nor is it intended that the Central Government can silently thwart the intention of Parliament by failing to carry out its purpose.'
There, thus, is a corresponding obligation on the Central Government pursuant to receipt of the report submitted by the State Government u/S. 3(4) of the Act to consider the cases of the detenus for revocation or modification of the detention orders u/S. 14(1) of the Act. The purpose behind making the sending of report u/S. 3(4) of the Act mandatory is not to have the report remained unread and thrown into the waste paper basket, and that any inaction on the part of the Central Government would defeat the intention of the Parliament attracting violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution.
11. As submitted by the learned counsel, the matter can be looked at still from another angle. By exercise of the power u/S. 14(1) of the Act, if the Central Government considers the case of one detenu, say of 'A', and does not in the case of another detenu, say of 'B', it attracts the vice of arbitrariness and unfairness, being resultants of discrimination, and sworn enemies of equality before law guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, looking the issue from any angle, it is to be held that the Central Government is charged with a duty to consider the cases of detenus u/S. 14(1) of the Act on receipt of a report from the State Government u/S. 3(4) of the Act.
12. In the instant case, the writ petitions were filed in March, 1991 and though more than two months have elapsed, the 3rd respondent Central Government has not filed any counter, nor there is any material, to show that the cases of these two detenus were considered u/S. 14(1) of the Act by the Central Government. This inaction, as held by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra 1987 SCC (Crl) 630 and Ranbir Singh v. T. George Joseph 1990 SCC (Crl) 613 renders the continuance of detention of the two detenus illegal and unconstitutional being in violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution. The detention of the two detenus, therefore, is quashed and there shall issue a writ to set them at liberty forthwith. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
13. Petitions allowed.