1. Here is a man whofought the litigation as party-in-person for over two decades, knocking the doors of justice from the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal to the Supreme Court, to vindicate his right to get appointment as Junior Medical Officer (Homoeo) as per the selections made by the 2nd respondent pursuant to the notification dated 2-1-1979 and 12-1-1979 to fill up 17 vacancies in the 2nd respondent organisation. Ultimately the petitioner succeeded in getting appointment on 10-2-1992 after the Supreme Court dismissed SLP No. 17522 of 1991 on 9-12-1991 which was filed against the orders of this Court in review WA MP No.245 of 1991 in WA No.1020 of 1990 dated 12-7-199!. Though the petitioner sought several reliefs, particularly in WPNo.18764 of 1988, including the implementation of Rule 22 of Andhra Pradesh Subordinate Service Rules hereinafter referred to as 'General Rules' providing rule of reservation to the constitutionally permissible classes and consequently to appoint him as Junior Medical Officer/Junior Lecturer (Homoeo) with retrospective effect from 30-3-1979, if necessary by creating supernumerary post with all consequential benefits and initiation of disciplinary action against the 14th respondent, i.e., one Dr. Sudfiakar Reddy who has since retired as Additional Director of the Indian Medicine and Homoeopathic Department for the alleged fraud played by him in making appointments pursuant to the selections that have taken place. As the petitioner was already appointed on 10-2-1992 and Dr. Sudhakar Reddy since retired from service, all those reliefs neither can be considered now nor can be granted at this length of time though some of them are germane to the issue to some extent.
2. The learned Government Pleader raised an objection stating that as this matter relates to realm of service, the petitioner has to approach this Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and this Court cannot adjudicate the dispute. This contention is no more res Integra in view of the orders passed by a Division Bench of this Court in review WAMP No.245 of 1991 in WA No. 1020 of 1990, dated 12-7-1991 as confirmed by the Supreme Court in SLP No. 17522/91, dated 9-12-1991 wherein their Lordships having noted the conduct of the official respondents in not opposing the reliefs sought for by some of the doctors in similar circumstances and also the fact that the question was not even raised before the single Judge, passed the following order :
'We have perused the records with an anxiety to see whether our earlier judgment, which is sought to be reviewed, has really caused any justice. What we find is, on two similar occasions before the single Judge in WP No. 17618 of 1986 and before a Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.626 of 1991, the State had not raised the point of jurisdiction. It had not done so before the learned single Judge when he passed orders in WP MP No.3757 of 1990. Thus the conduct of the State in inviting orders of this Court in the matter of appointment of Junior Medial Officers/Junior Lecturers (Homoeo) seems to be uniform and consistent. Whether such consent eonfers jurisdiction on this Court is a different mailer. What we find is that no point of jurisdiction nor even a passing reference to the circumstances under which the Government Pleader made a concession which induced the order of the learned single Judge is discernible. We should therefore have followed the ordinary rule that on consent except in very exceptional cases whether the consent was made on a mistake of law of facts or was it obtained under suspicious circumstances. All this should have been pleaded and proved. No such attempt was made in this case.'
Their Lordships further observed that :
'If the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court in favour of 44 persons is right, there is no justice in our interfering with an interim direction which the learned single Judge issued, that too on the basis of a concession made on behalf of the State.'
Ultimately, the writ appeal was dismissed.
3. Aggrieved by the said orders, the State carried the malter to the Supreme Court by filing SLPNo.17522 of 1991 and the same was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 19-2-1991. Subsequently RP No.2026 of 1987 was finally allowed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal on 14-8-1989. A little later the old Tribunal constituted under Article 371(D) was abolished and the present Tribunal constituted under Article 323(A) of the Constitution of India came into force on 1-11-1989. When the respondents were not implementing the final orders of the erstwhile Tribunal, the petitioner seemed to have filed OA No.2609 of 1990 on 29-1-1990. By that time the new Tribunal in Thinwavukkarasu v. General Manager, 1989 (2) SLJ (CAT) 349, has taken the view that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain applications from the persons who are not in service. Hence when the matter came up for admission on 28-2-1990, the Tribunal suggested that the petitioner may withdraw the OA and file fresh writ petition for implementation of the orders of the erstwhile Tribunal. Following that he has also filed a memo on 7-9-1990 before the Tribunal. But it seems no orders were passed on that application. Even L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, : [1997]228ITR725(SC) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that :
'Aggrieved party cannot directly approach the High Court without approaching the Tribunal after holding that the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court as welt as the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India is an intretal and essential part of its basic structure. The role of Tribunals is only supplementary in discharging the powers conferred on these Courts under Articles 226, 227 and 32 of the Constitution of India. By adopting this process two purposes can be served i.e., while saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter.'
4. Viewed from this angle also the Tribunal adjudicated the dispute by allowing RP No.2026 of 1987 on 14-8-1989 and in fact the order of the Tribunal has become final. Though these writ petitions were filed before the final disposal of the RP as on today this Court is called upon to decide the consequences that will flow from the judgment of the Tribunal, dated 14-8-1989, and this Court repeatedly held that the aggrieved parties can approach this Court complaining non-implementation of the orders of the Tribunal by the Government. On this ground also this Court is having jurisdiction to dispose of these writ petitions on merits, though the petitioner did not come up with necessary application seeking amendment of the relief in the changed circumstances. Further, it was conclusively held that the erstwhile Tribunal has no power of contempt and there was some doubt about the competency of the present Tribunal in entertaining the contempt applications. This Court in Syed Mohd. Ghouse v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1987 (1) APLJ 412, held that even this Tribunal has no power of contempt. But I was told across the Bar that the judgment of this Court has been suspended by the Supreme Court. At any rate, still the law on this aspect is not settled. Hence, in the light of the events that are going to be referred hereunder, I do not feel that it is a fit case to relegate the petitioner again to the Administrative Tribunal for getting consequential reliefs pursuant to the final order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in RP No.2026 of 1987, dated 14-8-1989, which has become final. Accordingly the contention of the learned Government Pleader on all counts stands rejected.
5. The only question that arises now for consideration of this Court would be whether the petitioner is entitled to get his services regularised from 30-3-1979 the day on which the other selected candidates were given appointments with back-wages till 10-2-1992, the date on which he was appointed as Junior Medical Officer.
6. The factual matrix of the case is as follows :
The second respondent i.e., the Director of Indian Medicines & Homeopathy sent a requisition to the Director of Regional Employment office on 2-1-1979 and 12-1-1979 to sponsor qualified candidates to be appointed as Junior Medical Officers in the vacancies notified as hereunder :
CATEGORYVACANCIES
Scheduled Castes2Scheduled Tribes2Backward Classes4Physically handicapped3Open competition6
Total No. of posts17
7. Pursuant to the requisition, the Regional Employment Officer sponsored the candidates on the live rolls of the Employment Exchange. Though the petitioner has registered his name in the Employment Exchange on acquiring the qualification as a BC 'B' candidate, in the light of the Government Order extending certain benefits to the inter-caste marriage spouses, he got an entry made in his papers in the Employment Exchange to sponsor his case in preference to others similarly placed as per the G,O. Accordingly his name seemed to have been forwarded by the Regional Employment Officer under the inter-caste marriage category. Subsequently the Selection Committee consisting of three officials interviewed the candidates on 16-3-1979 and 17-3-1979 and a merit list was prepared. In the merit list prepared by the Committee, the petitioner secured 102 marks. Pursuant to the merit list, the office of the 2nd respondent finalised the list of candidates to be appointed category-wise on 30-3-1979 and appointment orders were also issued to all the selected candidates. It is now on record that the petitioner could not get selection and he filed WP No.3711 of 1987 on the file of this Court and the same was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 19-3-1987 holding that this Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate service matters and directed the petitioner to approach the Tribunal for the relief sought for by him with a positive direction that the delay from 25-4-1979 may not be treated as delay, as the writ petition was pending consideration before this Court. Their Lordships also observed that if for any reason, in future this Court is vested with the power, the petitioner is given liberty to file fresh writ petition, if he so desires.
8. After the above judgment the petitioner filed RP No.2026 of 1987 on 6-4-1987 seeking a direction to the 2nd respondent to appoint him as Junior Medical Officer in Homeopathy with effect from 30-3-1979 with pay and allowances and all other consequential benefits. He also sought for interim relief to direct the 2nd respondent to appoint him as Medical Officer pending disposal of the above RP. The Tribunal, by its order dated 16-4-1987, white giving three weeks time to the Government Pleader to file counter-affidavit, directed the 2nd respondent to consider the case of the petitioner if there is any vacancy in the post of Junior Medical Officer. That order has not been complied with and in those circumstances he filed RMP No.728 of 1987 for the same relief and the Tribunal once again, by its order dated 24-4-1987, reiterated the earlier order. The Tribunal by its order dated 4-6-1987 while ordering fresh notice to the contesting respondent, once again observed that if the Government will not file counter-affidavit within the stipulated time it shall become necessary to the Tribunal to issue coercive orders for compliance and posted the matter to 22-6-1987. In the light of the defiance shown by the official respondents in neither complying with the orders of the Tribunal nor in filing counter the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.8688 of 1988. His Lordship P.A. Chowdhary, J., (as he then was) by order dated 15-6-1988 opined that the judgment of this Court in Syed Mohd. Ghouse v. State of A.P. (supra), wherein this Court held that the aggrieved party can approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking implementation of the orders of the Administrative Tribunal, requires reconsideration in the light of the legal position stated therein. This writ petition along with some other writ petitions was posted before a Division Bench consisting of B.P. Jeevati Reddy and Y. Bhaskar Rao, JJ (as they were then) and their Lordships by their order dated 9-10-1988 reiterated the above decision of this Court and felt that there is no need to refer the matter to a Full Bench for reconsideration. Stating so, their Lordships directed the office to post the individual writ petitions for disposal before a learned single Judge. Subsequently the miscellaneous application i.e., WP MP No.10779 of 1988 in Writ Petition No.8688 of 1988 came up for hearing before M. Jagannadha Rao, J. (as he then was) and by order dated 24-3-1989 his Lordship gave an interim direction to consider the case of the petitioner as per the orders of the Administrative Tribunal dated 24-4-1987 if the same has not been stayed by the Supreme Court or has not already been implemented. As this order was also not implemented the petitioner seemed to have filed another WP MP No.4660 of 1989. The petitioner, perhaps having been vexed with the defiant attitude of the respondents and without knowing how to get the orders of this Court as well as the Tribunal implemented, filed another Writ Petition No.18764 of 1988 seeking implementation of the orders of the Tribunal dated 16-4-1987 and 24-4-1987 and also prayed for an interim order to appoint him as Medical Officer pending disposal of the writ petition, apart from attacking the appointment of the 4th and 5th respondents on the ground that they have produced bogus certificates and got appointment under physically handicapped quota. All the above WP MPs. came up for hearing before M. Jagannadha Rao, J and his Lordship, by order dated 20-4-1989, once again gave an interim direction to implement the orders of the Tribunal and directed the office to post both Writ Petition Nos.18764 and 8688 of 1988 for final hearing subject to part-heard cases on 10-7-1989. But those cases seemed to have not been listed for hearing. In those circumstances, once again the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.2884 of 1990 on the file of this Court questioning the vires of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal Order, 1975 as well as the non-implementation of rule of reservation properly, and faulty selections made by the 2nd respondent and sought for several directions in the writ petition. In the meantime RP No.2026 of 1987 came up for final hearing before the Chairman of the Tribunal on 14-8-1989 and his Lordship, without going into various issues raised by the petitioner, allowed the RP on the ground that the allegation of the petitioner that the 5th respondent i.e., Dr. Ram Mohan Rao docs not possess the required experience for appointment stood uncontroverted by the Government and though the said Dr. Ram Mohan Rao was made a party-respondent he did not choose to file any counter-affidavit. With the result, the allegation of the petitioner must be taken to have been established and it is not open for the Government to relax conditions laid down in the notification and therefore the order of the Government in appointing the 5th respondent as, Junior Medical Officer is ex facie erroneous. In the words of his Lordship, 'Hence, unhesitatingly I hold that the said relaxation and consequential selection of the 4th respondent must be declared as illegal and invalid'. His Lordship having taken note of the allegations with regard to the other three persons selected for appointment in Zone' No.VII did not disturb their selection as they were not made parties to the proceedings. Ultimately, the following direction was given by the Tribunal :
'If, however, should there be no other candidate in between the aforesaid 105 and 102 marks securing higher than the petitioner is entitled to be selected and appointed if he is otherwise eligible. In case of such contingency the petitioner shall be appointed notionally with effect from the date on which others have been appointed without monetary benefit but with monetary benefit from the date en which he is appointed. The respondent authorities however are directed to comply with the decision arrived at within as directed above within two months from the date of receipt of this order positively.'
The 1st respondent, without implementing the orders of the Tribunal in Memo No.650/ 1.2/87-19 HM & FW, dated 16-2-1990, informed the petitioner that one Dr. Gangaiah who secured 105 marks could not be appointed for want of vacancy; hence, the question of appointing the petitioner as Medical Officer does not arise. It is also stated that the post is now under the purview of the Andhra Pradcsh Public Service Commission and as such the petitioner cannot be appointed as Medical Officer. I have gone through the entire file and to my surprise no appointment order was ever issued to Dr. Gangaiah nor Dr. Gangaiah claimed the post after the appointment of Dr. A. Ram Mohan Rao was set aside by the Tribunal. In the interregnum, the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal that was created under Article 371-D of the Constitution of India was abolished and a new Tribunal came into existence with effect from 1-11-1989 under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The poor man once again approached the new Tribunal by filing Original Application No.2609 of 1990 on 29-1-1990 and the matter seemed to have been posted before the Court on 28-2-1990 for admission. By that time, the Tribunal seemed to have taken the view that in the context of Article 323-A of the Constitution of India and the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, that the adjudication would be limited only touching the dispute of conditions of service and the dispute must be between the State and the civil servant or the civil servants inter se vide Thinmavukkarasu v. General Manager (supra). When the matter came up for admission on 28-2-1990 the Tribunal advised the petitioner to withdraw Original Application No.2609 of 1990 and pursue remedies open to him. Though as per the observations of the Tribunal the petitioner filed a memo seeking permission of the Tribunal to withdraw the Original Application the same seemed to have not been posted before the Court. As the fresh attempt made by the petitioner before the new Tribunal proved futile exercise, he filed Writ Petition No.2884 of 1988 on 5-3-1988 seeking a writ of mandanus to the respondents to implement rule of reservation in terms of Rule 22 of the General Service Rules and consequently appoint him as Junior Medical Officer with effect from 30-3-1979 by creating a supernumerary post with all the consequential benefits and also sought several reliefs including the cancellation of appointment given to some of the respondents therein and to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the 3rd respondent. He also filed Writ Petition MP No.3757 of 1990 seeking interim direction to the respondents to appoint him as Junior Medical Officer pending disposal of the writ petition. This Court seemed to have given notice on the miscellaneous petition. On 17-4-1990 his Lordship M.N. Rao, J (as he then was) granted interim directions as prayed for i.e., to appoint the petitioner herein as Junior Medical Officer/ Junior Lecturer (Homoeo) in Zone No.7 within a week pending further orders on the petition, as there was no representation from the respondents' side for days together. As this order was also not complied with, the petitioner seemed to have filed Contempt Case No.365 of 1989 to punish the respondents for flouting the orders of this Court. At that stage, the respondents filed WV MP No.1132 of 1990 seeking vacation of the interim orders dated 17-4-1990 and the learned Judge, while dismissing the vacate stay petition, directed the office to post the Contempt Case on 20-8-1990. Questioning the orders of the learned single Judge dated 31-7-1990, the Government preferred Writ Appeal No.1020 of 1990 before a Division Bench and a Division Bench of this Court initially allowed the writ appeal on merits and posted the writ petition for final hearing subject to part-heard cases on 24-10-1990. From a reading of this order the order of the learned Judge seemed to have been vacated mainly on the ground that the power of this Court is limited to enforce implementation of the orders of the Tribunal and not otherwise. The petitioner filed an application - WA MP No.245 of 1991 to review the judgment of the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1020 of 1990 and the same came up before the Bench on 12-7-1991. On that day, the petitioner not only produced the orders passed by this Court in several writ petitions but also brought to the notice of the Court that the respondents never raised the question of jurisdiction in the counter-affidavit in Writ Petition No.2884 of 1988. Having seen those orders the Division Bench reviewed the earlier order and dismissed the Writ Appeal No. 1020 of 1990 by order dated 12-7-1991. In the words of their Lordships, 'we allowed the writ appeal on the assumption that the respondent-State has raised a point of jurisdiction of this Court in the writ petition and in the writ appeal and also in the circumstances, it was better to expedite the hearing of the writ petition'. The order passed by the Division Bench on the issue of jurisdiction was also extracted by me while considering the plea of the Government that this Court cannot hear the matter and the petitioner has to go before the Tribunal again, i am not reproducing the observations of the Bench to avoid repetition. Against this order they preferred Special Leave Petition No.17522 of 1991 before the Supreme Court and the same was dismissed by a Full Bench of the Supreme Court on 9-12-1991. The respondents having failed in their attempt not to give appointment to the petitioner were ultimately forced to issue office order No.107/H/92, dated 1-2-1992 and the appointment order says that the appointment is purely temporary and liable to be terminated at any time without prior notice and without assigning any reasons; that the services of the candidate will be regularised subject to his character and antecedents being found satisfactory on verification; and that the appointment of the individual is subject to the final orders of High Court in WP No.2884 of 1990 filed by him. Subsequently, in proceedings No.716/ H2/97, dated 21-11-1997 the services of the petitioner were regularised with effect from 13-10-1992 and he was placed on probation.
9. From the above narration of the facts, it is seen that the petitioner is continuously fighting in one Court or the other for the last two decades and though this Court as well as the Tribunal went on giving directions one after the other in various proceedings the Government did not move its little finger till the petitioner filed a contempt case for flouting the orders of Justice M.N. Rao, dated 17-4-1990. Thereafter the respondents moved with swiftness but they received jolt in every forum. Ultimately having failed in all their efforts in denying appointment to the petitioner, for the first time the appointment order was given on 1-2-1992.
10. The case of the petitioner all through was that the denial of appointment to him by the respondents is not a bonafide one and vitiated by mala fide. If the select list is seen it would be evident that he is entitled to be appointed either in the open category or in the reserved category. In fact he strenuously contends that if this Court finds that rule of reservation was properly implemented by the respondents in making these appointments he is prepared to withdraw all the claims against the Government; otherwise, there is no meaning in denying him appointment from the date on which others were appointed pursuant to the selection made by the respondents in response to the requisition sent by them to the Regional Employment Officer on 2-1-1979 and 12-1-1979 with back wages and all other consequential reliefs. In fact, it is his case that as many as 200 persons were appointed without following rule of reservation. To know the truth or otherwise of the allegation of the petitioner, with regard to implementation of rule of reservation, I have gone through the select list prepared by the 2nd respondent zone-wise and to my utter surprise Rule 22 was observed more in breach than in its true spirit. For instance, in zone No.2, one Chandramoules wara Rao belonging to BC category and who secured 155 marks was appointed in the post earmarked for BC while one Ch. Ramamijayya and T.P.P. Sankaran who secured 152 and 145 marks respectively were appointed in the open category. As per Rule 22 the reservations made in favour of the constitutionally permissible classes are over and above the people who were selected in open category on the basis of their merit. That being the legal position Ch. Ramanuijayya would have been appointed in the open category having secured highest number of marks in zone No.2 and another BC candidate would have secured appointment in the post reserved for BC candidate. In zone No.6 the position is the same. One Ashok Kwnar belonging to BC-A and who secured 145 marks was appointed in the vacancy earmarked for BC-A candidate while one Bal Reddy who secured 130 marks was given appointment in open category. Coming to zone No.VII the total number of posts to be filled up are 4 - OC (3) and BC-A (1). Four persons were given appointment as under :
1.M. Gopalakrishna RaoST160 marks2.L.V. Ram MohanOC130 marks3.Smt. Ch. Srirama Lakshmi
(subject to production of BC certificate)BC-D115 marks4.A Ram Mohan RaoOC105 marks
As far as A. Ram Mohan Rao is concerned the Tribunal held that he is not having the requisite experience and as such his appointment is per se illegal. From the above it is seen that Srirama Lakshmi who secured 115 marks was given appointment in the vacancy reserved for BC-A while A. Ram Mohan Rao with 105 marks was given appointment in open category. Though no reservation is there for physically handicapped persons, in zone No.5 one Ch. Srinivas was appointed as a physically handicapped person in the open category. This is how the appointments were made by the respondents. The petitioner also brought to my notice that the Tribunal while allowing RP No.2026 of 1987, by order dated 14-8-1989, directed that he should be appointed nolionally with effect from 30-3-1979, the date on which others were appointed without monetary benefits but with monetary benefits from the date on which he is appointed if there is no candidate who secured more marks than the petitioner i.e., 102 marks. Though the respondents informed the petitioner that one Gangaiah with 105 marks could not be appointed for want of vacancy, after declaring the appointment of Dr. Ram Mohan Rao as illegal they have neither given appointment to Gangaiah nor Gangaiah claimed the appointment. Ultimately the petitioner was appointed on 1-2-1992.
11. This is not the first case where the Court has come across such instances. Time and again the Court is pointing out how the rule of reservation is being implemented in a tardy manner without any seriousness, as no penal action is contemplated against the erring officials. Even if after 50 years of independence the officers do not know how to implement the rule of reservation it is better to scrap the same than keeping it on the statute book. If the Government is serious about implementation of the rule of reservation the Government should contemplate stringent action against the erring officials or otherwise it will be better to scrap the rule of reservation than keeping it on the statute book without proper implementation. I feel that the petitioner is justified in throwing the challenge on the implementation of rule of reservation by the authorities concerned.
12. Coming to the appointment of the petitioner in zone No.VII the vacancy was earmarked for BC-A candidate and as per Rule 22 if a candidate is not available in the group for which reservation is made the post will accrue to the next group among the backward classes. That being the legal position the petitioner, belonging to BC, would have got appointment. The respondents cannot plead that the petitioner's case was not considered for appointment under BC-B category as his name was sponsored by the Employment Exchange under inter-caste marriage category. First of all, no reservations are made for a person who contracted inter-caste marriage and the petitioner cannot lose his social status on contracting inter-caste marriage. So the social status of the petitioner remains the same even after he contracted inter-caste marriage, more so, the petitioner in this case married a Scheduled Caste woman. If any benefit is conferred by the Government to encourage inter-caste marriages it should be over and above the legitimate entitlement of the candidate. But the same should not work out to his detriment. Hence the respondents would have considered his case for appointment under BC category, liven if he has not produced the social status certificate, as was done in the case of Srirama Lakshmi, the petitioner would have been appointed subject to production of backward class certificate. As three posts are earmarked for OC candidates in zone No.VII by virtue of the marks secured, Srirama Lakshmi has to be selected in open category and the post earmarked for BC-A would have been filled in by the petitioner. Hence the action of the respondent in denying the appointment to the petitioner cannot be justified. At any rate, as the appointment of Dr. Ram Mohan Rao on the ground of ineligibility was declared as illegal, the petitioner has to be appointed at least even after the judgment of the Tribunal on 14-8-1989. But till 1-2-1992 the petitioner was not only denied his appointment which is legitimately due to him but he was made to run from pillar to post by knocking at the doors of all the Courts including of the Supreme Court. Initially, I thought of dismissing these writ petitions as the petitioner was ultimately given appointment. But after seeing the appointment order and the orders issued by the Tribunal in RP No.2026 of 1987, I thought of awarding some compensation for denying employment to the petitioner for no fault of his. But the petitioner pursuaded me to go through the records as well as the orders passed by this Court and the Tribunal from time to time. The earliest order of the Tribunal directing the respondents to consider the case of the pelitioncr for appointment is dated 16-4-1987 and the same was reiterated by its order dated 24-4-1987 and 4-6-1987. When the respondents did not move in the matter the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.8688 of 1988 seeking implementation of the above orders of the Tribunal. This Court gave interim direction to consider the case of the petitioner in terms of the order passed by the Tribunal almost after an year after the Division Bench of this Court declared that this Court is having powers to issue a writ for enforcement of the orders of the Tribunal on 19-12-1988. Subsequently the very RP was allowed by the Tribunal on 14-8-1989. In consonance with the orders of the Tribunal I am of the opinion that the balance of convenience lies in favour of the petitioner in getting monetary benefit at least from the date on which the Tribunal finally disposed of the RP on 14-8-1989. Accordingly, the Tribunal gave a direction to regularise the service of the petitioner from 30-7-1979 the date on which the other selected candidates pursuant to the requisition dated 12-1-1979 to the Regional Employment Officer on notional basis, but limited the pay only from the date of appointment. Thereafter the respondents have no reason whatsoever to deny appointment to the petitioner. But the petitioner was made to go round the Courts for three more years till the Supreme Court dismissed their case. For the lapses committed by the respondents the petitioner was not only subjected to mental agony but also financial loss in going round the Courts. When the Court was contemplating to award compensation the petitioner requested the Court by showing papers in two suit cases that the compensation should at least be sufficient to meet the cost of paper and typing. Keeping the totality of the circumstances in view I am inclined to allow monetary benefits from 14-8-1989.
13. I am fortified in my view by a decision of this Court reported in Hammantha Reddy v. Union of India, 1986 (3) SLR 234. In the above case while all other candidates were selected and appointed as Tahsildars in 1944 in the Hyderabad Civil Service (HCS) the petitioner was appointed to the post of Deputy Tahsildar and since then he was fighting for his legitimate right to be appointed as Tahsildar. Ultimately, while he was working as Deputy Collector, his seniority was refixed in the cadre of Deputy Collector with effect from 16-9-1949 on 12-1-1965 by giving notional promotion from that date. Had the service of the pelitioncr been taken into consideration in the cadre of Deputy Collector from 16-9-1949, he would have acquired the eligibility for inclusion in the panel for the year 1958 or thereafter, but the respondents have considered his case for inclusion in the selected list of IAS Officers for the year 1969 by taking into account the actual service rendered by the petitioner as Deputy Collector without considering the notional seniority given to him in the cadre of Deputy Collector. The question that has fallen for consideration in that case was whether the notional seniority granted to the petitioner in the cadre of Deputy Collector has to be taken into consideration or not for being appointed to the cadre of IAS in 1958 or in 1969 in terms of the directions given by the learned single Judge. His Lordship the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Sri Bhaskarcm, as he then was, while speaking for the Bench held that the petitioner who was given seniority on the notional basis in the cadre of Deputy Collector with effect from 16-9-1949 is entitled to get the notional service for the purpose of promotion and he is eligible for inclusion in the panel for the year 1958 in terms of Rule 4(1) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954. It is useful to extract the observations made by the Bench while giving the benefit to the petitioners :
'The belated recognition of and giving effect to the legitimate rights of the petitioner, that too as a result of the relentless fight he had to carry on, should not operate to his prejudice in the matter of consideration for promotion, as the petitioner was in no way responsible for the delay. Justice has been delayed to him; but let it not be denied to him completely. Rules and Regulations, in our view, are intended to advance, not to frustrate the cause of justice. Merely on the ground that there is no positive direction in the rule to the Selection Committee to reckon notional seniority, in the absence of any prohibition in the rules against notional seniority being taken into account for the purpose of eligibility for being considered for inclusion in the panel, if the committee refuses to include the period covered by the notional seniority, restricting it to actual service in the post of Deputy Collector or its equivalent post, it would amount to perpetuation of injustice. It is to be also noticed that the rule also does not speak about the factual service, it speaks only about continuous service, which could normally mean actual service, but in peculiar circumstances it could include notional service also.
Undisputedly the petitioner would have been considered for inclusion in the 1958 list had this recognition come in time. Because of the delay in according this recognilion, to which petitioner made no contribution, the writ petitioner had suffered enough throughout the lime he was in service; and it would be only a token of what he deserved if now he is treated to have been eligible for being considered for inclusion in the 1958 list on the basis of his notional seniority, which might result in his entitlement for some arrears of salary and pensionary benefit on notional promotions and reflation of scales of pay.'
Accordingly the Bench gave the following direction :
'We, therefore, in modification of the direction given by the learned single Judge, direct the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for his inclusion in the panel for the year 1958, and if need be, in each of the subsequent years, for appointment to the IAS cadre; and on such inclusion in the said list; to give him such promotions as would have been due to him notionally and pay to him the arrears of salary and pension on refixation of the scale of pay and pension on inclusion in the list; and that may be done within six months from today.'
14. The facts of the case on hand squarely falls within the principles laid down in the above judgment by a Division Bench of this Court. To the same effect is the judgment of his Lordship Justice Sivaraman Nair, as he then was, in P.S. Seetha Lakahmi v. The Chairman, Visakhapatnam Port Trust, Visakhapatnam, : (1993)ILLJ270AP , the petitioner was interviewed on 10-9-1986 for appointment as Ayah on compassionate grounds as her husband died while he was in service of the Port Trust, but she was not appointed to the post by contending that she was not selected to the post and also on the ground of non-availability of vacancy. Mis Lordship Justice Sivammau Nair having rejected the contention of the respondents held that:
'The petitioner is entitled for appointment as Ayah/Peon/Attender with effect from 10-9-1986 on which date she was empanelled after interview. If need be, a supernumerary post in the above cadre may be created to accommodate her. Respondents shall pay her all monetary benefits consequent upon such ante-date appointment like re-fixation of pay, increments and arrears of pay. Respondents shall implement the direction within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.'
15. In the beginning of the case I thought of awarding some compensation to the petitioner as he has not discharged the duties attached to the post by following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Y. Ramanjaneyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 928. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court having declared the legal position in their wisdom chose to award compensation in lumpsum for the injustice done !o the petitioner instead of allowing back wages as the petitioner has also contributed in not getting the relief earlier by not approaching the Court for several years seeking the relief i.e., promotion to the post of Deputy Registrar and further promotions on the basis of G.O. Ms. No.559, dated 4-5-1961, whereunder the principle of reservation for appointments should be extended to all cadres of posts including posts involving promotions in all departments including the departments of Secretarial to which he did not apply till then. But. in this case the facts are otherwise. All through the respondents exhibited negative attitude and took defiant altitude by not caring to the orders of the Court that have been passed from time to time.
16. Having gone through the facts of the case, I felt that the petitioner should be allowed back wages at least from 14-8-1989, the day on which RP was finally allowed by the Tribunal and which has become final leaving apart the interim directions given by the Tribunal as well as this Court in directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner as Junior Medical Officer. Though the petitioner went on filing writ petitions one after the other in his anxiety to get employment, the ultimate relief sought for in all these writ petitions was that he should be appointed as Junior Medical Officer with effect from 30-3-1979, the day on which the other selected candidates were appointed as Junior Medical Officers with all consequential benefits including payment of arrears of salary. From the narration of the facts I am of the opinion that the petitioner being not fully aware of the legal intricacies went on filing writ petition after writ petition, perhaps on the basis of the observations made by the learned Judges while he was trying to argue the cases, but the ultimate relief sought for is one and the same in all these writ petitions.
17. Accordingly these writ petitions are disposed of by giving a direction to the respondents to fix the seniority of the petitioner in the cadre of Junior Medical Officer (Homoeo) on notional basis with effect from 30-3-1979, by extending all consequential benefits that flow from that order but the monetary benefit is limited from 14-8-1989, the date on which the Andhra Fradesh Administrative Tribunal finally adjudicated the dispute and held in favour of the petitioner. The respondents are further directed to revise and re-fix the salary of the petitioner from time to time by releasing animal increments due to him and also pay revisions, if any during the interregnum period. The whole exercise has to be completed within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the arrears payable thereon have to be paid to the petitioner within the stipulated time. It is needless to observe that the notional service shall be taken into consideration for the purpose of seniority, confirmation, promotion and other consequential benefits that accrue to him.
18. The writ petitions are allowed, hut in the circumstances no order as to costs.
19. Before parting with the case, I must place on record the valiant fight the petitioner has put in for nearly two decades without becoming mad and also in presenting his case so neatly with reference to the latest case law, though he is not trained as lawyer. I may not be misunderstood for observing that the legal fraternity emulates him in presenting the case of their clients perhaps their clients will have utmost satisfaction, without reference to the result of their case, and their efforts will go a long way in upholding the majesty of law. Like a knife in the hands of a doctor which can be used to kill a patient or save the life of a patient, the law degree in the hands of a lawyer can be used for advancement of the cause of justice to his client or ruin his life. In fact, the cry of the litigant public at the present juncture is a well trained and fully equipped lawyer community to bring home the truth in a lis and see that justice is done to all the parties in accordance with the law of the land.