ORDER
Obul Reddi, J.
1. The main question raised in this batch of writ petitions is that the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Produce and Live-stock Markets Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is repugnant to the two Central Acts viz. (1) the Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporation Act, 1956 and (2) The Food Corporation of India Act, 1964, as the Act made by the State Legislature encroaches upon the legislative power of the Parliament, which has exclusive power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Union List and as such, the levy and demand of market fees by the respective Market Committees is ultra vires.
2. The relevant facts necessary for consideration of the question involved are these: The petitioners in W. P. Nos. 1845, 1340, 3665 and 1339 of 1972 are all rice dealers in Guntur District. The petitioners in W. P. No. 3827 of 1972 are dealers in groundnut, jaggery and general merchants in Chittoor District. The Market Committees constituted under the Act, exercising jurisdiction over the respective notified market areas levied and demanded payment of market fees at varying rates in respect of the transactions of sale or purchase of agricultural produce within their jurisdiction. It is their common case that no facilities whatsoever are provided for storage of agricultural produce or for shelter of men and cattle and that they have been asked to pay fees without providing for such facilities as the Government may specify by general or special order. It is a statutory obligation on the part of the Govt. to notify the faculties and the market committee to provide thosefacilities and when such facilities are not available the collection of the fee or cess at the rates specified in the impugned notice is illegal. Section 7 (1) of the Act places a restriction on any person to purchase, sell, store or weigh the agricultural product without the permission or the market Committee and such a restriction it is alleged is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature as it encroaches upon the 'occupied field' under the two Central Acts.
3. It is, therefore necessary to seewhether the Act is repugnant to the provisions of the two Central Acts.
4. The 1956 Central Act was enacted to provide for the incorporation and regulation of corporations for the purpose of development and warehousing of agricultural produce on co-operative principles and for matters connected therewith. The Central Government is empowered to establish the National Co-operative Development and Warehousing Board. It is to consist of a chairman and other members. The functions of the Board are detailed in Section 9 of that Act, its functions being to plan and promote programmes for the production, processing, marketing, storage, warehousing, export and import of agricultural produce through a co-operative society or a Warehousing Corporation. The middleman or intermediary is totally excluded and it is the exclusive function of the Board to promote marketing, storage, warehousing, export and import of agricultural produce through a co-operative society or a warehousing Corporation. The Board is also empowered to advance loans of grants to State Government for financing Co-operative Societies and also provide funds to the State Government or a Warehousing Corporation for the purchase of agricultural produce on behalf of the Central Government. The functions of the State warehousing Corporation are to acquire and build godowns and warehouses at such places within the State as it may, in consultation with the Central Warehousing Corporation, determine; to run warehouses, in the State for the storage of agricultural produce, seeds, manures, fertilizers and agricultural implements; and to arrange facilities for the transport of agricultural produce to and from warehouses and act as an agent of the Central Warehousing Corporation or of the Government for the purpose of the purchase, sale, storage and distribution of agricultural produce, seeds, manures, fertilizers and agricultural implements. The State Government also under Section 28 of that Act, with the approval of the Central Warehousing Corporation, establish a Warehousing Corporation for the State.
5. The Food Corporation was established under the 1964 Central Act both in the interests of the producer of agricultural produce as well as in the interests of the consumer for purposes of undertaking tradein foodgrains on a commercial scale, The Central Government is empowered, in consultation with the State Government, to establish a Food Corporation for a State and the management of the State Food Corporation is vested in the Board of Directors consisting of Chairman and other members, who are to be appointed on consultation with the Central Government and the State Government. The functions of the Food Corporation are set out in Section 13 of 1964 Central Act, the primary duty of the Corporation is to undertake the purchase, storage, movement, distribution and sale or food-grains and discharge, among other things, such other functions as may be prescribed or as are supplemental, incidental or consequential to any of the functions conferred on it under the Act.
6. It is the case of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the functions assigned to the Food Corporation and to the Warehousing Corporations under the two Central Acts are encroached upon by the Market Committees, as the Market Committees are empowered under the Act to discharge the same functions.
7. It is therefore necessary to notice the scheme of the Act. The Government is empowered to notify its intention of regulating the purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock or other products in any particular area. The area so notified is called 'notified area' under the Act. For every notified area, a Market Committee is constituted. It is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to sue or be sued in its name. It is the function of this Committee to enforce the provisions of the Act, the rules and bye-laws. It has also to establish such number of markets as the Government may, from time to time, direct for the purchase and sale of notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock and provide such facilities in the market as and when specified by the Government from time to time. The Market Committee has to notify the limits of every market established. Every Market Committee consists of such number of members not being less than twelve and not more than sixteen as may be fixed by the Government. Section 7 to the extent material reads:
'7 (1) 'No person shall, within a notified area, set up, establish or use, or continue or allow to be continued, any place for the purchase, sale, storage, weighment, curing pressing or processing of any notified agricultural produce or products of livestock or for the purchase or sale of livestock except under and in accordance with the conditions of licence granted to him by the market committee:
XX XX Xx (2) ..............
(3) ...............
(4).............
(5) ...............
(6) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) no person shall purchase or sell any notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock in a notified market area, outside the market in that area.'
8. This section imposes a restriction en persons to set up, establish or use any place for the purchase, sale, storage, weigh ment, curing, pressing or processing of notified agricultural produce or products of livestock or for the purchase or sale of livestock except under and in accordance with the conditions of a Licence granted to him by the Market Committee. The Market Committee has also the power to exempt any person and the Act is not made applicable to institutions like Co-operative Marketing Societies, Khadi and Village Industries Commission etc. There is prohibition to purchase or sell any notified agricultural produce in a notified market area outside the market in that area. The rate at which market fee is to be levied is specified in Section 12 of the Act. The fee is payable ordinarily by the purchaser of the agricultural produce. The tees so received and collected constitute the Market Committee funds and it is to be expended in the manner provided in Section 15 i.e., for acquisition of site for the market; establishment, maintenance and improvement of the market; construction and maintenance of buildings; provision and maintenance of buildings; provision and maintenance of standard weights and measures; payment of pay, pensions, leave allowances, gratuities, payment of interest on loans; propaganda for the improvement of agriculture; measures for the preservation of foodgrains etc. This Act is not made applicable to markets established by or on behalf of the Government. 'Government' is defined as Government of the State and the Act is to override other laws which provide for the establishment, maintenance or regulation of a market or the levy of fees. That in substance is the scheme of the Act. The Act repealed the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Commercial Crops Markets Act, 1933 and the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Agricultural Market Act 1339 Fasli.
9. The validity of the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras, : AIR1959SC300 . But it is Mr. Chowdary's contention that the Supreme Court did not examine the validity of that Act in the context of the two Central Acts of 1956 and 1964 establishing corporations for the purpose of purchasing, selling, storing and warehousing foodgrains. Marketing of agricultural produce had always engaged the attention of the Government. A Royal Commission on Agriculture was appointed in 1928 and that Commission submitted a report for the establishment and regulation of markets, According to the Commission:
'The Keynot to the system of marketing agricultural produce in the State is the predominate part played by middlemen.'
'It is the cultivators chronic shortage of money that has allowed the intermediary to achieve the prominent position he now occupies.'
10. With a view to regulate the buying and selling of commercial crops by providing suitable and regulated market by eliminating middlemen and bringing face to face the purchaser and the buyer, the Madras Commercial Group Markets Act, 1933 which has been replaced by the Act was passed. The attack regarding the validity of Madras Act 1933 in Arunachala Nadar's case, : AIR1959SC300 was that it created unreasonable restrictions on citizen's rights to carry on their business and trade and that was repelled by Subha Rao J. (as he then was) who spoke for the Court. Now the attack is not on the ground that the Act creates unreasonable restrictions on the citizens rights to carry on trade or business, but it encroaches upon the field occupied by the two Central Acts made by the Parliament and as such the present Act is repugnant to the powers of the parliament. The two Central Acts were made by the parliament within the power conferred upon it under Entry 44 of the Union List. The power to make laws under List I is conferred only upon the parliament and the State Legislature is prohibited from making any law in respect of matters covered by the Entries in List I. In the case of Concurrent List where concurrent power is conferred upon both the Parliament and the State Legislature and both of them being competent to enact laws in respect of the Entries specified in List III, the law made by the Parliament prevails over that of the State.
11. The relevant Entries in thethree. Lists of the Seventh Schedule arethese:
List I
43. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial Corporations but not including co-operative societies.
44. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of Corporations whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one State, but not including Universities. List II:
14. Agriculture, including agricultural education and research, protection against pests and prevention of plant diseases.
15. Preservation, protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases; veterinary training and practice.
27. Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III.
28. Markets and fairs.
29. Weights and measures except establishment of standards.
32. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations other than those specified in List I, and universities; universities, unincorporated trading, literary scientific religious and other societies and associations; co-operative societies.
66. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, But not including fees taken in any Court.
List III:
33. Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of-
(a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported Roods of the same kind as such products;
(b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;
(c) cattle fodder including oilcakes and other concentrates;
(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or un-ginned, and cotton seed and
47. Fees in respect of any of the matters in this List, but not including fees taken in any Court.
Entry 44 of the Union List deals with incorporation and regulation of corporations, whether trading or not, the objects of which are not confined to one State. This Entry has to be read with Entry 43 trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations but not including cooperative societies. Entry 32 in the State List covers incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations other than those specified in List I, Entry 27 of the same List empowers the State Legislature to legislate in regard to production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III. Similarly, Entry 26 also empowers the State Legislature to legislate in regard to matters concerning trade, and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III. Entry 33 of the Concurrent List empowers both the State and Central Legislatures to legislate with respect to matters of trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs including edible oilseeds, oils and other goods specified therein. Markets and fairs is a State subject Markets and fairs transact sales and purchases of any merchandise including livestock. Under Entry 66 of List II, it is open to the State Legislature to levy fees in respect of any of the matters covered by the said List except fees taken in any Court. Entry 47 of the concurrent List also empowers the State Legislature to levy fees in respect of any of the matters in the Concurrent List except fees taken in any Court. The fee or the cess imposed under Section 12 of the Act is for the services rendered by the Market Committee to the buyers and sellers of the goods. Looking at the subjects allocated to the State and Centre under the three Lists, it is clear that markets come within the ambit of the legislative power conferred upon the State Legislature. The fact that the Market Committees or Corporations come within the meaning of the expression 'incorporation' will not by itself bring the Market Committees within the ambit and scope of Entry 44 of List I. Item 32 of List II empowers the State Legislature to establish corporations other than those specified in List I and when examining whether the incorporation of Market Committees under the Act is in conflict with the powers of the Central Legislature to legislate in respect of corporations under Entry 44, one has to bear in mind the scheme and object of the two Central Acts and the State Act. The establishment of markets is within the competence of the State Legislature and establishment of a Market Committee which shall be a body corporate for the purpose of regulating marketing of agricultural produce and livestock does not in any way encroach upon the occupied field under the Central Acts. The dominant purpose of the Act is to see that all agricultural commodities and livestock or products of livestock are sold or purchased through regulated markets, the market committees being empowered to issue licences to traders in a notified area. The constitution of the Committee is such that producers of agricultural produce and owners of livestock have adequate representation of the market committee so that their interests may be properly safeguarded. What all is demanded is only a fee under Section 12 for the services rendered by the Market Committees and a licence under Section 7.
12. Mr. Chowdary sought to draw support from the American decisions to show that the Market Committee has no competence to insist upon the Corporations established under the two Central Acts to transact their business in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In M. Culloch v. The State of Maryland, (1819) 4 L Ed 579, what the United States Supreme Court said is this:
'The Government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land.'.
That was a case where the validity of the State Act of Maryland was questioned on the grounds of its being repugnant to the constitution of the United States. The Government of the Union enacted an Act by which the Bank of United States had constitutionally aright to establish its branches or offices of discount and deposit within any State. The Legislature of the State of Maryland passed an Act to impose a tax on all banks or branches in the State of Maryland not chartered by the Legislature. It was therefore said by the Supreme Court of the United States:
'The State Governments have no right to tax any of the constitutional means employed by the Government of the Union to execute its constitutional powers.
The States have no power by taxation, or otherwise to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress, to carry into effect the powers vested in the national government.'
13. In Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 6 L. Ed. 1 at P. 73 Marshall, C. J. dealing with the conflict between State and Union Law observed:
'In argument, however, it has been contended that if a law, passed by a State in the exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty comes into conflict with a law passed by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, they affect the subject, and each other, like equal opposing powers.
But the framers of our constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for it, by declaring the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made in pursuance of it. The nullity of any Act, inconsistent with the Constitution, is produced by the declaration that the constitution is the supreme law. The appropriate application of that part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the state legislatures as do not transcend their powers but though enacted in the execution of acknowledged state powers, interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of congress made in pursuance of the Constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In very such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.
14. There can be no doubt and it is well settled that the law made by the State Legislature under our Constitution also covering a field occupied by the Central law must yield to the Central law and the law to the extent of repugnancy will be void.
15. The doctrine of pith and substance stated by the Federal Court in Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan, 1940 FCR 188 = (AIR 1941 FC 47) was quoted with approval by the Privy Council in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd. Khulna, (1947) 74 Ind App 23 = (AIR 1947 PC 60).
16. The Supreme Court has approved the pith and substance rule in a number of cases commencing from State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai, : [1951]2SCR51 . The main question that fell for decision in that case was whether the Bombay City Civil Court Act (XL of 1948) is ultra vires the Legislature of the State of Bombay. The ground on which that Act was challenged was that the Act conferred jurisdiction on the new Court not only in respect of matters which the Provincial Legislature is competent to legislate upon under List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, but also in regard to matters in respect of which only the Central or Federal Legislature can legislate under List I. The validity of the Bombay City Civil Court Act was upheld as being a Statute within the legislative field of the province under item 1 of List II. Patanjali Sastri, J., (as he then was) in a separate but concurrent judgment upholding the validity of the Act observed at p. 177:
'The constitutional puzzles which such a system is likely to pose to the Legislatures no less than to the Courts and the litigant public in the country whenever a new Court is constituted in finding out by searching through the legislative lists, whether jurisdiction to deal with a particular matter or power to make a particular order is validly conferred by the appropriate Legislature, must make one pause and examine the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act to see if there is anything in them to compel the acceptance of so novel a system. After giving the matter my careful consideration, I am convinced that both the language of the provisions and the antecedent legislative practice support the conclusion that the provincial Legislatures, which have the exclusive power of constituting and organising Courts and of providing for the Administration of justice in their respective provinces, have also the power of investing the Courts with general jurisdiction.'
Again the question that the Bombay Prohibition Act encroached on the Federal field was raised in State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, 1951 SCJ 478 = (AIR 1951 SC 318), Fazl Ali J., who spoke for the Court agreed with what Gwyer, C. J. said in Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidana and Sons, (1942) 5 FLJ 61 = (1942) 4 FCR 90 = (AIR 1942 FC 33) that 'the analogy with the American case is an attractive one; but for the reasons which we have given we are wholly unable to accept it' and observed that:
'There is thus no real conflict between Entry 31 of List II and Entry 19 of List I and it is difficult to hold that the Bombay Prohibition Act in so far as it purports to restrict possession, use and sale of foreign liquor, is an encroachment on the field assigned to the Federal Legislature under Entry 19 of List I.
Further, even assuming that the Prohibition of purchase, use, possession, transport and sale of liquor will affect its import, the encroachment, if any is incidental and cannot affect the competence of the provincial Legislature to enact the law in question.'
That view was based on what is stated in Gallagher v. Lynn, 1937 AC 863 at P. 870.
'It is well established that yon are to look at the 'True nature and character of the legislation: Russell v. The Queen, (1882) 7 App Cas 829 the pith and substance of the legislation''. If on the view of thestatute as a whole, you find that the substance of the legislation is within the express powers then it is not invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are outside the authorised field.'
17. In Zaverbhai v. State of Bombay, : [1955]1SCR799 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that
'The important thing to consider with reference to Article 254(2) is whether the legislation is 'in respect of the same matter.' If the later legislation deals not with the matters which formed the subject of the earlier legislation but with other and distinct matters though of a cognate and allied character, then Article 254(2) will have no application.'
18. In Tika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, : [1956]1SCR393 at pp. 690, 691 the U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act (24 of 1953) was held to be intra vires and it does not occupy the field covered by any one of the Entries in List I of the Seventh Schedule. While holding so, the Supreme Court observed:
'Production, supply and distribution of goods was no doubt within the exclusive sphere of the State Legislature but it was subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List 3 which gave concurrent powers of legislation to the Union as well as the States in the matters of trade and commerce in, and the production supply and distribution of, the products of industries where the control of such industries by the Union was declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.
The controlled industries were relegated to Entry 52 of List I which was the exclusive province of Parliament leaving the other industries within Entry 24 of List 2 which was the exclusive province of the State Legislature. The products of industries which were comprised in Entry 24 of List 2 were dealt with by the State Legislatures which had under Entry 27 of that List power to legislate in regard to the production, supply and distribution of goods according to the definition contained in Article 366(12) including all raw materials, commodities and articles.
When, however, it came to the products of the controlled industries comprised in Entry 52 of List I, trade and commerce in, and production, supply and distribution of these goods became the subject-matter of Entry 33 of List III and both Parliament and the State Legislatures had jurisdiction to legislate in regard thereto. The amendment of Entry 33 of List III by the Constitution, Third Amendment Act, 1954, only enlarged the scope of that Entry without in any manner whatever detracting from the Legislative competence of Parliament and the State Legislature to Legislate in regard to the same.
If the matters had stood there, thesugar industry being a controlled industry Legislation in regard to the same would have been in the exclusive province of Parliament and production, supply and distribution of the product of sugar industry viz. sugar as a finished product would have been within Entry 33 of List III. Sugarcane would certainly not have been comprised within Entry 33 of List III as it was not the product of sugar industry which was a controlled industry. It was only after the amendment of Entry 33 of List III by the Constitution Third Amendment Act 1954 that foodstuffs including edible oilseeds and oils came to be included within that List and it was possible to legislate in regard to Sugarcane, having recourse to Entry 33 of List III.
Save for that sugarcane, being goods, fell directly within Entry 27 of List 2 and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislatures, Production, supply and distribution of sugarcane being thus within the exclusive sphere of the State Legislatures, the U. P. State Legislature would be without anything more, competent to legislate in regard to the same and the impugned Act would be intra vires the State Legislature.'
19. It is thus manifest that Entries 14, 15, 27, 28, 29, 32 and 36 of List II read with Entries 33 and 47 of List III make the State Legislature competent to legislate in regard to agricultural produce, livestock and establish markets for the purpose of regulating sale, purchase, storage weighment etc. in accordance with the conditions of licence granted to a person by the Market Committee.
20. The three principles stated by Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) in Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, : AIR1959SC648 at p. 665 to ascertain whether there is repugnancy between the two statutes are these;
'(1) Whether there is direct conflict between me two provisions:
(2) Whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and
(3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field.'
Applying the tests laid down by the Supreme Court, I find no direct conflict between the Act which has received the assent of the President and the two Central Acts. The essential purpose of the Act is establishment of markets and regulating sale of agricultural produce and livestock; and as such, there is no direct or positive conflict between the Central Acts and the Act to say that the Act cannot be reconciled or cannot co-exist with the Central Acts. 'The Doctrine of 'occupied field' applies only where there is a clash between Dominion legislation and Provincial legislation within an area common to both' See Forbes v. Attorney General of Manitoba, (1937) AC 260 at p. 274.
21. Although the two Central Acts deal with supply storage and warehousing of foodgrains that itself is not sufficient to determine the question of repugnancy. The object of the two Central Acts though seem allied in character, they cover distinct and separate fields. The dominant purpose of the two Central Acts is not the establishment of markets. Markets is a State Subject under Entry 28 of List II and are established for supply, distribution, sale and purchase of agricultural produce. 'Agricultural produce' has been defined to mean anything produced from land in the course of agriculture, or horticulture and includes forest produce or any produce of like nature. Establishment of markets necessarily involves imposing licensing restrictions to enable the buyers and sellers to meet in a notified market area. Under the two Central Acts sales and purchases are effected on behalf of the Central Government through corporations. Under the State Act, sales and purchases are not effected on behalf of the State or Central Governments. Market Committees protect the ensuring correct weighment, making available to them latest information regarding prices of agricultural produce, arranging for sale or purchase of goods and settlement of disputes, if any, arising in the course of transactions between the sellers and buyers.
22. This Court in Sree Rama Coconut Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, : AIR1961AP138 repelled the contention that the notification issued by the State Government extending the Madras Commercial Crops Markets Act (Madras Act XX of 1933) to coconuts as being repugnant to the provisions of the Indian Coconut Committee Act (X of 1944) and to that extent void under Article 254(1) of the Constitution. Basi Reddy, J. held that the essential purpose sought to be achieved by the Madras Act is not covered by the Central Act because the latter does not touch the subject of markets.
23. There is no warrant for any inference that under the Act, the Corporations are bound to transact their business through markets established by the Market Committees, or that any restrictions are placed upon the corporations established under the Central Acts to discharge the functions assigned to them. Therefore, Section 7 of the Act is not inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of Sections 9 and 34 of the 1956 Central Act or Section 13 of the 1964 Central Act. To quote Dixon J. in Ex. Parte Mclean, (1930) 49 Com LR 472 at p. 483.
'The inconsistency does not lie in the mere co-existence of two laws which are susceptible of simultaneous obedience. It depends upon the intention of the paramount Legislature to express by its enactment, completely, exhaustively what shall be the law governing the particular conduct or matter to which its attention is directed.'
24. Another question raised by Mr. Chowdary is that the Market Committee has no competence to levy the market fee as the conditions laid down in Section 4 of the Act are not satisfied. There is no substance in this argument. By virtue of G. O. Ms. No. 2095 Food and Agriculture dated 29-10-1968, notified areas under Section 3 (b) for each of the revenue districts were notified. Under G. O. Ms. No. 655 dated 4-4-1969, Market Committees were constituted by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 4 (1). Market Committees were directed by the Government to establish markets. G. O. Ms. No. 2261 dated 7-12-1970 was notified under Section 4 (3) (a) of the Act. This is a general notification directing the Market Committee to provide facilities at the notified market areas. Further notifications under Section 4 (4) were duly published in respect of Market Committees with which we are now concerned.
25. In the result, I find no merit in these writ petitions and they are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Advocates fee Rs. 100/-in each.
(FOR BEING MENTIONED.)
26. It will be open to the petitioners to represent to the Tenali Market Committee in response to the notices issued by it that the Tenali Market Committee has no jurisdiction to levy fees under Section 12 as the competent Market Committees to levy the fees are Guntur, Narasaraopet and other Market Committees concerned. It is for the petitioners to satisfy the Tenali Market Committee that it has no jurisdiction to levy and collect the licence fee.