ORDER
1. The Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, respondent in this writ petition, is the owner and possessor of the Commercial Complex situate at Kummarguda, Secunderabad. In 1986, the respondent proposed to construct a commercial complex at Kummarguda, Secunderabad. However, the respondent-Corporation, for want of funds, could not complete the construction and also felt that it was not a profitable project and, therefore, took a decision to sell the property. Accordingly, the respondent obtained permission from the State Government on 18-3-1992, for selling the property. A wide publicity was made in four newspapers on three occasions, in the months of March, April and May 1992 by the respondent about the intention of the respondent-Corporation to sell the property. No person came forward to file tenders for purchase of the premises as the upset price fixed at 2.8 crores rupees was considered as very high. Thereafter, the respondent-Corporation wrote letters to various builders and associations in all the States. In response to the third advertisement and also the letters written by the respondent, nine persons have submitted applications for purchase of the tender schedules. The cost of the tender schedules was fixed at Rs. 217-50 ps. Petitioner in this writ petition is one of those nine persons who purchased the tender schedules. The earnest money deposit was fixed at rupees fifteen lakhs and it was made clear that no tender shall be accepted without the earnest money deposit. Between 2-6-1992 and 4-6-1992, tender schedules were issued and the last date for receipt of the tenders was fixed as 3-00 p.m. on 6-6-1992. Opening of the tenders was fixed at 3-30 p.m. on the same day, viz., 6-6-1992. Out of the nine persons who have applied for tender schedules, only six persons have taken the tender schedules. When the tenders were opened as per the schedule, it was found that the petitioner is the only person who has filed the tender quoting the price of 2.91 crore rupees after complying with the other formalities.On 23-7-1992, the respondent-Corporation sought for confirmation from the petitioner about her willingness to deposit the entire amount of 2.91 crores of rupees within sixty days from the date of receipt of the final acceptance of the tender by the Corporation, in accordance with Item 14 of the Terms and Conditions of the Tender. It was made further clear that the petitioner should send her reply on or before 30-7-1992. On 29-7-1992, petitioner wrote a letter to the respondent-Corporation, seeking two week's time for giving her reply. Finally, on 14-8-1992, petitioner wrote to the respondent, agreeing to pay the entire amount of 2.91 crores of rupees, after deducting the earnest money deposit within sixty days from the date of receiving final acceptance of the tender by the respondent. Petitioner did not get any reply from the respondent-Corporation but, on enquiries, petitioner came to know that the respondent is trying to dispose of the property to the Government of India, without finalising the tender in her favour. She, therefore, filed this writ petition for issuing a writ of mandamus, declaring the action of the respondent in trying to sell the property viz., Kummarguda Commercial Complex, Secunderabad to the Government of India or to third parties without finalising the tender filed by her as illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice and for a consequential direction to the respondent to accept the tender filed by her for purchasing the Kummarguda Commercial Complex, Secunderabad, and to complete the formalities.
2. The respondent-Corporation, in its counter, has stated that the only tender filed by the petitioner was not accepted by the respondent and, therefore, no vested-right has accrued to the petitioner for accepting her tender by the respondent; petitioner did not comply with Item-14 of the Terms and Conditions by paying the entire bid amount within sixty days; there is a lot of public criticism and also discussion in the Legislative Assembly about the sale of Kummarguda Commercial Complex by the Corporation to the lone tenderer, viz., petitioner-herein; the Government of Andhra Pradesh called forremarks from the respondent-Corporation regarding this and after careful examination, the- Government, exercising their power under S. 148 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act 1955, in Memo No. 1766/ F2/92-M.A., dated 12-11-1993, directed the respondent-Corporation to cancel the sole tender and call for fresh tenders fixing the upset price at rupees 4.19 crores; as there was no promise to finalise the lone tender filed by the petitioner to the detriment of the Corporation, the principle of 'equitable estoppel' is not applicable; and in any event, the respondent rejected the offer made by the petitioner and communicated the same to her by their letter dated 15-2-1994 in Reference No.28/JI/94/244.
3. In view of the above rival contentions, the point for determination in this writ petition is -- whether the respondent-Hyderabad Municipal Corporation is bound to accept the tender filed by the petitioner for the sale of Kummarguda Commercial Complex, situated at Secunderabad?
4. The facts narrated above will indicate that the tender filed by the petitioner has not been accepted by the respondent-Corporation. In the letter, dated 14-8-1992, written by the petitioner to the respondent-Corporation indicating her willingness to pay the entire bid amount of 2.91 crores of rupees within sixty days from the date of final acceptance of the tender, it is categorically mentioned by the petitioner as follows:
'We now await acceptance of our tender bid'.
The above statement of the petitioner indicates that the respondent has not accepted the tender. It is now well-settled that, unless and until the tender is accepted, no right will accrue to the tenderer regarding the contract covered by the tender. Clause 12 of the 'Terms and Conditions of the Tender for Out-right sale of Commercial Complex at Kummarguda, Secunderabad', gives power to the Officer authorised, to receive the tenders, to postpone/cancel the tender without assigning any reasons whatsoever. In the circumstances, no vested-right of thepetitioner has been violated by the respondents. On this ground alone, this writ petition can be dismissed.
4A, Further, Clause 14 of the terms and conditions specifies--successful tenderer shall have to remit the total amount of the tender within 60 days from the date of receipt of the final acceptance of the tender by the Standing Committee/General Body, failing which the 'Earnest Money Deposit will be forfeited.' As no indication is given by the petitioner in the tender filed by her regarding the compliance of Clause 14, the respondent wrote a letter on 23-7-1992 to the petitioner to inform her willingness to comply with the said condition by depositing the entire bid amount of Rupees 2.91 crores within sixty days from the date of receipt of intimation of final acceptance, for which the petitioner replied on 29-7-1992 requesting two weeks' time for giving her reply. There is no indication that, the time requested for by the petitioner, has been granted by the respondent-Corporation. Petitioner wrote to the respondent only on 14-8-1992 agreeing to pay the bid amount of 2.91 crore rupees within sixty days from the date of receipt of final acceptance.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, relying upon the abovesaid correspondence, contended that the respondent-Corporation has made a promise to accept the tender of the petitioner if the petitioner is willing to pay the entire bid amount within sixty days from the date of receipt of final acceptance and as the petitioner had agreed to pay the entire bid amount, the respondent is bound to give its acceptance, on the principle of 'promissory estoppel'. This contention cannot be accepted. The respondent-Coporation merely sought confirmation from the petitioner as to whether she is agreeable to pay the bid amount within sixty days from the date of receipt of final accetance of the tender, as the petitioner did not specify the same in her tender. Therefore, that by itself cannot be considered as a promise made by the respondent for accepting the tender of the petitioner if she is agreeable to pay the entire bid amount within sixty days. This contention has to be, and is accordingly, rejected.
6. The respondent has now passed an order, rejecting the tender filed by the petitioner and communicated the same to the petitioner by their letter dated 15-2-1994. Therefore, the petitioner has to question the correctness of this order, rejecting her tender. Petitioner now filed W.P.M.P. 5903 of 1994, to amend the prayer in the writ petition for declaring the proceedings, dated 15-2-1994, of the respondent-Corporation as arbitraty and illegal. The amendment of the prayer now sought for, cannot be entertained, as if the same is granted, will totally alter the prayer sought for originally in the writ petition by the petitioner. In other words, the rejection of the tender of the petitioner, by the respondent is a different cause of action, which can only be questioned by the petitioner by way of a separate writ petition and the same cannot be permitted to be raised in the present writ petition. Writ Petition Miscellaneous Petition No. 5093 of 1994 is, therefore, dismissed.
7. The respondent-Corporation has now submitted that the Government of India, for establishing their Regional Passport Office at Secunderabad, has offered to purchase the Kummarguda Commercial Complex at a price of 3.36 crore rupees and they have made a budgetary sanction of Rupees 4.00 crores for purchasing the same, and negotiations are going on for increasing the price from 3.36 crore rupees. The respondent-Corporation, being a public institution, should make all efforts to secure the maximum highest possible price for the property to be sold by it. The present offer made by the Government of India (Passport Authority) is comparatively a much higher price than the one offered by the petitioner.
8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the present action of the respondent in cancelling the tender filed by the petitioner is illegal inasmuch as it is based on the decision already taken by the State Government and is not taken independently by the respondent by applying their mind.
9. Section 148 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act 1955 lays down --'the Commissioner shall not lease, sell or otherwise dispose, of any moveable or immoveableproperty belonging to the Corporation, without the previous sanction of the Corporation and of the Government'. Before calling for tenders, admittedly, the respondent-Corporation had obtained sanction from the State Government. In view of the public resentment of the transaction and also in view of the discussion in the Legislative Assembly, the State Government called for the records from the respondent-Corporation and directed the corporation to cancel the tenders already called for fixing the upset price at Rupees 2.8 crores, and directed the Corporation to call for fresh tenders by fixing the upset price at 4 crorees rupees. Acting on the same, the respondent-Corporation cancelled the only tender filed by the petitioner. Section 148(3) of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act 1955 empowers the Corporation to sell the property moveable or immoveable belonging to the Corporation only with the previous sanction of the Government. Therefore, by implication, the Government have always got the power to, withdraw the sanction for selling the property of the Corporation before it is sold. In the present case, the only tender of the petitioner, as mentioned already, was not accepted by the respondent-Corporation and hence the instruction issued by the State Government to the Corporation for cancellation of the tender of the petitioner, is perfectly justified. The decision in Nitin Industrial Associates v. State, : AIR1986Bom298 relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of this case, inasmuch as the respondent-Corporation has cancelled the tender filed by the petitioner and the respondent did not sell the property to any third-party prior to concellation of the tender filed by the petitioner. A reading of the facts in the above decision will disclose that the contract was given to one of the respondents in that case, without cancelling the tender filed by the petitioner therein and others. Therefore, the above decision is not helpful to the case of the petitioner.
10. The decision in Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation, : [1992]1SCR616 relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is a casewhere an industrial unit brought to sale, without accepting the offer made by the owner of the said unit, for payment of reasonable amount towards discharge of the loan. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court laid down certain guidelines such as, the unit must be sold in public auction; the price secured in the public auction must be intimated to the unit-holder to enable him to file the objections if any as he is vitally interested in getting the maximum price; the highest price secured by calling for tenders must be intimated to the unit-holder and if the unit-holder is willing to offer the sale price secured in the public auction, an opportunity must be given to him for payment of the same. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, based on the abovesaid guidelines of the Supreme Court, that the petitioner should have been offered to purchase the property in question for the price now offered by the Government of India (Passport Authority) to the respondent, cannot be accepted. In the present case, the respondent-Municipal Corporation is selling their own property and therefore, unlike the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner where the property belonging to a particular party was put up for sale for realising the amount towards the money advanced by the party who is selling the property. Therefore, the facts in the case on hand are entirely different from the facts of the decision referred to above (supra) and the question of giving the offer to the petitioner once again for purchasing the property for the price now offered by the Government of India (Passport Authority) does not arise.
11. In Shri Sachinanand Pandey v. State of W.B., AIR 1987 SC 1109 the Supreme Court, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J. held thus:
'State-owned or public-owned property is not to be dealt with at the absolute discretion of the executive. Certain precepts and principles have to be observed. Public interest is the paramount consideration. One of the methods of securing the public interest, when it is considered necessary to dispose of a property, is to sell the property by publicauction or by inviting tenders. Though that is the ordinary rule, it is not an invariable rule. There may be situations where there are compelling reasons necessitating departure from the rule, but there the reasons for the departure must be rational and should not be suggestive of discrimination. Appearance of public justice is as important as doing justice. Nothing should be done which gives an appearance of bias, jobbery or nepotism'.
12. This decision of the Supreme Court, in my view, in all fours, applies to the facts of the case on hand, where public property is being sold by the respondent-Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. In the circumstances, the method adopted by the respondent-Corporation to sell the property, viz., Kummarguda Commercial Complex, Secunderabad, to the Government of India (Passport Authority), is perfectly justified. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court (Sachidanand Pandey's case) (supra), it is not necessary for me to refer to the other decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondent-Corporation.
13. For the reasons stated above, I hold that the respondent-Hyderabad Municipal Corporation is not bound to accept the tender filed by the petitioner for the sale of Kummarguda Commercial Complex, Secunderabad. The point is answered in the negative.
14. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed, as the same is without any merit. There shall be no order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.