ORDER
P. S. Mishra, C.J.
1. These writ petitions are off-shoots of the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Y. S. Vivekananda Reddy, : AIR1995AP1 .
2. Undisputed facts are as follows:
The Government of Andhra Pradesh by G.O.Ms. No. 27, Industries and Commerce (Mines. III) Department, dated 7-1-1974 declared that the Barytes Ore bearing areas in the villages of Mangampet and Anantaraju-pet of Cuddapah District other than those already leased out were reserved for exploitation in the public sector with immediate effect and granted in favour of Andhra Pradesh Mining Corporation, a public sector undertaking, the lease in respect of 22.799 hectares of land for extraction of Barytes Ore for a period of 20 years. This was followed by a tripartite agreement dated 25-5-1975 between the State Government, the Corporation and the Pattedars of the lands (writ petitioners), in whom the surface rights were vested and pursuant to the agreement the Corporation' executed sub-lease deeds in favour of the Pattedars for certain extents of lands for specified periods. The Andhra Pradesh State Assembly, however, appointed a House Committee to enquire into certain complaints of illegal extraction of Barytes Ore and after considering the recommendations of the House Committee, allegedly the Government took a policy decision and issued G.O.Ms. No. 402, dated 1-12-1993 reserving the entireBarytes Ore bearing areas in Mangampet and Anantarajupet of Cuddapah District for exclusive exploitation by the Corporation. Consequently, the Government cancelled all the existing sub leases and also issued G.O.Ms. No. 417, dated 7-12-1993 to withdraw with immediate effect the consent given to the Corporation to enter into sub-leases and asked the Corporation to take all necessary steps in this regard. Challenging the said action of the State Government, the sublessees (Pattedars) filed several writ petitions, which were allowed by the learned single Judge holding that the State Government had no power under S. 4A of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation & Development) Act, 1957 (for short 'the Act') to direct cancellation of the sub-leases and that the impugned action was violative of the principles of natural justice, since the same was not preceded by a notice to the affected parties (sub-lessees). Both the State Government and the Corporation preferred appeals against the order of the learned single Judge. The Division Bench hearing the appeals, however, having regard to the complexity of the legal questions involved, referred the matter for decision by a Full Bench. The Full Bench took notice of various contentions and referred, particularly, to clauses 15 and 16 of the sublease deeds and held, inter alia, that power under S. 4A of the Act was available to the State Government only in respect' of minor minerals and as Baryte was admittedly a major mineral, the State Government had no power to direct termination of the sub-leases. The judgment also referred to R. 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (for short 'the Rules'), which conferred power on the State Government to determine any lease for breach of the conditions specified therein and opined that the State Government could not rescind the consent granted earlier. It affirmed the aforementioned views of the learned single Judge in all respects. Adverting to the question whether the original consent given by the State Government under R. 37 of the Rules was itself illegal in view of the subsistence of the notification issued under R. 58 of the Rules reserving the entire area for exploitation by a public sector undertaking(the Corporation), the Full Bench declined to express any opinion, for cancellation of the sub-leases was not based on that alleged infirmity. The Full Bench, however, observed as follows : AIR1995AP1 , para 52):
'We leave it open to the appellants if theypropose to terminate the sub-leases or withdraw the consent, to issue notices to the sublessees to show cause as to why such an actionshould not be taken, grant them reasonabletime for submitting their explanation, consider the same and pass appropriate orders inaccordance with law. For this purpose, weconsider it just to direct the parties tomaintain status quo obtaining as on this dayfor a period of 3 months from today. If hofresh orders are passed within the said periodof three months pursuant to the show causenotice, it would be open to the sub-lessees toproceed with the mining operations in accordance with the sub-leases granted to them.The orders under appeals are accordinglymodified and subject to the above modification and observations, the appeals aredismissed, but in the circumstances of thecase, we direct the parties to bear their owncosts.'
3. Aggrieved by the view taken by the Full Bench, the State Government and the Corporation preferred special leave petitions in the Supreme Court. The sub-lessees, to the extent of the direction of the Full Bench to maintain status quo for a period of three months to enable the State Government to take action, filed special leave petitions in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by an interim order dated 6-10-1994 stayed the operation of the judgment of the Full Bench as regards the maintenance of status quo and directed the sub-lessees to maintain true and faithful account of the mining operation, which would be verified by the appropriate Mining Officer every fortnight. The Supreme Court also clarified that the exercise of the right of the Corporation as well as the State Government to proceed in accordance with law as a result of the High Court's judgment, was not stayed. The State Government, subsequent to the Full Bench judgment, issued show cause notices to the sub-lessees and after affordingpersonal hearing and considering their representations, passed orders in Proceedings No. 20/PSMA/94, dated 9-3-1995 withdrawing the earlier consent and cancelling the subleases. The sub-lessees preferred revisions before the Government of India. The Government of India passed interim orders staying the operation of the Proceedings of the State Government. Pursuant to the said order by the Supreme Court, permitting the sublessees to carry on mining operations with certain conditions, the sub-lessees started working the mines from 6-10-1994 till the expiry of the lease period in February, 1995.
4. Alleging, however, that on account of illegal cancellation of the sub-leases and withdrawal of the consent by the State Government, they could not work the mines for a substantial period and they could not also do so, for his Court, in proceedings before it, issued orders to maintain status quo and started operating only after the Supreme Court on 6-10-1994 issued directions as above, after which alone they could resume mining operations, the sub-lessees filed the instant Writ Petitions and claimed that they are entitled for exclusion of the period for which they have been illegally denied mining operations. The issue, however, canvassed before us, but apparently ancillary, was raised in Writ Petition No. 200 of 1991 by one of the sub-lessees and a learned single Judge of this Court allowed the same on 15-3-1991 (vide C. N, Ramanath Reddy v. State of A. P., 1991 (2) Andh LT 32) holding that once a sub-lease was granted with the consent of the Government, the order worked itself out and the mining operations once commenced, could not be deemed to have been suspended by the Government. The Writ Appeal filed against that order was subsequently withdrawn by the Government. The sub-lessee C. N. Ramanath Reddy is accordingly claiming that in addition to about 10 months extended period claimed by him along with other sub-lessees, he is entitled for the extra benefit of the aforesaid period. A learned single Judge of this Court at the interlocutory stage in W. P. M. P. Nos. 28146, 28148 and 28230 of 1994 in Writ Petition Nos. 22579,22580 and 22730 of 1994 passed interim orders on 3-2-1995restraining the Government and the Corporation from interfering with the rights of the petitioners (sub-lessees) to continue their mining operations beyond 10-2-1995 or 18-2-1995, as the case may be, for a period of 10 months, if it is not otherwise determined in accordance with law or the petitioners voluntarily surrender the lease before that period. The learned Judge also directed that the main Writ Petitions be listed for hearing after three weeks. The State Government, it appears, acted swiftly to determine the sub-leases, but its orders were stayed by the Government of India in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The State Government as well as the Mining Corporation preferred Writ Appeals against the above orders of the learned single Judge. The Division Bench, hearing the appeals, directed the listing of the matters before the appropriate Bench, but stayed the order passed by the learned single Judge. On 14-3-1995, when the matter again came up before the Bench, it noticed that no orders till then were passed by the Supreme Court and adjourned once again to 7-4-1995, on which date it issued order to the effect that the interim stay of the operation would continue and that the matter would be listed for hearing on 14-4-1995. In the meantime, the Supreme Court in I. A. Nos. 11-15/95 in C. A. Nos. 6651-55/94 dated 10-4-1995 passed the following order;
'No modification is required. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that Writ Appeal Nos. 115, 116, 117, 118, 119 and l20 of 1995 have not been heard by the High Court in view of the pendency of these matters. It is clarified that the pendency of these matters in this Court does not preclude the High Court hearing the Writ Appeals and decide on merits.'
5. After the above order of the Supreme Court, the Division Bench by order dated 17-4-1995, directed that the main Writ Petitions as well as the Writ Appeals should be listed for hearing on 13-6-1995. The Writ Petitions and the Writ Appeals are accordingly placed before a Bench of this Court, which has passed the following order:
'At the threshold stage, we are confrontedwith an insurmountable difficulty in that the very same deed of sub-lease executed on 20-7-1982 in favour of Y. S. Raja Reddy, the petitioner in W. P. No. 22580 of 1994, was interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court in Y. S. Raja Reddy v. A.P. Mining Corporation (1988) 2 Andh LT 722 to be 'purely contractual in nature' and so was not afflicted with any illegality so as to give rise to a valid cause of action for the sub-lessee (Raja Reddy) to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Art.' 226 of the Constitution. The very same sub-lease was subject matter of W. P. No. 18538 of 1993 and batch which culminated in the decision of the Full Bench. The Full Bench had not noticed this ruling of the Division Bench.
Clause (14) of the Deed of Sub-lease stipulated that the sub-lessee shall undertake to obtain specific prior concurrence of the lessee regarding sale and rates of barytes, lump and powder from time to time. Pursuant to this condition, the Corporation has been obtaining transport permits from the Mining Department to enable the sub-lessee to transport the extracted ore. But the sub-lessee found that there had been considerable delay on several occasions on the part of the Corporation in obtaining the permits and when he complained, the answer he received was that because he committed certain violations of the sub-lease, the delay had occurred. He, therefore, challenged the action of the Mining Corporation in insisting that applications for transport permits should be routed through it as arbitrary and violative of Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and sought a consequential direction to the Assistant Director, Mines and Geology to grant permits on application. The main attack was centered around the legality of including clauses in the sub-lease prejudicial to the sublessee and that the consent of the Central Government was necessary for inclusion of any clauses other than those mentioned in R. 27 in the deed of sub-lease. The Division Bench, speaking through Jayachandra Reddy, J., (as he then was) ruled :
'....... it is within the discretion of theGovernment to give its consent to a transfer oflease effected by way of a sub-lease or in any other manner. The Government under R. 37(1)(a) is broadly concerned with the transfer of lease and can exercise its subjective satisfaction having regard to the various conditions while giving the consent. Just because S. 3(c) defines 'mining lease' as to include a 'sub-lease', every transfer of lease by way of a sub-lease with some modifications which come under the category of 'in any other manner' need not contain only the conditions provided in R. 27. The above facts clearly go to show that it is purely a contractual obligation between the 1st respondent Corporation and the petitioner. Admittedly, the Corporation is the lessee. It entered into a sub-lease with the petitioner subject to certain other conditions which do not necessarily occur in Rule 27. But the Government in its discretion gave the consent to that sub-lease which contains some more conditions which tantamount to transfer of lease 'in any other manner' and 'in a form as nearly as possible' to Form O'.
Rejecting the contention of the counsel that certain conditions in G. O. Ms. No. 215 dated 22-4-1980 and G. O. Ms. No. 455 dated 19-7-1992 were offensive and therefore they should be severed or in the alternative those conditions should be declared as invalid and direct the Government to enter into a regular lease deed, the Division Bench categorically expressed the view:
'In any event, this is not a rule or a regulation to which the concept of sever-ability can be applied. This is a pure and simple contract between the Corporation and the petitioner entered into in the 1982 and the same is sought to be questioned in the year 1986 ..... we are firmly of the view thatpart of G. 0. Ms. No. 215 and some of the clauses which were agreed upon by the parties cannot be declared as invalid, while exercising the jurisdiction under Art. 226.'
Adverting to the question of the consent granted by the Government under Section (Rule ?) 37(1)(a) it was observed by the Division Bench:
'The consent . under Section (Rule ?)37(1)(a) is discretionary and while giving the consent the authority took several circumstances into consideration and this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 cannot in an objective manner decide as to which condition weighed with the Government and which condition did not weigh'.
It was also further observed :
'In the instant case, as already mentioned, the lease is between the Mining Corporation and the petitioner. The condition that the lease was agreed upon after obtaining the consent under R. 37(1)(a) does not make any change in respect of the character of the lease which is purely contractual in nature.'
After noticing the relevant clauses, the Division Bench further observed :
'We do not find any material to go to the extent of holding that the conditions of the lease in the instant case are opposed to public policy nor they are arbitrary and the Mining Corporation which is a statutory one, is given priority and it is the lessee in respect of these mines, the explorations of which are governed by statutes. The Government also permitted sub-leases of transfer of the same in any other form by the Corporation. The Corporation in the instant case, with the consent of the Government, has sub-let subject to certain conditions. The petitioner has agreed to these conditions. Now if his request viz., that certain clauses should be removed and that the G. O. Ms. 215 giving consent should also be modified suitably, (is to be accepted?) it would amount to asking the Court to create a new contract. In our view, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, we cannot go to that extent.'
Having agreed to the conditions of the sublease, the Division Bench observed, it was not open to the sub-lessee to turn around and say that certain clauses in the sub-lease deed were arbitrary. This judgment of the Division Bench became final as the Special Leave Petition preferred against the same was dismissed and about this, there is no dispute.
As already stated, the Full Bench had not noticed the ruling of the Division Bench inY.S. Raja Reddy, (1988 (2) Andh LT 722) (supra). The judgment of the Full Bench is under appeal before the Supreme Court in C. A. Nos. 6651-55/94.
Sitting as a Division Bench, we are bound by the finding by the Y. S. Raja Reddy (supra) that the sub-lease in question is purely contractual in nature, none of the clauses suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and that the remedy under Art. 226 was misconceived. What view the Full Bench would have taken as to the contractual nature of the sub-lease deed if the Division Bench ruling in Y. S. Raja Reddy (supra) had been noticed, it is difficult for us to predicate. We cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the finding of the Division Bench regarding the contractual nature of the sub-lease deed no longer holds the field because of the subsequent judgment of the Full Bench in Government of A. P. v. Y. S. Vivekananda Reddy, : AIR1995AP1 (supra) and that the cancellation of the sublease without observing the principles of natural justice was an action that could be set right in writ proceedings. In our considered view, such an examination can be taken up only by another Full Bench or a larger Bench. For the same reason, we are not inclined to examine the contention raised by the learned Advocate General that the decision of the Full Bench was per incurium since it did not notice the earlier judgment of the Division Bench which attained finality by reason of the Supreme Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition filed against that. We cannot lose sight of the reality that the Full Bench judgment is now under appeal before the Supreme Court whereas the Division Bench judgment attained finality in that the Special Leave Petition filed against the same was dismissed. That would not preclude the apex Court from examining the question on merits afresh from a different perspective in a different fact situation in a regular appeal : It is a firmly settled principle that dismissal of a Special Leave Petition without reasons by the Apex Court would not amount to rendering a decision on merits. For the very same reasons, we are extremely diffident even to analyse the legal position -- whether the view expressedby the Division Bench in Y. S. Raja Reddy (1988 (2) Andh LT 722) (supra) as to the contractual nature of the sub-lease deed really constituted the ratio -- binding, obiter or gratis -- or it was merely a dictum unrelated to the issue for decision and that the relief claimed therein did not call for an examination of the legal nature of the clauses whether they were statutorily encompassed or fell within the domain of pure contractual relations.
Judicial reasoning in support of any conclusion arrived at must be consistent so as not to leave any scope for emergence of divergent views. We think any expression of views sitting as we do in a Division Bench might, apart from breaching the well established legal tradition -- smaller Benches should not examine the correctness of the reasoning or conclusions of larger Benches with the possible exception of cases falling unerringly within the domain of the principles of per in curium, -- also spawn judicial anarchy.
In the circumstances, we are of the view that these cases deserve to be disposed of by a Full Bench or a larger Beach. The Registry is directed to place the papers before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders.'
6. It is seen from the above that the sub-leases granted to the petitioners by the Corporation with the consent of the State Government have been held to be valid by the Full Bench of this Court in Vivekananda Reddy's case, : AIR1995AP1 (supra) and the Court has found that withdrawal of the consent by the State Government and cancellation of the sub-leases by it were invalid. It is also clear that in all cases of withdrawal of the consent and the cancellation of the sub-leases by the State Government, the sub-lessees could not continue mining operations from 17-12-1993 to 6-10-1994. They could resume work only after the Supreme Court passed the order in these words:
'As a result of the cancellation of the subleases and withdrawal by the State Government of its consent for grant of the sub-leasesby the Corporation being held by the High Court to be void in its judgment, the operation of the further direction given by the Full Bench of the High Court to maintain status quo for a period of three months from the date of the judgment meaning thereby that the sub-lessees would not be entitled to carry on the mining operations till then, shall remain stayed. The sub-lessees shall, however, main-tain true and faithful account of the mining operation which would be verified by the appropriate Mining Officer every fortnight. It is clarified that the exercise of the right of the Corporation as well as the State Government to proceed in accordance with law as a result of the High Court's judgment is not stayed.'
7. Two issues are brought before us on behalf of the petitioners.
(1) Whether the sub-lessees are entitled to be compensated for the loss of the period of the mining operation/work by them on account of illegal withdrawal of the consent and the cancellation of the sub-leases by the State Government and
(2) If it is held that they are entitled to be compensated, whether the compensation will be by treating the period of lease completed by adding to it the period lost by illegalinterruptions.
Learned counsel for the petitioners have demonstrated before us the interruptions for the period from 17-12-1993 to 6-10-1994 and in Writ Petition No. 22730 of 1994 there was an additional loss of period of six months and sixteen days from 2-1-1991 to 18-6-1991 by an order of stay of the sub-leases granted in favour of the petitioners by the State Government and the Corporation. Learned Additional Advocate General has, however, contended before us that, apart from the reasons for which, on the recommendations of the House committee, the Government decided to withdraw their consent and cancelled the sub-leases, it is clear that the grant of sub-leases to pattedars, notwithstanding the tripartite argeement, was invalid for it was done in violation of Section 5 of the Act read with Section 19 thereof. We have to reasons to differ from the view taken by the earlier FullBench and accordingly not to decline to go into this question in the instant proceedings and close this contention on the ground as stated in the earlier Full Bench Judgment, but in deference' to the persuasions of the learned Addl. Advocate General, we propose to take notice of his submissions in this behalf, if not to finally give a verdict on it, at least for the purpose of satisfying ourselves whether such a contention needed a more elaborate consideration by the earlier Full Bench and that non-consideration of the said contention, in the manner it has been presented before us, has resulted in any legal injury to the State Government or not. A mineral which is not a minor mineral was a Union subject as it is specified in the First Schedule of the Act. Section 5 of the Act reads as follows:
'5. Restrictions on the grant of prospecting licences or mining leases:-- (1) No prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted by a State Government to any person unless he -
(a) is an Indian National; and
(b) satisfies such conditions as may be prescribed:
Provided that in respect of any mineral specified in the First Schedule, no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted with the previous approval of the Central Government. Explanation:-- For the purpose of this sub-section, a person shall be deemed to be an Indian National, -
(a) in the case of a public company as defined in the Companies Act, 1956 only in a majority of the directors of the company are citizens of India and not less than sixty percent of the share capital thereof is held by persons who are either citizens of India or companies as defined in the said Act;
(b) in the case of a private company as defined in the said Act, only if all the members of the company are citizens of India:
(c) in the case of a firm or other association of individuals, only if all the members of the firm or members of the association are citizens of India; and
(d) in the case of an individual, only if he is a citizen of India.
(2) No mining lease shall be granted by the State Government unless it is satisfied that -
(a) there is evidence to show that the area for which the lease is applied for has been prospected earlier and the existence of mineral contents therein has been established:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall apply to any area if such area has already been prospected by a Department or an agency of the Government and the existence of mineral contents therein has been established;
(b) there is a mining plan duly approved by the Central Government for the development of mineral deposits in the area concerned.'
Section 19 of the Act states that 'any .......mining lease granted, renewed or acquired in contravention of the provisions of this Act or any rules or orders made there under shall be void and of no effect.' Thus, if a lease is granted or acquired in contravention of Section 5 afore-quoted, it would be invalid. A lease is defined to include a sub-lease, in Section 3(c) of the Act. It is not the case of the State that pattedars are not Indian nationals or that any condition prescribed by Rules or otherwise was/ is not satisfied in granting the sub-lease to pattedars. The proviso, however, which states, 'no .......... mining lease shall begranted except with the previous approval of the Central Government', poses a question --whether sub-leases were granted to pattedars after obtaining approval of the Central Government?. It is important, however, to notice that the restriction on the grant of mining lease is imposed upon a State Government and not upon any other person. It is not difficult to visualise that the State Government, exercising its proprietary right, grants a lease and the lessee, following the terms and conditions of the lease grants sublease to another persons. In such a case, the State Government shall have paramount title and can always exercise the same, subject to the law of the land in this behalf, but cannot assume the role of the lessor, unless the law as engrafted under Section 5 of the Act is interpreted to take grant of any sub-lease bythe lessee of the State Government as one covered by the expression 'grant of a lease by the State Government'. It is possible to visualise that while prescribing restrictions on the grant of prospecting license or mining lease, the law-makers could not rule out the possibility of the ownership with either the Central Government or some other person as there are such laws which vest exclusive ownership of the sub-soil rights in respect of certain minerals in the Central Government as well as in some private Corporations, Companies or individuals, notwithstanding the Act as well as other enactments declaring that sub-soil rights vest in the State. While thus providing for the previous approval of the Central Government, as a restriction of prospecting licence of mining lease granted by a State Government, the Act cleared grant of sub-lease by the lessee other than the State Government for such laws which may be found in the Rules as to conditions for grant of sub-lease. Rule 37, afore-mentioned, appears to be one such provision, which has been substantially amended by GSR 129(E) dated 20-2-1991. The rule reads as follows:
'37. Transfer of lease:-- The lessee shall not, without the previous consent in writing of the State Government and in the case of mining lease in respect of any mineral specified in the First Schedule to the Act, without the previous approval of the Central Government.
(a) assign, sub-let, mortgage, or in any other manner, transfer the mining lease, or any right, title or interest therein; or
(b) .....
Provided that the State Government shall not give its written consent unless;
8. The above has thus extended the restrictions under Section 5 of the Act on any licence or lease by the lessee of the State Government without the previous approval of the Central Government. We have looked to the facts of the case and it is possible to say that except in Writ Petition No. 22579 of 1994 all other sub-leases are prior to 20-2-1991 andthus, they are not covered by the Rule. In the case of sub-lease to the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 22579 of 1994, it appears, process had started before 20-2-1991 as it was done to implement the tripartite agreement dated 25-5-1975. Thus, the sub-leases by the Corporation to the pattedars i.e., writ petitioners were obviously not affected by Rule 37 and subletting was not required to be done with the previous approval of the Central Government.
9. Since the State Government is a consenting party to the tripartite agreement and also it accorded consent for grant of sublease, they obviously were aware of the conditions, which they had prescribed under the Rules, and the requirement that a sublease cannot be granted or acquired in respect of Barytes without the previous approval of the Central Government. The State Government have to be bound by their representations and if what they represented in the form of consent at one time was contrary to the law, they are themselves to be blamed. They cannot later take shelter under a law which they themselves found not applicable to the grant of sub-leases to the pattedars or even if they knew that without the previous approval of the Central Government, such a sub-lease could not be granted, do so knowingly Consent of the State Government was a precondition of the sub-lease and thus a step before the actual contract came into existence. But for the representation by the State Gpvernment in the form of consent, the Corporation would not have executed the sub-leases and the pattedars could not have acquired the sub-leases. Such a precontract stage representation alone made the pattedars to proceed to acquire the sub-leases and to alter their position to enter into the contract of sub-leases'. One need not go in search of authorities to support the view that the Stale Government shall be estopped from going back from its representation in the form of consent and thus cancel the same. We have the support, however, from the law laid down by the Supreme Court in M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., : [1979]118ITR326(SC) , Jeet Ram v. State of Haryana, : [1980]3SCR689 ; and Union of India v. Godfrey Philips IndiaLimited, : [1986]158ITR574(SC) for the view we have taken to extend the principle of promissory estoppel to the facts of the instant case. One should have no wonder if the State Government had a clear perception and the Central Government also had the same perception that in a case, in which the State Government granted lease to another and the lessee in turn granted sub-lease, previous approval of the Central Government was not required. They interpreted the law correctly when they gave consent to the grant of subleases to the pattedars and later when they changed their view and took the stand that sub-leases should not have been granted to pattedars because previous approval of the Central Government had not been obtained, the Central Government expressed its disapproval to the said view by staying the order of the State Government and thus continuing the sub-leases. It will be proper, in such a case, to decide in favour of the sub-leases by accepting the interpretation previously given by the State Government and not the latter interpretation by them to the very same provisions of law and accept in principle they i.e., State Government are bound by their own interpretation of the law on principle of Contemporanea Exposito. If the Court shall accept on such facts the plea of the State Government that sub-leases were granted in violation of mandatory requirement of Section 5 of the Act, it shall, in a way, grant premium on their recalcitrance and if we extend the principle further and find that by acquiring the sub-leases in violation of Section 5 of the Act, pattedars are equally involved in the wrong done in the grant of sub-leases to them, the principle of pari delicto should be applied and the Court, in our view, should reject the contention of the State Government. The stand of the State Government in the instant proceedings has caused some worry and it seems, it decided to act under some pressure, may be, because a House Committee of the Assembly said something against the grant of sub-leases. A doctrine which is always attracted to a contract of this nature where parties by Consensus ad idem created a contract, which affects someone else's right or in violation of aright under a law and a third party has to injure, the party whose right is affected is the aggrieved party and not one of the parties to the contract. Ex justitiae, thus, the State Government should have preferred to refrain than to act at the instance of whoever he was, unless the Central Government wanted it to cancel the lease. We have stated above not to finally dispose of the issues as such but for the purpose of reiterating that the Full Bench in Vivekananda Reddy's case, : AIR1995AP1 (supra) was not wrong in saying that the Government were not entitled to raise a ground which was not the cause shown for the cancellation of the sub-leases and withdrawal of the consent. In case of such executive orders, even in the field of contract, it is necessary that order, affecting someone else's right under a document or instrument of the Government, is issued on such grounds which are either shown in the order or are shown preceding the order. In the instant case, the cause given for the cancellation of the sublease and withdrawal of the consent was not that the Central Government's prior approval was not taken before the sub-leases were executed. This ground, when raised before this Court, was rightly ignored and as we have said earlier, we have no reason to take a different view. It cannot be denied that the petitioners have not worked in their respective mines under the sub-leases which were in dispute in the earlier proceeding for the full period of contract. The sub-leases have suffered interruption and the cancellation of sub-leases have been found to be illegal. Thus, the petitioners have suffered a legal injury on account of interference in their right under the sub-leases by the State Government and the Corporation. They are, in our view, entitled to be compensated for the same. The expression 'compensation' is not ordinarily used as an equivalent to damages although compensation often may have to be measured by the same rule as damages in an action for breach. Ordinary dictionary meaning of the term 'compensation' signifies that which is given in recompense, an equivalent rendered; damages, on the other hand, constitute the sum of money claimed or adjudged to be paid in compensation for loss or injury sustained,the value estimated in money, of something lost or withheld.
10. In Md. Mozaharal Ahmad v. Md. Azimaddin, AIR 1923 Cal 507, speaking for the Bench of the Calcutta High Court, Mookerjee, J., as he then was, has spoken candidly on this in these words:
'The term compensation etymologically suggest the image of balancing one thing against another; its primary significations is equivalence, and the secondary and more common meaning is something given or obtained as an equivalent. The derivative meaning was familiar to the Roman Jurists and reappears in the modern Codes founded on the Civil Law. (Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law, 3rd Edition, pp. 458-463)'. .
11. Hidayatullah, C.J., as he then was, speaking for the five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Shanti-lal, : [1969]3SCR341 , has primarily spoken about guarantee of Art. 31 of the Constitution of India, but given a clear meaning to the expression 'compensation' in situations, as one before us, in these words (para 25):
'Article 31 guarantees that the law providing for compulsory acquisition must provide for determining and giving compensation for the property acquired. The expression 'compensation'' is not defined in the Constitution. Under the Land Acquisition Act compensation is always paid in terms of money. But that is no reason for holding that compensation which is guaranteed by Art. 31(2) for compulsory acquisition must be paid in terms of money alone. A law which provides for making satisfaction to an expropriated owner by allotment of other property may be deemed to be a law providing for compensation. In ordinary parlance the expression 'compensation' means any thing given to make things equivalent; a thing given to or to make amends for loss, recompense, remuneration or pay; it need not therefore necessarily be in terms of money. The phraseology of the constitutional provision also indicates that compensation need not necessarily be in terms of money, because it expressly provides that the law may specify the principles onwhich, and the manner in which, compensation is to be determined and 'given'. If it were to be in terms of money alone, the expression 'paid' would have been more appropriate.
12. We have given our anxious thought to the fact that the sub-leases have since expired and the Corporation has assumed possession. We have, however, no definite information whether the Corporation has been doing any mining operations or not. In one of the cases, however, there is an order putting an embargo upon the Corporation's right to operate the mines. We do not propose, however, to go into these aspects because we are of the view that the petitioners are entitled to be compensated and the proper compensation will be not in terms of money, but by restoration of their possession to the sub-leaseholds, limited to the extent and area as covered by their respective leases or by grant of equivalent area of the same quality and quantity of mineral. The latter, however, being ruled out because the lease-holds are still available for being restored to the sub-leassees, i.e., the petitioners, any speculative compensation, in our opinion, in the form of damages, will not be proper or appropriate. We accordingly hold that the respondents are liable to put the petitioners in possession of the lease-hold properties to continue their mining operations for the periods which they have lost, in all cases from 17-12-1993 to 6-10-1994 and in the case of petitioner in Writ Petition No. 22730 of 1994 for the additional period of illegal interruption on account of stay of the mining operations by the orders of the Government of the State. The petitioner in Writ Petition No. 22730 of 1994 has calculated the said interruption from 2-1-1991 to 18-6-1991. Learned Additional Advocate General has pointed out that the same has not yet been verified. It will be proper, in our opinion, to order for the restoration of the sub-lease for the said period of loss from 2-1-1991 to 18-6-1991 as well, subject, however, of the verification by the competent authority and in case the period of interruption is less or more accordingly to order. Disposal, however, at our level, with the directions as above to the respondents, will not do full justicebetween the parties, unless we take notice of the direction of the Supreme Court under which the petitioners have continued their mining operations. The Supreme Court asked by order in S.L.P. No. 15896-899 of 1994 dated 6-10-1994 as follows:
'The sub-lessees shall, however, maintain true and faithful account of the mining operation which would be verified by the appropriate Mining Officer every fortnight. It is clarified that the exercise of the right of the Corporation as well as the State Government to proceed in accordance with law as a result of the High Court's judgment is not stayed.'
13. The petitioners have been, however, out of possession after the expiry of the period of leases, with, however, interruptions, as aforementioned, and the Corporation has assumed possession. It will be proper, in our opinion, to keep such mining operations which the petitioners may do for being compensated for the lost period of the subleases under check by the same conditions as imposed by the Supreme Court and additionally by some deposits, which the petitioners must make for each metric ton of excavation by them, to be appropriated by the successful party before the Supreme Court in the pending appeal between the parties. The petitioners have offered to deposit 5% of the sale price of the Ore before it is transported beyond the jurisdiction of the appropriate Mining Officer. The sale price, we are informed, is determined by the competent authority i.e., the Corporation and thus, there is no chance of any speculation in it.
14. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. The respondents are directed to put the petitioners in possession of their respective mines covered by their respective subleases by 18-3-1996 and permit the petitioners to continue their mining operations and transportation of the Barytes under specific permit on conditions as laid down by the Supreme Court and as quoted above and deposit of 5% of the sale price as determined by the Corporation before issuing permits for transportation. The interrupted period, as stated above, shall be deemed to commenceon the date the petitioners assume work and continue until the completion of the period,No costs.
15. Petition allowed.