Judgment:
ORDER
Y. Bhaskar Rao, J.
1. This writ appeal is filed assailing the judgment of the learned single Judge dismissing W. P. No. 4565 of 1989 dated 27-4-1995.
2. The facts of the case are that the appellants herein are licensees of the coconut trees in a Gram Panchayat Poramboke situated in Relangi village. They used to pay Re. 1/- per tree per annum in the year 1964. Thereafter, the same was increased to Rs. 2/- in the year 1970 and Rs. 7/- in the year 1981 and Rs. 10/- in the year 1984 and again increased to Rs. 20/- in the year 1985 vide Gram Panchayat's Resolution No. 153 dated 29-11-l988. The same was questioned in the writ petition.
3. Ii was contended in the writ petition that the amount levied is 'fee' but not 'tax' and hence cannot be enhanced unless there is quid pro quo. If it is a tax, the Panchayat has no power to levy tax for grant of licence. There are no guidelines framed for the enhancement of the tax. Therefore, the same is arbitrary.
4. The learned single Judge held that theamount levied by the Gram Panehayat on the appellants is not a tax and only a fee. It was further held that where fee is collected for rendering any service, there is requirement of quid pro quo. But, where a fee is levied on the person (o derive sonic benefit from out of the permission or licence issued by ihe Local Authority, no quid pro quo is necessary. Therefore, the writ petition was dismissed. Against that, the present appeal if filed.
5. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that in Govt. of A. P. v. Hindustan Machine Tools, : AIR1975SC2037 , the Supreme Court has decided the., power of the Gram Panehayat to levy fee and held that where there is no quid pro quo, the levying of fee is not proper. The Supreme Court was dealing with the fee levied under A. P. Gram Panchayats Act and, therefore, Ihe said judgment squarely covers the present case.
6. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader contended that there are 2 types of fee levied by the Gram Panchayat: one is for quid pro quo and the other is to derive some benefit. Further, in Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Orient Paper & Industries Ltd., : (1995)1SCC655 , the Supreme Court held that where the fee is levied on a man who gets benefits out of the transaction, the same cannot amount to quid pro quo.
7. In view of the above contentions, the important question of law that arises for our consideration is 'whether requirement of quid proquois essential or not, for levying or increasing the fee of licence granted to plant and enjoy the benefit of fruit hearing trees on the Gram Panchayat's land.'
8. To appreciate the above contentions, it is relevant to extract the different kinds of fee levied by the Gram Panchayat as per the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act. Chapter IV of the A. P. Gram Panchayats Act deals with 'Taxation and Finance'. Section 69 enumerates the power of the Gram Panchayats to levy tax, fee and other subjects. Section 69 (iv) empowers the Gram Panchayats for levying fees for the occupation of buildings including chavadis and sarais under the control of the Gram Panehayat Section 69 (4) empowers the Gram Panchayal for levying a duly in the form of a surcharge on the seigniorage fees collected by the Government onmaterials other than minerals and minor minerals quarried in the village. Similarly, there are a number of other provisions empowering the Gram Panchayat to levy duty, fees and tax. It is not relevant to refer to all of them for the purpose of this case. The above enumerated provisions show that the Gram Panchayat is empowered to levy fee on different kinds of transactions. In Hindustan Machine Tools Case (supra), the Supreme Court was considering the validity of levying fees for according permission to construct a building. The Supreme Court held that there is no provision in the Act for imposition of such fees. Further, there is no quid pro quo for such fees. It was further held that the public authority has to show what services are rendered or intended to be rendered individually to the particular person on whom the fee is imposed, for justifying the imposition of fees. In the said case, the Supreme Court was only considering the power of the Gram Panchayat to levy fee for according permission for construction of a building and the Supreme Court clearly held that there is no provision in the Act empowering the Gram Panchayat for levying such fee and further, there is no quid pro quo. In the present case, the Gram Panchayat is empowered to levy fee for the use of the poramboke land under the control of the Gram Panchayat. There is no dispute that the coconut trees on which fee is levied by the Gram Panchayat are situated in the poramboke land of the Grain Panchayat. Therefore, it has power to levy fee. Once it has power to levy fee, it has got power to increase the fee also. There is no dispute that the money value has gone down and the inflation rate is up. Further, as contended by the learned Government Pleader, the income from each coconut tree is more than Rs. 200/- per year. Therefore, the increase in fee from Rs. 10/- to Rs. 20/- cannot be said to be disproportionate.
9. The next contention is that there is no quid pro quo service provided by the Gram Panchayat. So, the levy is bad.
10. There are two types of fees: one is levied for services rendered for which quid pro quo is essential; and the other is levied for use of the property of the Local Authority. Where the fee is levied for the use of the property of the Local Authority, there is no requirement of quid pro quo and this principle has been considered by theSupreme Court in Upaj Mandi Samiti's Case (supra):--
'.....As indicated in Article 110(2)of the Constitution, ordinarily there are two classes, of cases where Government imposes fees upon persons. The first is of grant of permission or privilege and the second for services rendered. In the first class of cases, the cost incurred by the Government for granting of permission or privilege may be very small and the amount of imposition levied is based not necessarily upon the costs incurred by the Government but upon the benefit that individual receives. In such cases, the tax element is predominant. If the money paid by privilege-holders goes entirely for the expenses of matters of general public utility, the fee cannot but be regarded as a tax. In the other class of cases, the Government does some positive work for the benefit of persons, and the money is taken as the return for the work done or services rendered.
.....Theelement of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not always a sine qua non for a fee. The clement of quid pro quo is not necessarily absent in every tax. It is enough if there is a broad, reasonable and general correlationship between the levy and the resultant benefit to the class of people on which the fee is levied though no single payer of the fee receives direct or personal benefit from those services.....'
The said decision of the Supreme Court squarely applies to the facts of this case.
11. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Machine Tools case (supra) was rendered by 3 Honourable Judges and that the Supreme Court held therein that the Gram Panchayat has no power to levy fee for granting permission for construction of a building and that the same is binding as per Art. 141 of the Constitution of India as a precedent and that, therefore, no fee can be levied on the coconut trees. For the proposition that once a point is decided by the Supreme Court, it is immaterial whether a particular argument is considered or not by the Supreme Court, the judgment is binding for the future cases, he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Shukoor v. Arji Papa Rao, : AIR1963SC1150 . The same was again followed in B.M. Lakhani v. MalkapurMunicipality, : AIR1970SC1002 , Shyamaraju v. U.V. Bhat, : [1988]1SCR340 and Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn., : [1995]3SCR246 .
12. There is no dispute about the proposition laid down in the above judgments holding that once a particular point is decided, the judgment of the Supreme Court is binding, whether a particular contention is considered or not. As slated supra, in Hindustan Machine Tools Case (supra), the Supreme Court was considering a case wherein there was no provision for levying the fee on construction of the building. Interpreting the provisions and considering the factsof that case, it was held that a Gram Panchayat of A. P. has no power to levy fee for construction of a building. But, in the present case, Section 69 (i v) of the Act empowers the Gram Panchayat for levying fee for use of the poramboke land under the control of (he Gram Panchayat. Thus, there is a specific provision in the Act which empowers the Gram Panchayat for levying fee for use of the poramboke land under its control. The facts of the present case are different. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan machine Tools Case cannot be said to be one dealing with the point involved in the present case. So, the same is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Once it is not applicable to the facts of the present case, the question of it having the force of a binding precedent will not arise. In view of the above stated circumstances, we hold that the legal principle 'precedent is binding' is not violated.
13. In view of the above circumstances, wedo not see any ground to differ with the judgment of the learned single Judge. The writ appeal is dismissed.
14. No costs.
15. Appeal dismissed.