ORDER
1. There is conflict of perception of a problem, the problem of dealing with stray dogs in the twin Cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and remedial measures to be adopted to solve that problem, between an individual and a public authority and this conflict is carried to this Court for consideration and resolution by way of this writ petition, styled as Public Interest Litigation (PIL) under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner is one J. Gopalan. He claims to be an Engineer by profession and he is a permanent resident of Hyderabad for the past 30 years. The petitioner has stated that he has filed this PIL to espouse the cause of the residents of the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad.
2. The Respondent No. 1 is the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, for short 'the Corporation'; the second respondent is Smt. Rachel Chatterjee who was the Commissioner of the Corporation at the relevant time and the third respondent is Blue Cross represented by its Chair-Person Smt. Amala Akkineni. After the writ petition was filed in this Court on 17-10-1994, the A. P. Jeeva-raksha Sangam represented by its Secretary Peela Ramakrishna was impleaded as additional respondent No. 4 to the writ petition by an order of this Court dated 2-3-1995 made in W.P.M.P. No. 3819/95.
3. In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus for declaring the action of the first respondent in stopping the destruction of unlicensed stray dogs, as required under the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 249 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955 for short 'the Act' and handing over the dog pound to the third respondent permitting them to release the stray dogs back into the streets after sterilising them as arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional.
4. The facts pleaded by the petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of the writpetition may be summarised briefly as under:
Under sub-section (5) of Section 249 of the Act the Corporation is under an obligation to destroy unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs. In pursuance of this statutory duty cast on the Corporation, the Corporation, earlier used to seize unlicenced stray dogs and cause them to be destroyed. The third respondent Blue Cross claims to be an Animal Welfare Organisation and that was established recently by Smt. Amala Akkineni, aformer film actress. The said organisation has been taking up the cases of percieved cruelty to animals. In the issue ol Hindu dated 18-7-1994 it was reported that the second respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee and Smt. Maneka Gandhi, the former Union Minister for State decided at a meeting to hand over the dog pound of the Corporation to the Blue Cross for being converted into a birth control centre for stray dogs and under the said agreement, according to Hindu, the stray dogs would be caught and handed over to the Blue Cross which will conduct sterilisation operations, inoculate and release the dogs back into their respective streets. It is also reported in Hindu that tags and marks would be put on dogs before releasing them back into their respective streets for the purpose of easy identification. It is also claimed, as per the press report, according to the second respondent and Smt. Maneka Gandhi adoption of this new method would result in reduction of stray dogs population at least by half in a period of three years and consequently the Corporation would be in a position to put an end to the inhuman method of destruction of unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs. 'The second respondent, without due application of mind and without examining whether the new method suggested by Smt. Maneka Gandhi was viable and expedient, acceded to the method suggested by Smt. Maneka Gandhi and accorded permission to hand-over dog pound to the third respondent for being converted into a birth control centre for stray dogs. The second respondent did it with sole intention to appease 'Smt. 'Maneka Gandhi and Smt. Amala Akkineni completely ignoring the health and safety of the residents of the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secundera-bad. On account of introduction of new method of sterilisation of the stray dogs and abandoning the earlier method of destruction of the dogs, instances of dog bites have shown an alarming rise and this fact was reported in the issues of Hindu and Deccan Chronicle dated 13-10-1994 and according to these reports, groups of stray dogs have been roaming freely in the public streets and they are terrifying the public who use the public streets. The petitioner claims that he has been personally witnessing stray dogs chasing scooterists and innocent children in a menacing manner on the streets, many times biting the unfortunate victims. Sometimes, the terrified scooterists and cyclists dash against one another or fall down with fright. The stray dogs, most of the times, are found fighting with one another on the roads and show their anger on the passers-by by chasing or biting them. It is impossible for the public to know whether the dog that bites them is inoculated or not. It is also claimed by the petitioner that he has not come across even a single stray dog with either any tag or mark. This has resulted in innocent, poor and middle class residents of the twin-cities becoming victims of dog bites and they are forced to run from pillar to post for painful medical treatment. It is also claimed that the Blue Cross does not have adequate staff trained in sterilising dogs.
5. The respondents 1 to 3 have filed their respective counters. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2, it is claimed that the new measure of sterilising stray dogs is taken in good faith and to reduce stray dog population in the twin cities. It is claimed that the 'sterlisation-cum-immunisa-tion' of stray dogs is an internationally accepted programme and that programme has been impleme nted in several developed countries like Holand, Spain, Hongkong and U.S.A. In India also this programme is being implemented in other metropolis of India like Delhi, Bombay, Madras, Bangalore etc. The third respondent Blue Cross is a voluntary organisation and it is affiliated to Animal Welfare Board of India, an organ of the Ministry of Environment, Government of India. The Corporation has not handed overthe dog pound to the Blue Cross and the Corporation is only co-operating with the Blue Cross by supplying stray dogs for sterilisation-cum-immunisation. Sub-section (5) of Section 249 of the Act does not mandate the Corporation to destroy ail the stray dogs and there is a discretion vested in the Corporation to destroy or not to destroy the unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs. The Corporation has claimed that the new method has been introduced on trial basis and if tangible results are not seen by adoption of the new method, the Corporation may review the situation and adopt any other method or the earlier method to deal with the menace of stray dogs. The Corporation is keeping a close watch on the outcome of the adoption of the new method of sterilisation-cum-immunisation.
6. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the third respondent is sworn to by its Chairperson Smt. Amala Akkineni. The facts stated in the counter-affidavit of the third respondent be summarised as under:
7. Blue Cross is an animal welfare organisation founded in January, 1993 by Smt. Amala Akkineni and a small group of animal lovers and the organisation is registered and ever since its inception it has been working sincerely for animal welfare in the twin cities. It is a moral obligation on every one that all animals whether domesticated or wild should be protected from cruelty. Animal welfare is a cause which has been thoroughly neglected though animals have been serving humanity from the dawn of civilisation. The Blue Cross has been working with the main object of preventing the uncontrolled proliferation of stray dogs and the incidence of rabies in the twin cities and it has ben conducting 25 sterilisation operations per day and the dogs' are given anti-rabies inoculations, tagged and released back in their respective areas. The laudable and result oriented new programme has resulted in tangible improvement in reducing stray dog population and it has earned compliments from the Animal Welfare Board of India. Even according to the World Health Organisation, mass destruction of dogs is not to beconsidered a reliable or an effective way to deal with the stray dog over-population. It is claimed that wherever there is disposal of garbage and food on the streets, there will automatically be stray dogs and the number of stray dogs, in spite of killing thousands every year, will remain in porportion to the amount of food and space available. Therefore mass destruction of stray dogs is not viable measure to deal with the problem. The effective measures recommended by the World Health Organisation in the third world countries are mass sterilisation, mass vaccination against rabies and removal of all garbage dumps, waste food etc., from city roads. The new project has been approved by the Animal Welfare Board of India by its letter dated 4-2-1994 and the Animal Welfare Board of India is providing ample funds for executing the project. It is also claimed that the dog pound is very much with the Corporation. The Corporation after noticing the miserable failure to control the stray dog over population through mass killing, has accepted the new method of sterilisation-cum-immunisa-tion with the help of the Blue Cross. The third respondent has produced materials and details to contend that the new project is not a failure but it has achieved tangible good results and the Animal Welfare Board also noticed these results and complimented the Blue Cross for its services. Lastly, the third respondent has taken strong exception to the pleading of the petitioner castigating motives to Smt. Maneka Gandhi, Smt. Amala Akkaineni and the then Commissioner Smt. Rachel Chatterjee. It is stated that without any warrant and basis, certain demeaning observations and statements are made throughout the petition averments and this part of the pleading should be disapproved.
8. The impleaded additional respondent No. 4, as could be seen from the averments made in W.P.M.P. No. 3819/95, has fully supported the claim of the respondents 1 to 3. The respondent No. 4 is also a registered society and is interested in the protection of stray dogs and in fact it wanted to launch a similar project of sterilisation-cum-immuni-sation in Guntur city and in that regard thesociety has been corresponding with the Animal Welfare Board of India for approval and financial assistance.
9. Heard Sri Prabhakar Sripada, the learned counsel for the petitioner; Sri K.N. Jwala, the learned standing counsel for the first and second respondents, Smt. C. Jaya-shree Sarathy, the learned counsel for the third respondent and Sri B. S Thakur, the learned counsel for the fourth respondent.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
(a) the first respondent is under a statutory obligation as commanded by the provisions of sub-section (5) of the Section 249 and Section 112 of the Act read with Section 27 and Section 66(f) of the Hyderabad City Police Act, 1348F to destroy unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs and this duty cast on the corporation is absolute and mandatory and under no circumstance the performance of its duty can validly be delegated to an external agency like the third respondent Blue Cross in the absence of any provision in the Act empowering it to delegate the performance of the said duty, and therefore the action of the first respondent to hand over the dog pound to the third respodent and empowering the latter to deal with stray dogs is totally ultra vires of Section 249(5) of the act;
(b) that the new project/programme of sterilisation-immunisation of stray dogs is neither pragmatic nor viable approach to deal with the problem of over-population of stray dogs and moreover the new project is not supported by any scientific investigation. The adoption of the new programme has resulted in an alarming increase in the population of stray dogs in the twin cities threatening safety and health of its residents;
(c) the action of the Corporation in entrusting the statutory duty to the third respondent-Blue Cross is otherwise invalid inasmuch as the action is tainted by malice in fact exhibited by the second respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee; and
(d) that serious personal allegations are levelled against the second respondent by thepetitioner and therefore if the second respondent wanted to deny those allegations, she herself ought to have filed counter-affi-davit and for the reasons best known to her, she has not chosen to file the counter-affidavit, The counter-affidavit filed by the deputy of the second respondent denying those allegations cannot be taken into account while dealing with the allegations levelled against the second respondent in the writ petition.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 4 would contend that
(i) the writ petition is a frivolous and vexatious one which is liable to be dismissed in limine;
(ii) the writ petition is grounded solely on the misleading, inaccurate and dishonest reports in the press and no acceptable materials worth the name are placed before the Court in support of the allegations contained in the writ petition;
(iii) the third respondent started functioning only from the month of September, 1994 whereas the writ petition was filed in this Court on 17-10-1994 making reckless and unfounded allegations against the second and third respondents and obviously the petitioner could not expect any tangible results within a period of one month from the initiation of the project and without waiting even for a reasonable time had rushed to this Court and made totally baseless allegations;
(iv) the materials placed before the Court by the respondents 1 to 3 clinchingly prove the fact that the new project providing for sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs is not only expedient, result-oriented and humane but also inconsonance with the prevailing thinking in the world, fully supported by scientific investigations carried out by the agencies and experts throughout the world including the world body like World Health Organisation, and moreover the adoption of the new programme has resulted in tangible and quite encouraging progress in containing the dog-bite menace and the public at large including the poor and middleclass citizens for whom the petitioner is stated to have special concern have welcomed the adoption of the new programme and no one except the petitioner, that too, in this petition, has so far complained about the expediency and utility of the new programme. On the other hand the Animal Welfare Board of India has very much appreciated the working of the Blue Cross and it complimented the Blue Cross for the results so far achieved by it.
12. In addition to these arguments, Smt. C. Jayashree Sarathy, the learned counsel for the third respondent took strong exception to the scandalizing averments mode in the writ petition castigating motive to the third respondent and she particularly drew the attention of the Court to what is stated by the petitioner in para 12 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and contended that such a motivated, unnecessary and baseless allegations should be disapproved by the Court and the petitioner for having made such reckless and baseless allegations should be saddled with exemplary costs payable to the third respondent to vindicate the requirement of decency and propriety in the matter of pleadings.
13. The last two contentions of the petitioner may be considered in the first instance. The last and the least attracting but quite vociferously argued technical argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner has levelled serious personal allegations against the second respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee to bring home the charge of malice in fact and therefore the law requires that if according to Smt. Rachel Chatterjee those allegations are baseless and false, she should have filed her personal counter-affidavit denying those allegations and the counter-affidavit sworn to by Sri M. Chandrapal Reddy, the Veterinary Officer of the Corporation denying those allegations is not a denial at all in the eye of law, and therefore the allegations of the petitioner should be taken to be true and correct and on that basis the Court should decide the case.
14. This is not an adversarial litigation but a public interest litigation filed underArticle 226 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Courts, while exercising anew jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226, are not bound to follow technical rules of procedure. The Supreme Court, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, : [1984]2SCR67 dealing with a public interest litigation filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and the procedure to be followed in such proceedings, held that the adversarial procedure embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidene Act have no application where the Constitutional Courts exercise a new jurisdiction conferred upon them under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the Courts can adopt any 'appropriate' proceeding, 'appropriate' not in terms of any particular form but 'appropriate' with reference to the purpose of the proceeding. The Supreme Court in para 15 of its judgment made it very clear that what it observed by it in paragraphs 11 to 14 would equally apply in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction by High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution.
15. Even otherwise it is not an invariable rule that the affidavit must be sworn by the party himself in all cases. Demand for compliance with the rule that the counter-affidavit must be sworn by the party himself depends upon many attending circumstances such as the nature of the allegations, whether those allegations are within the knowledge of the party himself or whether those allegations could be traversed on the basis of the records, whether those allegations, if not denied, will have any bearing or impact on the decision to be reached, the official status of the person who has sworn to the counter-affidavit and whether such official is the custodian of, and has access to, the relevant records and whether he has authority from the party to the legal action etc. The Court has to decide the necessity of filing the counter-affidavit by the party himself taking into account all these factors and circumstances. There is no hard and fast rule in this regard even in the field of adversarial litigations. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2, Sri M. Chandrapal Reddy has specificallystated that he was authorised by the respondents 1 and 2 and he is well acquainted with the facts of the case. This assertion of Sri Chandrapal Reddy is not denied by the petitioner in his reply affidavit. The petitioner has utterly failed to prove the charge of mala fide against the second respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee for the reasons to follow presently. Therefore, the failure of Smt. Rachel Chatterjee to swear to the counter-affidavit is no way helpful to the petitioner and there was no necessity for Smt. Rachel Chatterjee to file her personal affidavit. In the facts-situatioin of this case, Smt. Rachel Chatterjee perhaps might have been advised that there was no necessity to file her personal counter-affidavit.
16. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the action of the Corporation in adopting the scheme of sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs is tainted by the malice in fact exhibited by the second respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee. The decision of the Corporation to adopt the scheme for sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs is a policy decision of the Corporation. Policy is an art of Government, a State craft or a course of action based on some declared principle or expediency. 'Policy' is a system of administration guided more by interest than by principle. The very notion of 'policy' indicates its leaning towards a particular declared principle or expediency or utility. Looking from that angle and broad speaking one will find an element of orientation bias in large number of policy decisions of the administration. Generally speaking, departmental or ministerial policy cannot be regarded as disqualifying bias. As rightly pointed out by the learned author, S.A. de Smith in his book 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action' (4th Edition), that the public administration cannot be carried on in a spirit of judicial detachment. We should note that it will be legitimately proper and legal for a public authority to make a particular decision for its own perceived advantage or benefit, as distinct from the advantage or benefit perceived by individual members, and a decision as to the mode of discharging a public duty will not necessarilybe vitiated by the personal interest of the officer occupying the public office in the method adopted. Only in those cases where the policy decisions in question have a judicial flavour because of express procedural requirements or an obligation to act or operate under the limitations or constraints imposed by the statute, before discretion is exercised in a matter having civil consequences for individuals, a duty to comply with the rule against bias can be insisted. It is true that the policy decisions are not beyond the pale of Article 14 of the Constitution. The right or discretion to have a policy should not detract from fair mindedness, impartial enquiry, examination of relevant facts and due application of mind to those facts. The policy cannot be arbitrary, unreasonable and fanciful. In other words, the policy decisions also should satisfy the postulates of Article 14 of the Constitution. If the Court finds that the policy in question is illegal, irrational or it offends any of the provisions of the Constitution or suffers from procedural impropriety is such policy decision is required to be taken after following a specific procedure contemplated in a statute, the Court can interfere with such policy decision.
17. When we speak about 'a policy', we should remember that a policy is only a course of action in respect of a subject matter and there are other alternative courses of action to deal with the same subject matter. Here, the administration plays a key role. It has to choose one of the many courses of action to deal with the subject matter and it can choose any course of action which it thinks is advantageous to it unless its discretion to choose is taken away by law. Expediency and utility of a policy is primarily with the domain of the administration and the scope of judicial review in that regard is very much limited and circumscribed and the Court can interfere with policy decisions only under those circumstances set out above.
18. Even an administrator is entitled to have a particular perception about a policy administered by him. Frank, J., an American Judge speaking about 'bias' and 'partiality' of the Judges, in In re Linahan (1943) 138 F 2d.650 observed as under:
'If, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of pro-conceptions in the mind of the judge, then no one has even had a fair trial and no one ever will. The human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions; and the processes of education, formal and informal, create attitudes in all men which affect them in judging situations, attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by definition, are prejudices.'
In the same decision Frank, J., proceeded to observe that
'Much harm is done by the myth that, merely in putting on a black robe and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all predilections, and becomes a passionless thinking machine.'
Bias in the sense of conviction in moral and ethicai values is not avoidable, Professor Robson in his book 'Justice and Administrative Law (1951), writes:
'In all civilised countries the judge must, in fact, possess certain conceptions of what is socially desirable, or at least acceptable, and his decisions, when occasions arise, must be guided by these conceptions. In this sense judges are and must be biased .... It is a simple fact that a man who had not a standard of moral values which approximated broadly to the accepted opinions of the day, who had no beliefs as to what is harmful to society and what beneficial, who had no bias in favour of marriage as against promiscuous sexual relations, honesty as against deceit, truthfulness as against lying; who did not think wealth better than poverty, orthodox religion preferable to atheism, courage better than cowardice, constitutional Government more desirable than anarchy, would not be tolerated as a judge on the bench of any Western country.'
19. What is stated by Frank, J., and Professor Robson about the judges are also equally apply to the administrators. Aperson, after becoming an administrator, does not strip himself of all human perceptions and predilections and take the role of a machine.
20. In this case the main contention of the petitioner is that the Corporation, as per the provisions of Section 249(5) and Section 112 of the Act read with Sections 27 and 66(f) of the Hyderabad City Police Act, 1348F, is under an obligation to destroy the unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs and this duty cast on the Corporation is absolute and mandatory. If that is so, even accepting the case of the petitioner that Smt. Maneka Gandhi and Smt. Amala Akkineni persuaded the second respondent Smt. Rachel Chatterjee, the then Commissioner of the Corporation to accept their view point, that fact itself will in no way relevant or have a bearing on the issue to be decided. Admittedly, both the ladies are exponents and rigorously pleading with the authorities against killing of stray dogs and they pleaded for humane approach to solve the dog-bite menace. There was nothing wrong on their part to plead with the Commissioner to accept their view point and equally there was nothing wrong on the pan of the Commissioner to hear them before she decided to involve the Blue Cross and adopt the new scheme of sterilisation-cum-immuni-aation. Any modern responsible and responsive public authority is expected to act and react with the public opinion voiced through the enlightened citizens in the society. Smt. Maneka Gandhi and Smt. Amala Akkineni are not higher authorities in the echelon of Administration of the Corporation and therefore the Commissioner acting under their dictation without applying her mind did not Arise. The allegation is that the Commissioner was unduly influenced by Smt. Gandhi and Smt. Amala and in order to please them she approved the scheme of sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs. Every man including men holding public officers are capable of influencing others and in turn amenable to be influenced by others if the word 'influence', in the context, means the power of producing an effect. These are the traits of an efficient teacher and a open mind person respectively. Nodoby can have validobjection to it. Nothing is placed on record to show that Smt. Rachel Chatterjee acted mechanically without due application of mind to appease the two ladies for any collateral or extraneous consideration. Factual foundation is totally lacking in the pleading of the petitioner to bring home the charge of malice in fact against Smt. Rachel Chatterjee and the pleading in that regard is poorer than the poorest.
21. It is true that when an administrative or statutory action is taken out of affection, friendship, personal animosity, ill-will, grudge or vengeance, such action will be struck down by the Courts on the ground of malice in fact. Mala fides or bad faith means dishonest intention or corrupt motive. Sometimes, it is difficult to discern whether or not the administration has exceeded its powers because of the broader terms of the concerned statutes, nevertheless, administrative or statutory action may be declared invalid if the motivation behind the action is corrupt or dishonest. But, the burden of proving mala fides is on the individual making the allegation and this burden is very heavy. There is a presumption in favour of the administration that it exercises its power and discretion in good faith and for public purpose and benefit. The very seriousness of allegation of mala fides demands proof of a high degree of credibility. Law requires that the particulars of fraud or mala fides must be specifically alleged. Facts and grounds as basis of allegations of mala fides, must be clearly stated in the affidavit. The Court will not entertain general allegations of bad faith unless expressly pleaded. The petitioner has to clearly mention the ground of mala fides, as an attack in the pleadings and he is also under an obligation to make a full disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge in clearest possible terms failing which he may be disentitled to the relief. Comments based on impressions or opinions are completely out of place- The Supreme Court in Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, : AIR1988SC2181 held that in a writ petition a party raising a point must plead not only relevant facts but also state facts by way of evidence in proof of the facts so pleaded. This rule laid down by theApex Court is a departure from the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. The rule is so because the writ petitions are decided by the Constitutional Courts on the basis of affidavits and counter-affidavits and seldom the parties are examined and cross-examined in such proceedings.
22. The Supreme Court, in Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, : (1966)ILLJ458SC has emphasized that mala fides should be established only by direct evidence, i.e., that must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the notings in the file which preceded the order.
23. In E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, : (1974)ILLJ172SC although three out of the five Judges on the Bench thought that there were circumstances to create suspicion in the mind of the Court about the bona fides of the Government, nevertheless, the Court refused to declare the action mala fide holding that suspicion could not take the place of proof and proof needed is a high degree proof.
24. In the present case, the petitioner except stating that the Commissioner took the impugned action to please the two ladies has not set out circumstances or background facts in the pleading to show that Smt. Rachel Chatterjee, the then Commissioner was obliged to appease Smt. Maneka Gandhi and Smt. Amala Akkineni for any extraneous or collateral considerations. Therefore the plea of mala fide levelled against Smt, Rachel Chatterjee is not proved and the argument of the learned counsel based on alleged mala fide had to be rejected and it is accordingly rejected on the ground of lack of necessary pleading and proof. Alternatively, even accepting the case of the petitioner that Smt. Maneka Gandhi and Smt. Amala Akkineni pleaded with and pursuaded Smt. Rachel Chatterjee to adopt the scheme of sterilisa-tion-cum-immunisation of stray dogs and Smt. Rachel Chatterjee adopted the said scheme, that fact itself will not be a proof to bring home the charge of mala fide against her, if the action is otherwise legal and justified.
25. This takes us to the main contentionof the learned co unsel for the petitioner. The contention-is that the provisions of Section 249(5) and Section 112 of the Act read with the provisions o f Sections 27 and 66(f) of the Hyderabad City Police Act mandate the Corporation to destroy unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs and the duty cast on the Corporation is mandatory and absolute. To appreciate the argument of the learned counsel it is useful to refer to certain provisions of the Act and that of the Hyderabad City Police Act. Chapter III of the Act deals with obligatory and discretionary duties of the Corporation. Section 112 mandates the Corporation to make adequate provision for the matters specified therein. For our purpose, Entry 18 and Entry 21 are relevant. The matter in Entry 18 is 'preventing the spread of infectious diseases'. The matter in Entry 21 is 'the fulfilment of any obligation imposed by or under the Act or any other law for the time being in force'. The duty cast on the Corporation under Section 112 is obligatory. Section 113 of the Act provides that the Corporation shall make payments at such rates and subject to such conditions as the Government may from time to time by general or special order determine, for the maintenance and treatment in any institution which the Government declares by notification in the Andhra Pra-desh Gazette to be suitable for such purpose either within or without the City and other necessary expenses of persons undergoing anti-rabies treatment as indigent persons according to the rules applicable to such institutions, In other words, under Section 113 of the Act the Corporation is required to reimburse the expenses incurred for maintenance of institutions and treatment of the patients. Section 115 of the Act deals with the matters which may be provided for by the Corporation at its discretion and it states that the Corporation may provide from time to, time, either wholly or partly, for all or any of the matters specified in that section. Section 115 contains 40 Entries. The matter included in Entry 20 is 'the destruction of vermins, birds or animals causing a danger or nuisance, and the confinement or destruction of stray dogs. Section 27 of the Hyderabad City Police Act provides that the Commissioner of CityPolice, Hyderabad may, from time to time, by notification proclaim that any stray dog found, during such time as may be specified in the notification, wandering in any street or in any public place shall be destroyed and every such dog found in any street or public place, during the hours mentioned in the notification, shall be destroyed. Section 66 provides, among other things, that whoever in any street, or public place negligently lets loose any horse, or other animal so as to cause danger, injury, alarm or annoyamce or lets loose any ferocious dog without a muzzle, shall for every such offence, be pu nished with fine which may extend to Rs. 50/-. Section 248 of the Act deals with tax on dogs whereas Section 249 of the Act deals with grant of licence and providing number tic ket for dogs and disposal of unlicenced and unclaimed dogs. Sections 248 and 249 read as under:
'248. Tax on Dogs: (1) A tax not exceedingrupees ten per annum shall be levied on every dog kept within the city and not under the age of six months.
(2) Every person who owns or is incharge of any dog on which a tax is leviable under sub-section (1) shall be liable for such tux.
(3) (a) Every person who owns or is incharge of any dog shall, before the first day of May in each financial year, forward to the Commissioner a return signed by him containing his name and address and the age of such do?
(b) Every person who after the first day of May in any financial year becomes the owner or takes charge of any dog, shall within one week from the date on which he becomes the owner o r takes charge of the dog, forward to the Commissioner a like return, singned by him.
(4) The tax shall be payable for every financial year in advance on the first day of May.
Provided that -
(i) in respect of a dog which attains the age of six months after the first day of May, the tax shall be payable immediately after the expiry of one week from the day on which thedog attains such age, and
(ii) in cases in which a person becomes the owner or takes charge of any dog, not under the age of six months, after the first day of May, the tax shall be payable immediately after the expiry of one week from the day on which he becomes the owner or takes charge of such dog.
Provided further that the tax shall not be payable more than once for the financial year in respect of any dog.
(5) The Commissioner shall maintain a register showing the persons liable to pay the tax under this section.
249. Licence and number ticket for and disposal of dogs: (1) when the owner or pers on-in-charge of any dog has paid the tax levi able on and the price fixed for the number tickets for such dog, the Commissioner shall -
(a) grant him a licence for the keeping by him of such dog during the financial year for which he had paid the tax, and
(b) provide him with a number ticket, the number of which shall be specified in such licence.
(2) The owner or person in-charge of any dog so licensed shall at all times cause the said number ticket to be kept attached to the collar or otherwise suspended from the neck of the dog.
(3) Any dog, which has no number ticket so attached or suspended -
(i) shall be presumed to be a dog in respect of which no licence has been granted, and
(ii) may be seized by the police or by any officer duly authorised by the Commissioner in this behalf, and detained until the tax due, if any, has been paid.
(4) If any person, within three days from the date of such seizure, satisfies the Commissioner that he is the owner or person incharge of such dog, the Commissioner shall order it to be delivered to such person on payment of the tax if any, due and the costsincurred by the Commissioner by reason of its detention.
(5) if, within the said three days, no person satisfies the Commissioner that he is the owner or person in-charge of the dog, the Commissioner may cause the dog either -
(a) to be destroyed, or
(b) to be sold and the proceeds of the sale, after deducting therefrom the said tax and costs (together with the costs of sale) to be paid to any person who within six months from the date of such sale establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, his claim to such proceeds.
26. Dog is a domestic animal. There are two classes of dogs -- one class of dogs owned by persons and the other class of dogs not owned by any person. The reading of the provisions of Sections 248 and 249 together makes it very clear that these two sections essentially deal with the dogs owned by persons. Section 248 required that every person who owns or is in-charge of any dog to pay tax. Section 249 provides that when the owner or person in-charge of any dog pays the tax under Section 248. The Commissioner shall grant him a licence for keeping the dog by him and provide him with a number ticket and the owner is obliged to keep the number ticket attached to the collar or suspended from the neck of the dog. Sub-section (3) of Section 249 provides that if any dog which had no number ticket shall be presumed to be a dog in respect of which no licence has been granted and the officer duly authorised by the Commissioner of the Corporation is entitled to seize such dog. Sub-section 4 of the Section 249 provides that within three days from the date of such seizure, if any person satisfied the Commissioner that he is the owner of the dog, then the Commissioner shall order the delivery of the dog to the custody of such person on payment of the tax, if any, due and the costs incurred by the Corporation by reason of detention of the dog. Sub-section (5) provides that within the said three days, if no person comes forward claiming the ownership of the dog, the Commissioner may cause the dog either to be destroyed or to be sold.The language of sub-section (5) of Section 249 does not warrant an interpretation to hold that there is mandatory duty cast on the Corporation to destroy each and every unlicenced and unclaimed dog. On the other hand, the language of sub-section (5) of Section 49 is clear that there is a discretion vested in the Com missioner either to destroy the unlicenced and unclaimed dogs or he may choose to sell the dogs as provided under clause (b) of sub-section (5) or he may resort to some other procedure to dispose of the unlicenced and unclaimed dogs. The provisions of sub-section (5) do not mandate the Commissioner to destroy or sell the dogs. These are not the only options open to the Commissioner to dispose of the unlicenced dogs.
27. While interpreting these provisions, the Court may take into account the fundamental duties of the citizens set out i.n Article 51A of the Constitution. Part IV A has been added by the Constitution (42nd Amendment)' 1976 in accordance with the recommendations of the Swaran Singh Committee, Clause; (g) of Article 51A provides that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures (emphasis is supplied by the Court), Therefore if is expected that a citizen while exercising and enforcing his fundamental rights, should remember that he owes the duties specified in Article 51A to the State and that if he does not care for the duties he should not deserve the rights. Of course, the duty as such is not legally enforceable in the Courts; but if the State makes a law to prohibit any act or conduct in violation of any of the duties, the Courts would uphold that as a reasonable rest tiction on the relevant fundamental right, just as they did uphold any law implementing a Directive Principle. Even before Part IVA was in troduced by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 the Supreme Court in Chandra Bhavan v. State of Mysore, AIR 1970 SC 3042 had to observe as under;
'It is a fallacy to think that under our Constitution there are only rights and noduties. The provisions in Part IV enable the Legislatures to impose various duties on the citizens. The mandate of our Constitution is to build a welfare society and that object may be achieved to the extent the Directive Principles are implemented by legislation.'
If so, either in determining the constitutionality of such laws, or in interpreting the same, the Court should have regard to the Fundamental Duties as well as Directives along with the Fundamental Rights.
28. In Mumbai Kamgat Sabha v. Abdul-bhai, : (1976)IILLJ186SC the Supreme Court held that
'the Courts may also look at the dutieswhile interpreting equivocal statutes whichadmit of two constructions.'
To the same effect is the decision of the Apex Court in Mohan v. Union of India, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 594, AIR 1992 SC 1.
29. After insertion of Article 51A. it has become the duty of every citizen to have compassion for living creatures. Firstly, to have beneficial considerations at the hands of the State is not the monopoly of human beings. Innate compassion in man extends not only towards the fellow human-beings but also it extends towards all the creatures in his surrounding. Secondly, and more importantly the man has come to realise that his very existence is very much dependant upon the sustenance and protection of the creatures including plants. This historical realisation, rather the truth, led men to voluntarily enact laws for sustenance and protection of flora and fauna. If this aspect and the duty cast on the citizens under Article 51A(g) are kept in mind, the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 249 of the Act have to be interpreted in such a way as to advance the Constitutional goal. If it is so interpreted, it is not possible to accept the argument of the learned counsel that Section 249(5) of the Act mandates mass destruction of all the unlicenced dogs. It is equally not possible for the Court to hold that sub-section (5) of Section 249 of the Act gives only two options to the Commissioner to dispose of the unlicenced and unclaimed dogs, either by destruction or by sale. There-fore the argument of the learned counsel for , the petitioner is rejected.
30. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner based on Section 112 of the Act and Sections 27 and 66 (f) of the Hyderabad City Police Act is misconceived. As already pointed out supra, there is a specific entry. Entry No. 20 in Section 115 of the Act dealing with the destruction of certain animals including confinement and destruction of stray dogs. Section 115 of the Act unmistakingly states that the Corporation may provide from time to time, either wholly or partly, for all or any of the matters specified in that section at its discretion. Therefore, it cannot be held that confinement or destruction of stray dogs is a mandatory duty cast On the Corporation. When there is. specific entry in Section 115 of the Act itself dealing with confinement and destruction of stray dogs, it is not permissible to hold that there is a mandatory duty cast on the Corporation to destroy the stray dogs basing on the general Entry No. 18 in Section 112 of the Act dealing with the prevention of the spread of'ihfectious diseases. The mandatory duty of the Corporation under Section 112 of the Act to make adequate provision for preventing the spread of infectious diseases does not include the duty to destroy the unlicenced and unclaimed stray dogs. There-fore there is no merit in, the contention of the learned counsel. Equally, the argument of the learned counsel based on Sections 27 and 66(f) of the Hyderabad City Police Act should be rejected in limine for more than one reason. In the first instance, Section 27 of the said Act deals with the power of the Commissioner of City Police, Hederabad to order destruction of stray dogs. The Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad is not a party to the writ proceedings and no relief is sought against him. Secondly the reading of Section 27 of the said Act makes it very clear that sections does not madate the Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad to destroy all stray dsgs. A discretionary power is conferred upon the Commissioner of City Police. The provisions of Section 66(f) of the Hyderabad City Police Act has no bearing on the issue, raised before the Court. Section 66(f) of theHyderabad City Police Act only provides that whoever in any street or public place negligently lets loose any ferocious dog without a muzzle is liable to be punished with fine which may extend to rupees fifty. From this provision, it cannot be said that there is a duty cast on the Corporation to destroy all stray dogs.
31. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the entrustment of the dog pound and implementation of the scheme of sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs to the Blue Cross tantamounts to sub-delegation of statutory duty to an external agency without authority conferred upon the Corporation under the Act is misconceivedand not tenable. In the first place, the allegation of the petitioner that dog pound is handed over to the Blue Cross is factually incorrect. The dog pound is still managed and maintained by the Corporation. Blue Cross is a voluntary social organisation and it has come forward to assist the Corporation in its battle against the problem of dog-biting menace in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad and the Corporation has accepted its voluntary services. It is stated that Blue Cross is mainly funded by the Animal Welfare Board of India. Therefore it is not a case of sub-delegation. There is a difference between sub-delegation and taking of assistance. This is a case where the Corporation is taking assistance of a voluntary organisation. The Supreme Court in Pradyat Kumar v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, : [1955]2SCR1331 has pointed out the difference between sub-delegation and taking of an assistance. In that case, the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court appointed a puisne Judge to enquire into certain charges leveled against the Registrar of the High Court. After consideration of the enquiry report submitted by the puisne Judge, the Chief Justice dismissed the Registrar. Assailing the said action of the Chief Justice, it was contended by the Registrar that under the relevant Rules, only the Chief Justice was competent authority to hold the enquiry and therefore the entrustment of the case to the puisne Judge to hold enquiry into the charges against him tanta-mounted to sub-delegating the statutory power without there being any provision inthe rules empowering the Chief Justice to sub-delegate his power to any one else and therefore the action of the Chief Justice in dismissing him was vitiated. Repelling that contention, the Supreme Court held that the Chief Justice by entrusting the enquiry to a puisne Judge took only assistance from the puisne Judge and did not sub-delegate his power to the puisne Judge. Therefore it cannot be said that the Corporation has abdicated its statutory function and sub-delegated the same to the Blue Cross. The Corporation itself still manages, controls and supervises the new scheme of sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs. Involvement of the Blue Cross in the scheme is only an instance of assistance.
32. The other argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the new scheme of sterilisation-cum-immunisation of stray dogs is neither pragmatic nor viable and is it not based on any scientific investigation or enquiry. As already pointed above, the utility and expediency of the new scheme is primarily within the domain of the administration of the Corporation. Of course, policy decisions are not sacrosanct against the unreasonableness doctrine and in certain circumstances, even policy decisions can be reviewed and struck down by applying the tests of rationality provided necessary and acceptable materials are placed before the Court to show that the policy decision in question is wholly irrational and prejudicial to the public interest. It is not for the Court to appraise the wisdom of a policy decision in the absence of such acceptable materials. Lord Parker put the same point more strongly in stating that where no agreement exists on the ends of society and the means of achieving those ends, it would be disastrous if Courts did not eschew the temptation to pass judgment on an issue of policy (see pages 27-28 of Recent Developments in the Supervisory Powers of the Courts over Inferior Tribunals (1959)). Judicial self-preservation should dictate restraint in this field.
33. The contention of the petitioner is based on nothing except the reports in the Press and the petitioner's personal perceptionof the problem. No acceptable materials of any sort are placed before the Court to show that the new scheme is a failure. The new scheme was launched in the month of September, 1994 whereas the writ petition was filed in this Court on 17-10-1994. It was an impossibility for anybody to assess the viability, expediency, utility and result of the scheme in a matter like this within the period of one and half month. The petitioner has (produced a report which appeared in the issue of Deccan Chronicle dated 13-10-1994, as the factual matrix in support of his contention. The said report reads as under:
'Alarming rise in dog-bites
Thanks to Amala Akkineni and Maneka Gandhi's campaign to save the street dogs from a brutal end by the dog squad of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH), the twin cities are facing a serious menace and there is a rapid increase in the number of cases of dog bites. The rush at the Rabies Clinic at the Institute of Preventive Medicine is a testimony to it.
The authorities at the clinic say the cases have increased in recent months -- an average of 700 dog-bite victims come to the Institute to take the anti-rabies treatment and vaccine everyday. Apart from this clinic, many other private clinics and doctors are also giving the anti-rabies injections. The Institute produces around 25 lakh doses per annum. There is an increase in the demand for the vaccine in the city and the State. However, the Institute is not able to serve the needs of other States.
Meanwhile, four vehicles of the MCH's dog squad are lying unused. Under a deal struck between the Blue Cross and the MCH, the Municipal authorities have stopped killing stray dogs. Instead, they are being sterilised.
But the MCH officials feel that the solution is not effective in controlling the dog population. They are of the view that if stray dogs are not killed, their population will increase rapidly and the people will continue to suffer. The problem has already become serious in many localities, especially with residentsreturning to their homes late at night becoming the favourite targets of stray dogs.
But the most vulnerable are children, whose number among dog-bite victims is going high.
Tailpiece: Maneka Gandhi was in the city on Monday and shared the platform with NTR. If NTR comes to power, he is reported to have promised not only to protect the stray dogs, but also offer free food to all the street dogs in the twin cities.'
34. In the first place, who has authorised this report is not forthcoming from the report. It does not state that the report was preceded by any investigation or enquiry. It also does not state that before the new project was launched how many patients were visiting the Rabies Clinic. In other words, the opinion expressed in the report seems to be based on the subjective and personal opinion of the author and not on any impartial enquiry, investigation and collection of relevant materials. Therefore, it is totally improper for the Court to act on such report and hold that the new scheme is a failure.
35. The petitioner in para 8 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition hasstated:
'I submit that I have been personally witnessing stray dogs chasing scoolerists and innocent children in a menacing manner on the streets, many times biting the unfortunate victims. Sometimes the terrified scooterists and cyclists dash against one another or fall down with fright. The stray dogs, most of the time are fighting with one another on the roads and show their anger on the passersby, by chasing or biting them.'
36. The petitioner has not stated that what he claims to have personally witnessed was something new and such a thing never happened or existed before the launching of the new project. Even assuming that such state of affairs existed at the time when the new scheme was launched in September, 1994 and the same state of affairs continued eventhere afterwards, that fact itself cannot be an indication to say that the scheme is a failure. It was totally unreasonable to expect that within a short period of one and half month the new scheme involving an element of experimentation should have brought out some discernible encouraging results. The Corporation has specifically denied the allegation that there is an increase in the population of stray dogs after the new scheme was launched. The Blue Cross, in its counter, has set out the following statistics relating to number of dog bites, number of dogs killed and number of cases of rabies before and after the new project began.
YearNo. of dog bitesNo. of dogs killedRabies
1991-9234,70012,360221992-9342,20116,353261993-9451,49017,371321994-95April 5344150 per day6 May 4955150 per day7 June 4543150 per day4 July 3539150 until 17th1After the project began: Aug. 2183220 Sept. 1933231
37. In the counter it is stated that even the above figures do not reflect the correct state of affairs. It is stated that the above numbers include also the patients coming from villages for treatment and monkey bites, cat bites, pet dog bites and rat bites. It is also stated that if a pet dog has not received the anti-rabies vaccine, it is also registered as a stray dog in the Institute of Preventive Medicine. This assertion of the third respondent seems to be correct because the Director of Preventive Medicine in a statement given to the Blue Cross and also in the statement issued to the press which is reported in the issue of the Hindu dated 21-10-1994 has endorsed this position.
38. The statistics furnished by the res-pondents clearly go to show that there is considerable decrease in number of dog bites after the new project was launched. Therefore, the allegation of the petitioner to the contrary is baseless. On the contrary the work of the Blue Cross was appreciated. The Secretary to the Animal Welfare Board of India in his communication dated 9-5-1995 has stated as under:
'Animal Welfare Board of India
(Ministry of Environment and Forests,
Govt. of India)
No. 60, 4th Street, Abhiramapuram,
Madras-600018.
N. Ravi Shanker, I.A.S.,
Secretary. 9-5-95.
To Whomsoever It May Concern
This is to certify that Blue Cross of Hyderabad, 8-2-544/1, Road No. 7, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad-500 034 is an Animal Welfare Organisation, recognised by the Animal Welfare Board of India.
The organisation participated in the Animal Birth Control Programme, launched in Six Metros on a pilot project basis. The area of operation of Blue Cross of Hyderabad is Hyderabad City.
Among 15 organisations who were participants in the Animal Birth Control Programme in Six Metros, the work of Blue Cross of Hyderabad was exceptionally good and in quantitative terms they performed the largest number of ABC Operations (3,233 cases) in the span from July 1994 to March, 1995.
We recommend all assistance to this NGO which is doing yeomen service for the cause of Animals, specially Stray Dogs.
Sd. N. Ravi Shanker
(N. RAVI SHANKER)
Secretary.'
39. The petitioner seems to think that destruction of stray dogs is the only effective remedy to combat the dog bites menace.Destruction, throughout the history, appealed to the 'irrationalists' as the only remedy or at least the best remedy to get over a problem or a danger or a confrontation. Destruction as a remedy is a short-cut remedy but in the long run, in large number of cases, found to be ineffective and capable of creating counter problems to the destroyer. Man cannot afford to kill all dangerous animals in his own interest and for his survival. This realisation in man, in the ultimate analysis, was responsible for making provisions in our public law for protection and sustenance of even dangerous animals like lions, tigers, leopards and elephants. One will ill-afford to resort to destruction of the creatures in meeting a problem unless he is left with no other alternative course of action to meet such problem. In the cycle of creation, sustenance and destruction, the real challenge is to sustain the 'created' and not to destroy the 'created'. If the public administration is appraised of this realisation, one- should welcome it. The Father of the Nation said : 'The morality of a nation reflects on the way it treats its animals.'
World Society for the Protection of Animals, an organ of the World Health Organisation, in its bulletin titled as 'A Practical Guide to Stray Control Programmes for Dogs' states thus:
'A Practical Guide to Stray Control
Programmes for Dogs
1. Historical Perspective
The bond between man and dog is said to have had its beginning 12-14 millennia ago somewhere in Eurasia, where a reciprocal relationship first emerged. Provided: with scraps of food when approaching the early encampments and settlements of man, the wolf soon became a frequent and welcome visitor, warning man of imminent danger and later assisting him in the hunt for wild animals. Thus began the domestication of the dog and the establishment of a bond between man and animals that has no equal.
2. Benefits of Dog Ownership
There are numerous benefits of dog ownership. Dogs are used in a number of ways to provide practical support to humans - as working animals, such as sheep dogs, steigh dogs and guard dogs, and as assistance animals for disabled people, including the blind, the deaf and those with Downs syndrome. Dogs kept as companions can decrease loneliness and depression by providing companionship, exercise, an interesting and varied life-style and an impetus for nurturing. They can reduce anxiety by providing an external focus of attention, promote feelings of safety and provide a source of contact comfort.
Various scientific studies have confirmed that dogs can be of benefit to their owners in terms of both psychological and physiological health. They can reduce stress, which is known to improve the effective functioning of immune system. The benefits of companion dogs to people's psychological health has been a reason behind the introduction of dogs to visit patients in hospices and hospitals.
3. Breakdown of the Bond
Domestication of the dog, usefulness of the dog to man and the protection that man has given to the dog in return, has led to the development of this storyboard. Today, man often violates this bond by allowing dogs to breed excessively and then abandoning them in great, numbers, causirjg immense suffering to the animals themselves and, sometimes, a health risk to human society. Governments and local authorities confronted with the problems caused by these dogs have often turned to mass destruction, in the hope of finding a quick solution, only to discover that the destruction had to continue, year after year, with no end in sight. Moreover, by reducing temporarily the population of straying dogs, the authorities had improve the chances of survival of the remainder and encouraged migration of stray dogs into 'cleared areas', thus exacerbating the spreadof any existing diseases -- including rabies, if present.
A practical consideration is that the dogs most likely to be caught in these 'catch and kill' campaigns are those staying not far from home. The owners of these dogs may resent the activity of the dog catchers, and if the dogs are actually killed there will naturally be an outcry against the authorities. A humane programme to control dog populations, on the other hand, should gain the support of the local community and animal protection societies.
Removal and killing of dogs should never be considered as the most effective way of dealing with a problem of surplus dogs in the community, it has no effect on the root cause of the problem, which is the over-population of dogs. It is now being recognised that removal of surplus dogs alone cannot solve the stray problem. It is essential that long-term, proactive measures are taken, including registration, neutering and public education.'
40. Therefore, mass destruction of dogs is not to be considered a reliable or effective way to deal with stray dog over-population. Wherever there is disposal of garbage, and food on the streets, there will automatically be stray dogs. The number of stray dogs, in spite of killing them in thousands every year, will remain in proportion to the quantum of food and space available on the streets. The population of dogs is instinctively and automatically controlled by the amount of space and food available. This is the experience of the Corporation. Therefore, the Corporation wanted to experiment the new method of combat the menace of stray dog-bites. The more effective measures recommended by the World Society for the Protection of Animals in the third world countries are:
a) Mass sterilisation of dogs;
b) Mass vaccination against rabies;
c) Removal and killing of dangerous anddiseased dogs; and
d) Removal of all garbage dumps, wastefood etc., from city roads.
41. Effective control needs a comprehensive proactive programme which includes educating dog owners and prospective owners, controlling the reproduction of owned dogs, controlling the environment of unsupervised dogs, compulsory registration and identification of dogs and licencing and control of breeders and sales outlets.
42. The Corporation falling in line with these loud and laudable thinking, decided to implement the new scheme on experiment basis. The Corporation, in its counter, has made it very clear that if the implementation of the new project does not yield expected results, it would review the working of the new project and adopt any other alternative and more efficacious method or revert to the old method of mass destruction of stray dogs. It is also stated by the Corporation that even now the diseased and dangerous dogs are seized and destroyed. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the action of the Corporation.' Materials placed before the Court by the respondents show that the results so far achieved are quite encouraging. No grounds are made out to allow the writ petition.
43. Before concluding, the grievance made by Smt. Amala Akkineni that the allegations made by the petitioner against her are scandalizing, humiliating and totally unfounded has to be considered. Smt. Jaya-shree Sarady, the learned counsel drew the attention of the Court specifically to what is stated in para 12 of the writ petition. Para 12 reads as under:
'12. I submit that the 3rd respondent has no locus standi to interfere in the affairs of the 1st respondent. It appears that the 3rd respondent society is a mere congregation of high society multi-millionaire ladies residing in posh Banjara and Jubilee Hills who have no understanding of the miseries of victims of dog bites. They only appear to be interested in publicity rather than doing any concrete work to reduce the sufferings of the victims of dog bites. The respondents appear to be moreconcerned about the perceived cruelty of stray dogs rather than the actual cruel acts committed by stray dogs on poor and middle class human beings who are forced to undergo painful injections by waiting in long queues as reported in the press. Many poor and ignorant people do not know the seriousness of dog bite and do not take timely treatment resulting in dangerous 'hydrophobia' afflicting them. The sympathies of the respondents towards the stray dogs is not shown towards the victims of stray dogs. The respondents' sympathies appear to be misplaced which is arbitrary, quixotic and illegal.'
44. The whole object of pleading is to bring the parties to an issue, and to prevent the issue being enlarged, which would prevent either party from knowing when the case came on for trial or hearing, what the real point to be discussed and decided was. In civil suits, every pleading must state facts and not law, but that rule applicable to the civil suits stands modified by the decision of the Apex Court in Bharath Singh's case, : AIR1988SC2181 (supra). Now, a party raising a point for decision in the writ petition must plead not only relevant facts but also state facts by way of evidence in proof of facts pleaded. The party, whether it is a suit or writ petition, must plead only relevant material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence. Pleading is not a garb to scandalize or humiliate others and if a party does it he should be accountable. Any tendency to scandalize should be scrupulously avoided. Innuendo, insinuation, sarcasm have no place in pleadings. In the light of these well accepted principles governing pleadings, it should be held that what is stated by the petitioner in para 12 of the affidavit is totally unwarranted, unnecessary, not at all relevant and material and it tends to scandalize and humiliate Smt. Amala Akkineni and others who formed Blue Cross. In para 10 of the affidavit also the petitioner has described Smt. Amala Akkineni as 'cine glamour'. Such kind of pleadings should be disapproved and it is accordingly disapproved. As though such pleadings are not enough, the learned counsel for thepetitioner, in the course of argument, submitted that Blue Cross was formed as a publicity stunt and to acquire wealth and in pursuance of such scheming the office bearers of Blue Cross got a valuable and prime land at the hands of the Government and the office bearers of Blue Cross are more interested in publicity and acquisition of the properties than serving mute animals like dogs. At that stage the Court had to intervene and point out to the learned counsel that he should not make such submission on facts without the support of pleading. I think that disapproval of such pleadings and submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner without the support of the pleadings is sufficient vindication of the grievance of Smt. Amala Akkineni, though Smt. Jayashree Saradhy, her learned counsel prayed the Court to award of exemplary costs.
45. In the result and for the foregoing reasons the writ petition is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.
46. Petition dismissed.