Judgment:
ORDER
Sardar Ali Khan, J.
1. The twowrit appeals arise out of a common order which are fit to be disposed of by a common judgment. Writ appeal No.1149 of 90 arises out of W.P. No. 9367/88 filed for the issue of a writ of mandamus or a direction declaring the action of the respondents in disconnecting the power supply to the petitioner on 13-6-88, basing merely on inferences and surmises, including the letter No. DEE/O/ HUP/Coml/ 1843/88 dt.14-6-88 of the third respondent as being illegal, arbitrary, void and highhanded. Writ appeal No. 1150/90 arises out of W.P. No. 11454/90 in which the prayer is for issue of a writ of mandamus declaring the order dt/-2-7-90 made in Ref. No. CE/ CZ/CDP/C & P/221/F. A. 61/ ATP/1606/90 dt/-2-6/7-90, confirming the final assessment made by the fourth respondent in Ref. No. SAT/ 1850/D. HUP/D. No.704/89 dt./-7-3-1989, as being highly illegal, arbitrary, contrary to taw, unjust and void and to be set aside.
2. The petitioner in both the writ petitions, viz., M/s. Shanti Castings represented by its Director V.H. Shafi alleges that the petitioner-factory is an induction furnace, commercially known as mini steel plant, engaged in the manufacture alloy steel castings. The petitioner being in the nature of a heavy industry it is categorised as H.T. consumer with a contracted maximum demand of 3500 KVA under an agreement with the respondent-State Electricity Board. The Superintending Engineer D.P.E. inspected the petitioner's premises at Thumakunta, Hindupur on 13-6-88 and disconnected the supply of power on the ground that its P.T. voltages are unequal and it was suspected that the B-Phase load from P.T. secondary is opencircuited. As a result of the disconnection and the inspection notes the Divisional Engineer, Operation, Hindupur issued a letter dt. 14-6-88 intimating that an enquiry will be made into the matter by the Superintending Engineer, Assessments, Vijayawada-2 for fixing the amount of loss sustained by the Board and pending enquiry he had provisionally estimated the value of the energy pilfered at Rs.1,13,47,740/- and further stipulated that restoration of power supply will be granted pending enquiry if an amount of Rupees 56,73,720/-, being half of the estimated amount along with the reconnection charges of Rs.300/- and Rs.300/- towards supervision charges are paid.
3. We give the above said background of the dispute in order to highlight the point that it is a case of alleged pilferage of electricity by a heavy unit which comes into the category of H.T. consumer. The arrears, needless to say, run in huge figures. It seems, both the writ petitions were heard together and the learned single judge passed a common order. Before adverting to the common order, we make it clear, that the other writ petition i.e., W.P. 9367/88 has been filed against the provisional assessment. Be that as it may, both the cases were merged together and it may not be necessary for the decision in the writ appeals to go into the intricate details of either of the writ petitions because we are going to decide these cases on an important and fundamental principle of jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
4. The learned single judge in a fairly detailed common order after discussing the salient facts of the case ultimately came to the conclusion that the matter can best be decided only by a civil court of competent jurisdiction. Nevertheless while making the above said order the learned judge gave certain directions which have become a subject matter of debate in the writ appeals before us. It would not be out of place to give the gist of the directions given by the learned single judge which served more or less as an interim order while the matter is to be brought by way of a suit before the civil court. The learned judge has stated that the power-cut prior to 13-6-88was for a period of 30 days according to the petitioner and the power-cut was intended to be only for 24 days prior to 13-6-88 according to the respondents. Further it is stated for the writ petitioner that excisable articles are manufactured in this factory and the production figures are available and if they ate taken into consideration, the difference of the average of consumption of units per metric tonne before and after 13-6-88 may be taken as the basis and multiplied for three months, without prejudice to the contention of the petitioner that there was no pilferage at all, and as the petitioner had already deposited Rs.5 lakhs and had given security for Rs.10 lakhs, he may not be directed to deposit or furnish security for any other amount. The judgment further reads:
'If the method referred to for the petitioner is going to be adopted, the difference will be around ten lakh units and at the rate of Rs.2-50 per unit, which is fixed according to the respondents for pilferage, it will come to Rs.25lakhs. So, in the circumstances, I feel that the petitioner should be directed to pay an additional amount of Rs.5lakhs (Rupees five lakhs only) and to give bank guarantee for Rs.5 more lakhs (Rupees five lakhs) within one week from the date of filing of the suit, and the suit has to be filed within one month from today. The amounts ordered to be paid to the respondents will be subject to the result in the suit. This order is passed without prejudice to the respective contentions of the parties as to whether in fact there was pilferage of energy, and if so, what is the amount which the respondents are entitled to claim.'
We have almost given verbatim the directions along with the contentions of the parties which were raised before the learned single judge. The main question to be considered in these two writ appeals is, whether in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Art.226, the Court can make orders of an interim nature while at the same time directing that the matter is fit to be decided by a civil court.
5. It is axiomatic that disputes of the nature which require adducing of evidence.oral or documentary, which can be appreciated only after necessary evidence is adduced by the parties on either side on the basis of factual material are appropriately to -be decided by the civil courts rather than High Court under Art.226. In order to answer the question which we have posed to ourselves it would be necessary to make a reference to Art.226 of the Constitution which reads as follows:
'226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs:-- (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including (writs in the nature of HABEAS CORPUS, MANDAMUS, PROHIBITION, QUO WARRANTO and CHRT1ORARI, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part 111 and for any other purpose.)
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without -
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within aperiod of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the aplication is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated,
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this Article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.'
A reading of the fairly elaborate Article clearly shows notwithstanding anything in Art. 32, the High Court is invested with the power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. We may also state hear that a similar jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court under Art.32 but with a condition that a petition under Art.32 before the Supreme Court may be maintinable only when it involves an infringement of a fundamental right of a person who has approached the Supreme Court. The second aspect which has to be considered is one contained in Art.226, para (2) which provides that the power conferred by cl.(1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
6. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent defending the order passed by the learned single judge is if the jurisdiction is so vested in the High Court, it cannot be said that the High Court in exercise of its overall power of judicial review is precluded from making interim orders orarrangements which may be in the nature of orders which may ultimately affect the result of the litigation in the civil court. We want to give our earnest consideration to the above contention in the light of the provisions under Art.226.
7. It is no doubt true that the overall power of judicial review is all pervasive but all the same lime, it cannot be denied that there are certain well defined boundaries for exercise of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 empowering the High Courts to issue the prerogative writs and to make interim orders. We are aware that there are no clear rulings which can be relied upon in taking either view of the matter. But one thing is very clear and that is that if the High Court in its own wisdom has come to the conclusion that a particular dispute is fit to be decided by a civil court, taking into consideration the factual aspects, then it would not really he proper to give an interim direction which may result in obviating the options which are vested in the civil court in exercise of its own jurisdiction. When a matter is sent to a court of competent jurisdiction, it is the fundamental principle of jurisprudence that normally unless there are extreme circumstances it should be sent free from all encumbrances. When a court which has to exercise jurisdiction vested in it is called upon to adjudicate a dispute, its choice of making suitable interim orders should not be restricted by virtue of certain other orders which may have been passed by the High Court. What is the rationale of this thinking and how do we arrive at this conclusion? We pose this question to ourselves and would like to answer in the following manner. When the matter was not fit to be decided under Art. 226 either by virtue of its technicalities or by virtue of the fact that it can be decided only in the light of evidence adduced by either side and events proved according to law, then it would not be proper to pass interim orders which may result, to a certain extent, in influencing the course of litigation in the civil court. We do think that orders of this nature are bound to play a very significant part while the civil court gels seised of the matter and is called upon to decide the dispute brought before it. If that is so, then the jurisdictionvested in the civil court is bound to be affected in a manner which certainly will not be in the best interests of justice nor will it be conducive to a fair and free decision of the matter according to the understanding of the civil court in accordance with law. We have been concentrating throughout primarily at these points only when the matter was argued at length before us. The end product of this discussion seems to be that there is nothing which prevents the respective parties to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil court for obtaining suitable orders to safeguard their respective rights under Or.39 of the Civil P.C. Therefore, the sum and substance of the view taken by us is that no doubt the learned single judge was absolutely right in taking the view that this is a matter fit to be decided by the civil court but the order made by way of an interim arrangement, in our opinion, is not really called for. Moreover, looking at the problem from a slightly different angle whenever civil court is seized of its jurisdiction under S. 9 of the C.P.C., the power to make interim orders under O.39 comes into play as a result of concomitant power vested in the civil court itself. Sri Nagarjuna Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Electricity Board has brought to our notice perhaps the only single solitary decision which may have some relevance on the issue before us, viz., State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal, : [1952]1SCR28 . In the said case, on the question of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held about 40 years back that a High Court will have no jurisdiction under Art.226 to pass orders in the nature of interim reliefs where at the lime of the disposal of the writ petition it has directed that the matter may be brought before the civil court by way of a suit. Be that as it may, the fundamental point which we are striving to decide in this matter is that while directing that a matter shall be brought before the civil court by way of a suit, no interim orders of a nature which could restrict the choice of the city civil court to make suitable orders in this particular matter are to be made unless there are extremely compelling circumstances to do so. We are, therefore, setting aside the scope and purport of the order dealing with the question ofdepositing of the amounts in question on the ground of jurisdiction alone. It is made clear that nothing prevents the parties herein to obtain suitable orders from the civil court which may be available to them under law and it would be Open to the civil court to pass such orders if it is called upon to do so uninfluenced by the orders made by the learned single judge to this effect.
8. The Writ Appeals are accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above.
9. Sri Duba Mohana Rao has very fairly stated at the end of the dictation of this judgment that equity and fair play demand that a direction may be given to the civil court to dispose of the suit before it within a stipulated time. We could see the force of his contention in this regard and, therefore, direct that the civil court shall make all efforts to dispose of the suit within six months from the date of this order. If an application under O.39 R.1 is filed within two weeks from the' date of receipt of this order, the civil court shall dispose it of within four weeks thereafter.
10. Till a decision is made on the application under O.39 R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure the temporary arrangement as directed by the learned single judge by way of interim direction shall hold good.
11. There shall be no order as to costs.
12. Appeal allowed in Part