ORDER
1. The petitioners in the instant writ petition pray for issuance of an appropriate writ, particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus declaring the action of the second respondent in seizing Ambassador Car bearing No.AAV-6929 under Rc.No.1/MP/II/92-93 dated 9-4-1992 as illegal and arbitrary. The petitioners also pray for a declaration that the proceedings No.2371/92/HB, dated 21-4-1992 on the file of the first respondent as null and void.
Relevant Facts :
2. The petitioners are the owners of the Ambassador Car Bearing No. AAV-6929 (for short 'the Car') of 1969 model. The petitioners are stated to have purchased the said car for a sum of Rs.30,000.00/- in the year 1991 for the purposes of plying the same on hire. On 8-4-1992, the Car is said to have been hired by a marriage party from Warangal to Khamrnam. It was seized by the second respondent herein on the ground that the car was used as escort for a lorry which is alleged to have been transporting illegal timber. The vehicle was seized on the ground that it is used for the commission of forest offence. However, the allegation that the driver of the car has used the car for committing forest offence and he was escorting the lorry as alleged by the respondents and the seizure, according to the petitioners, is based on assumptions and prc-assumptions.
3. It is the specific case of the petitioners that the respondents are authorised to seize any vehicle if it is used for carrying the forest produce without any permit. It is their case that only such of the vehicles which are actually used for transporting and involved in committing the offence alone can be seized.
4. Admittedly, in the instant case, even according to the respondents, the car in question was used only to escort the lorry bearing No.AHJ 7373 which was transporting teak logs. The timber loaded in the lorry do not bear any hammer marks and the transportation was not covered by valid permits as required under Rules 3 and 4 of A.P. Forest Produce Transit Rules, 1970 (for short 'the Rules'). It is the case of the petitioners that the action of the respondents in seizing the vehicle followed by proceedings No.2371/HB/ 92, dt. 21-4-1992 directing the petitioners to show-cause as to why the seized car should not be confiscated, suffers from inherent tack of jurisdiction. The petitioners submit that the proceedings dt. 21-4-1992 arc ultra vires.
5. In the counter-affidavit, it is stated by the respondents that having received reliable and credible information that the lorry bearing No.AHJ 7373 was carrying illegal timber from Narsainpet to Tirumalagiri, the mobile party of the department had proceeded on 8-4-1992 for patrolling from Narsampet to Tirumalagiri, through Nakkonda, Warangal, Thorrur, Khammam Cross Road and Suryapet. They have noticed the lorry being escorted by the car bearing registration No.AAV 6929 and a Yamaha motor cycle. The lorry was stopped and intercepted. It was found that the lorry was carrying illegal teak logs, as the logs were not having any hammer marks and valid permit required under the rules. None of the persons present in the lorry and the escort car could produce the relevant documents. A Panchanama was conducted and the lorry was seized along with the car. It is the specific case of the respondents that one Manigala Venkata Reddy S/o Aga Reddy; Manieala Narasimha Reddy S/o Aga Reddy and some unknown persons took away the lorry by dragging the staff from the lorry and made an attempt to take the car by threatening the officers and the mobile party with weapons. The I.F.S. probationery officer, chased them away. The offence is stated to have been reported to the police station, Tirumalagiri immediately.
6. On enquiry, the car driver, Sri Amarender Reddy is alleged to have stated to the effect that the car was engaged for a sum of Rs.5,000-00 to escort the lorry carrying the illegal timber from Narsampet to Tirumalagiri on 7-4-1992.
7. It is the specific case of the respondents that the said car was used for escorting the lorry carrying illegal timber and as such the car was also used in the process of carrying the contraband and involved in the commission of a forest offence. Therefore, the same was seized. The seizure is followed by a show-cause notice dated 21-4-1992. Notice were served upon all the concerned, including the petitioners and the enquiry was to be held on 5-5-1992; 23-5-1992; 15-6-1992 and 22-6-1992. There was no appearance whatsoever. Publication was made in Telugu daily news papers informing all the effected persons to attend the enquiry to be held on 29-6-1992. It is at this stage, the petitioners instead of approaching the respondents and participating in the enquiry moved this Court by invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
8. The short, but important question that arises for consideration in the instant writ petition is as to whether a vehicle could be seized and confiscated under the provisions of the A.P. Forest Act only, if it is found to be used in 'carrying the property' or can be seized and confiscated if such vehicle is used in committing any forest offence or abetment thereof and whether the action of the respondents in seizing the Ambassador Car bearing No.AAV 6929 and the consequential show-cause notice proposing to confiscate the said car is intra vires; and whether the respondents have jurisdiction to proceed further pursuant to the impugned notice dated 21-4-1992.
9. Before adverting to the questions, it would be appropriate to read Section 44 of the A.P. Forest Act, 1967 (for short 'the Act'):
44. Seizure of properly liable to confiscation and procedure thereupon :--
(1) Where there is reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any timber or forest produce, such timber, or forest produce, together with tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing any such offence, may be seized by any forest officer or police officer.
(2) Every officer seizing any property under this section shall place on such property, or the receptacle, if any, in which it is contained, a mark indicating that the same has been so seized and shall, except where the offender agrees in writing forthwith to get the offence compounded (without any unreasonable delay either produce the property seized before an officer not below the rank of an Assistant Conservator of Forests authorised by the Government in this behalf by notification (hereinafter referred to as the authorised Officer) or make a report of such seizure to the Magistrate):
Provided that where the timber of forest produce with respect to which such offence is believed to have been committed is the property of the Central or State Government and the offender is not known, it shall be sufficient if the officer makes, as soon as may be, a report of the circumstances to the Divisional Forest Officer.
(2-A) Where an authorised officer seizes under sub-section (1) any timber or forest produce or where any such timber or forest produce is produced before him under sub-section (2) and he is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed, in respect thereof, he may order confiscation of the timber or forest produce so seized or produced together with all tools, ropes, chains, boats or vehicles used in committing such offence.
(2-B) No order confiscating any property shall be made under sub-section (2-A) unless the person from whom the property is seized is given,--
(a), a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate such property;
(b) an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation; and
(c) a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter.
(2-C) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (2-B), no order of confiscation under sub-section (2-A) of any tool, rope, chain boat or vehicle shall be made if the owner thereof proves to the satisfaction of the authorised officer that it was used in carrying the property without his knowledge or connivance or the knowledge or connivance of his agent, if any, or the person in charge of the tool, rope, chain boat or vehicle in committing the offence and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use.
(2-D) Any forest officer not below the rank of a Conservator of Forests empowered by the Government in this behalf by notification, may within thirty days from the date of the order of confiscation by the authorised officer under sub-section (2-A) either suo motu or on application call for and examine the record of that order and may make such inquiry or cause such inquiry to be made and pass such orders as he may thinks fit :
Provided that no order prejudicial to any person shall be passed without giving him an opportunity of being heard.
(2-E) Any person aggrieved by an order passed under sub-section (2-A) or sub-section (2-D) may within thirty days from the date of communication to him of such order, appeal to the District Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the property has been seized, and the District Court shall after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, pass such order as it may think fit and the order of the District Court so passed shall be final.
(3) Any forest officer not below the rank of a Forester, who or whose subordinate has seized any tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles or cattle under subsection (1) (and where he makes a report of such seizure to the Magistrate wider sub-section (2) may release the same on the execution by the owner thereof a bond for the production of the property so released, if and when so required before the Magistrate.
(4) Upon the receipt of any report under sub-section (2), the Magistrate shall, except where the offence is compounded, take such measures as may be necessary for the trial of the accused and the disposal of the property according to law.
(5) The property seized under this section, shall be kept in the custody of the Forest Officer not below the rank of a Forest Guard or the village headman until the compensation for compounding the offence is paid or until an order of the Magistrate directing its, disposal is received.
10. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, Sri A. Prabhakar Rao submits that an authorised officer or the police officer, as the case may be, is entitled to seize the vehicle only on reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed in respect of any timber or forest produce. It is the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the expression used in sub-section (1) of Section 44 of the Act 'the reason to believe' would make it clear that the seizure is not a formality and not a matter of course. The concerned officer should have reason to believe that a ferest offence has been committed and the vehicle was used for committing a forest offence. It is the submission of the learned Counsel mat sub-section (2-C) of Section 44 of the Act would further clarify the position that no order of confiscation shall be made if it is proved to the satisfaction of the authorised officer that such vehicle was used in carrying the property without his knowledge or connivance or the knowledge or connivance of his agent. The learned Counsel laid emphasis on the expression used in sub-section (2-C) ''carrying the property'.
11. The learned Government Pleader for Forests, Sri A. Gopal Reddy, however, submits that any authorised officer is entitled to seize the vehicle which is used in the commission of a forest offence and it is not necessary that such vehicle should be actually 'carrying the property'. It is enough if the vehicle is used in committing the offence.
12. It is submitted that unless the vehicle itself is found to be carrying the property no seizure can be effected. It is required to notice that sub-section (1) of Section 44 enables the authorised officer to seize any vehicle on entertaining a belief that forest offence has been committed. Sub-section (2-A) empowers the authorised officer to order confiscation of not only timber or forest produce seized under sub-section (1) of Section 44, but also the vehicles used in committing such offence.
13. In my considered opinion, entire Section 44 of the Act, including all its subsections are required to be construed in harmonious manner and so as to give force and life to the intention of the Legislature. The Court is required to adopt the purposive approach. It is well settled now, in the interpretation of statutes, the Court adopts such construction as will promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provision. It would sometimes requires supplying of words so as to avoid any part of the statute becoming meaningless. The Court is required to read the words used in a statutory provision in such a manner to give effect to the intention of the Legislature, which is apparent from the Act, if read as a whole. It would be appropriate to recall what Lord Denning observed in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, (1949) 2 KB 481 :
'The question for decision in this case is whether we are at liberty to extend the ordinary meaning of 'burden' so as to include a contingent burden of the kind I have described. Now this Court has already held that this sub-section is to be liberally construed so as to give effect to the governing principles embodied in the legislation........ and I think we should do the same.
'Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much die poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A Judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the Judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the Legislature. That was clearly laid down by the resolution of the Judges in Heydon 's case, and it is the safest guide today. Good practical advice on the subject was given about the same time by Plowden......... Put into homely metaphor it is this : A Judge should ask himself the question : If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out He must then do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.
'Approaching this case in that way, I cannot help feeling that the Legislature had not specifically in mind a contingent burden such as we have here. If it had would it not have put it on the same footing as an actual burden I mink it would. It would have permitted an increase of rent when the terms were so changed as to put a positive legal burden on the landlord.'
14. The Apex Court in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohanlal Sowcar, : [1988]3SCR384 , while construing the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, observed :
'It is no doubt true that the Court while construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the Court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful.'
15. The words used in Section 4(1) of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1970 as ' 'any debt due before the commencement of this Act to any banking company' were construed by the Supreme Court to mean 'any debt due at and before the commencement of this Act' and the Apex Court while construing the provisions in such manner observed 'we would have normally hesitated to fashion the clause by so restructuring it but we see no escape from that course since that is the only rational manner by which we can give meaning and content to it, so as to further the object of the Act.' See State Bank of Travancore v. Mohammad, : [1982]1SCR338 .
16. Similarly, Section 5(2} of the U.P. Muslims Waqfs Act, 1936, which provides to enable a Mutwalli of a Waqf or any person interested in a Waqf to file a suit in a civil Court for declaration that any transaction held by the Commissioner of Waqfs to be a Waqf is not a Waqf. It was so construed and interpreted by the Supreme Court, while interpreting the words 'any person interested in a Waqf, as meaning of 'any person interested in what is held to be a Waqf 'and while so interpreting observed 'It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a statute Courts should be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective, 'and'' where literal meaning of the words used in a statutory provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and ineffective, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the provision and to make the whole of it effective and operative.' See-Stray Ul Haq v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, : [1959]1SCR1287 .
17. It would be relevant to notice few relevant provisions and Statement of Objects and Reasons for which the Act is enacted and with particular reference Section 44 itself:
'At present, under Section 45 of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act, 1967, until a Court convicting a person for a forest offence orders confiscation of the timber or forest produce in respect of which offence was committed and any tool, boat vehicle other than a cart drawn by animals, vessel or other conveyance or any other article used in committing such offence, such articles cannot be confiscated. Although there is provision for seizure of such article in Section 44 of the Act, there is no other provision in the Act enabling the forest officers to confiscate such timber or forest produce and the implements etc. used for committing forest offences even in a case where he is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed. In view of the above position the Forest Department is finding it difficult to curb the forest offences effectively and quickly inspite of the fact that large scale felling and smuggling of forest produce is on the increase. It is, therefore, considered necessary to empower officials of the Forest Department seizing any property under Section 44, instead of merely making a report of the seizure to the Magistrate, to order confiscation of timber of forest produce seized together with all the tools, boats, vehicles etc., used in committing such offence. Hence, it is also, proposed to restrict the application of Section 45 only to cases other than those where an order of confiscation has already been passed by a forest officer under Section 44.'
18. One of the primary intention of the Legislature as evident from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act itself, is to effectively and quickly curb forest offences and for the aforesaid purpose the forest officer is authorised to confiscate such timber or forest produce or implements or vehicles etc. used for committing forest offences. Section 2(e) of the Act defines forest offence, which reads as under :
' 'forest offence' means an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder;'
19. It is required to notice that Section 20 of the Act provides for penalties for trespass or damage in reserved forest and acts prohibited in such forest. It, inter alia provides that any person-
(a) x x x x x
(b) x x x x x
(c) in a reserved forest-
(i) to (ix) ....................
(x) removes any forest produce.
20. Section 20(d) provides that any person who abets any of the acts specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) shall, in addition to such compensation for damages caused to the forest as the Court may direct to be paid be punishable with imprisonment for a term prescribed.
21. We have already noticed Section 44. A combined reading of all these provisions would undoubtedly show, not only removal of forest produce by any person is a forest offence, but its abetment also is equally a forest offence. The scheme of the Act authorises the forest officers to take such effective measures to prevent commission of forest offence, including illegal felling, smuggling and illegal transportation and for the aforesaid purpose the forest officers arc authorised to confiscate not only the forest produce, timber, but also the implements and the vehicles used in the commission of such offence. Therefore, Section 44 is required to be construed by keeping the scheme of the Act in mind. Viewed in that background the words in sub-section (1) of Section 44 'reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed' is required to be read as including 'abetment of forest offence has been committed.' Sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 where the expression 'forest offence has been committed' is found, is also required to be read in the same manner. If the provisions are read as such, the words used in sub-section (2-C) 'carrying the property' is required to be read along with words 'in committing the offence' and 'committing the offence' is required to be read as 'committing the offence, including its abetment'. Thus, read, every vehicle used in the commission of offence or the abetment of offence is liable to be seized and confiscated, whether such vehicle actually 'carried the property' or not.
22. Any other interpretation restricting the authority to seize and confiscate the vehicle would defeat the very object and the scheme and spirit of the Act. The vehicles involved in the process of committing the offence or its abetment would go scortfree. Such is not the intendment of the Legislature. Every vehicle used in the process of committing offence or its abetment is liable for seizure and confiscation. Of course, subject to such protection given in sub-section (2-C), where the owner proves to the satisfaction of the authorised officer that such vehicle was used in committing the offence or its abetment without his knowledge or connivance of the knowledge of connivance of his Agent and inspire of taking all reasonable and necessary precaution against such use. Law is required to be read and interpreted to sub-serve the purpose for which it is enacted. All the challenges which are required to be met by the authorities administering the Act may not have been imagined foreseen by the Legislature. It is therefore, not possible to read the words literally in the provisions of the Forest Act and in such a manner defeating the very object of the Act.
23. It would be useful to recall what the Apex Court had observed while interpreting the very provisions of the Act in Divisional Forest Officer v. G. K Sndhakar Rao, : 1986CriLJ357 :
'The change in the law was brought about with a view to prevent the growing menace of ruthless exploitation of Government forests by illicit felling of teak and other valuable forest produce by unscrupulous traders, particularly from the reserved forests by proving for a machinery for confiscation of illegally felled tress or forest produce by the Forest Authorities. Under Section 45 of the Act as it then stood, where a person was convicted of a forest offence, the Court sentencing him was empowered to order confiscation to the Government of timber or forest produce in respect of which a forest offence was committed and of any tool, boat, vehicle other than cart drawn by animals, vessel or other conveyance or any other article used in committing such offence. Although there was a provision for seizure of such articles in Section 44 of the Act, there was no provision in the Act enabling the forest officers to confiscate such timber or forest produce and the implements etc., used for committing forest offences even in a case where he was satisfied that a forest offence had been committed. In view of this, the Forest Department was finding it difficult to curb the forest offences effectively and quickly inspite of the fact that large scale felling and smuggling of forest produce was on the increase. Hence it was thought necessary to empower the officials of the Forest Department seizing any property under sub-section (1) of Section 44, instead of merely making a report of the seizure to a Magistrate, also to order confiscation of timber or forest produce seized together with all tools, boats, vehicles etc. used in committing such offence. (Statement of Objects and Reasons). The intendment of the Legislature in enacting Act 17 of 1976 was therefore to provide for two separate proceedings before two independent forums in the Act, one, for confiscation by a departmental authority exercising quasi-judicial powers conferred under sub-section (2-A) of Section 44 of the goods forming the subject matter of the offence and the other for the trial of the person accused of the offence so committed.'
24. It is thus not possible to agree with the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that no vehicle can be seized or confiscated unless such vehicle is found to be actually 'carrying the property.' On the other hand, Section 44 is required to be interpreted that every vehicle used either in committing the forest offence or used in the abetment of commission of the offence is liable for seizure and confiscation. Such vehicle need not be found carrying the property.
25. In the instant writ petition, the impugned notice dated 21-4-1992 is in the nature of show-cause. No opinion need be expressed on the question as to whether the Car was involved in the commission or abetment of any forest offence. No opinion need also be expressed as to whether the vehicle was used in the process of committing the offence or its abetment. If it is established that the Car was used in the process of committing or abetment of a forest offence, undoubtedly, it is liable to be confiscated. The petitioners shall now file their explanation before the authority concerned to the said show-cause notice dated 21-4-1992 and produce such material as they may wish to do pursuant to the directions of this Court, which shall be taken into consideration by the authority concerned. The respondents are directed to issue notice to the petitioners herein by fixing a date for filing of such reply and inquiry. The whole process in this regard shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
26. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs.