B. Sudershan Reddy, J.
1. Thepetitioners invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and accordingly pray for issuance of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ calling for the records and the orders dated 6-4-2002 passed in Appeal Nos.A2/3823 to 3829 of 2001 and quash the same. The impugned order passed by the first respondent Revenue Divisional Officer, East Division, Ranga Reddy district, is challenged on various grounds.
2. Before we consider the question as to the validity of the impugned order, it may be relevant to notice a few facts leading to filing of this writ petition.
3. The petitioners claim to have purchased the land ad measuring about Ac.50-39 guntas in Survey Nos.163, 164/1, 165 to 170, 170/1, 172/1, 173, 174, 177 to 179 situated at Gundlapochampalli, Medchal mandal, Ranga Reddy District, under an agreement of sale dated 15-01-1980; two unregistered sale deeds dated 16-08-1989 and two registered sale deeds dated 16-02-1989 from respondents 3 to 8 herein. It is claimed that the possession of the said land was delivered to the petitioners since they have paid the entire amount of sale consideration.
4. The petitioners have approached the second respondent-Mandal Revenue Officer for regularisation of the unregistered sale transaction under Section 5-A of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (for short 'the R.O.R. Act'). The applications so made by the petitioners herein are in respect of Ac.39-32 guntas out of a total extent of Ac.50-39 guntas.
5. The second respondent - Mandal Revenue Officer has passed orders dated 6-2-1990 regularising the unregistered sale transaction and accordingly issued certificates of validation under Section 5-A of the -R.O.R. Act. Simultaneously, necessary entries have been made in the pattadar pass books in conformity with the order of regularisation. The orders dated 6-2-1990 and the consequential entries made in the record of rights remained unchallenged till the respondents 3 to 8 herein have preferred the appeals in the year 2001. The appeals were actually filed on 18-12-2001.
6. The first respondent - Revenue Divisional Officer by common order dated 06-04-2002 allowed the appeals purportedly filed under Section 5-B of the Act by the respondents 3 to 8. The said orders are impugned in this writ petition on various grounds.
7. We are required to notice that pursuant to the orders dated 6-2-1990 passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, necessary entries have been made in faisalpatti to the effect that the petitioners have become owners pursuant to the certificate of validation under Section 5-A of the Act read with 45-A of the Rules, All revenue records including pahanies were updated and the names of writ petitioners are shown as owners and possessors of the land in question. The fact remains that neither the entries so made in the record of rights and the revenue records nor the certificates of validation have been questioned by respondents 3 to 8 herein for a period of more than 10 years.
8. It is also required to notice that aggrieved by the orders of Revenue Divisional Officer dated 06-4-2002, the petitioners filed Seven identical revision petitions under Section 9 of the R.O.R. Act before the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy district and obtained an order of status quoon 19-04-2002. The same was immediately vacated by the Joint Collector on 30-4-2002. The petitioners filed WP No. 9036 of 2002 challenging the order of the Joint Collector dated 30-4-2002. The writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 7-5-2002 at the admission stage with a direction to the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy district, to dispose of the revision as expeditiously as possible. The revisions were taken up for hearing. The petitioners raised an objection about the jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer, East Division, Ranga Reddy district, to entertain the appeals and accordingly requested the Joint Collector to frame the preliminary issue relating to jurisdiction. The Joint Collector by order dated 1-7-2002 refused to frame preliminary issue and proposed to decide all the issues together after providing reasonable opportunity of being heard to all the parties. The revisions were posted for hearing on 22-7-2002.
9. In the meanwhile, the petitioners filed present writ petition on 19th July, 2002, which came up for hearing on 22-7-2002 and after hearing both sides, the matter was adjourned in order to enable the writ petitioners to withdraw the revision petitions pending before the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy district.
10. It is not really necessary as to what transpired before the Joint Collector and as to how the respondents 3 to 8 tenaciously opposed the request of writ petitioners for withdrawal of their revision petitions. A number of objections were raised opposing the request of the petitioners even for withdrawal of their own revisions. Finally, on 31-08-2002, the Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy district, permitted the petitioners to withdraw their revision petitions. Meanwhile, this Court by its orders dated 23rd July, 2002 having admitted the writ petition granted interim suspension of the orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 6-4-2002.
Summary of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for Petitioners :
11. Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned Counsel for petitioners submitted that the impugned order dated 6-4-2002 of the first respondent under Section 5-B of the R.O.R. Act is totally without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel contends that Section 5-A of R.O.R. Act was introduced into the Act by A.P. Act 1 of 1989 and the Amending Act 1 of 1989 did not provide for any appeal or revision against the orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act. The order under Section 5-A by the statutory authority was final since no appeal or revision has been provided. Section 5-B was introduced into the Act by A.P. Act of 1994 with effect from 31st October, 1993. The same amending Act of 1994 has further amended Section 9 of the Act providing revisional remedy even as against an order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer or Revenue Divisional Officer under Section 5-A or 5-B of the R.O.R Act.
12. It is submitted that the remedy of appeal or revision was not available against the orders passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act before 31st October, 1993. It is contended that as on 6-2-1990 when the orders were passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act, there was no right of appeal provided under the Act. The order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer became final. It is submitted that as no right of appeal is conferred as on 31st October, 1993, it is implicit that the regularisation order under Section 5-A of R.O.R. Act passed 'before the said date is final. The sum and substance of the submission is that as on the date of commencement of litigation between the parties, there has been no right of appeal and the right of appeal as provided under Section 5-B of the R.O.R.Act with effect from 31st October, 1993 is of no consequence so far as the appeals filed by the respondents are concerned.
13. It is also submitted that the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, assuming that it is available, after 10 years is a colourable exercise of power on the principle that the statutory authority has to exercise the power within a reasonable time. The statutory authority cannot be permitted to exercise the appellate power to unsettle the settled rights. The decision of the appellate authority in condoning the delay and allowing appeals even on facts is totally unjustified. It is difficult to comprehend the plea of respondents that they were unaware of the regularisation orders dated 6-2-1990 in view of the fact that the names of petitioners have been entered in the record of rights and revenue records which are nothing but public documents.
14. It is further submitted by the learned Counsel that the contention of the respondents that the revisions filed by them have to be treated as appeals under Section 5(5) instead of Section 5-B of the R.O.R. Act is totally incorrect. It is also submitted that the contention of respondents that the appeals preferred before the first respondent may be treated as appeals under Section 158 of A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli, is equally untenable.
Summary of submissions made by learned Counsel for Respondents :
15. It is submitted that the agreement of sale dated 5-1-1980 is forged, fabricated and brought into existence in the year 1989 for the purpose of validation under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act. The respondents have already initiated prosecution against the petitioners herein in Crime No. 13 of 2002 of P.S. Medchal and the same is under investigation. It is further submitted that an agreement of sale cannotbe validated under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act, which provides for validation of only unregistered sale deeds.
16. The learned Counsel refers to certain admissions purported to have been made by the petitioners herein in their written statement in O.S.No.73 of 2002 on the file of I Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy district.
17. It is next contended that the appeals preferred by the respondents can always be treated as appeals under Section 5(5) of the R.O.R. Act. That right of appeal under Section 5(5) was always available even when an order was made by the Mandal Revenue Officer on 6-2-1990.
18. In view of the rival submissions, the following questions arise for our consideration:
(1) Whether the appeals preferred by the respondents herein on 18-12-2001 against the orders of Mandal Revenue Officer under Section 5-B of the R.O.R. Act are maintainable in law? Whether the Revenue Divisional Officer has jurisdiction to entertain the appeals preferred by the respondents?
(2) Alternatively, whether the Revenue Divisional Officer properly exercised the jurisdiction in condoning the delay and allowing the appeals preferred by respondents after a long lapse of more than ten years?
(3) The next question is whether the appeals preferred by respondents could be treated as appeals preferred under Section 5(5) of the R.O.R. Act.
(4) Whether the appeals preferred byrespondents may be treated as onepreferred under Section 158 of A.P.(Telangana Area) Land RevenueAct, 1317 Fasli.
19. Before we actually undertake to critically examine the rival contentions, it may be necessary to notice the broad scheme of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971. From the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is evident that Act 26 of 1971 has been mainly enacted to provide statutory basis for the record of rights in the Andhra Area of the State also since there has been no such provision similar to that of A.P. (Telangana Area) Record of Rights in Land Regulation, 1358 Fasli which provides for the preparation and maintenance of record of rights in Telangana Area of the State. The State introduced legislation to enact a fresh legislation applicable throughout the State for the preparation and maintenance of record of rights, repealing Regulations of 1358 Fasti. The provisions were accordingly made to deem the record of rights duly prepared and maintained for the villages under the said Regulation, as the record of rights for that village. The affected persons were given an opportunity to apply to the authorised officer for rectification of the entries. The ROR Act underwent several radical changes from time and it may not be really necessary to notice all the amendments that were made to the Principal Act. However, we shall briefly notice the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the purposes for which the Act 9 of 1994, with which we are concerned for the present, has been introduced amending some of the provisions of the main Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reads:
'In order to safeguard the interests of agriculturists and to overcome the difficulties experienced by the credit lending agencies, the Government has decided to amend the Andhra Pradesh Record of Rights in Lands and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 to achieve the following objects:
'(i) to issue title deed to the pattadar owners to enable them to use the same for
creation of equitable mortgage on their lands;
(ii) to provide an appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer against the orders of the Mandal Revenue Officer under Sub-section (4) of Section 5-A of the Act;
(iii) to protect the credit agencies by specifying that any charge not entered in the pass book will not have priority;
(iv) to provide that the title deeds issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 6-A of the said Act and duly certified by the Mandal Revenue Officer or by any authority as prescribed shall be the title deed in respect of the owner pattadar and it shall be the record of right and interest in the land of the person to whom the pass book is issued;
(v) to make pattadar responsible for getting necessary entries made in respect of transactions regarding the title deed and pass book by the Registering Officer;
(vi) to recover the loans in default as arrears of land revenue by the Revenue Department; and
(vii) to confer revision powers on the District Collector against the orders passed by the concerned authority under Sections 3, 5, 5-A or 5-B of the said Act.'
20. Be it noted that the Act of 1971 is implemented in different phases in the State. All the provisions of the Act have not come into force in the entire State of Andhra Pradesh on any particular date as such.
21. Section 2(6) of R.O.R. Act defines 'occupant' as a person in actual possession of land other than the tenant or usufructuary mortgagee. Section 2 (6) (a) defines 'owner' as a person who has a permanent and heritable right of possession of land which can be alienated and includes the holder ofpatta issued as a landless poor person. Section 2(6)(b) defines 'title deed and pass book', which means the title need issued under Section 6-A. Section 2(7) defines 'pattadar', which means and includes every person who holds land directly under the Government under a patta whose name is registered in the land revenue accounts of the Government as pattadar, and who is liable to pay land revenue.
22. Section 4 of the R.O.R. Act provides for intimation of acquisition of rights to the Mandal Revenue Officer within ninety days from the date of such acquisition and the Mandal Revenue Officer shall give or send written acknowledgment of the receipt of such intimation to the persons making it. Section 5 of the R.O.R. Act deals with amendment and updating of record of rights. Section 5-A provides for regularisation of certain alienations or other transfers of lands. We shall refer to Sections 5 and 5-A of the R.O.R. Act in detail since the whole controversy revolves around interpretation of those two provisions. Section 5-B of the R.O.R Act provides for an appeal against an order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer under Sub-section (4) of Section 5-A to Revenue Divisional Officer within 30 days of communication of the order. Section 6 of the R.O.R. Act provides that every entry in the record of rights shall be presumed to be true until it is otherwise amended in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 7 of the R.O.R Act declares that the record of rights shall be open to inspection by the public at reasonable hours free of any charge and certified copies thereof and certified extracts therefrom shall be given to all persons applying for the same on payment of such fee as may be prescribed. Section 9 of the R.O.R. Act confers jurisdiction upon the Collector either suo motu or on an application made to him to call for and examine the recording authority. Mandal Revenue Officer andRevenue Divisional Officer under Sections 3, 5, 5-A or 5-B in respect of any record of rights prepared or maintained, to satisfy himself as to correctness, legality or propriety of any decision taken or order passed or proceedings made in respect thereof. Section 10-A of the R.O.R. Act mandates that after the final publication of record of rights in the manner prescribed, the Mandal Revenue Officer shall take action to incorporate the said particulars in the village revenue records. This is the broad scheme of the Act.
23. We have already noticed that Section 5-A of the R.O.R Act has been introduced into the main Act by A.P. Act 1 of 1989 mainly for the purpose of regularisation of certain unregistered alienations or other transfers of land and for the convenience of the farmers so as to enable them to raise loans on such land.
24. Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act reads as follows:
'Regularisation of certain alienations or other transfers of lands:--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Registration Act, 1908 or any other law for the time being in force, where a person is an occupant by virtue of an alienation or transfer made or effected otherwise than by registered document, the alienee or the transferee may, within such period as may be prescribed, apply to the Mandal Revenue Officer for a certificate declaring that such alienation or transfer is valid.
(2) On receipt of such application, the Mandal Revenue Officer shall after making such enquiry as may be prescribed require the alienee or the transferee to deposit in the office of the Mandal Revenue Officer an amount equal to the registration fees and the stamp duty that would have been payable had the alienation or transfer been effected by a registered document in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 as fixed by theRegistering Officer on a reference made to him by the Mandal Revenue Officer on the basis of the value of the property arrived at in such manner as may be prescribed.
Provided that the Mandal Revenue Officer shall not require the alienee or the transferee to deposit the amount under this sub-section unless he is satisfied that the alienation or transfer is not in contravention of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 and the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977.
(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) shall be deemed to validate any alienation where such alienation is in contravention of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation, 1959 and the Andhra Pradesh Assigned lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977.
(4) The Mandal Revenue Officer on deposit of an amount specified in sub-section (2) shall issue a certificate to the alienee or the transferee declaring that the alienation or transfer is valid from the date of issue of certificate and such certificate shall, notwithstanding anything in the Registration Act, 1908 be evidence of such alienation or transfer as against the alienor or transferor or any person claiming interest under him.
(5) The recording authority, shall on the production of the certificate issued under sub-section (2) make any entry in the pass book to the effect that the person whose name has been recorded as an occupant is the owner of the property.'
25. A plain reading of the provisions would make it clear that it js a special provision introduced into the main Act in order to enable the persons inoccupation of the land by virtue of alienation or transfer made or effected otherwise by registered documents to obtain a certificate declaring such alienation or transfer to be valid. It is not uncommon practice that many persons in the State mainly agriculturists remained in possession of land after purchasing the same under unregistered documents, their title remained imperfect and they were disabled from applying for and obtaining loans from the credit agencies since they did not possess any evidence of title. In order to mitigate the said difficulty, the Legislature intervened and accordingly Section 5-A has been introduced into the main Act mainly for the purpose of regularisation of certain alienations or other transfers of land.
26. Sub-section (4) of Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act declares that the certificate has to be issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer to the alienee or transferee declaring that the alienation and transfer to be a valid one. The said certificate notwithstanding anything in the Registration Act, 1908 shall be evidence of such alienation or transfer as against the alienor or transferor or any person claiming interest under him. Sub-section (5) mandates that on production of the certificate, the recording authority is required to make an entry in the pass-book to the effect that the person whose name has been entered in the pass-book to be the owner of the property.
27. In contra distinction, Section 5 deals with only amendment and updating of record of rights. The amendments and updating of record is with reference to intimation of the fact of acquisition of any right by succession, survivorship, inheritance, partition. Government patta, decree of a Court or otherwise any right as owner, pattadar, mortgagee, occupant or tenant of the land etc. The Mandal Revenue Officer is required to determine as towhether and in what manner the record of rights have to be amended in consequence of such acquisition of any right by a person and shall accordingly carry out the amendment in record of rights in accordance with such determination. Section 4 does not enable an occupant acquiring the rights by virtue of alienation and transfer under unregistered documents to apply for amendment and updating of record of rights. Section 5 confers jurisdiction on the Mandal Revenue Officer to amend and update the records on the basis of rights acquired by a person by succession, survivorship, inheritance, partition, Government patta or decree of a Court.
28. Section 5-A is a comprehensive provision which confers jurisdiction on the Mandal Revenue Officer to determine the substantive rights of the parties and provides for regularisation of certain alienations or other transfers of land notwithstanding anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act or any other law for the time being in force.
Re. Contention 1:
29. It is well settled and needs no reiteration at our hands that an appeal is a right of entering a Superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress an error of the Court below. The right of appeal has been recognised by judicial decisions as a right, which vests in a suitor at the time of institution of original proceedings. It is always necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the right of appeal and right of access to a Court or Tribunal. It is recognised that the right of access to a Court or Tribunal is a fundamental and important constitutional right and to seek legal protection is a valuable basic right conferred upon the people in a system governed by Rule of Law and Constitutional democracy. There can be no settlement of disputes in a civilized mannerunless such right of fundamental importance is recognised and enforced. But a right of appeal cannot be equated to that of a right of access to a Court.
30. In Colley v. Council For Licensed Conveyancers, (2001) 4 All ER 998, the House of Lords noticing the substantial difference between the right of access to a Court and the right of appeal, observed:
'The right of access is accommodated by the right to bring proceedings at the first instance and to have them determined according to law. Rights of appeal are not so much rights of access to a Court, as rights to have the opportunity of persuading a higher Court that the first instance decision is wrong. There are instances where Parliament expressly provides that there shall be no right of appeal from particular kinds of decision.' (emphasis is of ours).
31. In Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving, (1905) AC 369 (PC), the Privy Council observed:
'To deprive a suit or in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right, is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new Tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested.'
32. The above principle laid down by the Privy Council has been accepted and followed by the Supreme Court in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary, : [1957]1SCR488 , wherein on a review of earlier authorities, Sri S.R. Das, Chief Justice, deduced the following five propositions:
'1. That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really butsteps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
2. The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.
3. The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit.
4. The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the Superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the Us commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.
5. This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.'
33. From the authoritative pronouncement of be Supreme Court in Garikapati Veeraya's case (supra) it is clear that the right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but it is a substantive right and also vested right and such a right to enter the Superior Court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences. The right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the time of institution of the proceedings. It is equally well settled that an order on the date it is made is final, gives rise to vested rights; and subsequent change in law giving rise to new right of appeal or revision is presumed not to affect the finality of the orders already made.
34. The Privy Council in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Limited v.Income-Tax Commissioner, Delhi, AIR 1927 PC 242, observed as follows:
'Their Lordships can have no doubt that provisions which if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality orders, which, when the statute came into force, were final, are provisions, which touch existing rights. Accordingly, if the section now in question is to apply to orders final at the date when it came into force, it must be clearly so provided. Their Lordships cannot find in the section even an indication to that effect. On the contrary, they think there is a clear suggestion that judgment of the High Court referred to in Sub-section (2) is one which under Sub-section (1) has been pronounced, by 'not less than two Judges of the High Court', a condition which was not itself operative until the entire section came into force. In their Lordships' judgment, therefore, the petitioners in these cases have no statutory right of appeal to His Majesty in Council. Only by an exercise of the prerogative is either appeal admissible.
Both petitions their Lordships have, from this point of view, carefully considered. They have not forgotten that the circumstances are somewhat special; that the right of appeal introduced by the Act of 1926 is very probably conceded in order to rectify an omission inadvertently made from previous legislation, and is not one thought of for the first time. Even so, however, their Lordships are unable to find in the circumstances of either case sufficient ground for any exercise of the prerogative in favour of the petitioners.'
35. In the said case, the High Court of Lahore on reference under the provisions of Income-tax Act, 1922 passed certain orders. At the relevant time, there was no statutory appeal to the Privy Council against the orders of the Lahore High Court. The Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1926 came into force with effect from 1-4-1926, which inserted Section 66-A in the Income-'* tax Act conferring right of appeal to the Privy Council against the orders of the High Court made under Section 66. In a petition for special leave against the orders made inJanuary, 1926 by the Lahore High Court, the Privy Council held that the finality of the orders as they were passed prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act was not affected as the Act did not provide for the same and therefore, no appeal lies to the Privy Council.
36. It is equally well settled that the right to finality however does not vest or accrue until the making of the order; and therefore, if a new right of appeal or revision is conferred before making of the order, although after institution of proceedings, the right of appeal or revision is available against all orders subsequently made. (For the proposition see Motiram v. Surajbhan, : [1960]2SCR896 ).
37. In Keshavlal Jethalal Shah v. Mohanlal Bhagwandas, : [1968]3SCR623 , the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Section 29(2) of Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) as amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965 observed as follows:
'Section 29(2) of the Bombay Act as amended by Gujarat Act 18 of 1965 which confers upon the High Court a jurisdiction wider than the jurisdiction exercisable under Section 115 Civil Procedure Code cannot apply to a pending revision under Section 115 C.P.C. filed against the appellate order under Section 29(1) long before the date of amendment and the revision has to be decided in accordance with the limitations imposed under Section 115 C.P.C. The order of the appellate Court, subject to scrutiny by the High Court within the limited field permitted by Section 115 C.P.C. was final. In conferring upon the High Court, a wider jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether the decision of the appellate Court was according to law, the Legislature did not attempt to legislate in the matter of procedure. The Legislature expressly sought to confer upon the High Court power to reopen questions which till then were to be deemed finally decided.'
It is further observed:
'Section 29(2) as amended in terms confers jurisdiction on the High Court to call for the record in a case for the purpose of satisfying itself that the decision in appeal was according to law, which the High Court did not possess before the date of the Amending Act. The amending clause does not seek to explain any pre-existing legislation which was ambiguous or defective.'
38. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with various pronouncements of the Apex Court laying down the law that a vested right of appeal is a substantive right and is governed by the law prevailing at the time of commencement of the suit, and comprises of successive rights of appeal from Court to Court, which really constitute one proceeding.
39. We have already noticed that Amending Act of 1994 was given effect from 31st October, 1993. The Act did not provide any right of appeal or revision against the orders passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act prior to Section 5-B coming into operation. In the instant case, the orders under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act are dated 6-2-1990 and the proceeding resulting in grant of certificate under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act itself was initiated prior to 6-2-1990. Thus, it is clear that neither on the date when the proceedings were instituted under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act nor as on the date when the orders were passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, there has been any right of appeal provided under the Act.
40. The right of appeal is only a creature of the Statute. Once it is created, it becomes a vested right. But, there is no automatic right of appeal unless it is provided for by the Statute itself.
41. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the appealspreferred on 18-12-2001 by respondents 3 to 8 herein are not maintainable in law, it is no doubt true that as on the date of filing of appeals, Section 5-B of the R.O.R. Act has come into force where under an appeal is provided against the orders passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act, to the Revenue Divisional Officer. But, the crucial test is as to whether there was any right of appeal as on the date when the proceedings were initiated and orders passed.
42. It is a case of patent and inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Revenue Divisional Officer to entertain any appeal against the orders dated 6-2-1990 passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act.
43. The appeals are not maintainable in law. The point is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioners.
Re. Contention 2:
44. We shall now consider the contention that the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction (assuming that it is available) after 10 years is a colourable exercise of power. The appeals in the instant case were admittedly preferred after a period of more than 10 years. That immediately after grant of certificate to the petitioners declaring the alienation and transfer to be a valid one, the names of the petitioners were incorporated in the pattadar pass book and other revenue records as occupants and as well as owners of the lands. The names of the petitioners were also entered in faisalpatti and the pahanies and all such entries have continued until the disposal of the appeal by the Revenue Divisional Officer under the impugned order. For a period of more than 10 years, the names of the petitioners herein remained in the record of rights and all of them were treated as occupants as well as owners of the land. In the circumstances, it is impossibleto accept the plea put forth by the respondents that they were not aware of the regularisation orders passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer. The plea that they have no knowledge of the proceedings is not acceptable to the Court.
45. The affidavit filed by the respondent No. 4 in support of the application to condone the delay makes an interesting reading and the relevant para reads:
'That the M.R.O. neither issued the notices to us before amending the records nor he communicated the orders passed by you under Section 5-A of R.O.R. Act, as contemplated under Rule 22-A(1) and (2) of A.P.R. in Land and Pattadar Pass Book Rules, 1989, the appeal lies to the Revenue Divisional Officer within a period of 60 days from the date of communication of order. So I have communication of the order only on 26-11-2001, when I approached the M.R.O. for obtaining title deeds and pass books, as such there is no delay on my part in filing the present appeal. However, I am filing present petition to condone the delay if any to enable to file the present appeal.'
46. The same affidavit has been filed in all the appeals and by the same person. In the memorandum of grounds, there is no whisper that the appeals are being filed from the date of knowledge of the order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer dated 6-2-1990.
47. The appellate authority passed the order admitting the appeals while condoning the delay in the following manner:
'22-12-2001
Case called. Counsel for the appellant present. Sri M.Jeevan Reddy, Advocate filed Vakalat on behalf of the respondent. Heard the arguments of the Counsel for appellant and other side. Appeal petition admitted by condoning the delay. Interim order granted for suspension of impugned order. Postedto 2-2-2002. Call for the lower Court record.'
48. In the impugned order, the appellate authority observed:
'Further, the other plea taken by the appellants that their mothers met with a road accident while coming from the schedule land and nearby schedule land in the year 1982 and Smt. Laxmamma died on the spot and that the police concerned issued FIR in the year 1982 with regard to the accident and whereas Smt. Narsamma who was also severely injured in the same accident suffered for 3 years and died on 23-01-1985 also cannot be overruled. The appellants filed documents in support of their contention, death certificate of Smt. Narsamma. The appellants also stated that they suffered with implication of criminal cases such as Section 302 of IPC, which were compromised by the end of December 1999, as such the plea taken by the appellants that they sentimentally ignored to visit the schedule land as well as they could not verify the records appears to be proper. At the same time, the registration of crimes against the family members of the appellants is also a crucial evidence to establish that they were away from the cultivation of the land and verification of the records. It is also a fact that due to the accidental death of mothers, the sons will be mentally upset and also suffer from mental agony due to involvement in criminal cases.'
49. The observations or findings, as the case may be, of the appellate authority are totally vague and indefinite. The observations are unintelligible. There is no material in support of the said observations. Neither the affidavit nor the memorandum of grounds of appeal, which are similar in all the cases, contain any such averments or allegations. It is not known wherefrom the appellate authority got this information. May be such submissions were made during the course of hearing of appeals. Submissions without there being any foundation in the pleadings cannot be taken into consideration particularly in a case where an appeal is sought to be preferred after a period of more than 10 years. No reasonable manwould have arrived at such conclusion as that of the appellate authority in the instant case.
50. In our considered opinion, even in the absence of communication of the orders by the Mandal Revenue Officer as required under the Rules, the appeal under Section 5-B of the R.O.R. Act by an aggrieved person is required to be filed within a reasonable time. The appeals are to be filed within a reasonable time from the date of knowledge of the order. We have already noted that consequent upon the orders and the certificate issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, necessary entries were made in the pass books recording the names of the petitioners herein as owners of the property. The names were incorporated in the faisalpatties (revenue account) and they were accordingly made liable to pay the land revenue payable in respect of land to the Government. It is difficult to accept that the respondents herein did not have the knowledge of the Mandal Revenue Officer issuing the certificate in the light of the necessary changes and modifications carried in the revenue records and the village records. The material available on record discloses that the respondents never had any connection whatsoever with the lands ever since the date of orders of Mandal Revenue Officer. Evidently, they were not even paying the land revenue. The belated attempt on the part of respondents herein to impugn the orders passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer is nothing but an after-thought. Settled legal rights cannot be permitted to be unsettled in this fashion. Such course is not permissible in law. If such a course is permitted, there will be no end to the litigation and no finality can be attached to any of the orders of the Courts or Tribunals, as the case may be.
51. The entries in the record of rights are made after holding public enquiries. Theentries made in the record of rights carry with them a great evidentiary . value, sometimes they constitute the only evidence available in order to establish one's title to the lands. The record of rights is thus prepared, maintained and updated by public servants in discharge of their official duties. It would be impossible to accept that the entries made in the record of rights in the instant case which remained in the record for a period of over 10 years have not been noticed by the respondents until they have preferred the appeals before the appellate authority. The vague explanation offered by the respondents about the entries and the orders passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer, is totally unacceptable.
52. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered opinion that the so-called appeals preferred by the respondents herein ought not to have been entertained by the appellate authority after long lapse of more than 10 years virtually unsettling the settled rights of the parties. The rights accrued in favour of the petitioners cannot be set aside resulting in miscarriage of justice.
53. The order condoning the delay and admitting the appeals and their disposal is vitiated. It is an improper exercise of jurisdiction.
Re. Contention 3:
54. We have already noticed that Section 5 of the R.O.R. Act provides for amendment and updating of record of rights. Such amendment and updating of record of rights is with reference to acquisition of any right referred to in Section 4 of the R.O.R Act. It is clear from a plain reading of Section 5 of R.O.R. Act that the recording authority (later amended as Mandal Revenue Officer by A. P. Act 9 of 1994) is require to determine as to whether, and if so, in what mannerthe record of rights may be amended in consequence of receiving intimation of the fact of acquisition of any right referred to in Section 4 of the Act. Thereafter, the amendment shall be carried out in the record of rights in accordance with such determination. The amendment and updating of record of rights by the recording authority under Section 5 is with specific reference to the rights acquired by the individuals by succession, survivorship, inheritance, partition, Government patta, decree of a Court or otherwise any right as owner, pattadar, mortgagee, occupant or tenant of a land as provided under Section 4 of the R.O.R. Act. Sections 4 and 5 of R.O.R. Act are inter-related and only on such acquisition of rights under Section 4 and upon an intimation of the same by the person concerned may enable the Mandal Revenue Officer to determine as to whether and if so, in what manner the record of rights may be amended in consequence of such acquisition of rights and intimation thereof.
55. No doubt, Section 5(5) of the R.O.R. Act provides an appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer within a period of sixty days of the date of communication of the said order as against every order of recording authority either making an amendment in the record of rights or refusing to make such amendment. Section 5(5) of R.O.R. Act obviously does not deal with updating and amendment of any entry in the pass book on the basis of certificate issued under Section 5-A (4) of R.O.R. Act. The contention that the act of making necessary entries in the pass book on the production of the certificate issued under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A of R.O.R. Act is the same as amendment and updating of record of rights under Section 5 of R.O.R. Act, is totally misconceived and untenable. Section 6-A of R.O.R. Act enables every owner, pattadar, mortgagee or tenant of any land to apply for issue of pass book and title deed to the Mandal Revenue Officer.The owner, pattadar shall apply for issue of title deed in addition to a pass book. The Mandal Revenue Officer on making such enquiry shall issue a title deed and pass book with such particulars and in such form as may be prescribed. Under Sub-section (5) of Section 5-A, the recording authority on production of certificate issued under Section 5-A (2) is required to make an entry in the pass book to the effect that the person whose name has been recorded as occupant is the owner of the property.
56. It is thus clear that Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act is a special and composite provision, which provides for regularisation of alienation or other transfers of land under unregistered instruments. Its area of operation is totally different from that of the area of operation of Section 5 of the R.O.R. Act, which essentially deals with amendment and updating of record of rights on the strength of acquisition of any right referred to in Section 4 of the R.O.R. Act. Making of an entry in the pass book on the strength of the certificate issued under Section 5-A (4) cannot be equated to that of amendment and updating of Record of Rights as provided for under Section 5(1) of the R.O.R. Act. An appeal under Section 5 (5) is provided only as against making amendment or refusing to make amendment in the record of rights under Section 5(1) of the Act. Therefore, no appeal as against a consequential decision of the recording authority under Sub-section (5) of Section 5-A is provided for under Sub-section (5) of Section 5, which in turn provides for an appeal against the act of amending and updating of record of rights.
57. At any rate, no appeal lies as against making an entry in the pass book on production of certificate of regularisation, which is a consequential one in its nature, without there being any challenge' to the grant of certificate itself which constitutesthe basis for making entries in the pass book.
58. Be it noted that the respondents in the appeals preferred by them challenged the certificate of regularisation issued under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act and as well as the entries made in the Record of Rights. Admittedly, no appeal as against grant of certificate under Section 5-A (4) lies under Section 5(5) of the R.O.R. Act. The desperate argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents stands exposed itself.
59. The impugned order itself reveals that the first respondent has set aside the Certificate issued under Section 5-A(4) of R.O.R. Act, cancelled the pattadar pass book and title deeds of the writ petitioners. Admittedly, such course is not permissible in an appeal preferred under Sub-section (5) of Section 5 of the R.O.R. Act.
60. It is thus clear that Section 5-B was brought into force by Legislature by way of amendment in order to provide a composite appeal against the orders made under Section 5-A which right was not available prior to introduction of Section in the R.O.R. Act. The decision reported in G. Sudershan Reddy v. Joint Collector, : 2000(6)ALD421 , is of no assistance in the matter.
Re. Contention 4:
61. The submission that the appeals before the first respondent may be treated as appeals under Section 158 of A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli, is equally untenable and unsustainable. Section 158 of A.P. (T.A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli provides that an appeal shall lie against the order and decision passed by the Revenue Officer under the Act or any other law for the time being in force to his immediate superior officer whether such decision or order may have been passedin exercise of original jurisdiction or in appeal. Section 2(1) of the A.P. (T,A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli defines 'Revenue Officer': 'Revenue Officer' means every officer of any rank whatsoever appointed under any provision of this Act or of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Record of Rights in Land Regulation, 1358-F (Regulation LXIII of 1358 F) and appointed for carrying on the land revenue administration or who discharges the function relating to survey assessment and preparation of accounts and records.
62. A plain reading of Section 158 of A.P. (T.A.) Land Revenue Act makes it clear that it provides appeals against the orders passed by an inferior officer to a superior revenue officer. The Revenue Officer is one who is appointed as such under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act or the A.P. (Telangana Area) Record of Rights in Land Regulation, 1358 Fasli, for carrying on land revenue administration or who discharges the functions relating to survey, assessment and preparation of accounts and records. By the enactment of A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971, the earlier law, that is to say, Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Record of Rights in Land Regulation, 1358 Fasti, was repealed. The said Regulation is not in force. Under the R.O.R. Act, there is no provision for appointment of any Revenue Officer except the Mandal Revenue Officer for the purposes of the R.O.R. Act. Section 2(4-a) of R.O.R. Act defines that 'Mandal Revenue Officer' means the Officer in-charge of a Revenue Mandal and includes any officer of the Revenue Department authorised by the Commissioner to perform the functions of the Mandal Revenue Officer under the Act. The expression 'Mandal Revenue Officer' in A. P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 is one who is required to perform the functions of the Mandal Revenue Officer under the Act. SuchMandal Revenue Officer cannot be equated to that of a 'Revenue Officer' within the meaning of the expression used in A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli. Therefore, an appeal against an order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer does not lie to his superior officer under Section 158 of A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli.
63. Be that as it may. Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act contains non obstante clause and it provides that notwithstanding anything in the Act, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Registration Act, 1908 or any other law for the time being in force, the Mandal Revenue Officer is conferred with the statutory power to issue certificate regularising certain alienations or other transfers of land. The R.O.R. Act itself is special law dealing with the record of rights and Section 5-A is a special provision by itself whereas the A.P. (T.A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli is a general one.
64. In Sanvan Singh v. Kasturilal, : [1977]2SCR421 , the Supreme Court, while considering as to what happens when competing provisions vesting jurisdiction under different laws open with non obstante clause and invests jurisdiction in different Courts, held that in such a situation the object and purpose of a legislation assumes greater relevance. It was further observed:
'When two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law, stimulating and incisive problems of interpretation arise. Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol, cases of such conflict have to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration........For resolving such inter se conflicts, one other test may also be applied though the persuasive force of such a test is but one of the factors which combine to give a fair meaning to the language of the law. Thattest is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one.'
65. Same is the view taken by the Apex Court in Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Co-operative Housing Society Limited, : [1990]1SCR862 .
66. We have no doubt whatsoever in our mind to hold that the A.P. (T.A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli is a general law which deals mainly with land revenue and allied matters whereas the R.O.R. Act not only being a subsequent Act but also being a special law in relation to record of rights shall prevail over the provisions of the A.P. (T.A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli. In our considered opinion, the remedy provided under Section 158 of the Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli is not available to challenge any order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer under the provisions of the R.O.R. Act. The remedies provided under the R.O.R. Act alone would be available to the aggrieved individual. The contention urged by the learned Counsel for respondents is accordingly rejected. Thus, the appeals preferred by the respondents herein before the first respondent cannot be treated as appeals filed under Section 158 of the Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli.
67. We may also notice that an appeal under Section 158 of A.P. (T.A.) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli has to be preferred within a period of sixty days. In the instant case, the respondents have chosen to prefer appeals after a period of 10 years. The appeals could not have been entertained even if the said appeals preferred by them are treated as appeals under Section 158 of the Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli.
Subsidiary Contentions :
68. The learned Counsel for respondents made a feeble attempt to contend that the case on hand is not a fit case for interference in exercise of this Court'sjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India since the order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer is void inasmuch as the same has been passed without issuing any notice whatsoever to the affected persons.
69. It is settled law that no writ would be issued quashing an illegal order to give effect to or reviving another illegal order. The Court of equity when exercising its equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution must so act as to prevent perpetration of the legal fraud and the Courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith as far as it lies within their power. Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtlities invented to evade law.
70. The principle enunciated that there can be certain situations under which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and also the principle that the quashing of the order, if it is in breach of natural justice, is likely to result in revival of another order, which is in itself is illegal as in Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, : [1966]2SCR172 , is not applicable to the facts on hand.
71. In the instant case, we are concerned with the very jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer in entertaining the appeals preferred by the respondents herein. The question is as to the maintainability of the appeals themselves. It is not a case where the order is void because of violation of principles of natural justice. It is nobody's case that the Mandal Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications filed by the petitioners under Section 5-A of the R.O.R. Act. The complaint essentially relates to certain procedural irregularities about which we do not propose to express any opinionat this stage after 13 years of passing oforders.
Void or Voidable Decisions: Consequences thereof :
72. But, the question then is: When can an order passed by the Tribunal or the authority of limited jurisdiction be held to be a void one? It is trite law that an order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and is void.
73. The distinction between void and voidable decisions is now obsolete; the House of Lords having written its obituary in Baddington v. British Transport Police (1999) 2 AC 143.
74. Lord Radcliff in a well-known passage in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, (1956) 1 All. ER 855 at page 871, observed:
'An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.' (Emphasis is of ours)
75. It is true that a decision of administrative or domestic Tribunal reached in breach of natural justice may be void. In Calvin v. Carr, (1979) 2 All. E.R. 440, the Privy Council observed:
'...... what is void and what is voidable, asto which some confusion exists in the authorities. Their Lordships' opinion would be, if it became necessary to fix on one or other of these expressions, that a decision made contrary to natural justice is void, but that, until it is so declared by a competent body or Court, it may have some effect, or existence, in law.' (Emphasis is supplied)
76. There is a useful discussion on the topic 'Nullity and Voidness' inAdministrative Law - Eighth Edition by Sir William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, as under:
'An act 'or order which is ultra vires is a nullity, utterly without existence or effect in law. That is the meaning of 'void', the term most commonly used.. .... 'there are nodegrees of nullity' and that errors such as bad faith, wrong grounds and breach of natural justice all necessarily involve excess of jurisdiction and therefore nullity.........The Court may hold that the act or order is invalid, but may refuse relief to the applicant because of his lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case the 'void' order remains effective and, must be accepted as if it was valid. It seems also that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another. A common case where an order however void, becomes valid for practical purposes, is where a statutory time limit expires after which its validity cannot be questioned, The statute does not say that the void order shall be valid; but by cutting off legal remedies it produces that result. As Lord Diplock said of a compulsory purchase order alleged to be made in bad faith but challenged after the expiry of the limitation period, the order 'had legal effect notwithstanding its potential invalidity.' (See Hoffmann La Roche v. Secretary of State - (1974) 2 All. E.R. 1128). (Emphasis is of ours).
77. In de Smith, Woolf And Jowell -Judicial Review of Administrative Action Fifth Edition, in respect of the juristic principle relating to distinction between void and voidable decisions it was observed that the Courts have become increasingly impatient with the distinction and the law is summarised in the following manner:
'(1) All official decisions are presumed to be valid until set aside or otherwise held to be invalid by a Court of competent jurisdiction.
Under the terminology of void and voidable decisions, this proposition raises a paradox, namely, that decision, although technically void, is in practice voidable. Such a paradox is, however, circumvented if we abandone those terms which 'lead to confusion' and instead use the terms lawful and unlawful decisions. Decisions are thus presumed lawful unless and until a Court of competent jurisdiction declares them unlawful. There is good reason for this the public must be entitled to rely upon the validity of official decisions and individuals should not take the law into their own hands. These reasons are built into the procedures of the application for judicial review, which requires for example an application to quash a decision to be brought within a limited time. A decision not challenged within that time whether or not it would have been declared unlawful if challenged, and whether or not unlawful for jurisdictional error, retains legal effect. So does a decision found to be unlawful but where a remedy is, in the Court's discretion, withheld. The language of void and voidable cannot, however, accommodate such an effect, as it would insist that a void decision, being void ab initio , is devoid of legal consequences and that a voidable decision is capable of being set aside.' (Emphasis is added)
78. In State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi, : (1996)6SCC445 , the Supreme Court observed:
'The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner.'
79. It is well settled that the Court or Tribunal having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the proceedings and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and even though itdecided wrong, it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. (For the proposition, see Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, : [1964]1SCR495 )
80. The law is thus very clear that even a void order continues in de facto operation and the same can be ignored by an aggrieved person at his own risk and peril. Even such void orders continue to hold the field and have the effect in law like all other lawful orders until the same is set aside in a properly instituted proceedings at the instance of an aggrieved person. Even a void order cannot be whisked away. Individuals cannot be permitted to disobey and disregard decisions presuming them as void decisions. Such a course if permitted may amount to taking law into ones, own hands. Rule of law and administration of justice processes would be in peril resulting in chaos.
81. In the instant case, the Mandal Revenue Officer had the jurisdiction over the subject-matter and he had the jurisdiction over the party and therefore, he made an order in deciding the applications submitted by the respondents, which cannot be said that the Mandal Revenue Officer has acted beyond his jurisdiction. The order cannot be treated as nullity. The errors, if any, in exercising his statutory power may amount to error of law and error of law can be corrected in the manner laid down and procedure prescribed by availing remedies available to get it corrected. If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have the error corrected, the error will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity.
82. In our considered opinion, the characterisation of the order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer as 'void' is not a determinative of its legal impact. In State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar, : AIR1996SC906 , the Supreme Courtobserved:
'The word 'void' has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity, depending upon the gravity of the infirmity, as to whether it is, fundamental or otherwise.,...'
83. In the instant case, nothing prevented the respondents herein from challenging the order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer by availing such remedies as may have been available to them in law.
84. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot refuse to issue a writ to correct the jurisdictional errors. This Court cannot refuse to issue a writ on the principle than no writ could be issued quashing an illegal order to give effect to or reviving another illegal order in case where the order impugned suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction.
85. It is further contended by the learned Counsel for respondents that the petitioners have obtained orders from the Mandal Revenue Officer in a fraudulent manner and by making misrepresentations and such orders can always be set aside by the very same authority which passed the orders.
86. There is no such whisper in the memorandum of grounds and the affidavit filed before the appellate authority nor is there any finding by the appellant authority on this aspect of the matter. The order passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer is not set aside by the appellate authority on the ground that the petitioners herein have obtained orders in any fraudulent manner. We do not propose to make any further comment on this aspect of the matter.
87. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the impugned order suffers from incurable legal infirmities. The order is vitiated by errors apparent on the face of record. It suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction. It is liable to be set aside and the same is accordingly set aside.
88. Let a writ of certiorari be issued quashing the impugned order.
89. The writ petition is allowed with costs.