ORDER
B. K. Somasekhara, J.
1. The order of dismissal of W.P.M.P. No. 287.19/95 in W.P.M.P.(SR) No. 116983/95 in W.P. No. 8394 of 1989 dated 18-6-1996 passed by the learned single Judge questioned in this appeal having a tinge of dealing with such matters arising out of proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Limitation Act confronts us with these questions to lay down the correct law settled so far in this regard.
1. Whether (a) the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, the Code) and (b) the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 (in short, the Act) are applicable to the proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India (in short, the Constitution)?
2. If not, what is the effect of Rules 20, 24 and 25 of the Writ Proceeding Rules of Andhra Pradesh, 1977 (in short, the Rules)?
2. The Amendment Act of 1976 of the Code was brought into force with effect from 1-2-1977. Section 141 of the Code as it existed before the amendment Act of 1976 enabled any Court of Civil Jurisdiction to apply the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits in all its proceedings. But the Amendment Act adding the Explanation to the provision excluded any proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution from the expression 'proceedings'. This is apparent from reading the provision as it exists since 1-2-1977 as herein.
'Miscellaneous Proceedings:
141. The procedure in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction.
Explanation : In this section, the expression 'proceedings' includes proceedings under O.IX, but does not include any proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution'.
(stress imported)
Therefore, in unambiguous terms the provision made the procedure in the Code inapplicable to any proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In view of the conflicting opinions expressed by different courts including our own High Court in A. Adinarayana v. State of A.P., : AIR1958AP16 , the Parliament, by the aforesaid amending Act, introduced the Explanation and statutorily recognised the views expressed by some of the Courts, that writ proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution shall not be deemed to be 'proceedings' within the meaning of S. 141 of the Code as has been noted in Puran Singh v. State of Punjab, : [1996]1SCR730 . Therein it was concluded as follows (at p. 1096, para 5 of AIR):--
'After the introduction of the explanation to S. 141 of the Code, it can be said that when S. 141141 provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable 'in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction', it shall not include a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution ..... '
The non-applicability of the procedure provided in the Code to the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution had been settled by the Supreme Court even before the amending Act of 1976 in Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Board, : [1975]2SCR71 . The pronouncement therein with the following words was affirmed in Puran Singh's case : [1996]1SCR730 (supra):-- '
' ..... S. 141 of the Code, to whichreference has been made, makes it clear that the provisions of the Code in regard to suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction as far as it can be made applicable. The words 'as far as it can be made applicable' makes it clear that, in applying the various provisions of the Code to proceedings other than those of a suit, theCourt must take into account the nature of those proceedings and the relief sought for....:After the introduction of the explanation to S. 141 of the Code, it can be said that when S. 141 provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable 'in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction', it shall not include a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution ..... Ifbecause of the explanation, proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution has been excluded, there is no question of making applicable the procedure of Code as far as it can be made applicable to such proceeding. The procedures prescribed in respect of suit in the Code if are made applicable to the writ proceedings, then in many cases it may frustrate the exercise of extraordinary powers by the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution.'
A Full Bench of our own High Court in Govt. of India v. National Tobacco Co. of India, : AIR1977AP250 , had settled the question in its own words:--
' ....... But this position no more obtains inview of the recent amendment to the Code which also came into force on. 1-2-1977. Section 141 of CPC says that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction. Now by virtue of the new amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, an explanation is added to this section which says that any proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution does not come within the meaning of the word 'proceedings' occurring in S. 141. Therefore, it is no more possible to say, relying on the procedure of the Civil Procedure Code, that service on the learned Government Pleader is service on the Government which is generally the party against whom a writ petition is filed.'
With that the conflict due to Adinarayana's case : AIR1958AP16 (supra) of our own High Court was no longer continued. But another Full Bench of our High Court in M. Srinivas y. Jawaharlal Nehru, (1991) 3 Andh LT 1, made a review petition underO.47, R. 1, CPC maintainable in writ proceedings in view of the provisions of R. 24 of the Rules. Apparently no reference is made to. the earlier Full Bench ruling of our High Court (supra). That obviously led to the conflict of the two Full Bench pronouncement of our High Court. In view of that and Puran Singh V case : [1996]1SCR730 (supra) of the Supreme Court, being the latest, we are called upon to restate the correct position of law in this regard.
3. It is true that the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution may be either Civil or Criminal depending upon the right asserted or enforced, but still not a suit or the proceedings arising therefrom as settled in Babubhai Muljibhai Patel's case : [1975]2SCR71 (supra), CF. Thirtba Singh v. Bachida, AIR 1995 SC 830 (sic) and Desh Pandey v. Gendulal, (CA.950/65 Dt. 6-1-1966) (reported in : [1966]3SCR198 ). The jurisdiction therein although original is not an ordinary original jurisdiction within the meaning of S. 141 of the Code. The law in this regard was settled by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Vijay Anand Maharaj, : [1962]45ITR414(SC) as follows :--
'...... It is, therefore, clear from the natureof the power conferred under Art. 226 of theConstitution and the decisions on the subjectthat the High Court in exercise of its powerunder Art. 226 of the Conslitution exercisesoriginal jurisdiction, though the said jurisdiction shall not be confused with the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court. Thisjurisdiction, though original in character ascontrasted with its appellate and revisionaljurisdictions, is exercisable throughout theterritories in relation to which it exercisejurisdiction and may, for convenience, bedescribed as extraordinary original jurisdiction.'
(stress imported)
Relying on that the Supreme Court in Puran Singh's case : [1996]1SCR730 (supra) emphasized that -
' ..... When the High Court exercisesextraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, it aims at securing a veryspeedy and efficacious remedy to a person whose legal or constitutional right has been infringed. If all the elaborate and technical rules laid down in the Code are to be applied to writ proceedings, the very object and purpose is likely to be defeated ..... Theprocedures prescribed in respect of suit in the Code if are made applicable to the writ proceedings then in many cases it may frustrate the exercise of extraodinary powers by the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution.'
With the total exclusion of the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution from the purview of S. 141 of the Code, there is no question of making applicable the procedure of the Code 'as far as it can be made applicable to such proceedings'. If in spite of it, the provisions of the Code are made applicable to the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution, it would be repugnant to the extraordinary powers of the High Court thereunder.
4. In Srinivas's case : 1991(3)ALT1 (supra) although our High Court conceded that the writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is the extraordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court, it applied the provisions of the Code in view of Rule 24 of the Rules holding that it permitted such a course. Therefore, a serious question arises whether the provisions of the Rules override the powers of the High Court under Art. 226.
The Rules are framed under Art. 225 of the, Constitution to regulate the proceedings under Art. 226 (Roc.No. 136/SO/77). They came into force on 4-6-1977. They are applicable to the petitions, applications and appeals (Rule 1-C). The Rules being the delegated legislation, has the force of law provided of course they are within the ambit of the article and did not militate against the object or the terms of the substantive article as held in State of U.P. v. Batuk, : 1978CriLJ839 . They being the procedural rules have no effect of substantive law within the dictum in Prabhu v. Srivastav, : [1975]3SCR552 . Our own High Court has already ruled in Venkata v. Dist. Collector, : AIR1969AP381 , that the powersunder Art. 226 are not subject to or controlled by anything in Art. 225. Therefore, their purpose and object to regulate the proceedings under Art. 226 cannot be but to achieve the purpose and object of the latter and thus meant to supplement and compliment it. It is true that Rule 24 reads as if the provisions of the Code will apply to the proceedings under Art. 226 as has been stated in Srinivas's case (supra) and to repeal:
'Rule 24. All other rules relating to causes and matters coming before the original side and appellate side of the High Court and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 will apply to the writ petitions and the writ appeals in so far as they are not inconsistent with these rules.'
In a way it reads like S. 141 of the Code before the Explanation was added by the amending Act of 1976. The amending Act of 1976 coming into force on 1-2-1977 categorically taking the proceedings under Art. 226 out of the expression 'proceedings' in S. 141 of the Code not to operate the provisions of the Code as far as they are not inconsistent with the rules as settle in Puran Singh's case (supra), should be taken to have repealed through the Rule 24 coming into force on 4-6-1977 if such a construction to apply the provisions of the Code with the aid of Rule 24 is put upon the implication in the rule making power. What the Courts wanted to present the conflict in the precedents by suggesting amendments to S. 141 of the Code which was acceded to by the Parliament in adding the Explanation to S. 141 of the Code cannot be demolished with the aid of Rule 24 which should be a self destructive judicial process of which no judicial system can contemplate or envisage. At no stretch of imagination, Rule 24 can be taken to substitute S. 141 of the Code even after the Amending Act of 1976 only to apply the provisions of the Code to the proceedings under Art. 226. In fact such a construction was attempted to be made by using such a Rule in pari materia by the High-Court of Punjab and Haryana in Ramakala v. Asstt. Director of Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, (FB) and TejaSinghv. Union Territory of Chandigarh, (FB) and by the High Court of Karnataka in Rokyabi v. Ismail Khan, : AIR1984Kant234 . (Rule 32 of the Writ Rules of Punjab and Haryana High Court and Rule 39 of the Writ Proceeding Rules of Karnataka High Court are in pan materia with Rule 24 of the Writ Proceeding Rules of A.P.). The Supreme Court has disapproved such a procedure in applying such rules by the High Courts to do something which was not permissible in view of the exclusion of the proceedings under Art. 226 from the purview of S. 141 of the Code. Such a disapproval and the reason behind it in the very words of the Supreme Court in Puran Singh's case : [1996]1SCR730 (supra) read:
'We have not been able to appreciate the anxiety on the part of the different Courts in judgments referred to above to apply the provisions of the Code to Writ Proceedings on the basis of S. 141 of the Code. When the Constitution has vested extraordinary power in the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 to issue any order, writ or direction and the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which such High Court is exercising jurisdiction, the procedure for exercising such power and jurisdiction have to be traced and found in Arts. 226 and 227 itself. No useful purpose will be served by limiting the power of the High Court by procedural provisions prescribed in the Code. Of course, on many questions, the provisions and procedures prescribed under the Code can be taken up as guide while exercising the power, for granting relief to persons, who have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. It need not be impressed that different provisions and procedures under the Code are based on well recognised principles for exercise of discretionary power, and they are reasonable and rational. But at the same time it cannot be disputed that many procedures prescribed in the said Code are responsible for delaying the delivery of justice and causing delay in securing the remedy available to a person who pursues such remedies. The High Court should be left to adopt its own procedure for granting relief to the persons concerned. TheHigh Court is expected to adopt a procedure which can be held to be not only reasonable but also expeditious. (stress imported)
Thus the ratio in Srinivas's case (supra) not only conflicts with the earlier Full Bench ruling of our own High Court in National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. case : AIR1977AP250 (supra) but also the law declared in Puran Singh's case by the Supreme Court and cannot hold the field of precedent to exist. On the other hand, the earlier Full Bench ruling in National Tobacco Co. of India's case (supra) which is in tune with Puran Singh's case should continue to be a binding precedent declaring the law as such. Therefore, we conclude that notwithstanding Rule 24, the provisions of the Code cannot be made applicable to any extent to any of the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution and the High Court in dealing with such matters should be left to adopt its own procedure for granting relief to persons concerned and by adopting a procedure which can be held not only reasonable but also expeditious. Rule 25 of the Rules deals with an application to set aside an order dismissing for default or an ex parte order subject to imposing certain conditions like payments of such costs etc. This is also to be read within the law declared as above. As the very Rule emphasizes the discretion of the Court to pass such orders while using the expression 'may' has imported the unfettered discretion vested in the High Court under Art. 226 to exercise such a power. To that extent, Rule 25 cannot be taken to militate against Art. 226, but Rule 24, if taken aid of to do something which is prevented from doing, is bound to militate against Art. 226 and therefore cannot be normally given effect.
5. With the law so declared as to make the provisions of the Code inapplicable to the proceedings under Art. 226 in spite of Rule 24 of the Rules or any other such Rule, a situation may arise as how the discretion under Art. 226 of the Constitution can be exercised in a given case without the aid of any such regulation or the procedural provisions like the Code. The answer lies in the expressions in Puran Singh's case : [1996]1SCR730 extracted from para 10 (supra) that '..... on many questions the provisions andprocedures prescribed under the code can be taken up as guide while exercising power for granting relief to persons who have involved the jurisdiction of the High Court, it need not be impressed that the relevant provisions and procedures under the Code are based on well recognised principles for exercise of discretionary power and they are reasonable. Possibly the Rule 24 of the Rules has to be understood in the context of exercise of discretionary power by taking up such procedural provisions as guide while exercising such a power for granting the reliefs. Many occasions may arise to deal with while exercising the power under Art, 226 or 227 of the Constitution to render both procedural and substantive justice. The illustrations may be plenty. Among them the impleading of parties, amendment of pleadings, death of parties to bring their legal representatives on record, payment of costs, and passing of interim orders to preserve the existing rights etc., are few illustrations. In Puran Singh's case : [1996]1SCR730 while holding that the provisions contained in 0. 22 of the Code are not applicable per se to writ proceedings in view of the law so settled, the question whether the party who has invoked the jurisdiction of High Court by filing a writ petition under Arts. 226 and 227 is at liberty to proceed with such writ petitions against a dead respondent was raised and answered thus:
'If such legal representative is not brought on the record, any order passed against the original respondent after his death shall not be binding on them because they have not been heard. The order of the High Court shall be deemed to have been passed against a dead person. If the right of the petitioner to pursue the remedy survives even after the death of the original respondent to the writ petition, then on the same principle even the right to contest that claim survives on the part of the legal representative of the deceased respondent. In such a situation, after the death of the respondent if the right to sue survives againstthe legal representative of such respondent, then the petitioner has to substitute the legal representative of such respondent before the writ petition can proceed and can be heard and disposed of. The petitioner has to take steps for substitution of legal representative within a' reasonable time. It need not be impressed that it will be unreasonable on the part of the court to implead the legal representative of the deceased respondent after lapse of several months or years and then to direct them to contest the claim of the petitioner merely on the ground that after the death of the original respondent the right title or the interest of such respondent has devolved on them.'
(From para 7 on pages 385 and 386} (of SCALE) : (Para 6, at p. 1096 of AIR). Such similar situations have been dealt with by various High Courts and the Supreme Court in the country by taking aid of Order- 1, Rule I, as to joinder of parties, Order 1, Rule 8 to plead or to defend in the representative capacity, Order 6. Rule 8 relating to pleadings including amendment, Order 9, Rules 9 and 13 as to ex parte proceedings, Order 19 relating to affidavits, Order 21 relating to execution. Order 22 relating to abatement, Order 23 relating to withdrawal or compromise, Order 26 relating to appointment of Commissoiners, Order 27 relating to the proceedings against Government or Public Officers in their official capacity etc., etc., of the Code (pages 559 nd 560 of the Constitution of India by D.D. Basu, 12th Edition, 1996) But at the same time it must be emphasized that the taking aid of such principles to exercise the powers of discretion under Art. 226 does not mean that such provisions of the Code per sc arc applicable in their form or technique as has been cautioned in Puran Singh's case : [1996]1SCR730 . So we declare the law hereby that the provisions of the Code are not applicable to the proceedings under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution to any extent except to borrow any of the principles therein to exercise the discretion within the powers under the very articles to render justice and for no other purpose.
6. The preamble of the Limitation Actreads:
'An act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings for purposes connected therein.'
Apparently the Act is meant for suits and other proceedings connected therein and if read in the context of the explanation to Section 141 of the Code, the proceedings under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be read into the expression 'proced-ings' in the preamble. The reasoning in Puran Singh's case : [1996]1SCR730 supra to exclude the proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 in the context should also be extend to the Limitation Act in use of such expression. The Supreme Court in Makashi v. Menon, : [1982]2SCR69 and State of U.P. v. Bahadura, : 1983ECR1556D(SC) made it emphatic that the proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution not being a suit nor an application to which Limitation Act applies, the provisions of that Act cannot be invoked in such proceedings and that no limitation is provided for such proceedings. That is why even while drafting Rule 20 into the Rules as hereunder, by abundant caution the framers of the rules saved the discretion of the Court for issuing such directions as it may think fit to give thereon so as to serve the purpose of Art. 226.
'Rule 20: Where a petitioner unduly delays the bringing of a petition to hearing the Registrar shall call upon him to explain the delay and after notifying all parties who have entered appearance, place the petition and the explanation if any, before the Court for such directions as the court may think fit to give therein.'
While holding that Order 22 of the Code is not applicable to writ proceedings or writ appeals and that it is incumbent on the part of the parties to substitute the heirs of such parties within a reasonable time, the Supreme Court in Puran Singh's case : [1996]1SCR730 explained the meaning of 'reasonable time' for such purposes by taking note of Art. 120 of the Limitation Act without allowing the proceedings to automatically abate to consider an application filed beyond 90 days of theparties by considering the facts and circumstances of a particular case for the purpose of condoning the delay. But still it was cautioned that 'this power has to be exercised on well known and settled principles in respect of exercise of discretionary power by the High Court. If the High Court is satisfied that delay, if any, in substituting the heirs of the deceased respondent was not intentional, and sufficient cause has been shown for not taking the steps earlier, the High Court can substitute the legal representative and proceed with the hearing of the writ petition or the writ appeal, as the case may be. At the same time, the High Court has to be conscious that after lapse of time a valuable right accrues to the legal representative of the deceased respondent and he should not be compelled to contest a claim which due to the inaction of the petitioner or the appellant has become final' (from para 11 on page 387 and 388 stress inducted). Therefore, the emphasis is on the exercise of discretionary power df the High Court ultimately under Art. 226 and not under the Limitation Act. Any olher article or the provision of the Limitation Act may in a given case serve the same purpose and nothing more nor intended to control or regulate the disrection of the High Court. Rule 20 of the Rules should also be thus taken aid of within such limitations.
7. Notwithstanding the law of Limitation or the Act not being made applicable to the proceedings under Arts. 226 or 227 of the Constitution as per (the settled law the doctrine of laches to deal with the delay in bringing such proceedings and the condonation has been operating the field of law in such situations. In State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, : 1992CriLJ527 and Babu v. Union India, : AIR1979SC1713 , Ashok v. Collector, : [1980]1SCR491 , Ramesh v. T.I.D., AIR 1980 SC 1200 (sic) and State of M.P. v. Nandlal, : [1987]1SCR1 , the Surpreme Court has authoritatively held that though there is no specific period of limitation, the High Court may refuse to exercise the extraordinary power where the petitioner is guilty of laches on undue delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation. What constitutes laches andwhat circumstances are sufficient to condone the same depends upon the facts and circumstances each case. The real lest to determine delay is that the petitioner should come to the court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligenece of the petitioner. The test is not the physical running of time. Where the circumstances justify the conduct exists, the illegality which is manfiest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. (Dehri Rohtas Light Railway v. District Board, : (1992)2SCC598 . No hard and fast rule can be laid down in the matter and each case should be determined according to its circumstances. The law now settled is not restricted or expected to particular type of relief under Art. 226 but the whole thing is' left to the discretion of the Court as has been held by the Supreme Court in several precedents including Puran Singh's case : [1996]1SCR730 . Therefore, we unhesitatingly conclude that the provisions of Limitation Act 1963 or the Rule of Limitation are not applicable to the proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution in dealing with the delay proceedings thereunder expect to borrow any such law or the provisions in addition to applying the doctrine of laches to exercise the discretion therein and further subject to the restrictions enumerated as above.
8. Before parting with this case we are to reiterate and impress that Art. 226 of the Constitution is a storehouse or a reservoir or even a dam of justice, equity and good conscience which are meant for exercising within the discretionary power of the Court vested in that article to do full and complete justice, the whole justice and nothing but the justice and such a forebay of all the contents may consist of any law, any rule of law and the rule of human law and human justice and none can restrict such a power.
9. Now we are to test the merits of the appeal with the above principles. On 22-11-1994 there were three writ proceedings viz. W.P. Nos. 8394/89, 6780/87 and 6951/87. They were between the same parties in respect of the same subject matter concerning the 4th respondent Sri H.S. Shiromani, an employee of the appellant. All the three matters weretaken up together for hearing. W.P. Number 6780/87 which was filed by the appellant was disposed of as having become infructuous. W.P. No. 6951 / 87 filed by the 4th respondent was also disposed of on the same ground. W.P. No: 8394/89 filed by the appellant was disposed of as not pressed.
10. The grievance of appellant is that there was no authority for the advocate who was on record not to press the petition. Therefore, the appellant in W.P. M.P. S.R. No. 116983/95 sought to set aside the impugned order dates 21-11-1994'in regard to W.P. No. 8394/89 and to reopen the matter for disposal on merits. The delay of 298 days in filing such a petition was also sought to be condoned as a first measure in W.P. M.P. No. 28739/95. The learned single Judge did not find any merit in that and thus passed the impugned order.
11. In all three matters, the appellant being one of the parties represented by the same Advocate had no grievance in regard to the disposal of the W.P. Nos. 6780/87 and 6951 / 87 by the orders of the Court passed on the same day followed by the impugned order in W.P: No. 8394/89. But only in regard to the order in W.P. No. 8394/89, a grievance has been raised. The case records bear out that Mr. V. Subramanyam, the learned Advocate was on record for the appellant in all the three cases. He was one of the three advocates viz. Mr. GVL. Narasirnha Rao, Mr. V. Subramanyam and Mr. K. Nagaraj, in whose favour the vakalat was executed by the appellant in the said writ petition on 21-6-1989. Hon'ble Mr. Justice GVL. Narasimha Rao was elevated as a Judge of this court in 30-1-1993 and expired on 7-11-1993. The impugned order was passed quite long after such dates and presumably, the learned Advocate Mr. V. Subramanyam was continuing on record to represent the appellant till the date of the passing of the impugned order in the writ proceedings. The grievance is not that the appellant was not at all represented in the three appeals when they were taken up on the relevant date. In the nature of the orders passed in the three writ petitions on 22-11-1994, it is apparent that the three orders were passed one after the other affer hearing all thepersons concernd in the proceedings. As such no grievance is expressed in regard to the two orders and the grievance only in regard to, the impugned order in W.P. No. 8394/ 89 appears to be unnatural. Therefore, the question whether the Advocate on record was not authorised not to press the petition was not at all open for consideration. But still we have gone through that question with the materials on record to positively hold against the appellant. Therefore, even if the delay in filing the petition to set aside such an order had been condoned, the result would not have been different.
12. The delay of 298 days in filing the petition to set aside such an impugned order in W.P. No. 8394/89 cannot be but inordinate amounting to negligence and should be judged with serious concern. Admittedly, the appellant came to know about such an order on 12-1-1995 when the respondent made a representation to pay all the emolouments to him in pursuance of the other two orders passed on 22-11-1994. In spite of it, the appellant did not report to the Court that the Advocate on record had no authority to submit that the petition was not pressed nor took any steps to file a petition to set aside the order either immediately or within a reasonable time. Even pressuming that the appellant had to correspond with the Advocate on record and the son of the former Advocate late Mr. Justice GVL. Narasimha Rao, in regard to such a mailer to know the circumstances under which such a representation was made to the High Court that the petition was not pressed, it is difficult to believe that the appellant would have required 298 days to approach' this Court for such a relief. The appellant although came to know about the impugned order on 12-1-1995, he addressed a letter to Mr. V. Subramanyam, the learned Advocate on record only 14-6-1995 seeking certain clarifications in this regard and Mr. GVLN. Murthy, son of the former Advocate late Mr. Justice GVL. Narasimha Rao, on 4-7-1995. As rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge the normal human behaviour would have been to immediately rush to the Court and protest. No reasonable person would have acted except in such amanner in such a situation. This is a clear case of serious laches and inordinate delay in approaching the Court for the relief in the background of unsatisfactory circumstances against the appellant. It was not a fit case to exercise the discretion of the Court to condone the delay. The learned single Judge for adequate reasons rightly did not accept such explanations for delay amounting to laches and this Court even after re-examination of all the facts and circumstances finds no reason to interfere with the said order.
13. The writ appeal is dismissed as having no merit to admit.
14. Order accordingly.