Jayachandra Reddy, J.
1. In all these three cases the scope of some of the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, hereafter called TADA, and the procedure to be followed by the Courts designated under the said Act, fall for consideration. For the sake of convenience, we shall first State the facts in each case and then examine common submissions made by the learned counsel.
2. Cr. P. No. 1434 of 1989 : Crime No. 44 of 1989 was registered in Lingala Police Station under Sections 147, 148, 341, 302 read with 149, I.P.C. and 3(2) of TADA. The Inspector of Police, Pulivendala, against five accused. The learned Magistrate took it on file as P.R.C. No. 5 of 1989 and committed the case to the Court of Session on 7-8-1989. Pending the trial of the said Sessions Case, bail applications were filed on behalf of some of the accused and A. 4 and A. 5 were released on bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Cuddapah, before whom the sessions case arising out of P.R.C. No. 5 of 1989 was pending. A. 1 moved the High Court for bail and our learned brother Jagannadha Raju, J. by his order dated 27th March, 1989 in Crl.M.P. No. 481 of 1989 released him on bail. It was contended before the learned Judge by the learned Public Prosecutor that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, : 1988CriLJ938 the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail. Having gone through the decision of the Supreme Court, the learned Judge however observed that the present case differs very much on facts and that as a matter of fact the charge-sheet, which mentions the offence under Section 3(2) of TADA, was filed only before the Judicial First Class Magistrate and further the definition of 'Terrorist' is not satisfied in the present case and granted bail. Then the remaining accused viz., A. 2, and A. 3 came to this Court at a later stage and filed Cri. P. No. 1434 of 1989, the present petition for bail, the same came up before tour learned brother Bhaskar Rao, J. The learned Public Prosecutor once again took the objection that the High Curt has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail either under Section 439 or 482, Cr.P.C. On behalf of the accused the order of Jagannadha Raju, J. granting bail was relied upon. Our learned brother Bhaskar Rao, J. found it difficult to reject the submission of the learned Public Prosecutor. However, in view of the importance of the point involved, the matter is referred to the Division Bench. That is how this application is before us.
3. Sri Kolanda Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that TADA is more or less a self-contained Act and under Section 14 the designated Court alone has got jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and in the instant case, though the learned Additional Sessions Judge is also designated Court, he did not take cognizance as contemplated under the provisions of TADA. On the other hand the case was investigated, processed and charge-sheeted and filed into the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate. The learned Magistrate committed it under Section 209, Cr.P.C. This is how the Additional Sessions Judge got jurisdiction to try this case and not under the provisions of TADA. Therefore, the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge comes within the meaning of a Criminal Court, which is amenable to appellate, revisional as well as inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.
4. Crl. P. No. 1405/89 : This is an application filed to quash the proceedings in P.R.C. No. 32 of 1989 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nalgonda. On 10-7-1987 at about 10 p.m. when the complainant in the case, Anantha Reddy was sleeping in his house, it is alleged that about twelve miscreants entered the house armed with lethal weapons, threatened the inmates and took away cash and ornaments worth Rs. 13,000/- A. 1 to A-7 were arrested on 17-11-1987 and A. 8 to A. 11 were arrested on 6-1-1988 and at their instance stolen property was recovered. The Circle Inspector of Police, Nalgonda, filed a charge-sheet in the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nalgonda, which was taken up as P.R.C. No. 32/89. The proceedings are pending on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nalgonda, and the same is sought to be quashed at the instance of A. 12 in this petition.
5. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that under Section 14 of TADA a designated Court alone can take cognizance of the offence without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts, and that the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take the case on his file and commit the same to the designated Court under TADA, 1987. The charge-sheet in the instant case has not been filed before the designated Court as per the provisions of TADA and therefore the proceedings are sought to be quashed.
6. Writ Petition No. 8683/89 : This writ petition is filed seeking writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution calling for the records in S.C. No. 30/88 on the file of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad and quash charge Nos. 11 and 12 framed by him under Sections 3 and 6 of TADA, 1985, by his orders dated 11-4-1989 and 12-4-1989.
7. The Inspector of Police, Team-II Central Crime Station, filed a charge-sheet against the petitioners and some others for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 307 read with Section 149, I.P.C. and also under Sections 3, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act and under Sections 3 and 27 of the Indian Arms Act. It is alleged in the charge-sheet that during the elections of Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad A-4 contested from Jangamet Constituency and A-1 and A-2 are the sitting members of the Legislative Assembly. These accused entered the polling booth, picked up quarrel with the polling officer and attempted to prevent an eligible voter from casting his vote and also threw bombs. Then the crime was registered and the matter was investigated. The charge-sheet was filed in the Court of the 12th Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad and numbered as P.R.C. and the learned Magistrate by his order committed the same to the Court of Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, and it was numbered as S.C. No. 30 of 1988. The learned Sessions Judge heard the counsel for the accused and the Public Prosecutor on the question of framing charges and also on the applicability of the provisions of TADA, 1985. Ultimately he took the view that he as a Judge of the designated Court under TADA, 1985 can take cognizance of the case under Section 3(2) and 6 of the TADA. He accordingly framed charges Nos. 11 and 12.
8. Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge has not taken cognizance of the matter as contemplated under Section 12 of TADA, 1985 and on the other hand the case was committed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and that is how he has got jurisdiction to try the case. That being so, though the Court of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge is a designated Court under the provisions of TADA, 1985, when he has not taken cognizance of the matter as a designated court, he has no jurisdiction to frame charges Nos. 11 and 12 and therefore the charges are liable to be quashed.
9. On an examination of the above submissions it can be seen that the mode of taking cognizance of a matter by a designated Court assumes importance. In this regard it becomes necessary to examine some of the provisions of TADA, 1987, and also the corresponding provisions of TADA, 1985. The TADA, 1985, came into force on 23rd May, 1985 and it was enacted to be in force for two years. The TADA, 1987 (Act 28 of 1987) was passed on 3rd September, 1987, and by virtue of Section 1(3) Sections 5, 15, 21 and 22 came into force on 3-9-1987 itself and the other provisions are deemed to have come into force on 24th May, 1987. Section 2 consists of definitions. Section 2(b) lays down that 'Code' means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 2(c) defines 'Designated Court' as a designated Court constituted under Section 9. Section 3(1) provides for punishments and measures for coping with terrorist and disruptive activities. It lays down that :
'Punishment for terrorist acts : (1) Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or ................... as to cause, or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Govt. or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act.'
10. Section 3(2) provides that whoever commits a terrorist act shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, if such act has resulted in the death of any person and in any other case, he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not less than five years and which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. Section 3 also provides for conviction of conspirators as well as persons who harbour or conceal such offenders. Section 4 prescribes punishments for disruptive activities. Part III of the Act begins with S. 9, which deals with the designated courts. Section 9 lays down that the Central Government or a State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, constitute one or more designated courts of such area or areas or for such case or class or group of cases, as may be specified in the notification. Section 9(4) lays down that a designated Court shall be presided over by a judge to be appointed by the Central Government or as the case may be, the State Government, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of High Court. Section 9(6) provides that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge or an additional judge of a designated Court unless he is, immediately before such appointment, a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge in any State. Section 11 prescribes the jurisdiction of designated courts and provides for the issuance of notification and transfer of cases pending before a designated Court in one State to any other designated Court within that State or in any other State. Section 11(1) reads thus :
'Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code every offence punishable under any provision of this act or any rule made thereunder shall be triable only by the designated Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed or, as the case may be, by the designated Court constituted for trying such offence under sub-section (1) of Section 9.'
11. This Section makes it obligatory that every offence punishable under the provisions of TADA should be tried only by designated Court notwithstanding the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 14 enumerates the procedure and powers of designated courts. Section 14(1) is in the following terms.
'A designated Court may take cognizance of any offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint or facts which constitute such offence of upon a police report of such facts.'
12. This Section further lays down that for the purpose of trial of an offence under the Act the designated Court shall have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try the offence as if it were a Court of Session.
13. From a combined reading of the above provisions it is clear that the offence under TADA shall be tried only by a designated Court established under Section 9 of the Act and the designated Court has to take cognizance of such offence upon a complaint of facts or upon a police report, and follow the procedure applicable to a trial of a sessions case.
14. In the instant cases, as already been noticed, the charge-sheets were filed in the Court of Judicial First Class Magistrate and the learned Magistrate took cognizance under Section 190(a) and followed the procedure under Chapter XVI in the 1st and 2nd matters and passed a committal order as contemplated under Section 209, Cr.P.C. It is on the basis of the committal order, the Sessions Court got jurisdiction to try the same as sessions case. It is clear that the Sessions Court, though is also a designated Court under Section 9 by virtue of a notification, did not get jurisdiction to try an offence under TADA inasmuch as it has not taken cognizance of the matter as a designated Court as contemplated under Section 14. In the charge-sheet filed in the above first case the offence is punishable under I.P.C. as well as under the provisions of TADA. In the second case the offence is punishable under I.P.C., under the provisions of Explosive Substances Act and Indian Arms Act and also under the provisions of TADA. Therefore, if any Magistrate takes cognizance on the basis of such charge-sheet or police report, he gets jurisdiction to conduct an enquiry under Chapter 16 and commits the same. But, once an offence punishable under the provisions of TADA is also included, the whole complex changes and if any offence punishable under TADA is also to be tried duly as per law the procedure prescribed has to be followed scrupulously. It may be mentioned at this stage that there are certain special provisions which are made application only to such trials, in respect of confessions made to police officers and presumptions under Section 15 and 21. These provisions cannot be made applicable to the other offenders except terrorists. Therefore, the designated Court alone is empowered to try these cases and it gets jurisdiction to try cases only when it takes cognizance under Section 14. Under Section 18 such designated Court has got power to transfer cases to a regular court, if it is of the view that the offence involved is not triable by it. Therefore the discretion is given to the designated Court to examine the contents of the complaint or the police report and then proceed. That being the position, it cannot be contended that the designated Court can proceed with the trial of the offence punishable under TADA even though the Court has not taken cognizance of the matter as prescribed under TADA. There is no provision in TADA enabling the designated Court to take cognizance suo motu either upon information from any person or from any other source except by way of a complaint filed by the complainant or a report filed by a police officer. In two cases before us, there was neither a police report nor complaint before the designated court. It is only by way of a committal order the Sessions Judge got jurisdiction. At that stage he did not get jurisdiction as a designated court, but only as a Sessions Court. Therefore, the Sessions Court or the Judicial First Class Magistrate, cannot proceed with the enquiry or trial in respect of the offence punishable under TADA inasmuch as the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance and the Sessions Judge did not get jurisdiction by way of taking cognizance as a designated court.
15. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, : 1988CriLJ938 , the High Court's jurisdiction over the designated Court is completely excluded and therefore the High Court cannot quash the proceedings pending before these courts either by exercising inherent jurisdiction or revisional jurisdiction under the Code or writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in the above case considered the scope of the jurisdiction and power of the High Court to grant bail to the accused facing trial before a designated Court. It was contended on behalf of the State that TADA behind a special Act must prevail in respect of the jurisdiction and power of the High Court to entertain an application for bail under Section 439 of the Code or by recourse to its inherent powers under S. 482, Cr.P.C. and that under the scheme of the Act there is complete exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court in any case involving the arrest of any person or accusation of having committed an offence punishable under the Act or any rule made thereunder. Their Lordships considered the scope of Section 14 of TADA and observed that the jurisdiction and power of the designated Court is derived from the Act and it is the Act that one must primarily look to in deciding the question, and that under Section 14(1) a designated Court has exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of offence under the Act and by virtue of Section 12(1) it may also try any other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence. Their Lordships further observed thus (Para 17).
'Where an enactment provides for a special procedure for the trial of certain offences, it is that procedure that must be followed and not the one prescribed by the Code.'
16. Regarding the jurisdiction of the Designated Court, their Lordships, after an examination of the relevant provisions, held (Para 18) :
'There is thus a total departure from different classes of Criminal Courts enumerated in S. 6 of the Code and a new hierarchy of Courts is sought to be established by providing for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment or order of a Designated Court, not being an interlocutory order, and substituting the Supreme Court for the High Court by S. 20(6) in the matter of confirmation of a death sentence passed by a Designated Court.'
Their Lordships also held thus (Para 19) :
'It is true that the source of power of a Designated Court to grant bail is not Section 20(8) of the Act as it only places limitations on such power. This made explicit by Section 20(9) which enacts that the limitations or granting of bail specified in Section 20(8) are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being in force. But it does not necessarily follow that the power of a Designated Court to grant bail is relatable to Section 439 of the Code. It cannot be doubted that a Designated Court is 'a Court other than the High Court or the Court of Sessions' within the meaning of Section 437 of the Code. The exercise of the power to grant bail by a Designated Court is not only subject to the limitations contained therein, but is also subject to the limitations placed by Section 20(8) of the Act.
Their Lordships finally held as followed (Para 20) :
'It therefore follows that the power derived by a Designated Court to grant bail to a person accused of an offence under the Act, if in custody, is derived from the Code and not from Section 20(8) of the Act.'
17. Relying on these observations it is submitted on behalf of the State that the High Court has no power to grant bail and it is the Supreme Court that has such power.
18. Before we proceed further, it becomes necessary to refer to some of the other provisions dealing with the jurisdiction. Section 18 provides for the appointment of Public Prosecutors in the Designated Court. Section 19 provides for appeal and reads thus :
'19. Appeal : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Designated Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law.
(2) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Designated Court.
(3) Every appeal under this Section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from : Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is specified that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days.'
Section 20 provides for modified application of certain provisions of the Code. Section 20(6) reads thus :
'Sections 366 - 371 and Section 392 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence triable by a Designated Court subject to the modifications that the references to 'Court of Session' and 'High Court', wherever occurring therein, shall be constructed as reference to 'Designated Court' and 'Supreme Court', respectively.'
19. From a combined reading of Sections 19 and 20 it appears that the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of the Designated Court is excluded. Therefore, by implication though a Designated Court also is a Sessions Court and is presided over by a Sessions Judge, yet unlike a normal Sessions Court or a Criminal Court, the Designated Court is not subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court and against an order or a judgment or a sentence passed by the Designated Court and appeal lies only to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, on a conspectus of the various provisions occurring in the special enactment, held that the jurisdiction of the High Court is totally excluded. In paragraph 12 however it is observed that the constitutional remedies available to a citizen to approach the High Court under Art. 226 or Art. 227 or move the Supreme Court under Art. 32 are not taken away. Therefore, it must necessarily follow that the citizens can always move the High Court under Article 226 or Art. 227 of the Constitution challenging the provisions of the TADA on one or the other ground which can be urged in relation to these Articles. Therefore, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a bail application under Section 439, Cr.P.C. in respect of a case pending before the Designated Court. The Supreme Court, as mentioned above, laid down that the Designated Court gets power to grant bail as provided under Section 437 of the Code and Section 20(8) of the TADA. If that be so, a doubt may arise whether a Magistrate before whom an accused under TADA is produced as provided under Section 167 of the Code read with Section 20(4) of the TADA, has got jurisdiction, while the jurisdiction of the High Court is excluded. A careful reading of the provisions of bail in the Code as well as the TADA governing the provisions, will show that the Magistrate has no power to grant bail under Section 437, Cr.P.C. when accused of the offence under the TADA is produced before him under Section 167, Cr.P.C. It must be borne in mind that the power under Section 20(8) of TADA read with Section 437 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised only by the Designated Court. Therefore under Section 437, Cr.P.C. the Magistrate before whom the accused is produced under Section 167, Cr.P.C. has no independent jurisdiction to grant bail.
20. But in the instant cases the position is altogether different. As already held, in all the above three matters cognizance was not taken as per the special procedure provided under TADA. As noted above, in such cases not only the offences punishable under TADA, but also offences punishable under TADA, but also offences punishable under other laws in respect of which the Criminal Courts have jurisdiction are also involved. Therefore, when a comprehensive charge sheet is filed in a Court of a First Class Magistrate, there is no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences punishable under the provisions of TADA. When such a report is filed, he should return it to the concerned complainant or police officer to file it in the Magistrate takes cognizance, his jurisdiction only extends to the extent of trying the other offences. But taking cognizance on the basis of such police reports or complaints involving offence punishable under TADA should be avoided by the First Class Magistrates. Otherwise, the very object for which TADA is enacted will be defeated. However, in the instant cases though the Magistrate has taken cognizance, such cognizance is not in accordance with the due process of law. Therefore, to that extent the proceedings involving the offences punishable under TADA are vitiated and the Criminal Courts like that of First Class Magistrates or the Sessions Courts not being Designated Courts, cannot either enquire or proceed with the trial of those offences.
21. Bearing these principles in mind we shall now examine the facts in each case.
22. In Criminal Petition No. 1434 of 1989 the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Pulivendala took cognizance on the basis of the charge sheet filed by the Inspector of Police, Pulivendala and numbered it as P.R.C. No. 5 of 1989 and committed the case to the Court of Session, Cuddapah, which in the usual course numbered it as Sessions Case. No doubt in the charge-sheet the offences punishable under TADA are mentioned, but neither the Magistrate nor the Additional Sessions Judge has got jurisdiction to proceed either with preliminary enquiry or with the subsequent trial in respect of these offences. As held by the Supreme Court, there is total lack of jurisdiction so far as these courts are concerned to enquire into or try these offences. Therefore, the learned Additional Sessions Judge can proceed with the trial of the Sessions Cases only with the other offences excluding the offences punishable under Section 3(2) of TADA, and the charges if framed already in respect of these offences have to be dropped. Now coming to the bail application, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has already refused the bail. No doubt the Designated Court while granting bail, has to give an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor and must also keep in view the limitations in granting bail as laid down under Section 20(8)(b) and also under sub-section (9) of Section 20 of TADA, viz., that when the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, and these limitations are in addition to the limitations under the Code. Now in the view we are taking, viz., that the pending sessions case should only relate to other offence, there are circumstances to release the petitioner on bail. Accordingly the petitioners in Crl.M.P. No. 1434 of 1989 i. e., accused Nos. 2 and 3 shall be released on bail on each of them executing a bond for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- with two sureties each for a like sum to the satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Pulivendala.
Criminal Petition No. 1405 of 1989
23. In this case the P.R.C. is pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nalgonda. In the view we have taken, the First Class Magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed with the committal proceedings under Chapter XVI in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of TADA consequently, he should be deemed to have taken cognizance only in respect of other offences and then proceed accordingly. It is open to the concerned authorities to withdraw the charge sheet and then file the same in the Designated Court comprehensively including the offences under TADA. Otherwise, the Magistrate shall proceed to enquire into the other offences and then act in accordance with law as provided under Section 209 and thereafter the learned Sessions Judge also shall proceed with the trial and the Sessions casein accordance with the provisions of the Code and not as a Designated Court.
Writ Petition No. 8683 of 1989 :
24. We have already noted that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate who took cognizance under Section 190(a), Cr.P.C. committed the case to the Court of Session following the procedure under Chapter XVI and now the same is taken on file as Sessions Case. In the charge-sheet the offences under TADA are not included. It is only at the time of framing of the charges this question arose and the view that his is also a Designated Court, framed charges Nos. 11 and 12. Since he has not taken cognizance as provided under Section 12 of TADA of 1985 which corresponds to Section 14 of TADA of 1987, he has no jurisdiction to try the offences as a Designated Court. On the other hand, as a Sessions Court (not Designated Court) the Metropolitan Sessions Judge has got jurisdiction to try the Sessions Case in the normal course because of the order of committal passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate in the P.R.C. Now that the committal order is already there in respect of other offences only, the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge can proceed with the trial of these offences. The charges Nos. 11 and 12 framed by him in respect of the offences under TADA cannot be sustained and they are accordingly quashed. We may once again make it clear that we are exercising the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution which is not excluded. Even otherwise, we can exercise our jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. as we have done in the other cases, because all the three Courts before whom the proceedings are pending in these three matters, are not Designated Courts, but they are only Criminal Courts amenable to the revisional as well as the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court as provided under the Code.
25. Before parting with the these matters, we must also observe that the Legislature by enacting the TADA has treated terrorism as a special Criminal problem and made provision for creation of special Courts called 'Designated Courts' to deal with this problem and also provided for a special procedure for the trial of such offences. The provisions relating to confessions of co-accused and the presumptions as contained in Sections 15 and 21 of TADA are of special nature as compared to the rules of evidence applicable to the other trials. And in respect of granting of bail also strict limitations are there and the application of Section 167, Cr.P.C. in respect of these cases is also modified as provided under Section 20 of TADA and the Magistrate before whom an accused under TADA is produced can remand him to custody for a period of sixty days whereas in the other cases it is only for 15 days. When the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try, he has to forward him to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case, who in turn can remand him to custody for a period not exceeding 90 days; Whereas in the case of an accused under TADA, further remand can up to one year. The provisions are very stringent. Therefore, the authorities concerned have to act with great circumspection. In this context the Supreme Court in Usmanbhai's case : 1988CriLJ938 (supra) observed thus (Para 15) :
'It is well to remember that the legislation is limited in its scope and effect. The Act is no extreme measure to be resorted to when the police cannot tackle the situation under the ordinary penal law. The intendment is to provide special machinery to combat the growing menace of terrorism in different parts of the country. Since, however, the Act is a drastic measure, it should not ordinarily be resorted to unless the Government's law enforcing machinery fails.'
26. Therefore, we hope the authorities will not resort to this extreme measure unless it is absolutely necessary. The writ petition is according disposed of. No costs.
27. Order accordingly.