ORDER
1. These two CMAs. can be disposed of by a common order since the facts are identical and the question involved is also one and the same.
2. The appeals are directed against identical orders passed by the lower Court refusing to grant temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs in two suits for permanent injunction. The plaintiffs in both the suits are the licensees to run Janatha canteens at different places on Tirumala hills. They were granted the licence by the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams for one year from 5-10-1997 to 4-10-1998. Before the expiry of the licence period i.e., on 27-8-1998, the plaintiffs made a representation to the Devasthanams seeking renewat/extention of the licence for a further period of one year. On 16-9-1998 the Devasthanam issued notices to the plaintiffs calling upon them to clear all the dues, if any, towards the licence fee and hand over possession of the Janatha canteens on the afternoon of 4-10-1998 positively. The plaintiffs thereupon made a further representation dated 22-9-1998 stating that they incurred heavy loss in the business and requesting the Devasthanams to renew the licences for a further period of three years on par with several others whose licences have been so renewed so as to enable them to recover their losses. By proceedings dated 28-10-1998, the Devasthanams, while rejecting their request for renewal of thelicence, however, granted them winding up time of three months upto 4-1-1998 and called upon them to vacate the canteens by 4-1-1999 to facilitate the TTD to hand over the same to the fresh tenderers. It is stated that the said proceedings were received by the plaintiffs on 7-11-1998. In the mean time the plaintiffs filed the present suits on 4-11-1998 alleging that their applications for renewal of the licences were still pending consideration and obtained interim orders of status quo. After hearing both parties, the lower Court, by the impugned orders dated 16-7-1999, dismissed the applications for temporary injunction and vacated the status quo orders granted on 9-11-1998 holding that the possession of the plaintiffs after the expiry of the licence period is unlawful and that a person in unlawful possession is not entitled to the equitable relief of temporary injunction. The lower Court further held that the plaintiffs obtained the orders of status quo on 9-11-1998 suppressing the fact that they received the proceedings dated 28-10-1998 of the Devasthanams rejecting their request for renewal of the licence and they are, therefore, disentitled for the equitable relief of injunction.
3. According to the respondents after the dismissal of the injunction petition by the lower Court, possession of the premises was taken on 20-7-1999 without any resistance or objection from the plaintiffs and the premises have been put under the lock and key of the Devasthanams. It is also further pleaded that the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams, invited fresh tenders for grant of licences to run the canteens for a period of one year commencing from 1-4-1999 to 31-3-2000 in the month of February, 1999 and a third party by name N. Jayalakshmi was the highest bidder for a sum of Rs. 1,32,000/-towards the licence fee for RBGH Janatha Canteen but no further steps could be token in view of the pendency of the proceedings.
4. It is not in dispute that the licence granted to the plaintiffs-appellants expired on 4-10-1998 and their request for renewal of the licence was finally rejected by proceedings dated 28-10-1998, however, granting them winding up time of three months upto 4-1-1999. In numerous judgments of this Court, it has been held that the possession of a licensee after the expiry of the licence period is unlawful and that a person in unlawful possession is not entitled to the equitable relief of injunction. (See APSRTC v. N. Jayalakshmi, 1989 (2) ALT 247, K. Sambamurthy v. Ramakrishna Deo, : 1995(1)ALT3 , S. Sudhakar Gupta v. APSRTC, : 1998(3)ALD116 (DB) and APSRTC v. N.R. Nagappaiah, : 1998(1)ALD364 (DB).
5. In the decision reported in Chandu v. Delhi Municipality, : AIR1978Delhi174 , a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court held that the existence of a legal right and its invasion is the pre-requisite for the grant of injunction. Mere physical possession after the expiry of licence does not confer any right and the licensor cannot be driven to a Court of law for resuming possession. In a recent decision in Sri Sarva Sangh Seva Ashram v. District Collector, Visakhapatnam, : 1999(4)ALD215 , a learned single Judge of this Court held that a mere encroacher of a temple land cannot claim an injunction against the temple and that temple authorities cannot be compelled to consider the application filed by the encroacher seeking to purchase the subject land. In a similar case relating to the licensee of a stall in the bus-stand, by judgment dated 7-10-1999 passed in CMA No.2345 of 1999, following the decisions referred to above, I have held that the licensee is not entitled for the grant of temporary injunction after the expiry of the licence period.
6. Sri M. Chandramouli, the learned Counsel for the appellants, however, contended that even assuming that thepossession of the appellants after the expiry of the licence period is wrongful and they are to be treated as encroachers, for evicting them, the Devasthanams has to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 83 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 and until such time they are evicted by following the due procedure prescribed by law, the appellants are entitled to continue in possession and such possession has to be protected by the grant of injunction in their favour. In view of the long line of authorities mentioned above which are binding on me, it is not possible to agree with this submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants.
7, The learned Counsel for the appellants finally contended that the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam has renewed the licences of several other licensees who are similarly situated as the appellants but arbitrarily and unjustly turned down the request of the appellants for renewal without any justification even though the appellants have expressed their readiness and willingness to pay the amount offered by the highest bidder and even a little more than that. He contended that the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam comes within the meaning of 'State' or instrumentality of State and it is expected to act fairly in all its dealings and should not discriminate between similarly situated persons or apply different yard-sticks in the matter of grant of licences or their renewal. The learned Counsel tried to draw support in this behalf from certain observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in the unreported judgment in CMA No.87 of 1999 and Batch dated 30-4-1999 and also the observations of the learned single Judge in the decision reported in Sri Sarva Sangha Seva Ashram v. District Collector, Visakhapatnam, (supra), but a close look at the said judgments makes it clear that they cannot render any assistance to the appellants herein. In CMA No.87 of 1999,the Division Bench, no doubt, made some observations to the effect that if the plaintiffs wanted to continue in possession after the expiry of the period of licence, they should stick to their offer to pay more rents than what they were paying earlier and in such an event, the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam would have to consider their request sympathetically in view of the huge investments made by the plaintiffs to run the canteen but ultimately the Division Bench dismissed the appeals filed by the licensees and confirmed the order of the lower Court. As such the said judgment cannot render any assistance to the appellants. In the decision reported in Sri Sarva Sangh Seva Ashram v. District Collector, Visakhapatnam (supra), the learned Judge, while holding that the temple authorities cannot be compelled to consider the application filed by the encroacher of a temple land seeking to purchase the same in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution as the said application is extra legal in nature, made the following observations on which Sri Chandra Mouli, the learned Counsel for the appellants herein, seeks to rely :
'No doubt if an applicant for the writ under Article 226 shows that he has a right to be considered at the hands of the respondents-public authorities, writ will lie to such authorities to consider his claim/application, as the case may be. But such right to be considered should be established with reference to the Constitution or public law statute or common law principles. In the instant case, the petitioner has utterly failed to establish that he has a right to be considered and the temple administration is under a legal obligation to consider the application of the petitioner dated 14-7-1992.'
8. I fail to see how these observations can be of any help to the appellants herein. In the first place, we are not dealing withany writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The rights of the parties are purely governed by the contract or the agreement of licence. In dealing with such a case, public law principles of fairness and reasonableness and hostile discrimination cannot be imported or applied. In Assistant Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter, : [1994]2SCR67 , the Supreme Court ruled as follows;
'We are, therefore, of the opinion that in case of contracts freely entered into with the State, like the present ones, there is no room for invoking the doctrine of fairness and reasonableness against one party to the contract (State), for the purpose of altering or adding to the terms and conditions of the contract, merely because it happens to be the State. In such cases, the mutual rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contracts (which may be statutory in some cases) and the laws relating to contracts.'
9. For all the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in the appeals and they are accordingly dismissed but without costs. The interim orders granted on 23-7-1999 stand vacated.