G. Anjaneyulu Vs. Collector (Civil Supplies), Joint Collector and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:

.....therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor. section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the..........his removal from the dealership.2. sri v. manohar rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the scope and ambit of the proceedings under section 6-a of the act initiated before the first respondent was limited and the maximum that could have been done by the first respondent was to have ordered confiscation of the seized stock. he submits that the authority to appoint an individual as a dealer of a fair price shop is the revenue divisional officer and the question of removing the existing dealer by the authority, under section 6-a of the act, does not arise. he also contends that under the a.p. state public distribution system control order, 2001, the first respondent is the appellate authority against any order passed by the third respondent cancelling the authorization of a fair price shop dealer and in that view of the matter, the impugned order to the extent indicated above is unsustainable.3. learned government pleader for civil supplies, on the other hand, submits that the direction as to removal of the petitioner from the dealership is only consequential to the order of confiscation passed under section 6-a of the act and that no exception can be taken to the.....

Judgment:

ORDER

L. Narasimha Reddy, J.

1. Petitioner was appointed as a fair price shop dealer of Palkonda Village of Mahaboobnagar District by the third respondent, through proceedings dated 12-1-1991. The second respondent initiated proceedings under Section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act') against the petitioner before the first respondent. It was alleged that the petitioner committed certain irregularities in the matter of distribution of essential commodities. After conducting an enquiry, the first respondent passed an order dated 1-1-2005 directing confiscation of the stock seized from the petitioner and imposed a penalty of Rs.5,746/-. The first respondent also directed that the petitioner be removed from the dealership of the fair price shop. The petitioner challenges the order dated 1-1-2005 passed by the first respondent insofar as it relates to the direction as to his removal from the dealership.

2. Sri V. Manohar Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the scope and ambit of the proceedings under Section 6-A of the Act initiated before the first respondent was limited and the maximum that could have been done by the first respondent was to have ordered confiscation of the seized stock. He submits that the authority to appoint an individual as a dealer of a fair price shop is the Revenue Divisional Officer and the question of removing the existing dealer by the authority, under Section 6-A of the Act, does not arise. He also contends that under the A.P. State Public Distribution System Control Order, 2001, the first respondent is the appellate authority against any order passed by the third respondent cancelling the authorization of a fair price shop dealer and in that view of the matter, the impugned order to the extent indicated above is unsustainable.

3. Learned Government Pleader for Civil Supplies, on the other hand, submits that the direction as to removal of the petitioner from the dealership is only consequential to the order of confiscation passed under Section 6-A of the Act and that no exception can be taken to the same. He also contends that the petitioner had an effective remedy by way of appeal under Section 6-C of the Act and he can canvas the present grievances also in that.

4. The proceedings under Section 6-A of the Act were initiated against the petitioner before the first respondent. Two charges, namely he was indulging in clandestine business in relation to the commodities meant for public distribution and that he misappropriated certain quantities of PDS rice and kerosene oil meant for the distribution in the month of August, 2004, were framed against him. The petitioner responded to the notice and submitted his explanation. Not being satisfied with the explanation offered by the petitioner, the first respondent directed confiscation of the commodities seized from the petitioner. If the petitioner feels aggrieved by the same, he has to avail the remedy of appeal provided for under Section 6-C of the Act. In addition to directing confiscation of the seized commodities, the first respondent directed that the petitioner be removed from the dealership of the fair price shop. In this context, it needs to be seen that appointment of dealers for fair price shops and other matters relating thereto are governed by the Control Order, 2001. The third respondent is the appointing authority. It is he who is conferred with the power either to appoint a person as a dealer or to cancel the dealership. Mere confiscation of essential commodities in the proceedings under Section 6-A of the Act cannot by itself result in cancellation of the dealership. For that purpose, separate and independent proceedings have to be initiated by the competent authority, viz., the third respondent. Clause 5(4) of the Control Order mandates that any such action shall precede a show-cause notice as well as an enquiry. Therefore, the direction issued by the first respondent for removal of the petitioner from dealership cannot be sustained.

5. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order insofar as it relates to the cancellation of the authorization of the petitioner is set aside. This order, however, does not preclude the Revenue Divisional Officer, Mahabunagar, the third respondent, from initiating the proceedings against the petitioner in accordance with the relevant provisions of law.

6. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.