ORDER
Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.
1. These two Writ Petitions, W. P. No. 10587 1995 (the first Writ Petition) and W.P. 11256 1995 (the second Writ Petition), arise out of the same facts and raise the same questions of law, so they are heard together and arc being disposed of by a common judgment.
2. The petitioner in the first Writ Petition is the former Chief Minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh and the petitioner in the second Writ Petition is the former Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The petitioners pray for an appro-pirate writ or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to call for the records relating to G.O.Ms. No. 11, General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated January 13, 1995 appointing the 4th respondent as Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (for short 'the Act') and G.O.Ms. No. 15, General Administration (I PR) Department, dated January 17, 1995, containing the terms of reference, as arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust and to declare them as being vitiated by mala fide and bias and to further declare that the 4th respondent is biased and is disqualified to conduct an enquiry into any matter which is likely to adversely affect the petitioners' reputation and also to declare that the notice issued by the 4th respondent in R.O.C. No. C.O.I./I≺/275/95. dated April 10, 1995 is void ab initio being violative of the provisions of Section 8B(b) of the Act and also in violation of the principles of natural justice and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
3. In the State of Andhra Pradesh, after the State-re-organisation, the Congress Party was in power till December, 1982 when a new regional parly, called 'Telugu Desam Party'(T.D.P.) emerged and mustered the support of the people of Andhra Pradesh who voted it to power in the General Elections held in December, 1982. In January, 1993, for the first time, a Non-Congress (I) Government was formed and Sri N.T. Rama Roa, the 2nd respondent herein, who was the leader of the Telugu Desam Party, became the Chief Minister and continued as such, except for a short term, till the General Elections of 1989 when the Congress (I) Party came to power. The petitioner in the first Writ Petition became the Chief Minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh in 1992 and remained so till the then ruling party was defeated in the General Elections held in December, 1994. In the said elections the Telugu Desam Party was voted to power and again the 2nd respondent became the Chief Minister. Soon thereafter the Government of Andhra Pradesh, the 1st respondent herein, issued orders in G.O.Ms. No. 11, Genera! Administration (I≺) Department, dated January 13, 1995 appointing One Man Commission of Inquiry consisting of the 4th respondent herein, under Section 3 of the Act, to enquire into the alleged irregularities in the functioning of the Andhra Pradesh State Film Development Corporation, Information & Public Relations Department and Filmnagar Co-operative Society. The terms of reference of the Commission are specified in G.O.Ms. No. 15, General Administration (I≺) Department dated January 17, 1995. Pursuant to the above said G.Os., the 4th respondent took up the work of the Commission and in the course of the enquiry issued notices to the petitioners under Section 8-B of the Act being of the opinion that their reputation was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry.
4. We shall refer to the specific allegations averred by the petitioners in the writ affidavits and the replies thereto in the counter-affidavits of the respondents while dealing with the contentions of the parties.
4A. Sri G. Rama Swamy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in the first Writ Petition, has contended that the notice issued under Section 8-B of the Act isnot in conformity with the provisions of theAct; it is vague and lacking in material particulars, so it is null and void and all subsequent proceedings are also bad in law. It is further contended that the Commission had already formed its opinion as is evident from the notice itself which affects the reputation of the petitioners, as such the notice is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Canvassing the plea of bias, it is argued that on the facts stated in the affidavit of the petitioner in the first Writ Petition, the petitioner has a reasonable suspicion that the 4th respondent is biased and that there could be no fair and impartial enquiry by the 4th respondent and that the question of bias had to be judged by the Court from the point of view of the person complaining of bias and not from the point of view of the Commission or the Court or the third party. In any event, submitted the learned counsel, the petitioner in the first Writ Petition having held constitutional posts as the Cabinet Minister of Union of India for Law, Justice and Company Affairs and also the Chief Minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh, had to be treated as a reasonable person and his suspicion that there was real likelihood of bias would satisfy the test of the suspicion of a reasonable person, so the 4th respondent must be declared as disqualified to man the One Man Commission.
5. The above submissions are adopted by Sri C. V. Mohan Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner in the second Writ Petition.
6. Broadly speaking, these submissions can be classified under two heads, viz.,
(i) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the petitioners have made out a case on the ground of bias to disqualify the 4th respondent to man the One Man Commission of Inquiry, appointed under G.O.Ms. No. 11, General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated January 17, 1995.
(ii) Whether the notice issued by the Commission under Section 8-B of the Act is vitiated as being vague and for want of material particulars and is violative of Section 8-B and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitutionof India.
7. First we shall take up the first point. The rule against the bias is an offshoot of the principle of natural justice.
'Bias by interest which disqualifies a Judge falls into two broad classes:
(A) where the Judge has a pecuniary interest in the subject-matter of the litigation;
(B) where from kindred or other cause the Judge may have a bias in favour of one of the parties.'
8. In this case we are concerned with that kind of bias which falls under Category (B). This rule is based on the maxim 'nemo judex in causa sua', which means that no man can be a Judge in his own cause. Professor Wade elucidated the principle as follows: 'Nemo judex in re sua' 'A Judge is disqualified from determining any case in which he may be, or may fairly be suspected to be, biased. So important is this rule that Coke supposed, as we have seen, that it should prevail even over an Act of Parliament.
Massey in his treatise on Administrative Law has neatly described the principle of bias in the following words: 'personal bias arises from a certain relationship equation between the deciding authority and the parties which incline him unfavourably or otherwise on the side of one of the parties before him.'
9. Lord Hewart C.J. founded the rule in Rex v. Sussex, (1924) 1 KB 256 thus :--
'..... a long line of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.'
The learned Chief Justice observed:
'Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice.'
This being the content of the rule, in its application, proof of existence of bias is not insisted upon. It is more concerned with how justice is administered than with the substance of justice. We hasten to add sharing the concern of Slade, J., speaking of the Queen's Bench Division, in R. v. Camborne Justices, (1954) 2 All ER 850 at 855, that its continued and inappropriate application may lead to the erroneous impression that it is more important that justice should appear to be done than that it should in fact be done. The application of this rule has been aptly described by Garner as under:
'The natural justice 'bias' rule looks to external appearance rather than to proof of actual improper exercise of power. If the reasonable observer would have the requisite degree of suspicion of bias in the decision-maker then that decision can be challenged. It .is a matter of courts ensuring that 'justice is seen to be done.' ()
10. The rule against bias is an intrinsic requirement of the administration of justice. Breach of this rule disqualifies a Judge/ Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute before him and if the Judge/ Arbitrator had already adjudicated upon it, renders the adjudication null and void.
11. However, the learned Advocate General contended that the nature of proceeding before the Commission of Inquiry is inquisitorial and not judicial or quasi-judicial or adversorial, and therefore, the principle has no application to the proceedings before the Commission,
12. Sri G. Rama Swamy elaborated his submissions thus: the petitioner was issued notice under S. 8-B of the Act on the ground that his reputation was likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry and thai reputation is part of the right to life and personal liberty which is guaranteed byArticle 21 of the Constitution of India, therefore, in every proceeding, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative or inquisitorial or otherwise, if the fundamental right of a citizen guaranteed under Art. 21 is involved, the principles of natural justice have to be observed and a fortiori the doctrine of bias will be attracted.
13. We shall examine the above contentions. So far as the nature of the proceedings before the Commission is concerned, it is now well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that the function of the Commission is merely to investigate and record its findings and make recommendations. There is no lis before the Commission and it has no power to adjudicate or pronounce a binding judgment or recommend punishment for past wrongs and its findings are not binding on anybody and cannot be enforced proprio vigore. The Commission is not having any power to enforce the enquiry report nor could the. enquiry be looked upon as a judicial enquiry in the sense of it being an exercise of judicial function properly so called. (See Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Tendol- -kar, : [1959]1SCR279 and Karnataka State v. Union of India, : [1978]2SCR1 .
14. In Karnataka State v. Union of India (supra), the validity of S.3 of the Act was questioned on the ground that the federal structure of the States was jeopardised. In that case, under S. 3 of the Act, both the State Government of Karnataka as well as the Central Government issued notifications. After considering the provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court summarised the scheme as follows (at page 137):
'It is clear from these provisions and the general scheme of the Act that a Commission of Inquiry appointed under the Act is a purely fact finding body which has no power to pronounce a binding or definitive judgment. It has to collect facts through the evidence led before it and on a consideration thereof it is required to submit its report which the appoiniing authority may or may not accept. There are sensitive matters of public im-portance of which, ifjgft to the normal investigational agencies, can create needlesscontroversies and generate an atmosphere of suspicion. The larger interests of the community require that such matters should be inquired into by high-powered commissions consisting of persons, whose findings can command the confidence of the people.'
The Supreme Court referred to, with approval, the address of Sir Cyril Salmon given in the Lionel Cohen Lectures on 'Tribunals of Inquiry' and as that passage is worth-reading, we quote it here:
'In all countries, certainly in those whichenjoy freedom of speech and a free press,moments occur when allegations and rumours circulate causing a nation-wise crisis ofconfidence in the intrigity of public life orabout other matters of vital importance. Nodoubt this rarely happens, but when it does itis essential that public confidence should berestored, for without it no democracy canlong survive. This confidence can be effectively restored only by thoroughly investigatingand probing the rumours and allegations so asto search out and establish the truth. Thetruth may show that the evil exists, thusenabling it to be noted (rooted?) out, or thatthere is no foundation in the rumours andallegations by which the public has beendisturbed. In either case, confidence isrestored.'
15. That the rule against bias applies with' all vigour to Courts and Tribunals, judicial proceedings and quasi-judicial proceedings; and also to those who are entrusted with the duty of adjudicating the rights of the parties, like arbitrators, is universally accepted principle. In Rex v. Sussex, referred to supra, claim of damage's was made by W consequent upon collision which took place between the motor cycle driven by M and a motor cycle and side car driven by W. W alleged that he and his wife suffered injuries due to negligence of M. The police also took out summons against M for dangerous driving of motorcycle. After the hearing of the case, the Justices retired to consider their-decision and along with them the deputy clerk also retired with a view to assist them, should they desire to be advised on any point of law. The Justicesdid not consult him. They convicted M, the applicant, and imposed a fine of 10 and costs. It was then brought to the notice of the Justices that the deputy clerk was a brother of solicitor of W. The question before the Court was, whether the judgment was invalidated on account of bias. Lord Hewart C.J., with whom other Law Lords concurred, held that decision was invalidated due to bias.
16. In Franklin v. Minister of Town Planning, (1947) 2 All ER 289, under the New Towns Act, 1946 the Minister of Town and Country Planning was required to consider objection to a proposed order under the Act. Prior to the passing of the Act in a speech he had stated that the bill would become law and a particular site would be the first scheme under the Act. It was urged before the House of Lords, that the Minister of Town and Country Planning, while hearing the objections under the Act, was discharging judicial or quasi-judicial duty and in view of his public speech he was biased in considering the objection. The House of Lords held that while considering the objections under the Act no judicial or quasi-judicial duty was imposed on the Minister in the discharge of his statutory duty and that those duties were purely administrative and had not established either that in his speech the Minister had pre-judged any genuine consideration of the objections or that he had not genuinely considered the objections. With regard to application of rule against bias, Lord Thankerton observed as follows:
'My Lords, I could wish that the use of the word 'bias' should be confined to its proper sphere. Its proper significance, in my opinion, is to denote a departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the law requires from those who occupy judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial office, such as an arbitrator. The reason for this clearly is that, having to adjudicate as between two or more parties, he .must come to his adjudication with an independent mind, without any inclination or bias towards one side or other in the dispute.'
17. In G. Nageswara Rao v. A.P.S.R.T. Corporation, : AIR1959SC308 , Subba Rao, J. (as he then was), speaking for the majority, held that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 cast a duty on the State Government to act judi-caily in approving or modifying the scheme proposed by the Transport Undertaking. His Lordship quoted with approval, the observation of Lord Thankerton in Franklin v. Minister of Town Planning, referred to above, and on the facts of the case held that the principle was violated.
18. In Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.O.) Ltd. v. Lannon, (1969) 1 KB 577, dealing with the question of bias of the Rent Assessment Committee in rent restriction proceedings. Lord Denning M.R. observed that a man might be disqualified from sitting in a judicial capacity if he had a direct pecuniary interest in the subject-matter or if he was biased on one side or the other. The lis was between the landlord and the tenant. It was held that the connections of the Chairman of Rent Assessment Committee with the tenant were such as to give reasonable impression that he was biased even though there was no actual bias on his part; the determination of fair rent by the Committee was quashed and the matter was remitted to another Assessment Committee.
19. Those are cases where the rule against bias was applied to judicial and quasi-judicial determination by the Court/Tribunal.
20. Rex v. Hendon R.D.O., (1933) 2 KB 696, is a case where the rule against the bias was applied to a Rural District Council when it passed order affecting civil rights of the parties. There it was laid down that where one of the Councillors voting in favour of the resolution to grant permission to develop, had such an interest in the matter as to disqualify him from taking part or voting, on account of bias, an order nisi for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Council could be issued. Lord Hewart C.J. applied the principle of bias to a decision of Hendon Rural District Council which conferred a legal right and affected the rights of subjects. In the concurring judgment, Avory, J. observed that the jurisdiction of the Court oughtto be exercised widely when dealing with matters which are not perhaps strictly judicial but in which the rights and obligations of persons may be affected. Though the question in that case was whether the decision of the Council was amenable to certiorari, the application of the doctrine of bias to such a decision of the Council was not doubted and holding that the certiorari would lie, the decision was quashed on the ground of bias. This is a case where doctrine of bias was applied where duty to act fairly existed though there was no judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.
21. In Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, ATR 1957 SC 425, bias was attributed against the Chairman of the Bar Council Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that it was well settled that every member of a Tribunal that was called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that Judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. It was further held that in such cases the test was not whether in fact a bias had affected the judgment; the test always was and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the Tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the Tribunal. It was pointed out that it was in that sense that it was often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.
22. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, 1994 AIR SCW 3344 : (1994) 6 SCC 651, the question of bias arose in respect of a decision taken by the authorities to award contract. On the ground that the son of one of the members of the Tender Evaluation Committee was an officer of the tenderer company selected for the contract, the decision to. award the contract was challenged as being biased. It was held that the concerned member was only a recommending authority and not decision-making authority; being Director General of Communications as well as Telecom Authority, his involvement in the decision-making process was a necessity inview of the provisions of the Indian Telegraphs Act, therefore, the selection was not vitiated on the ground of bias. This case deals with exception to the rule on the ground of necessity.
23. From the above decisions what follows is, that when a Court, judicial authority, quasi-judicial authority or a statutory authority or any other authority including administrative authority takes a decision which has civil consequences and/or affects the rights of a person, the doctrine of bias would apply.
24. This being the position in law with regard to application of rule against bias, can the same principle be extended to the proceedings before the Commission of Inquiry under the Act, whose function it is to collect facts, record findings and give recommendations which cannot be enforced proprio vigore? This question can be looked at from two angles; the first is the object and the purpose of the enquiry contemplated under the Act and the second is the rights of the person whose conduct and/or reputation is involved in the enquiry.
25. But before going into these aspects, it will be apt to recapitulate here that the doctrine of bias is part of the rules of natural justice. We shall, therefore, examine to what extent the principles of natural justice are applicable to the proceedings before the Commission. 'There is no question of invoking the rule of natural justice except insofar as they are incorporated in the Act itself in Ss. 8-B, 8-C of the Act or in the Rules made thereunder! (#), is the view expressed by D. D. Basu. He culled out that principle from the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of J & K. v. Bakshi Gulam Mohammed, : AIR1967SC122 . It is laid down therein that the rules of natural justice require that a party against whom an allegation is being enquired into should be given a hearing and it was pointed out that Bakshi Gulam Mohammed was certainly given that right. Rejecting the contention that right to hearing included a right to cross-examine, it was observed, 'weare unable to agree that that is so'; and rejecting the claim that the rules of natural justice require that the respondent therein should have been given the right to cross-examine all those persons who had sworn to the affidavits supporting the allegations against him, their Lordships observed, 'we are not aware of any such rule of natural justice'. It was pointed out that the rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had been contravened should be decided not under any pre-con-ceived notions but in the light of the statutory provisions. Their Lordships reiterated the principle laid down in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division, : [1958]1SCR1240 , thus:
'... The rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitulion of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function; and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had. been contravened should be decided not under any pre-conceived notions, but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions.'
Having gone through the judgment in Bakshi Gulam Mohammed s case, referred to supra, carefully, we are unable to say that the Supreme Court laid down therein that the rules of natural justice do not apply to the proceedings before the Commission of Inquiry. In our view the principle 'there is no question of invoking the rule of natural justice' to proceeding before the Commission of Inquiry, is too broadly stated by the learned author to be accepted.
(Italics supplied)
26. We may notice here that though the proceedings under the Act are inquisitorial, yet for limited purposes the Commission is treated as Civil Court under sub-section (4) of S. 5 of the Act and the proceedings are treated-as judicial proceedings under sub-section(5) of S. 5 provided a notification is issued under sub-section(1) of S.5 applying sub-sec-tions(2) to (5) to the proceedings, before a Commission. In the instant case G.O.Ms.No. 15 General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated 13-1-1995 makes subsections (2) to (5) of S.5 applicable to the proceedings before the Commission. Further, in the procedure laid down by the Commission under S. 8 of the Act it is provided that the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, as far as may be, will be followed and that the principles of natural justice shall be followed as a guide. It is, therefore, clear that the principles of natural justice are applicable to the proceeding before the Commission and the question of contravention of those principles has to be decided in the light of the terms of reference to the Commission, provisions of the Act, the rules made thereunder and the procedure settled by the Commission.
27. It is pertinent to note here the modern equivalent of the principles of natural justice epitomised by Lord Denning in B. Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya, (1962) AC 322. The learned Law Lord observed thus:
'... The rule against bias is one thing. The right to be heard is another. Those two rules are the essential characteristics of what is often called natural justice. They are the twin pillers supporting it. The Romans put them in the two maxims: Nemo judex in causa sua: and Audi alteram partem. They have recently been put in the two words, Impartiality and Fairness.'
28. From the above discussion it follows that wherever the principles of natural justice are attracted the duty to act impartially and fairly automatically follows.
29. Now reverting to the above noted aspects -- in regard to the first aspect, it must be remembered that the proceedings under the Act are of paramount importance in a democratic country like ours, having a written Constitution and governed by rule of law. In our country on issues of public importance the demand of the public is to have a judicial enquiry to know the true facts and such enquiries have proved to be of great satisfaction to the public at large. Very many issues of public importance are now being set at rest by appointment of Commissions ofInquiry under the Act for, to use the words of Sir Cyril Salmon, public confidence without which no democracy can long survive, can be effectively restored only by thoroughly investigating and probing the rumours and allegations so as to search out and establish the truth. It is for this reason that more often than not, the demand of the public is, we think we can take judicial notice of this fact; to have a judicial enquiry by a Supreme Court Judge (sitting or retired) or by a High Court Judge (sitting or retired) because the public have faith in the fairness and impartiality of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to ensure that the enquiry is fair and impartial and in appointing Commissions under the Act, the germane consideration should be that the public confidence is strengthened or restored, as the case may be, lest it should be shattered.
30. Now we turn to the second aspect; it will be well to remember that it is only where the Commission considers it necessary to enquire into the conduct of any person or where the Commission is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry, the Parliament, to safeguard the rights of such persons, enacted S, 8-B of the Act and enjoins the Commission to give to such persons a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the enquiry and to produce evidence in defence. The Parliament has thus made the principles of natural justice applicable to the proceedings before the Commission, though in a limited sense.
31. Here we may point out that the reputation of an individual is an important part of the right to life. It is perhaps in recognition of the importance of the reputation that Sec. 8-B was inserted along with Sees. 8-A and 8-C by Commissions of Inquiries (Amendment) Act, 79 of 1971, on December 30, 1971. That every individual has a right to protect his reputation is laid down in Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh v. Committee of Inquiry, : 1989CriLJ903 . In that case while emphasising the importance of reputation of a person the Supreme Courtquoted with approval in para 25 the following observation from D.F. Marion v. Davis, 55 American LR 171:
'The right to the enjoyment of a private reputation, unassailed by malicious slander is of ancient origin and is necessry to human society. A good reputation is an element of personal security and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty and property.'
This puts the issue beyond doubt that reputation is part of fundamental right to life and personal liberty which is guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. Having regard to the eminence of this right. S. 8-B of the Act enjoins the Commission to give reasonable opportunity of being heard in the enquiry and also the right to produce evidence in defence of conduct or reputation of the addressee of notice under the aforementioned provision and S. 8-C of the Act confers a right on such person to cross-examine a witness produced before the Commission and to be represented by a legal practitioner before the Commission. Will these safeguards have any significance if the Commission is biased? Will non-application of rule against bias to proceedings in relation to conduct or reputation of a person to whom notice under S. 8-B has been issued, achieve the object of the Act and inspire confidence in the public? Our answer to these questions is -- No. What would be the worth of a report of the Commission whose impartiality is questionable but persons, for whose benefit Sees. 8-B and 8-C are inserted, are debarred from raising the plea of bias? In our view such a report would neither satisfy the purposes of the Act nor do justice to the cause and the rights of the persons whose interest the Parliament thought it fit to protect by enacting Ss. 8-B and 8-C of the Act. From the point of view of public confidence as well as from the point of view of protection of rights of the category of persons dealt with in Ss. 8-B and 8-C the impartiality of the Commission is of paramount importance. It is but just and proper to allow such persons to raise the plea of rule against bias to have the satisfaction that the proceedings are conducted impartially, whichwill be commensurate with the spirit of the Act and will also inspire confidence in the public about the enquiry conducted by the Commission, rather than to preclude them, from raising the plea of bias. Giving our most' anxious consideration to this question we are inclined to think that allowing persons envi- saged in S. 8-B to raise the plea of bias which is but a concomitant of the rule of natural justice before the Commission of Inquiry would be in tune with the spirit and the object of the Act.
32. Further having regard to the nature of the rights -- conduct and reputation of a person -- which are likely to be prejudicially affected by the enquiry and the safeguards provided to such persons by the Parliament under Ss. 8-B and 8-C to protect those rights by affording an opportunity of hearing and conferring right to cross-examine the witness, we are of the view that while conducting enquiry on those aspects the Commission of Inquiry will be discharging a quasi-judicial function. Accordingly we hold that the petitioners are entitled to raise the plea of bias against the fourth respondent.
33. We shall now refer to the judgment of our High Court in Arun Shridhar Bondale V. Government of A.P., 1992 (1) Andh LT 654, which is relied upon by the learned Advocate-General in support of his contention that the petitioners cannot raise the plea of bias against the fourth respondent. In that case a retired learned Judge of this Court was appointed as One Man Commission to find out the circumstances leading to the accident resulting in sinking of the Buddha statue and other equipment and also loss of life in Hussain Sagar Lake at Hyderabad on March 10, 1990. The Government of the day had proposed to erect Buddha statue in the Hussain Sagar Lake on a high plat-form which was specially constructed on the rock of Gibralter which is in the middle of Hussain Sagar Lake. While transporting the statue to the centre of the Lake in a barge, it sunk into the Lake resulting in sinking of the Buddha statue and other equipment and also causing loss of life and considerable damage. In the course of the enquiry the Engineer-in-Chief(Retired) of the State was examined as CW 1 on the question whether the transport company (the third respondent therein) was appointed after due consideration of its capacity to take up the work. The petitioner in the writ petition was one of the persons, who was engaged by the third respondent for fabrication of the modular project, entered appearance in response to the notice issued by the Commission of Inquiry. He wanted to cross-examine the said Engineer-in-Chief and filed an application for that relief before the Commission. The Commission rejected the petition and made some observations orally. Alleging mala fide and bias against the Commission on the ground that the Commission commented in open court hall of the Commission about the competency of the counsel for the petitioner and threatened that he would impose costs of Rupees Ten Thousand if the counsel insisted on recalling the witness for cross-examination, the petitioner filed the writ petition in our High Court. The Division Bench which dealt with the case, held that the statement of CW 1 did not prejudicially affect the petitioner, so the petitioner had no right to cross-examine CWI. The Division Bench considered the applicability of S. 8-B read with S.8-C of the Act and opined that both the sections conferred no right of cross-examination on the petitioner. The Bench observed that the doctrine of bias applied only to judicial and quasi-judicial bodies and as the Commission of Inquiry did not answer the description of either, the doctrine had no application. It was held, 'any observations made by the Commission directed against an Advocate, even if true, do not constitute bias against the party who engaged the counsel.' In view of this finding on facts of the case, the pronouncement of the Division Bench on larger question of applicability of bias to the Commission of Inquiry, is immaterial to the ratio of the case and is, therefore, obiter dicta.
34. On the conclusion we have reached above, namely that the petitioners can raise the plea of bias against the fourth respondent, we proceed to consider the question, what then is the test of bias? Where the bias is pecuniary bias, slightest interest of theadjudicator in the subject-matter of litigation would disqualify the Judge. The classical illustration of this type of bias is the case of Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietary, (1852) 3 HLC 759. There the House of Lords, presided by Lord Cottenham, rendered the decision in favour of respondent-Company. After Lord Cottenham ceased to be the Lord Chancellor, that decision was challenged before the House on the ground that Lord Cottenham was a shareholder of that company. The House of Lords set aside its earlier judgment on the ground of pecuniary interest of the Lord Chancellor although it was admitted that the interest could not have influenced the judgment in the remotest degree. But here we are not concerned with that category of bias; we are dealing with the other category of bias - personal bias which is also termed by Garner () as 'appearance of bias'. For this category of bias the test laid down by Lord Hewart C.J., is:
'Nothing is to be done which creates even any suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice.'
In Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd, v. Lannon, referred to supra, Lord Justice Edmund Davies elucidated the test as follows:
'With profound respect to those who have propounded the 'real likelihood' test, I take the view that the requirement that justice must manifestly be done operates with un-diminished force in cases where bias is alleged and that any development of the law which appears to emasculate that requirement should be strongly resisted..... But Icannot bring myself to hold that a decision may properly be allowed to stand even although there is reasonable suspicion of bias on the part of one or more members of the adjudicating body.'
35. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, : 1988CriLJ158 , the Supreme Court applied the test of 'real likelihood of bias' to mean whether a reasonable person, in possession of relevant information,would have thought that bias was likely and whether the authority concerned was likely to be disposed to decide the matter only in a particular way. Their Lordships observed that what was relevant was the reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party and pointed out that the proper approach for the Judge was not to look at his own mind and ask himself, however, honestly, 'Am I biased?' but to look at the mind of the party before him. The question in that case arose under the Army Act, 1950 where the decision of the Court-Martial was questioned as being biased. The appellant before the Supreme Court was punished for violating the norms for presenting representations to higher officer. While serving the sentence he was again tried for disobeying a lawful command given by his superior officer. The Court-Martial consisted of the 4th respondent therein and two others. About the 4th respondent, the appellant had sent representations complaining illtreatment. The proceedings were challenged on the ground of bias on the part of the fourth respondent. The Supreme Court held that the presence of the fourth respondent in the Court-Martial rendered the proceedings coram non-judice and the judgment a nullity.
36. Explaining the 'real likelihood test', Mathew J., speaking for the Supreme Court in S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., : (1973)IILLJ473SC observed that the court must look at the impression which other people have and that that follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seem to be done; there must be real likelihood of bias and that surmises and conjectures would not be enough.
37. The test is vividly summarised by Justice Thakker thus:
() 'Reasonable apprehension in the mind of a reasonable man is necessary. Such reasonable apprehension must be based on cogent materials. Again, there must be reasonable evidence to satisfy that there was a real likelihood of bias. Vague suspicions of whimsical, capricious and unreasonablepeople should not be made the standard to regulate normal human conduct.'
38. It follows that in determining the question of personal bias against the fourth respondent the Court should see whether there is undisputed material which is likely to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of the person complaining of bias taking care that apprehension is not vague, whimsical or capricious suspicion. The Court will have to satisfy itself of three things before recording a finding of bias against an authority, viz.,
(i) there is uncontroverted and undisputed material;
(ii) the material is such as is likely to give rise to reasonable apprehension in the mind of the person complaining of bias; and
(iii) the apprehension is not a vague, whimsical or capricious suspicion.
39. Now, we shall consider whether on the material on record, the test of bias is satisfied in this case. It may be observed here that no bias is alleged against the fourth respondent as such. What is urged is that circumstances exist, which give rise to reasonable suspicion in the minds of the petitioners that the fourth respondent will not be impartial and will be biased against them. The suspicion of bias is said to emanate from the following:
(a) The hostile attitude of the 4th respondent towards Congress-I Party and his bias in favour of Telugu Desam Party.
(b) The manner in which the 4th respondent is chosen by the 2nd respondent to head the Commission.
(c) The language in which the two identical notices dated 10-4-1995 were issued by the 4th respondent to the petitioner in the first writ petition and the petitioner in the second writ petition without disclosing any material based on which he formed the prima facie satisfaction which enabled him to issue the said notices under Section 8B of the Act.
(d) The fact that the 4th respondent has notchosen to send any reply to the letter of the petitioner dated 22-4-1995.
(e) The fact that the 4th respondent did not furnish the material based on which he formed his opinion to the petitioner in the second writ petition despite of a specific request made by him.
(f) The manner in which the 4th respondent was putting leading questions to witnesses and not recording their evidence truthfully but record in the summary of the same.
(g) The manner in which the 4th respondent has been briefing personally the Press of his choice to give wide publicity to the proceedings before the Commission.
(h) The circumstance that in spite of request made by the petitioner by his letter dated 13-5-1995 to the 2nd respondent to appoint an unbiased, fair and impartial Commission to enquire into any alleged omissions and commissions of his administration which are likely to affect the reputation personally remained unreplied till now.
40. For the 1st respondent, the Secretary to the Government (Services), General Administration Department, filed counter-affidavit. Insofar as the above mentioned grounds of bias are concerned, it is stated that the allegations of mala fide and bias are totally baseless and the apprehension of the petitioners is not reasonable and the very fact that the 4th respondent gave notice under Section 8B of the Act shows that the apprehension is wholly misplaced and is invented for the purpose of writ petitions. The submission of the report by the Commission will not end the malter. The petitioners will not be without any remedy even if their apprehension comes to be true. The various factors mentioned in sub-paras (a) to (h) are only repetitive of the allegations made in the main writ petitions.
41. The 2nd respondent in his counter-affidavit denied that he appointed the 4th respondent with any mala fide intention.
42. On behalf of the Commission, the 3rd respondent, the P. S.-cum-Deputy Registrar filed counter affidavit stating that the Commission has assumed charge on January 18,1995 and started the enquiry pursuant to the procedure settled down on 20-3-1995. It is denied that the 4th respondent is hostile to the petitioners. The Commissioner set the procedure pursuant to which summons were issued to the officials and others. The recording of oral evidence commenced on 3-4-1995. Sri M.V.S. Prasad, I.A.S. Officer was examined as the first witness. On 7-4-1995 Sri M.S. Reddy, who was the Chairman of the A.P. State Film Development Corporation from 1990 to 1994, was examined and after perusing all the matters of the record, the Commission felt that it would be just, proper and consistent with the norms of fair play and natural justice that the petitioners should be given an opportunity to explain their role in the decision making process, as such the notices dated 10-4-1995 came to be issued. It is stated that a reading of the evidence of Ms. Shanta K. John would show that the allegation that the 4th respondent made any remarks about 'Kona Seema Brahmins' is without any basis. The further allegation that the 4th respondent had asked whether there are any employees or partners of M / s. Sista's belonging to Reddy Community, is also not correct and those allegations are invented for the purpose of the writ petition. He added that the details of the apprehension, mentioned in para 20 of the affidavit are baseless.
43. The 4th respondent filed counter-affidavit denying all the material allegations made against him. He denied that he was appointed to head the Commission of Inquiry with' the so-called mala fide intention of securing a report adversely affecting the Congress-I party and its leadership. He submits that under the Commission of Inquiry Act the power to appoint is vested with the Government and it is for the State Government to decide whom to appoint to head the Commission. The statements imputing bias are only hear-say and they do not satisfy the requirements of 0rder 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Rule 5 of the Writ Proceeding Rules. It is stated that after recording the evidence of Sri M.S. Reddy, Film Producer, in part, on 7-4-1995, the 4th respondent directed issuance of notices to thepetitioners under Section 8B of the Act. The said notices were issued on 10-4-1995 which were sufficiently understood by the petitioners. The allegation that the 4th respondent has put the leading question is denied. It is stated that the petitioners have not chosen to disclose the particulars of the witnesses to whom leading questions were put to elicit information adverse to their reputation. All the witnesses have been examined before the Commission in open court; they are educated and they comprehended the questions posed to them. None of the witnesses, who had appeared, made arty application drawing attention to any error, mistake or omission in the recording of the deposition. He denied that in the course of recording the deposition of the local Head of M/s. Sista's Pvt. Ltd. Ms. Shanta K. John, the 4th respondent has openly observed that Kona Seema Brahmins are like Cobras. He also denied the allegation that he put a question to her as to whether M/s. Sista's Pvt. Ltd., had any partners or employees belonging to the Reddy Community. He also denied that the allegation that the 4th respondent had not allowed such questions to go on record, as false. The said witness Ms. Shanta K. John, was represented by Sri C. Ramakrishna, Bar-at-Law who was present during the cross-examination. She had added, in her own hand-writing, some sentences which were not asked by anybody. If really such observations or comments were made, the witness who is an educated lady would have certainly made it a part of the deposition itself. The Judge's record is conclusive and final and in respect of what events have taken place and what statements have been made, the record of the court shall have to be the last word on the subject. He also denied that the proceedings of the Commission ere conducted in manner to elicit adverse information and to make adverse comments in the report to damage the reputation of the petitioners. It is also denied that the 4th respondent had any conversation, muchless any casual conversation with an unnamed brother of Sri Prabhakar Reddy, a Cine Artist, to the effect that he would put an end to the political career of the petitioner by the end of June 1995 and it is stated that this allegation is unfounded one. It is stated thatsub-paragraphs (a) to (h) of Paragraph 20 are all false and no reasonable apprehension of bias can be made out from them. There is no foundation for any fear or apprehension of any bias. The intention of the petitioner is firstly not to participate in the proceedings before the Commission of Inquiry and secondly to attribute unfounded bias and thirdly to prevent the conclusion of the assignment of the Commission as a result of their non-participation.
44. The allegations in support of rule against bias can be classified under three heads,
(i) appointment of the fourth respondent without reference to the Chief Justice of the High Court to recommend the names.
This is ground No. (b) aforementioned. We may point out here that there is no requirement under the Act or the Rules made thereunder that the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry should be made in consultation with the Honourable the Chief Justice of the High Court. There is thus no violation of any statutory provision. In our view, merely because a retired Judge has been appointed to head the Commission by the State Government without consulting the Chief Justice of the High Court, bias cannot reasonably be inferred.
(ii) The hostile attitude of the fourth respondent towards Congress-I Party and his bias in favour of Telgu Desam Party.
Under this head judgments rendered by the fourth respondent while functioning as a sitting Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh are relied upon. In our view, the orders passed by the 4th respondent while functioning as Judge of the High Court cannot be taken as the basis of any bias because the essence of the functioning of the judicial authority is acting fairly and impar-tially and the presumption is the Judge has' acted fairly and impartially unless, of course, the contrary is proved in the case in which judgment is attacked on the ground of being vitiated by bias and there is no material to show that the judgments in those cases were questioned before the appellate authority on that ground. For this reason we consider itunnecesssary to refer to the material on this aspect.
(iii) Conduct of the fourth respondent while functioning as Commission.
Grounds (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) aforementioned are relevant in this connection. Of these grounds, Grounds (f) and (g) are denied. Grounds (c), (d) and (e) relate to not disclosing the material on which opinion was formed for issuing the notices. We shall deal with this ground while considering the second point; but we are of the opinion that these grounds are not enough to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias, they may give rise to a vague suspicion but certainly no reasonable person on those grounds can have apprehension of bias. The allegations that the fourth respondent observed about some person as 'Kona Seema Brahmin' etc., are also allegations which are disputed, therefore, they also do not form basis for inferring reasonable apprehension of bias. In our view, such allegations may give rise to a vague suspicion which cannot be the basis of bias. So also the other ground, viz., that Sri Prabhakar Reddy, Cine Artist told the petitioner in the first writ petition that the fourth respondent, in a casual conversion, told his brother that he would put an end to his political career by the end of June, 1995, cannot be said to be an uncontroverted material for the purpose of inferring reasonable apprehension of bias. Insofar as Ground (h) is concerned, nobody can dispute that it would have been most desirable and would not have given rise to the present controversy had the second respondent acted on the letter of the petitioner in the first writ petition dated May 13, 1995 and appointed another person to man the Commission of Inquiry. That deals with the conduct of the second respondent which, without more, cannot have any reflection on the fourth respondent functioning as Commission of Inquiry. Further it cannot also be a ground to infer apprehension of bias by the fourth respondent against the petitioners.
45. However, Sri Rama Swamy con-tendeded that as the petitioner in the first writ petition had served as constitutional func-tionary in the capacity of Union Law Minister and as Chief Minister of the State more than once, suspicion of bias in his mind should be taken as reasonable apprehension of bias. We are afraid we cannot accede to this contention of the learned counsel. We have no hesitation in accepting that those who have worked as constitutional functionaries are certainly reasonable persons by any standard but in a court of law their actions, comportment and behaviour will be judged subjecting to same analysis, criterion and examination as that of any other litigant.
46. From the above discussion, it is clear that the aforementioned three requirements of test of bias are not satisfied. Therefore, the fourth respondent cannot be held to be disqualified from manning the One Man Commission appointed under G.O. Ms. No. 11, General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated January 13, 1995.
47. Now we shall take up the second point, viz., whether the notice issued by the Commission under Section 8B of the Act is vitiated as being vague and for want of material particulars and is violative of Section 8B of the Act and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
48. Inasmuch as the validity of the notice dated April 10, 1995, issued under Section 8B of the Act, is questioned in the Writ Petitions, it would be appropriate to read that notice here, which is in the following terms:
'R.O.C. No. C.O.I./I & P.R./275/95.
BEFORE JUSTICE G. RADHAKRISHNA
RAO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 'C'
BLOCK : II FLOOR : B.R.K.R. GOVT.
OFFICES COMPLEX:
HYDERABAD
(Inquiry into the irregularities in the functioning of I. & PR Department, Filmnagar Co-operative Housing Society Limited and Film Development Corporation)
NOTICE
(Under Section 8-B of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952)
To
Sri K. Vijayabhaskara Reddy, M.L.A.,
Former Chief Minister of A.P.,
H. No. 8-2-268/K/9, Navodaya Colony,
Banjara Hills,
HYDERABAD.
WHEREAS the Government of Andhra Pradesh have appointed the Commission of Inquiry in G.O. Ms. No. 11, General Administration, I and PR Department, dated 13-1-1995 to enquire into the irregularities in the functioning of Andhra Pradesh State Film Development Corporation, I & P.R. Department and Filmnagar Co-operative Housing Society.
AND WHEREAS the files have been submitted by the Government of Andhra Pradesh forming part of G.O. Rt. No. 1505 General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated 28-3-1994, G.O. Ms. No.224, General Administration (I & PR) Department dated 2-4-1994, G.O. Rt. No, 3871, dated 25-6-1994, G.O. Ms.Nos. 311, 315, 316, General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated 25-6-1994, G.O. Ms. Nos. 482, 483 and 484, General Administration (I & PR) Department, daled 24-9-1994, G.O.Ms. No. 382 General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated 13-7-1994, G.O. Ms, No. 533, General Administration (I & PR) Department, dated 12-10-1994, G.O.Ms. Number 1304, Revenue (Assignment-Ill) Department, dated 22-12-1993 which relate to the appointment of M/s. Sistas Private Limited Publicity Agency with sanctions for payments and in relation to the sanction of loan advances to Andhra Pradesh State Film Development Corporation, approval of loan of Rs. 97.50 Lakhs to Sri M.S. Reddy, Film Producer and also for allotment of extra land in favour of Sri M.S. Reddy, Film Producer (Copies of the G.Os. enclosed).
AND WHEREAS from the perusal of the above mentioned files, your name is revealed as being the important authority in the decision making process.
AND WHEREAS the Commission of Inquiry is of the opinion that your reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected whileappreciating the aforesaid files and related records. And hence with a view to provide you with an opportunity of being heard, the Commission of Inquiry has been pleased to order issuance of Notice to you.
NOW THEREFORE, you may, if you so desire participate in the inquiry and to inform the willingness to produce evidence in your defence, if any, within 15 days from the date of receipt of this Notice.
(NOTE: The relevant records are available in the Office of the Commission of Inquiry and they can be perused on any working day during Office hours)
Dated this the 10th day of April, 1995.
(BY