Kadur Ramchandram Vs. Kadur Seetamma - Court Judgment |
| Andhra Pradesh |
| Nov-24-1932 |
| Nawab Jeevan Yar Jung Bahadur,; Nawab Samad Nawaz Jung Bah Dur and; Rai Bisheshar Nath, JJ. |
| 143Ind.Cas.883 |
| Kadur Ramchandram |
| Kadur Seetamma |
.....therefore, the insured and the insurer have no escape but to discharge the said award as directed. undisputedly, in this case as deduced for proved facts, the vehicle in question was not properly maintained by the owner and despite faulty brake system, the claimant had undertaken the hazardous journey to his peril at the behest of and at the instruction of the owner. the owner is therefore, tortfeasor.
section 168: [v. gopala gowda & jawad rahim, jj] insurers limit of liability - held, it is well settled that the liability of the insurance company for payment of compensation can be statutory or contractual. is for the insurance company to show that the insurance policy was a statutory policy and not a contractual policy to restrict its liability. that issue was neither raised before the tribunal nor is raised in this appeal requiring decision. thus, if at all the insurer has any valid ground to restrict its liability, it can proceed against the insured but firstly it has to discharge the award as required under section 149 (1) of the act. where the owner/insured has failed to maintain the vehicle as per prescribed safety standards and has caused the claimant to drive the..........for the appellant has also cited manchharam v. kalidas 19 b. 821. there is no specific decision on the point in the said case rather the revisional powers of the high court have been resorted to. at any rate the tenor of the present act seems to be that the appropriate remedy against such an order is not by way of appeal. however, in view of the facts of the case, we deem it proper to exercise our revisional power and vary the order of the court below. the court below ought to have passed orders after hearing the objection of the petitioner. it is not correct to refuse the application on the ground that the applicant ought to have obtained the succession certificate can be revoked on sufficient grounds. the only question to decide is whether the grounds advanced are tenable for which an enquiry will have to be held. hence the appeal is dismissed; but in the exercise of our revisional power our order is that the case will go back to the lower court for inquiry as directed above.
1. The application for revocation of the succession certificate has been dismissed by the District Court, Mahbubnagar. The present appeal is preferred against the said order. The question is whether an appeal against such order is competent. The learned Pleader for the appellant relies upon Section 17 of Act No. III of 1307 Fasli (The Hyderabad Succession Certificate Act). But from the wording of the section it is clear (?) the right of appeal is given to a party aggrieved against the order granting the application for revocation and not when the (application is refused. Vide, Raghunath v. Venkat Anna 3 D.L.R. 540 in this connection. The Pleader for the appellant has also cited Manchharam v. Kalidas 19 B. 821. There is no specific decision on the point in the said case rather the revisional powers of the High Court have been resorted to. At any rate the tenor of the present Act seems to be that the appropriate remedy against such an order is not by way of appeal. However, in view of the facts of the case, we deem it proper to exercise our revisional power and vary the order of the court below. The court below ought to have passed orders after hearing the objection of the petitioner. It is not correct to refuse the application on the ground that the applicant ought to have obtained the succession certificate can be revoked on sufficient grounds. The only question to decide is whether the grounds advanced are tenable for which an enquiry will have to be held. Hence the appeal is dismissed; but in the exercise of our revisional power our order is that the case will go back to the lower court for inquiry as directed above.