ORDER
D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J.
1. This house rent revision petition under Section 46(1) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 is directed against the judgment and decree dated 7-11-2002 passed in H.R.C. No. 10237 of 1995 on the file of the Court of the V Additional Small Causes Judge, Mayo Hall Unit (SCCH20), Bangalore.
2. Under the impugned order, the Court below has allowed the petition of the petitioners/joint owners/landlords therein which had been filed under Section 21(1)(h), (i) and (j) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the petition having been allowed under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 ('the Act' for short), which has replaced the erstwhile Act during the pendency of the petition and the respondent-tenants having been directed to vacate and hand over possession of the petition schedule premises within sixty days from the date of the order, the aggrieved tenants are in revision before this Court.
3. The eviction petitioners claiming to be the joint owners of the premises in question filed a petition under the provisions noted above, one amongst which is bona fide requirement of the premises for the occupation of the owners. The petitioners claim that they have inherited the property under a Will executed by their grandfather late Krishnamurthy Naidu and that subsequent to the death of the grandfather, they have also exercised the ownership right in respect of the very premises and as against the respondent-tenants by collecting the rents and as they required the premises for their own use and occupation, they sought for eviction of the tenants.
4. The petition was resisted by the respondents who are brothers. It appears, initially one brother had been impleaded as a respondent and later on that respondent having taken up a contention that the other brother is a tenant and not himself, the other brother was also impleaded as a party respondent to the eviction petition. The respondent also contested the petition disputing the relationship of 'landlord' and 'tenant'; that the petitioners do not require the premises for bona fide use and occupation; that the schedule premises is not one which is required to be demolished and rebuilt; that the petitioners do not have the requisite funds for demolition and reconstruction and that the tenants do not have any other alternative premises to reside if they are evicted from the petition schedule premises and as such the petition was to be dismissed. It was also sought to be pleaded that the petitioners themselves were in occupation of other suitable accommodation and as such they do not need the premises for bona fide use and occupation.
5. The petitioners' evidence was that of the power of attorney holder who was examined as P.W. 1, one by name K Raghunath; that the power of attorney holder is the son of the first petitioner-Smt. K Sharadamma; that the petitioners have also produced documentary evidence, Exs. P. 1 to P. 9 including the death certificate of the erstwhile owner late Krishnamurthy Naidu, certain documents relating to property where they had earlier resided and a certified copy of the Will said to have been executed by the erstwhile owner Krishnamurthy Naidu. On behalf of the respondents, documents such as rent receipts and certain other documents indicative of the manner of payment of rents by the two brothers, are produced. The petitioners had also pleaded that under the Will left behind by the grandfather, the property in question was to be enjoyed by his sister during her lifetime and it is only thereafter it would pass on to the petitioners absolutely. It is subsequent to the death of Smt. Lakshmidevamma, the sister of the said testator Krishnamurthy Naidu that the petitioners have taken steps for filing the eviction petition.
6. In the light of the respective pleadings of the parties and the evidence let in, in support of their case, the Trial Court formulated the following points for its determination.--
'(1) Whether the petitioner requires the petition schedule premises for reconstruction and for use and occupation?
(2) Whether the respondent has acquired alternative premises?
(3) Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent?'
7. The Trial Court, on appreciation of the material on record found that the petitioners require the premises for their own use and occupation and it can be used after demolition and reconstruction also. The Court below also found that though not both respondents have alternative premises, one respondent had an alternative accommodation. The third point which had been considered by the Court below does not arise for consideration in the light of the view I am taking that the revision petition does not deserve to be retained on the board of this Court by admitting the same.
8. The Court below having allowed the petition under the Karnataka Rent Act and having ordered eviction of the respondents and having directed handing over vacant possession of the petition schedule premises to the petitioners, as already stated, the aggrieved respondent-tenants are before this Court.
9. I have heard Sri D.R. Sundaresha, learned Counsel for the petitioners, who apart from making submissions on the pleadings, has also taken me through the evidence of P.W. 1 in great detail. Learned Counsel submits that the petitioners had not made good their case that the premises is required for bona fide use and occupation; that they had not been able to substantiate the ground for eviction of the premises under Section 21(1)(j) of the 1961 Act for demolition and particularly the petitioners not having satisfied the Court below about their financial ability for demolition and reconstruction and the petitioners having continued to stay at some other premises, they cannot seek for vacation of the premises for bona fide use and occupation.
10. Learned Counsel also submits that the eviction petition having been filed under the provisions of Section 21(1)(h), (i) and (j) and the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 having been replaced by the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, the petitioner having not taken steps to amend the petition and not having indicated the corresponding provisions in the present Act which correspond to the provisions of the 1961 Act under which eviction had been sought for, the present petition could not have been maintained and the order of eviction passed itself not indicative of any particular provision under which the order is passed, the order suffer from legal infirmity and is liable to be set aside.
11. The evidence let in by the parties are based on the understanding of the respective cases and the requirement and need that is pleaded by the petitioner-landowners was that this premise was required for their use and occupation and that they themselves are living in some other premises. Though the learned Counsel for the revision petitioners submits that as the eviction petitioners were joint owners and admittedly the requirement of only one petitioner having been indicated, the suit schedule premises could not have been directed to be vacated by the tenants and handed over possession. I am not inclined to accept this submission as it is always open to one joint owner to plead for all other joint owners and so long as there is no conflict of interest as between the joint owners, law presumes that the requirement is of all the joint owners.
12. Learned Counsel has also contended that eviction the petitioners who are claiming under a Will left behind by the erstwhile owner having not proved the said Will nor having produced the original of the Will, no eviction order could have been passed particularly when the respondent-tenants have disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant.
13. Insofar as the relationship of 'landlord' and 'tenant' is concerned, the respondent-ten ants had continued to be tenants even subsequent to the death of the said erstwhile owner Krishnamurthy Naidu and that one of the petitioners had in fact been collecting rents for the premises in question and issuing receipts. Even as on the date of filing of the petition, the respondent-tenants have been paying rents to one of the petitioners. In such circumstances, there was no occasion at all for the respondent-tenants to have disputed the relationship particularly when they had already admitted this relationship by making payment of rents in favour of petitioners. Under the provisions of the present Act, if a tenant disputes the relationship and fails to make good, that in itself constitutes a ground for eviction.
14. These aspects apart, the evidence on record has substantiated the case of the petitioners insofar as their use and occupation is concerned. The evidence on record indicates that the petitioners are not in possession and occupation of premises belonging to themselves and which was suitable for their need and requirement. It is not even suggested by the respondent during the cross-examination of the power of attorney holder of the petitioners that the petitioners were already in occupation of the premises which they themselves owned and which satisfies their need and requirements.
15. The need and requirement of the petitioners who are the landlords, is to be found in accordance with the provisions of Section 27(2)(r) of the present Act. It reads as under.--
'(r) that the premises let are required, whether in the same form or after reconstruction or rebuilding, by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation:
Provided that where the landlord has acquired the premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under this clause unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition'.
16. In the light of such provisions, as to whether the petitioners require the premises only after demolition and reconstruction or without that and as to whether the petitioners have the necessary wherewithal for reconstructing after the building is demolished, recedes to the background though Sri Sundaresha, learned Counsel for the petitioners would urge that until and unless the petitioners establish that they have such resources and were ready for reconstruction with all necessary formalities complied with, as has been held by the Supreme Court, eviction order cannot be passed. The decision would have been applicable only to a situation where the eviction is exclusively under the provisions of Section 27(2)(f), (g) or (h) of the present Act. If the landlord is able to prove his requirement under Section 27(2)(r) of the present Act, then the provisions of Section 27(2)(f), (g), (h) and (i) of the Act may not in any way affect an order of eviction suffered by the tenant.
17. Insofar as establishing the requirement under Section 27(2)(r) of the Act is concerned, it is sufficient if the landlord has indicated that the premises is required for use and occupation of himself or any member of his family. Even assuming that they were two owners as petitioners and are joint owners if requirement of any one joint owner is established, that requirement is sufficient to pass an order of eviction as against the tenant. When a landlord can maintain a petition for the requirement of any member of his family, it can be equally so if two joint owners present the eviction petition. The requirement of one joint owner constitutes the requirement of all petitioners. The only situation where the landlord can be denied relief and the Court can refuse passing an order of eviction order against the tenant under Section 27(2)(r) is when the Court finds that the landlord or the person for whose requirement the petition schedule premises is sought, for has some other reasonably suitable accommodation.
18. Insofar as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the evidence on record has clearly indicated that the landlord/petitioners did not have such suitable accommodation. On the other hand, it was found that one of the brothers who was the respondent-tenant, had in his possession an alternative premises. It is on this aspect, the Trial Court has recorded a finding on point No. (2). This is not a point which was required to be considered by the Court below, particularly when the question as to whether a tenant is in occupation of a suitable alternative accommodation or not does not have a bearing on the outcome of a petition for eviction under Section 27(2)(r) of the Act. The question to be considered is as to whether the petitioner-landlord has such reasonably suitable accommodation in view of which he can be denied the relief. The finding is in the other way in the present case,
19. Insofar as the dispute raised by the tenant with regard to the correctness or validity of the Will and the petitioners' right to claim under the same, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted on this aspect. It is only to be rejected inasmuch as the respondent-tenants have clearly admitted that they are in possession in their right only as tenants and further that they had paid rents in favour of one of the petitioners. Whether the petitioners can really claim right, title or interest to the property in question under a Will set up by them is a matter which concerns such person who seeks to challenge the Will and who is disinherited by the petitioners. It is not open to the tenant to do so and at any rate it cannot constitute a ground on which the eviction petition could have been rejected.
20. Insofar as the submission that there is no finding by the Court below as to under which corresponding provision of the present Act the petition has been allowed and in the absence of amendment application and for want of amendment of the petition, the order suffers from infirmities is concerned, I am of the view that the provisions of the Act operate by force of law and the question is as to whether the Act is applicable to the premises in question which was the subject-matter of the eviction petition. There is no dispute that the present Act is applicable to the premises in question. If that is so, the only other question will be on the available pleadings as had been pleaded by the parties and evidence let in, if there is scope for passing orders under the corresponding provisions of the present Act. The eviction petition having been allowed and the requirement of bona fide use and occupation of the petitioners, even if it is not indicated, it can be safely inferred that it is under the provisions of Section 27(2)(r) which corresponds to the provisions of Section 21(1)(h) under the old Act. In fact, the provisions of Section 27(2)(r) of the present Act are not as rigorous and as strict as against a landlord seeking for eviction of a tenant on the grounds of personal use and occupation. The material on record had clearly made out a case for passing an order of eviction under the provisions of Section 27(2)(r) of the present Act though not under any other provision.
21. Though the Court did not have occasion to look into the provisions of Section 43 of the present Act in the light of the application made by the respondent-tenants, the respondent-tenants had taken up the defence that there is no relationship of 'landlord' and 'tenant' as between the petitioners and the respondents. If a defence of this nature had been taken up and the tenant is unable to make good his case, then failure to make good such defence also constitutes an independent ground for passing an order of eviction by the Court under Section 27(2)(o) of the Act. Though the Trial Court had not recorded a categorical finding on this aspect, examination of the material on record itself indicates that the respondent-tenants would have suffered an eviction order under this provision also, had the Trial Court bestowed its attention to this aspect of the matter.
22. In this view of the overall position, I am of the definite opinion that the order of eviction passed by the Court below does not suffer from any error of fact or law and I do not find any scope for inference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 46(1) of the Act.
23. In the circumstances the revision petition is dismissed without being admitted.
24. The Court below had granted two months' time for the respondent-tenants therein to vacate and handover vacant possession of the premises to the petitioners. That order was dated 7-11-2002. The period has since expired during the pendency of this proceedings, perhaps the landlord had not taken any further proceedings. However, the tenant is granted six months' time from today to vacate and handover vacant possession of the premises to the landlords subject to payment of rents regularly.
25. Ordered accordingly.