Judgment:
K. Sreedhar Rao, J.
1. M.F.A. No. 2572 of 1994 arises out of M.V.C. No. 721 of 1990. M.F.A. No. 2596 of 1994 arises out of M.V.C. No. 722 of 1990.
2. The two appeals arise out of the common judgment rendered by Second Additional District Judge cum III Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Dharwad in M.V.C. Nos. 721 and 722 of 1990. Along with the said cases there were other three claims which came to be decided by common judgment. In M.V.C. No. 721 of 1990 claim is made by the parents of the deceased one Channabasappa who was a boy aged 6 years at the time of accident. In M.V.C. No. 722 of 1990, the father of the deceased Channabasappa has made the claim, seeking compensation for the personal injuries sustained in the motor accident that occurred on 14.2.1990 at 5.30 p.m., near Kamadod Cotton Spinning Mill on P.B. Road, Ranebennur. The goods truck bearing registration No. TDW 6949 which was driven in a rash and negligent manner hit against a Tempo bearing No. MEH 4045 and caused one fatal injury to Channabasappa and personal injuries to the other inmates of the Tempo. The trial court has found that the accident has occurred only on account of rash and negligent driving of the truck and has held that the driver of the Tempo has not contributed in any manner for causation of the accident. The trial court has granted a compensation of Rs. 15,000 with interest at 6 per cent per annum in M.V.C. No. 721 of 1990 and Rs. 34,500 in M.V.C. No. 722 of 1990. The claimants being aggrieved by inadequate compensation have preferred the appeals.
3. The trial court has granted compensation to the parents of the deceased in a sum of Rs. 15,000, something in the nature of a global compensation. A question would arise that in case of death of a minor child whether the multiplier method is to be adopted. The earlier trend in the precedent law was to award a lump sum compensation in case of young and minor children only for loss of expectation of life obviously for the reason that their life expectancy was uncertain and infantile mortality was rampant. The view of mine finds support from the ruling of this Court in Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. L.J. Machado 1966 ACJ 321 (Mysore), wherein a similar view is held following the view in Benham v. Gambling (1941) 1 All ER 7: (1941) AC 157. With the advanced medical preventive and curative techniques, the life expectancy of the infants is substantially improved and the problem of infant mortality has been overcome thanks to the positive achievements made in the medical field.
4. The tendency on the part of the Tribunals in awarding compensation in case of young children by adopting the amount prescribed as a compensation for death in the case of no fault liability even in cases where negligence is established and proved is bad in law. The Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 which brought about substantial changes in the assessment of compensation in case of fatal injuries has provided a structural compensation. Up to the attainment of 15 years of age by any person multiplier of 15 is made applicable for assessment of compensation. No doubt, the constitutional mandate and the complementary labour legislation do prohibit the employment of child labour. Up to the age of 15, no child can be employed and it is also not permissible in law to infer or attribute any income by way of earning to a child below 15 years. However, this logic cannot be stretched too far to deny the compensation to a child who under the changed conditions is capable of surviving for the normal lifespan of 65 to 70 years and after completion of the minority or the restrictive period for seeking employment, a person is entitled to take up employment and it is also permissible in law to assume the earnings of such persons notionally after completion of the restrictive period for the child employment. Perhaps keeping in view this logic, the legislature in Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has provided a structural compensation and without discrimination has applied the multiplier system even in the cases of the deaths of persons up to the age of 15. The Schedule provides the application of multiplier of 15.
5. In the ruling of the Supreme Court in U.P. State Road Trans. Corporation v. Trilok Chandra : (1996)4SCC362 , an observation is made that the structural compensation envisaged in the Act suffers from several defects and neither the Tribunal nor the courts can go by the ready reckoner and that it can be used only as a guide. Although the methodology in the structural compensation suffers from serious defects but nonetheless with the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court, even to the persons below the age of 15 the multiplier system could be applied as the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act are a piece of social and beneficial legislation, the benefit whatever the poor claimants are entitled to cannot be denied.
6. The educational career, monthly earnings of any person is highly speculative subject. Normally on part of the claimants, there is always a tendency to exaggerate the career prospects of their children. However, in such cases, the ideals of law and the realities of life have to be taken into account and at least a bare minimum of the income usually earned by any person at the given point of time that is the date of accident has to be considered and attributed as the income of the deceased irrespective of the fact that the child was incapable of earning at the time of accident.
7. While applying multiplier in case of death of a child two seeming undue advantages enure to the dependants/claimants have to be carefully considered. The earnings and income to the child notionally could be attributed only after the child crosses the barriers of child employment and usually the employment can be taken around the age of 18. Supposing a child of 8 years dies, for a period of 10 years, no income can be attributed to such a child. It is only beyond the age of 18 for the full length of normal lifespan, the income has to be assessed. Whereas in case of an adult aged around 18 dies, normal multiplier method is followed and dependants would get the full benefit. But in the example case, the income of the deceased is assessed much in advanced period of about 10 years, that is from the standpoint of the deceased, the assessment of notional income is judged and attributed which is one of the advantages enuring to the dependants. Further after such advanced notional accelerated assessment, the dependants would receive the compensation much in advance period of about 10 years. Therefore, the dependants enjoy twin advantages in the sense that to the account of the deceased the accelerated notional income assumed for the notional normal lifespan is assessed from the standpoint of the deceased and similarly by the same measure of period of number of years the dependants take the accelerated benefit of assessment much in advance and there is a benefit of acceleration of 10 years to each of the advantage noticed above thereby the total benefit of acceleration would be around 20 years, to neutralise the benefit of the accelerated period and in order to bring about equitable fair play in the assessment of compensation proportionate deduction of 4 multiples is to be made from the applicable multiplier which is judged from the standpoint of the age of the dependants.
8. With the aforesaid method, the compensation in the present case is to be assessed. The deceased was aged 6 years. There is an acceleration of almost 12 years while reckoning the income and earning capacity of the child and so also well in advance of 12 years, the dependants would be getting the lump sum compensation. The age of the mother in the instant case is 32 years. Therefore, multiplier of 15 would be applicable in the normal course. If one multiple is deducted for every completed accelerated period 5 years, 4 multiples have to be deducted from the normal multiples of 15. Thereby the proper multiplier to be applied would be 11.
9. Considering the income of the child by the minimum income set out in Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a sum of Rs. 1,200 can be assumed as the notional income which the child might earn from the stage of its legal employment. Deducting 1/3rd towards personal expenses of the deceased, the annual dependency would be Rs. 9,600 and by application of multiplier of 11, the total loss of dependency would be in a sum of Rs. 1,05,600. In addition to the said amount, the claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 10,000 towards loss of expectancy and Rs. 3,000 towards funeral expenses, in all, the petitioner would be entitled to a compensation of Rs. l,18600 which is in consonance with the view of this Court and as well of the Supreme Court when the compensation payable in case of death shall not be less than Rs. 1,00,000. In that view of the matter, the assessment of compensation by the trial court in a sum of Rs. 15,000 is illegal and requires to be modified in the terms stated above.
10. In M.V.C. No. 722 of 1990, the trial court has granted a compensation of Rs. 20,000 towards pain and suffering. The injured had suffered a depressed fracture of skull of parietofrontal region and was inpatient for three months. The trial court has also granted Rs. 8,000 towards medical expenses and Rs. 6,500 towards loss of income during treatment. The post-accident disability is spoken to by the doctor in his evidence and it is stated that the patient is suffering from post-traumatic syndrome. This is also called as the post-concussion syndrome as a result of which, the patient would develop giddiness, decrease in his memory, inability to concentrate. These disabilities appear to be of a lasting nature. Towards the future unhappiness and loss of amenities, the trial court has not awarded any compensation. Therefore, an addition of Rs. 10,000 under the head of loss of amenities and future unhappiness on account of aforesaid disabilities appears to be just and reasonable. Accordingly, the compensation granted by the trial court in a sum of Rs. 34,500 is modified and enhanced to Rs. 44,500. The interest and costs whatever awarded by the trial court is confirmed and the interest granted by trial court is made payable on the enhanced compensation also. The appeals are allowed with costs.