Judgment:
ORDER
1. The prayer in the writ petitions is as follows:
'Wherefore, the petitioners abovenamed most respectfully pray that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the 2nd respondent to absorb the petitioners as permanent employees after their decasualisation at Bangalore Complex Factory, Doorvaninagar, Bangalore-16, and further be pleased to direct the 2nd respondent to pay salary on par with the permanent employees with effect from October 19, 1992, on the date on which the junior- most were appointed as permanent employees, including the continuity of service and all other consequential benefits.'
2. The learned counsel is not able to substantiate as to the nature of the prayer to bring it within the provisions of Article 226. Ultimately, he submitted that it can at best be a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to consider the case of the petitioners for the purpose of absorbing them.
3. Normally, such ambiguous prayer cannot be granted for considering the status of the petitioners vis-a-vis the second respondent. But in the light of the objections filed such a prayer is not to be granted.
4. It is no doubt that it is the fervent appeal of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even as late as on February 18, 1996 there has been previous promise made by the management not only to the employees but also to the union that their issues will be examined at later stage. In fact the real complaint is that they have been merely showing the promise and the promise was never acted upon. The counsel even went to the extent stating that had it been shown to them, they would have gone out of the industry and gone somewhere else.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the union, the third respondent, would support the cause of the petitioners and even submitted that the people who were appointed on compassionate grounds whenever the employee died, should have been treated as the original man and for the continuous working they should have been made permanent employees and paid accordingly. The learned counsel also relied upon the dictum of the Supreme Court in Secretary, Haryana State Electricity Board v. Suresh and Ors., : (1999)ILLJ1086SC , and contended that a person who is an employee for 240 days in service should be regularised and there is no option given to the industry as such.
6. On the other hand, Ms. K. Subha Ananthi brought to my attention Annexure-R1, which reads as follows;
'Government of India had introduced a ban on creation and filling up of vacancies in public sector undertakings as a measure of economy in administrative expenditure during June 1984. In conformity with these Government guidelines, the company had stopped recruitment except in exceptional cases of company's needs in specific areas. Change in Technology and Technological obsolesence also generated large surplus manpower in the Units. The company has also undertaken a major exercise of redeployment of surplus labour in different Units after retraining. As a supplemental measure, Voluntary Retirement Schemes were introduced during different spells in 1991, 1992 and 1993. In spite of this, there are large number of surplus employees in the Company.
The Scheme of employment to dependents of deceased employees was not operational from 1985 onwards except in exceptional cases of unnatural death while on duty. In the Joint Committee Meeting held, on January 10, 1992, Management indicated to the Unions of all Units that it is not possible to consider employment to dependents of deceased employees and the scheme was also withdrawn from that date. But at the request of the Unions, Management agreed to continue the practice of registration of DDES.
Since the scheme has been withdrawn from January 10, 1992, this is to notify for the information of all concerned that registration of DDES will also be discontinued with immediate effect as it: would create avoidable hopes in the minds of people and general litigations.'
7. It is her submission that in view of the ban imposed by the Government and withdrawal of the Scheme, it is not possible for them either to regularise the appointments or to give any other benefit which the petitioners seek. She also brought to my notice the decision of this Court in W.Ps. 1326-32/1998, disposed of on June 23, 1998 (K.H. Gangadharaiah and Ors. v. ITI Limited and Anr.), wherein this Court in a similar case against the present employer in the sports club, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Workmen, : (1996)IILLJ42SC , has dismissed the writ petitions.
8. It is also rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent management that these people on the date when the objections filed were employees in the sports club and this fact is not disputed. The learned counsel also relied upon the dictum of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. A. Radhika Thirumalai (Smt.), : (1997)ILLJ492SC for the proposition that in compassionate appointment, rule providing for compassionate appointment depends upon availability of vacancies. When ban is imposed on fresh recruitment and when company is prepared to offer incentive for voluntary retirement, policy of the company is to reduce work force due to surplus labour. There is no obligation for the company to make appointment on compassionate grounds. Direction given to consider case of respondent if vacancy is available and company deciding to make appointment to fill such vacancy. The Supreme Court held thus:
'In the appellant company appointment on compassionate grounds is governed by rules. Under Rule 78.1 provision is made that one of the dependents of the deceased employee could be considered for appointment in the company in preference to other applicants without being sponsored by the employment exchange. But in Rule 78.3 it has been laid down that such appointment would be made depending upon the availability of vacancies in the respective staffing cadre/authorisation. In other words, an appointment on compassionate grounds can be made only if a vacancy is available. According to the Company no vacancy is available since there is surplus force and the policy of the Company is to progressively reduce the work force and with that end in view a ban has been imposed on fresh recruitment and the Company is also offering incentives for voluntary retirement. The learned single Judge of the High Court was of the view that in spite of such a ban on fresh recruitment it was obligatory for the Company to make appointment on compassionate grounds. The decision in the case of Sushma Gosain v. Union of India : (1990)ILLJ169SC has no application to facts of the case. In the present case the ban on fresh recruitment was in force when the respondent submitted the application for appointment on compassionate grounds.'
9. Having regard to the submissions made by the respective counsel, I am of the view that the view of this Court in W. Ps 1326-32/98 and the Supreme Court referred to above in 1997-I-LLJ-492, has to be followed and following the same, I hold the petitioners are not entitled to seek any relief. Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed.