D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J.
1. These appeals are directed against the judgments and decrees in O.S. Nos. 798, 795, 1069, 796 and 797 of 1996, wherein, while the plaintiff is common, the defendants are different. The issues that were framed for determination by the Trial Court in all the suits are common as the pleadings indicate that the relationship between the parties are almost identical. The judgments which were rendered on 24-8-1998 in all the suits are almost identical. The submissions made by the learned Counsels appearing for the appellant and the respondents are common to all the appeals and accordingly, we are disposing of these appeals by this common judgment.
2. The plaintiff had brought the suit for specific performance praying for directions to the defendants to execute the sale deed to be registered by them in their favour in respect of the suit schedule properties and the suits having been dismissed are in appeal before us.
3. The pleadings in all the suits insofar as the plaintiff is concerned is almost identical and the defence taken by the defendants is also similar.
4. The plaint averments briefly are that the plaintiff and the defendants have entered into 2 agreements, one dated 1-6-1984 followed by another agreement dated 19-12-1985 which agreements are almost identical in all the suits and as per the plaint averment, these agreements were agreements for conveying the suit schedule property which is an agricultural land and for compliance with certain conditions therein.
5. According to the plaintiff, it is a registered society under the Karnataka Societies and Clubs Registration Act, 1960. The defendants be-ing the owners of the suit schedule properties had entered into an understanding with the plaintiff under the respective agreements of the two dates referred to above to sell their lands in favour of the plaintiff at the rate of Rs. 74,000/- per acre and that the possession of the lands had been given to the plaintiff in pursuance of the agreement and that the plaintiff had also paid the full consideration to the defendants as per the agreement. The further plea is that the plaintiff having performed his part of the agreement namely, making payment of the amount, had got issued legal notices to the defendants and also had called upon them through paper publication to perform their part of the agreement by executing sale deed and having the same registered in favour of the plaintiff as per agreement dated 1-6-1984 and in spite of receipt of such notice, the defendants had failed to comply with the same. The suit had been brought for directing the defendants to perform their obligations under the agreement. It is also pleaded that the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court on 9-1-1996 and subsequent dates and as such, prayed for a decree in the suit.
6. The defendants contested the suit. The plaint averments were denied inter alia pleading that the suit itself was not maintainable as there was no proper authorisation on behalf of the petitioner/society to file the suit. It was also denied that there was any agreement for sale of the agricultural land in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants further pleaded that the agreement itself provide for payment of certain amounts in favour of the defendants/landowners on the said lands being acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and the payments were to be made in stages on the happening of the events like issue of acquisition notification under Section 4 of the Act and then, under Section 6 of the Act and then the balance amount to be paid on proceedings being completed and possession handed over to the acquiring authority.
7. The defendants apart from pleading that there was no agreement for conveying the property also pleaded that there was no obligation on the part of the defendants to take any action under the agreement except for receiving the amounts and facilitating the land being acquired under the Land Acquisition Act.
8. The defendants denied that they have parted possession of the land and pleaded that they never handed over possession of the land in favour of the plaintiff/society as averred in the plaint. The defendants also took up the stand that the society was not entitled to own agricultural land as there is a statutory prohibition and that the question of seeking or compelling the defendants to execute the sale deed would be in the teeth of such statutory provision and as such, the agreement was not enforceable being opposed to public policy.
9. The defendants further pleaded that in fact, acquisition proceedings having neither been initiated nor having taken place in respect of the land, they were not required to do anything at all and though the defendants had co-operated with the plaintiff by signing on several papers presented to them by the plaintiff for the purpose of facilitating the plaintiff to go ahead with the acquisition proceedings, the same havingnot taken place, they have no obligation to perform any other act under the agreement. The defendants also pleaded that the plaintiff had not shown as to what legally enforceable right had accrued in its favour under the agreement. The plaintiff had not pleaded the cause of action for praying for the relief of specific performance and that the suit required to be dismissed in limine.
10. In view of such rival pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues:
1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendants have executed an agreement to sell the suit schedule lands as alleged in the plaint?
2. Whether the plaintiff further proves that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?
3. Whether the plaintiff proves that there exists a specifically enforceable contract between the plaintiff and the defendants?
4. Whether the defendants prove that the suit itself is not maintainable for the reason that, there exists no specifically enforceable contract between the parties?
5. Whether the defendants prove that the contract is opposed to the public policy and prohibited under law and therefore, not enforceable?
6. What relief?
The issues 4 and 5 which arose in the context of the plea of the defendants that the suit for specific performance itself was not maintainable was taken up in the first instance by the Trial Court. The other issue namely, as to whether the defendants prove that the contract is opposed to public policy and prohibited under law and therefore not enforceable was also considered. The Trial Court having answered both these issues in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff dismissed the suit. It is aggrieved by these judgments and decrees, the plaintiff is in appeal before us.
11. We have heard Sri V. Tarakaram, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff/appellant and Sri A.K. Subbaiah, learned Counsel for defendants/respondents .
12. Sri V. Tarakaram would submit that the Trial Court has fallen into a serious error in showing haste by disposing of the suit and by dismissing the suit even without permitting the parties to let in their evidence that the issues as framed necessarily require letting in of evidence by the parties in support of their respective cases and in a matter of this nature, the Trial Court could not have disposed of the suit itself even without allowing the parties to lead their evidence.
13. The learned Counsel would submit that on the face of the agreement, it had indicated that it is an agreement for specific performance namely, conveyance of the suit schedule land and that the plaintiffs having performed their part of the agreement, i.e., by paying the fullsale consideration and also having called upon the defendants by issue of a legal notice to perform their obligations under the agreement and the defendants having failed to do so, had approached the Court for appropriate relief. In the circumstances, if at all, the defendants had taken up any plea that the suit is not maintainable or that the agreement was not one for conveying the property and not one which could have been specifically enforced, that aspect had to be determined only after the parties have led in evidence and the parties had full opportunity to substantiate their case and the Trial Court, having not done so, has committed a serious error.
13-A. An application has also been filed during the course of the hearing purporting to be under Sections 21 and 22 of the Specific Relief Act read with Section 151 of the CPC seeking amendment of the plaint. The application seeks for raising an additional plea and for an additional alternative prayer. It is sought to be pleaded that in the event of the Court holding that the agreements are not enforceable, it is just and proper that the defendants should be directed to refund the amounts which they had received from the plaintiff, as otherwise, it will amount to the defendants being permitted to make unjust gain at the cost of the plaintiff and could amount to unjust enrichment to the defendants at the cost of the plaintiff and opposed to the provisions of Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act. The prayer sought for is that an enquiry is to be directed into the amount refundable to the plaintiff and on such enquiry to decree the suit for payment of such amount as compensation payable by defendants to the plaintiff.
14. The learned Counsel for the appellant elaborating his submissions would urge that an application of this nature could be made at any stage of the proceedings before the Court. That proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act expressly provides for making of such an application praying for amendment and the Court to allow such a prayer for amendment on such terms as may be just for including the claim for such a relief. The learned Counsel submits that the historical background of this amendment clearly indicates that the amendment has been brought about to provide a plausible relief to a party who is unable to get the just relief which he was otherwise entitled to because of subsequent developments and in this regard, has brought to our notice the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:
(i) Jagdish Singh v. Natthu, Singh, : AIR1992SC1604 ;
(ii) Y.R. Mahadev v. K. Dayalan, 1997(4) Kar. L.J. 264
The learned Counsel for the appellant submits that having regard to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagdish Singh's case, supra, an application of this nature should necessarily be allowed, in which event, it will be necessary for this Court to remand the matter to the Trial Court for conducting an enquiry as to the relief that can begranted in favour of the plaintiff in the alternative. The learned Counsel submits that in either eventuality, the matter requires to be remanded to the Trial Court either for granting the relief after full-fledged trial if the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of the agreement if it is possible and if not for granting a lesser relief of compensating the plaintiff in respect of the amounts that the plaintiff/society has parted in favour of the defendants.
15. Sri A.K. Subbaiah, learned Counsel for the respondents/defendants while drawing our attention to the two agreements dated 1-6-1984 and 19-12-1985 points out that the agreements by themselves do not indicate anywhere that the defendants are required to execute any conveyance or sale transaction in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property. The learned Counsel points out that the agreement even accepting it at face value indicates that it is only an agreement for receiving certain amounts by the defendants and on the happening of certain events like issue of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and the acquisition proceedings being concluded under the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Counsel also points out that the agreement itself is one for facilitating the plaintiff to initiate acquisition proceedings in respect of the suit schedule property and to co-operate with the plaintiff/society by not opposing or resisting such acquisition proceedings. The learned Counsel also submits that the agreement itself being not one for sale of any property, the question of enforcing such an agreement for the relief of conveyance does not arise and the agreement does not give rise to any cause of action provided for an enforceable agreement particularly, for seeking a relief of execution of a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff.
16. The learned Counsel also submits that at the best, the agreement can be termed as a contingent contract and the obligation on the part of the defendants under the agreement being to facilitate the plaintiff for ensuring the acquisition proceedings having concluded without any hassles and that even namely, the acquisition proceedings itself having not been initiated, the contingent event itself has not occurred and even as per the contract could have been possible, as sought for by the plaintiff under the agreement, being of removal of any obstruction or resistance of such acquisition proceedings, the question of plaintiff seeking any relief of specific performance does not arise at all at this stage.
17. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions. The submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the matter could not have been disposed of at this stage cannot be accepted for more than one reason. The plaintiff has to indicate the cause of action in the suit and particularly, in a suit for specific performance as to the nature of the agreement, as to what obligations are on the parties and as to how each party has complied his part of the obligation under the agreement. That the matter had not gone to trial, the defendant having not disputed the two agreements based on which the suit was brought, and the entire issue with regard to the grant of relief in favour of the plaintiff being dependent on the terms and clauses of this agreement, it cannot be saidthat any prejudice is caused to the plaintiff by the Trial Court having disposed of the suit even without the parties going to trial on any other aspect of the matter. In fact, no controversy or dispute had arisen in the context to the existence of the agreement. Job of the Court was made easy and the plaintiffs burden got reduced to that extent. We have perused the contents of the agreement.
18. The Trial Court had occasion to examine the two agreements andhas extracted the relevant portion of the agreement in its judgment. Itreads as under:
19. The agreement on the face of it does not cast any obligation on the part of the landowners to execute any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. It only provides for receipt of certain amounts at stages and to facilitate the society to go ahead with the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Trial Court is in error in holding that there was no agreement for the performance of ' executing a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff or for fulfilling any obligation on the part of the defendants and as such, suit for specific performance was not maintainable.
20. In fact, on the other hand, the agreement at the best can be said to be a contingent agreement for certain performance on the part of the parties to the agreement on the happening of certain future events such as, the issue of notifications under the Land Acquisition Act and the culmination of the acquisition proceedings. Even assuming it to be so, a contingent contract can be sought to be enforced, if the event has occurred. If the event itself has become impossible of happening, then such a contract becomes void. Therefore, in respect of contingent contracts, on reading of Sections 31 and 32 of the Contract Act together, it is obvious that if the future uncertain event has occurred, then only the contract becomes enforceable and not till then and the contract itself becomes void, if the future event becomes impossible.
21. These provisions have a bearing in the context of the relief that has been prayed for by the plaintiff/appellant by making an application under Sections 21 and 22 of the Specific Relief Act read with Section 151 of the CPC praying for an alternative relief. The agreement being in the nature of a contingent contract, at the best, prayer for an alternative relief of damage or compensation is maintainable only on a pleading that the event has become impossible and the contract has become void and on equitable principles as contemplated under Section 73 of the Act, the party who has been made to suffer is entitled for a just compensation.
22. The application essentially is in the nature of an application for amendment of the pleadings. The principles regarding allowing an application for amendment of pleadings are well-settled by now and the rule is that, such an application is allowed, so long as by the amendment, the nature of the suit is not altered and the relief sought for is within the period of limitation. Under the present application for compensation, the plea can be sustained and the relief can be granted only if it is conceded that the future contingent event is impossible of occurrence and as such, the contract has become void.
23. In the present case, there is no such plea. The relief of compensation as also the relief of specific performance do not go together. Even under the Specific Relief Act, an alternative relief of compensation is permitted only when the agreement is one capable of being specifically performed and when one party has not performed his part of the obligation while the other party is willing to perform his part and the relief ofspecific performance cannot be granted due to certain subsequent developments not attributable to the person seeking the relief.
24. In the instant case, the agreement itself is not one which has cast on the defendants any obligation to perform any act more so, for executing any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. The agreement having not provided for executing any conveyance in favour of the plaintiff, is not one which can be enforced for the relief of execution of a valid sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and in such an event, the question of seeking an alternative relief does not arise.
25. The suit as well as the amendment application, in our opinion, has to fail as the plaint averments really does not indicate any cause of action which gave rise to the relief which had been sought for. The provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC enables the Court to reject a plaint where it does not disclose any cause of action. In a suit for specific performance for conveyance of any immovable property, plaintiff should necessarily plead and show that the agreement is one for conveying the property and on the face of it, the plaint averments does not indicate that the agreements were one for such purpose which becomes obvious when the same is examined in the light of the clauses of the agreements.
26. Even in the application praying for amendment, it is for an enquiry to be held and to determine the quantum of compensation based on the amounts which the plaintiff has already parted in favour of the defendants. Neither this application nor the plaint have indicated as to what exactly is the amount that the plaintiff has paid to the defendants. In the absence of any specific plea that any particular amount had, in fact, been paid by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants, the question of allowing the prayer for conducting an enquiry into such a matter does not arise. When the plaintiff has not shown anything to this Court, it is not for this Court to direct an enquiry on such vague and uncertain pleas.
27. In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation in rejecting the application for amendment of the plaint seeking the relief under the provisions of Sections 21 and 22 of the Specific Relief Act read with Section 151 of the CPC. Accordingly, the application is rejected,
28. In the result, we do not find any scope for interference with the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court which is justified not only for the reasons given by the Trial Court but also for other reasons indicated by us.
29. The appeals are accordingly, dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.