Judgment:
Anand Byrareddy, J.
1. The present appeal is by the Insurance company seeking to raise the following questions of law:
a) Whether the Commissioner was justified in ignoring his quasi-judicial functions while not considering the evidence placed on record and making the appellant liable to satisfy the award?
b) Whether the Commissioner was justified in entertaining the claim petition without the relationship of workman and employer being established between the respondents?
c) Whether the Commissioner was justified in entertaining the claim petition without production of the wound certificate from the Government Hospital where the first respondent claimed to have undergone treatment and in holding that he has suffered permanent disability on the basis of manipulated medical evidence?
d) When the terms of policy and Section 147 of the M.V. Act does not require a coverage of a cleaner in the LMV, whether the Commissioner was justified in making the appellant/insurer liable ignoring Rule 100 of the KMV Rules?
2. The primary contention on behalf of the appellant is that respondent No. 2 and respondent No. 1 are father and son, respectively. Respondent No. 2 is the insured and respondent No. 1 is the claimant who was said to be employed as a cleaner in the vehicle as on the date of the accident. The Counsel was at much pains to demonstrate that the claim is fraudulent. As it is only for the purposes of raising a claim for compensation that respondent No. 1 is set up as a cleaner in the vehicle. There is no relationship of employee and employer and from the material on record, it is clear that the respondent No. 1 has made a shoddy attempt to fabricate the documents to establish his independent status as an employee in the insured vehicle. The learned Counsel would draw pointed reference to documents such as a ration card and voters list which are suspicious documents and having regard to the tenor to replies made by respondent No. 1 in his cross-examination and the further failure to offer respondent No. 2 as a witness. It is apparant that the claim was pre-medicated. It is not open to the respondent to contend that the commissioner has committed an error in arriving at a finding contrary to the material on record and therefore has resulted in perverse award being passed, which gives rise to a substantial question of law.
3. It is to be noted that a father engaging his son as an employee in a vehicle owned by the father is not prohibited in law nor it can be said that such a situation is not normally possible. Just as in any other avocation, it is possible for a father to engage his own son as employee. If this proposition is accepted, the doubt cast on the documents filed by the claimant in support of his contention do not take on much significance. The accident is not denied. Though the injuries said to have been suffered by the claimant are disputed by the appellant on the ground that they are not supported by any certificate issued by the competent authorities. It is to be noticed that however the claimant has furnished a certificate from a private doctor as to the injuries suffered by him. The appreciation of the material on record by the Commissioner in a summary proceedings which is contemplated under the Act could not be tested on the touchstone of degree of proof required in more formal proceedings requiring an in depth examination of the details sought to be advanced in order to evidence a fraudulent claim.
4. In the instant case, at best the appellant would be demonstrating that the facts asserted are doubtful, but it would not advance the case of the appellant that there was no accident at all and that the claimant could not claim as a cleaner in the vehicle by virtue of the fact that he was related to respondent No. 2, the owner. Therefore, in my opinion, the questions said to be urged as substantial questions of law relate merely to questions of fact which have been found in favour of the claimant. Further the appellant has not been called upon by the Commissioner in terms of Section 170 to contest the claim of the respondent nor has the Insurance Company filed any application seeking such permission.
5. In the result, the defences that are available and pleas that could be taken in the present appeal are circumscribed by Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act and in the result it is not possible for the appellant to raise any ground of defence other than what are available in the said provision. On that ground also, the appeal would fail. Hence, the following judgment:
I) The appeal is dismissed.
II) The amount in deposit is remitted to the Commissioner for the benefit of the claimant.