Hari Nath Tilhari, J.
1. These revision petitions raise a common question of law and, therefore, they are heard together and disposed of by a common order.
2. C. R. P. No. 3242 of 1991 arises from the judgment and decree dated March 26, 1991, passed by the 8th Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore City, in S. C. No. 605 of 1988.
3. The plaintiffs-respondents had filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 5,001.05 with costs and future interest at the rate of 18 per cent. per annum from the date of the suit till realisation from the defendants. The first plaintiff, who is respondent No. 1 in the revision petition, had been carrying on business of general insurance of motor, marine, fire, etc., with its registered office at Delhi and regional office at Bangalore. The second plaintiff, i.e., respondent No. 2, is a trading concern carrying on its business of transporting goods from place to place. The defendant-revision petitioner is a public carrier in common law as well as under the Carriers Act, 1865. On February 16, 1985, the second plaintiff got despatched consignment of goods, having purchased the same from Binny Ltd., Bangalore, by entrusting the said goods to the defendant (revisionist) under C. C. Note No. BGL 117079. The goods were entrusted for being carried to Gauhati and delivered as a self-consignment. The goods were entrusted in sound condition. In respect of the said consignment, the first plaintiff had issued a marine policy covering the risk, such as damages, short delivery, non-delivery, etc., during the transit or while the goods were in the custody of the defendant. The defendant did not deliver the goods at Gauhati and issued non-delivery certificate on August 14, 1985. In respect of the said non-delivery, the second plaintiff made a monetary claim on the first plaintiff in terms of the policy. After processing the papers and on noticing that there were correspondences between the second plaintiff and the defendant (carrier), the first plaintiff assessed the amount of loss at Rs. 5,001.05 in full settlement of the claim from the insurance company and Special P. A. holder in favour of the first plaintiff to recover the value of the goods from the defendant was given by plaintiff No. 2. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant revision petitioner being a public carrier is bound to carry the goods safely and deliver the same in safe condition at the place of destination. The case of the plaintiffs has been that the first plaintiff (i.e., the first respondent herein) had settled the claim and made payment for the goods for non-delivery and the plaintiffs were entitled to the said claim from the defendant with current and future interest at the rate of 18 per cent, per annum from the date of the suit till realisation.
4. As far as C. R. P. No. 113 of 1992 is concerned, plaintiff No. 1 insurance company and plaintiff No. 2, (Madras Cloth House) filed a Suit No. 8318 of 1987 against the defendant--East India Transport Agency--for recovery of a sum of Rs. 4,946.02 with current and future interest at the rate of 18 per cent, per annum.
5. The allegations in these two petitions were almost the same. On account of non-delivery of the goods, the plaintiffs had to file a suit--S. C. No. 8318 of 1987. In this case, the plaintiffs have clearly stated in the plaint that on May 21, 1985, the owner of the goods issued a notice calling upon him to pay the value of the goods. The defendant in both the cases denied the allegations and the plaintiffs in the two suits have accordingly filed the suits.
6. The plea'taken on behalf of the defendant is that the person who verified and signed the plaint had no authority or power to sue or represent the plaintiff. It is not admitted that the second plaintiff is a registered firm. Therefore, he urged that the suit, S. C. No. 8318 of 1997, may be dismissed for want of registration as provided under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. It is further stated that the goods were insured and the insurance company has not settled the claim by making the payment. He also alleged that he is not liable to pay any interest. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the suit.
7. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed (in S. C. No. 605 of 1988 corresponding to C. R. P. No. 3242 of 1991)-
'(1) Whether this suit filed by the regional manager of the second plaintiff is not maintainable in law as contended by the defendant ?
(2) Whether this suit is bad for want of production of registration certificate by plaintiff No. 2 ?
(3) Whether this court has jurisdiction to try this suit ?
(4) Whether the defendant proves that the consignment was accepted under 'owner's risk' and, hence, he is not liable to pay suit claim ?
(5) Whether the first plaintiff proves that it has settled the claim of the second plaintiff for Rs. 5,001.05 and paid the same to the second plaintiff and is entitled to recover the same from the defendant as alleged ?
(6) To what decree or order, parties are entitled ?' In S. C. C. No. 8318 of 1987, the issues framed were as under (i.e., C. R. P. No. 113 of 1992) :
'(1) Whether this court has no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit ?
(2) Whether the regional manager of the first plaintiff has power or authority to represent the plaintiff ?
(3) Whether the second plaintiff is a registered firm If so, whether Ramesh Kumar Agarwala is the partner of the second plaintiff firm ?
(4) Whether the suit consignment was insured If so, whether the settlement of claim made by the insurance company is binding on the defendant ?
(5) To what amount is the plaintiff entitled ?'
8. In both cases the trial court held that it had jurisdiction to try the suits and that the suits have been maintainable and the regional manager of the first plaintiff could duly sign and verify and file the suits. It was also held that the suits were filed not in respect of the second plaintiff. In S. C. No. 8318 of 1987 it held that by virtue of the letter of subrogation, the insurance company is entitled to institute a suit in its own name and in this view of the matter, issue No. 3 does not arise. The trial court further found that the first plaintiff has settled the claim of the second plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 5,001.05 in terms of the insurance policy and the second plaintiff has issued letter of subrogation in favour of the first plaintiff, after receiving Rs. 5,001.05 and hence the first plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit claim from the defendant (i.e., S. C. No. 605 of 1988 corresponding to C. R. P. No, 3242 of 1991). The trial court also decreed the suit in S. C. No. 8318 of 1987 (corresponding to C. R. P. No. 113 of 1992) for a sum of Rs. 4,946.02 with costs and future interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum from the date of decree till the date of realisation of the decretal amount, against the defendant (i.e., the petitioner in C. R. P. No. 113 of 1992). Thus, the trial court decreed the suit claims for the sums claimed in both the suits respectively in favour of the first plaintiff and against the defendant,
9. Feeling aggrieved by the judgments and decrees in the two suits passed by the trial court, the defendant (East India Transport Agency) has come up in revision under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964.
10. I have heard S. A. Srivatsa and U. Ashok, learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners in C. R. P. Nos. 3242 and 113 of 1992 respectively. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the suits in question had not been validly verified and signed by the first respondent-plaintiff No. 1. It was contended that Ramesh Kumar Agarwal, who has signed the plaint, has not been authorised by any power of attorney so he could neither sign nor verify the suits and, therefore, the suits ought to have been dismissed. It is further contended that though advocates had been engaged on behalf of the plaintiffs to file the suits, there is no valid presentation by counsel as counsel could not present the suits on behalf of the company. The order-sheet, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, indicates that the plaints were presented by S. P. Shankar, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents. The contention is that the plaints were not validly instituted. The further contention of the petitioner is that no notice under Section 10 of the Carriers Act, 1865, has been issued, giving of which was essential and incumbent for filing of the suit and, therefore, institution of the suits was invalid and suits were not maintainable and as such they were liable to be dismissed. He further submitted that plaintiff No. 2 in S. C. No. 605 of 1988 was not a registered firm and, therefore, when the suit has been filed impleading East India Supply Centre (textile wholesale dealers), the suit was bad in law for want of proper parties. It is further contended that plaintiff No. 2 not being a registered firm, but an unregistered partnership firm, the institution of a suit by one of the partners is not maintainable and as such it has to be dismissed. In C. R. P. No. 3242 of 1991, the contention is based on Section 69 of the Partnership Act, has not been raised because the firm is registered. These contentions have been hotly contested by S.P. Shankar, learned counsel for the respondents. He contended that the jurisdiction of this court under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964 is not that of, a first appellate court, He submitted that the jurisdiction is confined to see whether the decision of the court below, is according to law, which means that the decision of the court below must suffer from any error of law, or jurisdiction which has tendency to cause miscarriage of justice and irreparable loss or injury to the party concerned. He contended that there is no error of law, but if any is there, or any is alleged, it is a mere technical one, this court should not interfere with the order or decree as it may amount to obstructing with the course of justice on the basis of sheer technicality.
11. I have applied my mind to the various contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties. Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964 provides and reads as under ;
'Revision of decrees and orders of court of small causes. The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself, that a decree or order made in any case decided by a court of small causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such orders with respect thereto, as it thinks fit.'
12. It must be made clear that the jurisdiction of this court under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964, though no doubt is wider than the jurisdiction of this court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, but it is not as wide as that of the first appellate court. The Supreme Court in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698, had to consider the meaning and scope of power under analogous provisions of Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control) Act, 1952, and the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, with reference to the expression used therein, i.e., 'in accordance with law'. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, is in pari materia with Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964. Their Lordships observed that the phrase 'according to law' refers to the decision as a whole, and is not to be equated with error of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall decision, which must be according to law which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. In this very decision their Lordships made a reference to the observation of Beaumont C, J. (as he then was) in Bell and Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bom 223 ; 40 Bom LR 125. It will be appropriate to quote observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court which read under (page 701) :
'The section we are dealing with, is almost the same as Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending at the other with a power of interference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumont C. J. (as he then was) in Bell and Co, Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bom 223 ; 40 Bom LR 125 where the learned Chief Justice dealing with Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed :
'The object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the court may interfere in revision, as does Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference ; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at'.
This observation has our full concurrence.'
13. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is in pari materia with Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964, and the above observations are applicable with full force to the interpretation of Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964, and for understanding the scope of jurisdiction of this court thereunder, and in the context of the expression 'according to law' used in the section. Thus, the High Court under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964, is required to examine if there has been any miscarriage of justice and the decision was in accordance with law. This jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964 is not so extensive as of a first appellate court. It has been specifically laid down that wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at. Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in other cases also in the context of the proviso to Section 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act (vide Malini Naicker v. Seth Mangal Raj, : [1969]3SCR698 ).
14. Thus, it has to be examined whether there is any error of law or jurisdictional error and whether that would lead to miscarriage of justice to anyone, As regards the question of notice under Section 10 of the Carriers Act, 1865, it would be appropriate, firstly, to refer to and quote Section 10 of the Carriers Act, 1865, which reads as under :
'10. Notice of loss or injury to be given within six months.--No suit shall be instituted against a common carrier for the loss of, or injury to, goods entrusted to him for carriage, unless notice in writing of the loss or injury has been given to him before the institution of the suit and within six months of the time when the loss or injury first came to the knowledge of the plaintiff.'
15. That, under Section 10 of the Carriers Act, it is obligatory on the plaintiff in the suit to give notice as required under Section 10 of the Act before institution of the suit, by the plaintiff. But Section 10 does require that it is not incumbent on the plaintiff to allege that notice under Section 10 has been given as is required with reference to notice or giving of notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. So omission to state in the plaint giving of notice under Section 10 will not affect the maintainability of the suit,
16. It appears that the documents on record and the deposition of P. W.-1 and the copy of notice, exhibit P-4, that on May 21, 1985, the owner of the goods, i.e., plaintiff No. 2, had issued a notice calling upon the defendant to pay the value of the goods, as well as intimating the defendant that the goods had not been delivered as per exhibit P-4. In the other case, legal notice was issued by the second plaintiff, i.e., the East India Transport Agency, on May 21, 1985, as per exhibit P-5 on record in S. C. No. 8313 of 1997 giving rise to Civil Revision Petition No. 113 of 1992. The defendant-revision petitioner had not denied the fact of giving of notice, nor had asserted the notice was not served under Section 10 so the evidence of P. W.-l was rightly relied upon. Once the notice under Section 10 of the Carriers Act, 1865, had been proved to have been given by the owner or by the consignor, plaintiff No. 2 (i.e., respondent No. 2) to the defendant, i.e., the carrier-appellant and more than six months have been allowed to pass on and he had not paid the sums thereunder then the requirement of Section 10 of the Carriers Act can be said to have been complied with and there is no necessity for the plaintiffs to have given the second time notice before filing the suit. I find support for my above view from the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Charanji Lal v. Financial Commissioner, AIR 1978 P & H 326 ; Kerala Transport Company v. Apollo Cables Pvt. Ltd., : AIR1986Ker219 , and U Ba Tin v. U Tun On, AIR 1938 Rangoon 437. It cannot be disputed nor has been disputed that the right of the insurer flows from the insured. In the present case, it has already been held that notice under Section 10 of the Carriers Act has been served on the defendant by the second plaintiffs. In my opinion, after service of notice under Section 10 by the assured, it was not necessary for the insurer to serve another notice on the carrier. In this view of the matter, the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner that no notice has been served under Section 10 of the Carriers Act is without any substance, particularly when the defendant did not raise the plea to the effect that no notice was served on it, nor did the defendant press any issue on this aspect. The documentary evidence, exhibit P-4, considered in the light of P.W.-1's state ment, clearly proves that notice under Section 10 has been issued by the owner or consignor of goods, i.e., plaintiff No. 2 in the suits. Thus, considered this contention of the revision appellant is rejected.
17. As regards the contention that the East India Supply Centre, textile wholesale dealers being an unregistered body could not file the suit in view of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. Section 69 reads as under :
'69. Effect of non-registration.--(1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the register of firms as a partner in the firm.
(2) No suits to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the register of firms as partners in the firm,
(3) The provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect--
(a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or
(b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or court under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909), or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920), to realise the property of an insolvent partner.
(4) This section shall not apply--
(a) to firms or to partners in firms which have no place of business in the territories to which this Act extends, or whose places of business in the said territories are situated in areas to which, by notification under Section 56, the Chapter does not apply, or
(b) to any suit or claim or set-off not exceeding one hundred rupees in value which, in the presidency towns, is not of a kind specified in Section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (15 of 1882), or outside the presidency towns, is not of a kind specified in the Second Schedule to the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (9 of 1887), or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim.'
18. The scope of the section is that it bars the filing of the suit by or against a firm which is unregistered. Section 69 indicates the impact and effects of non-registration and it provides that no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the register of firms as a partner in the firm, nor a suit shall be instituted to enforce a right arising out of a contract shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party, unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the register of firms as partners in the firm. This section does not affect the right of subrogation accruing under Section 79 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963, nor does it bar the filing of a suit by the insurance firm, namely, which stands subrogated to all rights of the assured,
19. Under the Marine Insurance Act, 1963, as per Section 79 a right of subrogation has been conferred on the insurer. Section 79 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963, reads thus,;
'79. Right of subrogation.-(1) Where the insurer pays for a total loss, either of the whole, or in the case of goods of any apportionable part, of the subject-matter insured, he thereupon becomes entitled to take over the interest of the assured in whatever may remain of the subject-matter so paid for, and he is thereby subrogated to all the rights and remedies of the assured in and in respect of that subject-matter as from the time of the casualty causing the loss.
(2) Subject to the foregoing provisions, where the insurer pays for a partial loss, he acquires no title to the subject-matter insured, or such part of it as may remain, but he is thereupon subrogated to all rights and remedies of the assured in and in respect of the subject-matter insured as from the time of the casualty causing the loss, in so far as the assured has been indemnified, according to this Act, by such payment for the loss.'
20. The present suit primarily has been filed by a person, who claims the right to recover the amount under the statutory right of subrogation. The suit really is not filed by or on behalf of the unregistered firm. No doubt, where the insurer has paid for a total sum of loss to the consigner-plaintiff No. 2 and having so paid, to the concerned, the plaintiff (respondent No. 1) stood surrogated to all the rights and remedies of the assured in respect of the subject-matter. That the insurance company, i.e., plaintiff No. 1 having stood subrogated to all the rights of and all remedies available of the insured was entitled to file a suit and the suit was maintainable as such at the instance of plaintiff No. 1, i.e., insurer. When I so opine, I find support from the following decisions, i.e., (1) Gaya Muzaffurpur Roadways Co. v. Fort Gloster Industries Ltd., : AIR1971Cal494 ; Union of India v. Great American Insurance Co. Ltd., : AIR1971Cal491 ; Union of India v. Gangabishan Banshilal, : AIR1973Cal141 , and Union of India v. Bharat Fire and General Insurance Ltd. . Plaintiff No. 2, the assured firm, i.e., the consignor o'f goods, could be said to have been impleaded as a matter of caution, though the suit could be filed by plaintiff No. 1 only in its name. At the most, it can be said though I do not hold 'as such plaintiff No, 2's inclusion in the suit was a misjoinder or it may be said non-joinder of the partners and it may, if at all, be said that it was a technical irregularity, but it did not affect the right of the subrogated appellant to file the suit in its own name as a plaintiff, i.e., plaintiff No. 1 and as such the suit was maintainable in its, i.e., the appellant-plaintiff No. 1's name. Further, I find this being a technical error, if at all, it does not affect the decision of the case on merits. It is to be further taken note that Section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code ordains no decree is to be set aside or reversed on the ground of misjoinder of parties. Thus, in my opinion, the court below was justified in holding that S, C. No. 605 of 1988 (corresponding to C. R. P. No. 3242 of 1991) was maintainable and that Section 69 of the Partnership Act did not affect the giving of notice under Section 10 of the Carriers Act, namely, giving of notice thereunder. It has further not been shown or pointed out as to how any miscarriage of justice can be said to have taken place on account of misjoinder.
21. As regards C. R. P. No. 113 of 1992 is concerned, it has been found that the firm is a registered one and there was no need to go to that question. The other contention that has been raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the plaint of the suit had not been signed and verified by the person authorised for that purpose, as there was no power of attorney in favour of the regional manager. As held by this court in Kithania Textiles v. East India Transport Agency (C. R. P. Nos. 1445-51 of 1994--September 2, 1998) and connected cases, decided on September 2, 1998, the regional manager of the present respondent-company being the other principal officer of the insurance corporation, who could be expected to be conversant with the facts of the case and would depose to them necessarily has been held as the proper person to sign and verify the suit by virtue of his responsibility. When I so hold, I find support from the observations of the Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar : (1996)6SCC660 , wherein it has been held that 'suits instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation like bank, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects, which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause . . . Under Order 6, Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity, it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation, the secretary or any director or other principal officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. From the reading of Order 6, Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code together with Order 29, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed, a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 of the Civil Procedure Code can by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation.' Ramesh Kumar Agarwal, who is an officer coming within 'the other principal officer', in the absence of the power of attorney holder, in my opinion, could sign and verify the pleadings. The suits have been instituted on behalf of the plaintiffs by learned counsel for the plaintiffs as appears from the order-sheet of those cases. The power under vakalath per se reveals that the plaintiff has appointed and retained his counsel named therein and authorises him to appear, act and plead for the party in the matter and to conduct and defend the same in all interlocutory or miscellaneous proceedings connected with the same or with any decree or orders passed therein, appeals and or other proceeding arising therefrom and in proceedings for review of judgment and for leave to appeal, etc., etc. When power to act has been given, it included in itself the power to file or institute the suit also. Therefore, it cannot be said that the suit has not been validly instituted. In my considered view, the suits have been validly instituted. This is the position in both suits giving rise to the revision petitions. I do not find any error in the proceedings of the suits, which could be said to have resulted in miscarriage of justice in the suits, or failure of justice to any other parties nor has it resulted in miscarriage of justice.
22. In the result, both the revision petitions the dismissed with costs and the judgment and decree of the trial court passed in S. C. Nos. 605 of 1988 and 8318 of 1987, dated March 26, 1991, and September 13, 1991, respectively, are confirmed.