Judgment:
ORDER
D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J.
1. The provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (PTCL) Act, 1978, (for short 'Act') have proved to be a fertile ground for unending litigation during the course of which the statutory functionaries, namely, the Assistant Commissioner as the first authority and the Deputy Commissioner as the appellate authority also join the fray, many a times by taking sides to promote interest of one side or the other, though without any justification either on facts or in law, exercise their power in quixotic, arbitrary, whimsical manner, assume jurisdiction which is not conferred under the Act, pass orders which do not bear scrutiny even in the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India even for a moment and bring to ridicule the law, provisions of the Act and the efforts on the part of law makers to achieve certain social goals and objectives.
2. The present writ petition illustrates vividly as to how a successor Deputy Commissioner can misuse the powers of an appellate authority under Section 5A of the PTCL Act even to the extent of sitting in appeal over an appellate order that had been passed in the exercise of the very power and jurisdiction by his predecessor to characterise the earlier order that had been passed by the very appellate authority as illegal, not one in consonance with the provisions of the Act; that the order passed is not one that is envisaged under the provisions of the Act; that by calling in aid as apology, the powers under Section 25 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, (for short 'KLR Act'), he can do all these things for the purpose of exercising the very appellate jurisdiction under Section 5A of the Act which had been once invoked against the very order and which had been exercised by the very appellate authority for entertaining another appeal against the very order passed by the Assistant Commissioner in the present case which is dated 27-7-1992 against which, two sets of appeals had been filed earlier, one at the instance of the person claiming under the grantee as an applicant, i.e., Appeal No. SC/ST.12/ 1992-93 and the other Appeal No. SC/ST. 1571992-93 by persons who were in possession and occupation of the land which had come to be disposed of, by partly allowing the appeal of the applicant and dismissing the appeal of the respondents therein, persons claiming under the purchaser and who were in possession in terms of the appellate order dated 4-2-1994 and notwithstanding, the incumbent Deputy Commissioner not only entertains a fresh round of appeal against the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 27-7-1992, nine years after passing of the original order and 7 years after passing of the appellate order because of which the original order had got merged with the earlier appellate order and in spite of that, not only entertains the appeal by purporting to condone the delay in preferring the appeal, but characterizing the earlier order of the appellate authority to be bad in law etc., allows the present round of appeal, sets aside the entire order of the Assistant Commissioner which had reached finality in terms of the appellate order dated 4-2-1994 passed by the very appellate authority i.e., the predecessor Deputy Commissioner in the earlier round and remands the matter to the Assistant Commissioner for fresh disposal.
3. It is such sorry state of affairs which are revealed in the present writ petition questioning/challenging such arbitrary, quixotic, malafide exercise of power by the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore District, Bangalore, who had acted as an appellate authority under Section 5A of the Act and passed such an order on 29-9-2003 (copy at Annexure-D) to the detriment of the present writ petitioner who is before this Court praying for invalidation of such order of the Special Deputy Commissioner.
4. In the course of dealing such matters, while examining them in the exercise of judicial review of the orders passed by the statutory authorities brought before this Court invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, I have come across many orders which are most erratic, fanciful, whimsical or arbitrary orders passed by assuming jurisdiction where there is none, orders passed declining jurisdiction where it called for exercise of jurisdiction. The present order of the Special Deputy Commissioner challenged in this petition takes the cake in the gathering of such whimsical, arbitrary, illegal orders that are being passed by these authorities.
5. The present order is an order on the face of it, without jurisdiction, an order which is passed by usurping jurisdiction, an order that is sought to be sustained by calling in aid the provisions of Section 25 of the KLR Act, a provision which purports to save the inherent powers of a Revenue Court which reads as under:
25. Saving of inherent powers of a Revenue Court.-
Nothing in this Act, shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Revenue Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Revenue Court.
This provision in the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, by itself has proved to be another source for arbitrary exercise of power by the revenue authorities to pass any orders to their liking by calling in aid this provision and in the name of rendering justice or to prevent abuse of the process.
6. As though passing of such arbitrary orders under the KLR Act was not sufficient for the exercise of powers by the revenue authorities, it is now sought to be extended for passing orders under the provisions of the SCST Act also. There is no such enabling provision either under the provisions of this Act or under the rules, so far as disposal of appeal under Section 5A of the Act read with Rule 5A of the Rules which enables the appellate authority under this Act to invoke Section 25 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. There is nothing in either of these provisions to indicate that the appellate authority as a statutory tribunal under this Act under Section 5A of the Act becomes either a Revenue Court or any of the powers of such Revenue Court is extended to the statutory tribunal, the Deputy Commissioner functioning as an appellate authority under Section 5A of the Act.
6. The brief facts leading to the above case are as follows: It appears that an extent of 3 acres 2 guntas of land (inclusive of Kharab land) in Sy. No. 27 of Kumbarahalli village, Hesaraghatta hobli, Bangalore North taluk had been granted in favour of two persons, Karihanumaiah and Venkatappa way back in the year 1939 in terms of the grant order dated 16-9-1939 as persons belonging to depressed class under the Depressed Classes Dharkhasth Rules.
7. It appears an extent of 2 acres 18 guntas of land had been sold in terms of sale deed dated 18-12-1950 in favour of one Kempaiah and thereafter several transactions had taken place in respect of very land and the latest in the series of such transactions is the sale deed dated 14-12-1971 in favour of a person also by name Kempaiah s/o Chikkanna.
8. Hanumaiah, son of original grantee Venkatappa, had applied to the Assistant Commissioner under the provisions of Act praying for invalidation of the sale transactions, resumption and restitution of the land. On such application, the Assistant Commissioner issued notices to the persons who were in occupation and possession of the land in question. It appears by that time the land had been divided amongst many persons.
9. The Assistant Commissioner who heard the matter, being of the view that in terms of the available revenue records and the report of the revenue officials, it was ascertained that an extent of 3 acres 2 guntas in Sy. No. 27 had been granted in favour of Karihanumaiah and Venkatappa on 16-12-1939 under Depressed Classes Rules with a permanent non-alienation condition; that in respect of such land series of transfers had taken place; that all such transfers were in violation of the terms and conditions of the grant, calls for invalidation of such transactions; that the land was to be resumed in favour of the State and restituted to the legal heirs of the original grantee, passed orders accordingly on 27-7-1992, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-A to the writ petition.
10. This order had been appealed against by the persons who were in possession of the land and who had claimed as the legal heirs and sharers of the property of Kempaiah, a person who had purchased the property in the year 1971, by filing an appeal in Appeal No. 15/ 1992-93.
11. The applicant also had filed an appeal against the very order contending that the grant was only in favour of Venkatappa and that restitution can only be in his favour, as the son of the grantee and not in favour of persons claiming as legal heirs of Karihanumaiah; that the order of the Assistant Commissioner directing restitution to be made in favour of all such legal heirs of Karihanumaiah was bad in law.
12. The persons claiming under the purchaser, on the other hand, contended that the order was passed without proper opportunity and the enquiry was not satisfactory; that not all the legal heirs of the said Kempaiah had been impleaded as party respondents; that there is no finding to the effect that the land in question was a granted land nor that it was either free of cost or on collecting an upset price etc.,; that the original records had not been properly examined; that the order was contrary to the statutory provisions and settled legal position and therefore the order requires to be set aside.
13. The Deputy Commissioner, exercising his appellate power under Section 5A of the Act, heard both appeals together and disposed of the appeals in terms of a common order dated 4-12-1994 (a copy of which is produced at Annexure-B to the writ petition) allowing the appeal of the applicant-petitioner Hanumanthaiah, in part, to the extent that the findings of the Assistant Commissioner that the land should be restituted in favour of all persons claiming as legal heirs of Karihanumaiah was set aside and the matter remanded to the Assistant Commissioner for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to who are the real legal heirs of Karihanumaiah and Venkatappa in whose favour the land had been granted jointly and then only for passing orders for restitution of the land etc., but the appeal filed by the persons claiming under the purchaser came to be dismissed, as the Deputy Commissioner found that the land in question was one which had been granted under the Depressed Classes Rules in favour of persons belonging to depressed class; that the grant was with a condition of permanent non-alienation and such land had been sold in violation of the condition and therefore the first transfer and all subsequent transfers gets invalidated under Section 4(1) of the Act.
14. Such order was passed on 4-2-1994 and the mater attained finality in so far as the persons claiming under the purchaser, as it appears they did not pursue the matter any further.
15. While the records are not very clear as to the subsequent developments after the order of the Assistant Commissioner invalidating the sale transactions and directing resumption and restitution of the land and as to further course of action taken by the Assistant Commissioner/Tahsildar either for evicting the persons in possession of the land in question or to have put the grantee or his legal heir/s in possession of the land, it is claimed by Sri Gurudath, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that in terms of the endorsement dated 28-7-1994, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-C, the land is restored to the legal heirs of the original grantee. It is not clear from this endorsement as to whether it is of any particular year, as though the Assistant Commissioner's signature is dated as 27/7, but the year is not mentioned and it is the assertion of the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 in this petition that so far as fourth respondent is concerned, he continues to remain in possession of land to an extent of about 15 guntas of land, which had fallen to his share in the partition/ division that had taken place amongst the members of the family and the other members being (1) Puttaraju, (2) Kempaiah (3) Siddappa, (4) Doddarevanna (5) Chikkarevaiah and (6) Gangappa, as indicated in the endorsement at Annexure-C.
16. Though the matter attained finality so far as the persons claiming under the purchaser are concerned, it appears the fourth respondent herein claiming to be the son of Kempaiah filed yet another appeal under Section 5A of the Act to the Deputy Commissioner against the very order dated 27-7-1992 that had been passed by the Assistant Commissioner and this appeal came to be numbered as SC/ ST(A) 25/2001-02. As the number indicates, the appeal itself came to be filed nine years after the Assistant Commissioner passed the order and seven years after that order had come to be affirmed in appeal by the then Deputy Commissioner, acting as the appellate authority under Section 5A of the Act.
17. It is the order that has been passed in such an appeal that has given rise to this writ petition. The Special Deputy Commissioner before whom the appeal had been filed, while did not hesitate to entertain the appeal, but found sufficient reasons not only to entertain the appeal but also to allow the appeal in terms of the impugned order dated 29-9-2003, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-D to the writ petition. Though the operative portion of the order indicates that the appeal is partly allowed, under the impugned order, the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner on 27-7-1992 has been set aside and the matter has been remanded to the Assistant Commissioner for fresh enquiry and orders on the application of the fourth respondent herein.
18. It is against this order, the present writ petition is filed, contending that the order is without jurisdiction; that it has been passed on erroneous assumptions and presumptions; that the order is liable to be quashed etc,.
19. Notices were issued to the respondents. Respondents 1 to 3-State and statutory authorities-are represented by Sri Bharamagouda B Goudar, learned Government Pleader. He has also placed the records. Fourth respondent, at whose instance the appeal came to be allowed, is represented by Sri Prakash T Hebbar and the respondents 5 to 11, who came to be added in this proceeding on their application, as it was sought to be urged that they are the legal heirs of Karihanumaiah and should be accorded opportunity to present their views even in this writ petition, are represented by their counsel Sri Muniraju. It is the stand of these respondents that they fully support the case of the petitioner that the impugned order of the Deputy Commissioner is not sustainable.
20. The fourth respondent has also filed statement of objections, inter alia, contending that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine; that the order is one with jurisdiction; that the order of the Assistant Commissioner was not legally sustainable for not having recorded the relevant and necessary finding for the purpose of the Act; that the applicant-petitioner had not placed a single material before the Assistant Commissioner to conclude that the land in question was a granted land in favour of persons belonging to depressed class; that there is no material to show that it is a granted land and therefore the very provisions of the Act are not applicable; that this respondent being a person who was having right, title and interest over the land, succeeding to the interest to such land through his father Kempaiah, who had expired before the proceedings had been initiated under the Act and in the absence of notice to fourth respondent, though he was in possession of a portion of the land, the proceedings of the Assistant Commissioner was a nullity in the eye of law; that there is nothing on record to show that opportunity had been accorded to this respondent; that the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner was just and valid and no interference is required by this Court.
21. Submission of Sri B.S. Gurudath, learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that the impugned order is one without jurisdiction; that the Supreme Deputy Commissioner could not have exercised the very appellate power which had been once exercised for examining the correctness or otherwise of the order of the Assistant Commissioner in the very jurisdiction by his predecessor and when the very appellate authority had passed final orders in the appeal of the persons claiming under the purchaser, who were in possession of the land in question and who had been put on notice and they having contested the matter and also having failed in the further appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, the matter had attained finality and it could not have been reopened by the successor Deputy Commissioner invoking the very jurisdiction; that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner is a nullity in the eye of law; that even the factual premise is incorrect; that the Special Deputy Commissioner fell in error in thinking that there was no proper notice to the fourth respondent; that the land in question was being enjoyed by the members of the family of fourth respondent and other members had been put on notice; that the mere fact that the fourth respondent by name had not been put on notice did not make any difference, as the interest of the purchaser who claims as legal heir or representative of the purchaser Kempaiah had been fully represented by not less than five to 6 persons who were in actual possession of the land and on behalf of the purchaser by participating in the proceedings; that there was no occasion for the Special Deputy Commissioner to entertain the appeal against an order which was passed more than nine years ago; that the grounds urged for seeking condonation of delay was only a concocted ground and not a real one; that the fourth respondent who was aware of the proceedings all along and has chosen to keep silent and if so, cannot plead a grievance on the bogey of want of notice or opportunity; that there was absolutely no justification to entertain the appeal; that the Deputy Commissioner failed to see that the present appeal by the fourth respondent was nothing but a backdoor entry to reagitate the matter, which had become concluded, by filing appeal in the second round, which appeal the Deputy Commissioner could not have entertained in law; that it is not open to the successive officers who occupy the post of Special Deputy Commissioner to keep reopening the concluded matters and that it was nothing but a mockery of law and impugned order deserves to be quashed.
22. Submission of Sri Muniraju, learned Counsel for the respondents 5 to 11, while fully supporting the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that these respondents also have an interest to the extent the matter is before the Assistant Commissioner for the purpose of ascertaining the shares of the legal heirs of the original grantees and they should not be excluded and it is only for such purpose they have joined this petition and their endeavour is also to get over the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner, which is one totally not warranted on facts or in law without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed.
23. Writ petition is hotly contested by the fourth respondent. Sri Prakash T. Hebbar, learned Counsel for the fourth respondent submits that the fourth respondent had never been put on notice; that the proceedings had gone on in the name of a dead person i.e. the father of fourth respondent, who was not alive even by the time the proceedings had been initiated before the Assistant Commissioner in the year 1991; that any proceedings or order against a dead person is nullity in law; that part, not putting the fourth respondent on notice, when he was in actual possession of the land in question, also had vitiated the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner; that the mere fact that the other occupants of the land had been put notice and they contested the proceedings and had suffered an adverse order cannot come in the way of this respondent working out his rights; that even assuming that this respondent should lose such land which had come to his share, it can only be through a procedure provided by law, as under the Act and not because others have suffered such an order and therefore the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner is justified.
24. It is also the submission of Sri Hebbar that the fourth respondent came to know of such development only when his possession was sought to be disturbed in the year 2001 by the petitioner and the revenue authorities; that immediately after having enquired as to the development that had taken place, the fourth respondent had preferred the appeal; that the fourth respondent had no remedy other than availing the appellate remedy under Section 5A of the Act against the order of the Assistant Commissioner in so far as his interest is concerned and therefore there is nothing wrong in the Special Deputy Commissioner having entertained the appeal and in allowing the same by remanding the matter to the Assistant Commissioner for affording an opportunity to the fourth respondent and then pass orders.
25. It is also the submission of Sri Hebbar, Learned Counsel for the fourth respondent that a perusal of the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner clearly indicates that the order is not one which can pass the test of law as laid down by this Court in the decisions reported in Neelamma v. Veerabhadrappa and Ors. 2003 (1) KCCR SN 30 Nagendrappa v. Deputy Commissioner, Davangere 2002 (3) KCCR 1633 and Pedda Reddy v. State of Karnataka and Ors. 1993 (l) Kar. LJ 328. Relying on the said decision, Sri Hebbar submits that the Special Deputy commissioner is fully justified in passing the impugned order and the writ petition is to be dismissed.
26. Sri Bharamagouda B. Goudar, learned Government Pleader, understanding the unenviable position that he is placed, who otherwise vehemently defends the orders passed by the statutory authorities, submits that this is a case where the order deserves to be quashed as the Special Deputy Commissioner at the first instance could not have entertained the appeal filed after nine years of the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner; that it is not open for the successive Deputy Commissioner to entertain an appeal under Section 5A of the Act, as and when a new party comes on the scene and seeks to reopen the matter. The learned Government Pleader finds it rather difficult to support such an order.
27. I have examined the matter in a little greater detail than such orders merit consideration in the exercise of 227 jurisdiction by this Court. In the first instance, this is an unusual situation where an order passed by the Assistant Commissioner which was one being made subject matter of an appeal under Section 5A of the Act and on disposal of the appeal on merits and had become concluded, is again sought to be made subject matter of yet another appeal, seven years after the passing of the appellate order by the very appellate authority and yet another appeal entertained under the very appellate jurisdiction. The order of the Assistant Commissioner gets merged in the appellate order once the appellate authority has examined such an order on merit in the appeal and the original order does not exist independently any more.
28. It is not open to the very appellate authority to sit in appeal against its own order, just because yet another person comes on the scene, occupies the seat and invokes the appellate jurisdiction. It is not open for the appellate authority like the Deputy Commissioner exercising the appellate jurisdiction under Section 5A of the Act to sit in appeal on the very order passed under the very jurisdiction once earlier by his predecessor. The scope and power of the authority under Section 5A is to examine an order of an Assistant Commissioner as an appellate authority once and not repeatedly.
29. It is also not open to the very appellate authority, in the present case the successor Special Deputy Commissioner, to characterize the very appellate order passed by his predecessor, as either not in consonance with the provisions of the Act or that the finding therein needs to be corrected etc. It was not open to the third respondent-Special Deputy Commissioner to entertain-to entertain the appeal against the very order of the Assistant Commissioner which was once earlier subject matter of appeal before the very authority and had reached finality and even when such proceedings had come to his notice and stared at him warranting that he has to exercise restrain and not to venture on unfettered adventurism.
30. The appellate authority-the Special Deputy Commissioner-in the second round, to compound such misdeeds, calls in aid the provisions of Section 25 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 to justify his action, which again, was neither available in law nor can this Court approve of such a notion. This part of the impugned order reads thus:
With regard to the previous proceedings of this Court in SC/ST 12 and 15/1992-93 dated 4-2-1994, referred to by the respondent-2, it is respectfully placed on record that the order remanding the matter to the Assistant Commissioner for delivering possession of the land after ascertaining the legal heirs of the grantee is not in consonance with the provisions of the Act since such an order could not be passed and envisaged under the Act. And as such the decision of this Court on the said point needs to be reasserted for the ends of justice. Accordingly, in exercising the inherent powers vested in this authority under Section 25 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, it is hereby made clear and ordered that the earlier order dated 4-2-1994 of this authority shall not be construed independently and in its entirety and on the other hand the legal course of action as directed in this order shall follow. Thus, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order is legally unsustainable in law. Consequently, the same is set aside and the matter is remanded to the respondent-I for fresh enquiry and disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.
I am of the view that this is clear evidence of adventurism in assuming the jurisdiction only for the purpose of promoting the cause of appellant before him-the fourth respondent herein.
31. I have examined the records also to ascertain as to the bona fides of the fourth respondent who had pleaded ignorance of the entire proceedings for filing the appeal against the order of the Assistant Commissioner invoking the appellate jurisdiction, after a lapse of nine years from the date of passing of the order. The fourth respondent in his memorandum of appeal has not confined his interest to the extent of 15 guntas of land as submitted in this case by Sri Hebbar, learned Counsel appearing for the fourth respondent, but had espoused the cause of others also by claiming interest and for invalidation of the orders of the Assistant Commissioner in respect of the entire extent of 3 acres 2 guntas. It is not as though the other persons who were admittedly in possession and who are claiming right, title and interest in the land under the very purchase made by the father of the fourth respondent namely-Kempaiah, had not contested the proceedings. They in fact contested the proceedings on merits and on all aspects available to them and having failed before the Assistant Commissioner also pursued the matter by way of appeal to the Deputy Commissioner and failed there also. They did not pursue the matter any further and the matter attained finality. These are all matters well within the knowledge of the fourth respondent also as it is claimed that an extent of 3 acres 2 guntas, a part of which land only the fourth respondent's father had purchased and had also obtained sale deed, the other persons had shared as members of the family and were in possession and cultivation etc.,.
32. The fourth respondent who is also present in the Court today on being questioned, has answered that persons who had been impleaded as respondents to the application of the petitioner, other than Kempaiah are all the very relatives who had shared the land along with the fourth respondent or his father; that they were all in possession and cultivation of the entire extent of 3 acres 2 guntas including kharab etc., If such is the factual position, not much can be made of the legal contention that the proceedings were in the name of a dead person nor that the proceedings went on without as much notice or hearing of the fourth respondent. If at all it was only the estate of Kempaiah that was represented by the other respondents to the application before the Assistant Commissioner fully and effectively. Though, technically, assuming that there was no notice in the name of the fourth respondent, it matters little for invalidating the order of the Assistant Commissioner, as the entire proceedings can be definitely inferred to be well within the knowledge of the fourth respondent and who had banked on the relief that the other sharers of the property would get in the appeal filed by them against the order of the Assistant Commissioner to defend his possession also. A person who is a fence sitter and who takes his chances cannot be permitted later on to turn around and to contend that he did not have an opportunity and therefore the proceedings should be set aside for want of notice. That is not the law nor the position that can be accepted on any settled legal principle.
33. The appeal of the fourth respondent before the Special Deputy Commissioner filed in the year 2001 was nothing but a second attempt on the part of the purchasers and legal heirs claiming under the purchaser to get over the order of the Assistant Commissioner. It is rather unfortunate that a responsible officer of the rank of the Deputy Commissioner functioning as an appellate authority under the Act, sits in appeal over the order passed by his predecessor in the very jurisdiction, functions as an appellate authority to pass orders contrary to the earlier order, virtually to set aside the order passed by his predecessor in the very jurisdiction and chooses to remand the order to the Assistant Commissioner for fresh enquiry etc.,
34. The impugned order, on the fact of it, is a telltale revelation that the Special Deputy Commissioner is bent upon promoting the cause of the appellant-fourth respondent as also that of his other co-sharers. It is rather unfortunate that such officers functioning as statutory authorities under the Act, by such conduct and erratic, irrational, arbitrary exercise of their powers, are virtually setting at naught the very purpose and object of the Act which is made for protecting and lending a helping hand to the underprivileged, exploited and weaker sections of the society who have been sought to be conferred with certain benefits, which they would have lost more out of their ignorance and due to exploitation by the more privileged sections in the society and the attempts on the part of the legislature to set right such inequalities. The authorities functioning under the Act are expected to exercise their statutory functions by functioning in a manner as provided under the very statute, with restraint, care and for the purposes of the Act and not to derail the provisions of the Act. The action on the part of the Special Deputy Commissioner in this case in entertaining the second round of appeal in Appeal No. SC/ST (A) 25/2001-02 has caused further hardship and misery to the petitioner, a situation which could have never happened but for the impugned order. The officer functioning as the appellate authority under the Act in passing the impugned order being a Special Deputy Commissioner and as he becomes an ex-officio appellate authority under the Act because of his position as Deputy Commissioner has actually caused the opposite of what the framers of the law seek to achieve.
35. It has come to the notice of the Court that the very officer had exercised the very power in a rather arbitrary and whimsical manner almost in a partisan manner favouring a party and such action came in for adverse observations and with directions issued to the Secretary to Government, Department of Revenue for appropriate action against the erring officer. Yet again such an incident is revealed in this writ petition. The registry is, therefore, directed to forward a copy of this order to the Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka, Bangalore, who is directed to initiate action, to hold a proper enquiry and to take such necessary action against the officer who had functioned as the Special Deputy Commissioner - appellate authority - in passing the order dated 19-9-2003 in Appeal No. SC/ST (A) 25/2001-02. It is also directed that the Chief Secretary is to ensure that the officer concerned is not posted in such sensitive positions when the officer has displayed the tendency of abusing such power and passing illegal quixotic orders as in the instant case.
36. Registry is directed to send a copy of this order along with copy of the impugned order passed by the third respondent to all the Deputy Commissioners in the State who also act as the appellate authority under Section 5A of the Act, to the Revenue Secretary, to the Chief Secretary to the Government who is directed to ensure suitable follow up action as also to the Karnataka Lokayukta.
37. On the examination of the impugned order and records and after hearing the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, I am of the view that the impugned order dated 29-9-2003 passed by the third respondent vide Annexure-D to the writ petition is clearly without jurisdiction, illegal, not sustainable and deserves to be quashed and it is accordingly quashed by issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari. Writ petition is accordingly allowed. Rule made absolute.
38. The order dated 27-7-1992 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore North Sub-Division passed in Case No. KSC.ST. 14/1991-92, to the extent affirmed in the order dated 4-2-1994 passed by the Deputy Commissioner earlier in Appeal No. 12/1992-93 and Appeal No. 15/1992-93 is hereby restored. The Assistant Commissioner to ensure that the proceedings to the extent that had been remitted to him under the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 4-2-1994 is completed expeditiously and the legal heirs of the original grantees are restituted with the possession of the land at the earliest.