Judgment:
S.R. Nayak, J.
1. In view of the larger Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Gurushanth Pattedar v. Mahaboob Shahi Kulburga Mills, Gulbarga and Anr., : AIR2005Kant377 . this writ appeal preferred against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 6th December, 2004 passed in W.P. No. 33935 of 2004, is not maintainable. The above writ petition should be regarded as the one essentially filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India invoking the power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. However, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that since the order of the learned Single Judge suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record, writ appeal is maintainable in terms of the observation made by the larger Bench in paragraph 4 of the judgment. Learned Counsel for the appellant would specifically draw our attention to the following observation of the larger Bench in support of his submission:
If in addition to the correctness of the award the petitioner were to challenge the vires of any provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or of any other provision or the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court to pass the award, or on the ground that it suffered from an error of law apparent on the face of the record, he is invoking the powers of the High Court under Article 226 as well and if such issues are decided by a learned Single Judge the decision will be deemed to have been rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction under Article 226.
(emphasis supplied)
2. In order to appreciate the above contention, the facts of the case which are relevant to the decision-making are required to be noted at the threshold. A claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act') was filed by the respondents herein seeking compensation for the death of one Karisiddappa, who died in an accident involving a motor vehicle insured by the appellant-Insurance Company, in MVC No. 1377 of 1999. During the pendency of the said claim petition, an application was filed by the respondents under Section 140 of the Act for payment of interim compensation on the basis of no fault liability. The said application filed under Section 140 of the Act was ordered by the Tribunal and the appellant herein was directed to deposit sum of Rs. 50,000/- towards interim compensation. Ultimately, the matter was settled between the parties and a compromise petition was filed before the Tribunal under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC, in MVC No. 1377 of 1999. The joint compromise memo filed in the case reads as under:
The petitioner having filed the claim petition claiming compensation on account of the injuries/damages or on account of the death of the legal heir the respondent-Insurance Company has agreed to settle the claim in fall and final settlement for a sum of Rs. 7,35,000.00 (Rupees Seven Lakhs and Thirty-five thousand only) and prays to pass an award, accordingly. The respondent agrees to deposit the said amount within 2 months failing which the said amount shall carry an interest at the rate of 6% from the date of the decree. (The interest of the minor will be safeguarded by making necessary deposits, as per the decree to be passed). The petitioner is not entitled for any costs.
3. On the basis of the compromise memo, the Tribunal passed an award awarding compensation of Rs. 7,35,000/- to the respondent-claimants. In pursuance of the said award, the appellant-Insurance Company deposited only Rs. 6,85,000/- which is short of Rs. 50,000/- as agreed to in the joint memo. In the circumstance, an application I.A. No. I was filed by the respondent under Order 21, Rule 43 of the CPC for issue of warrant of attachment of movables of the appellant-Insurance Company alleging that the Insurance Company had not deposited the entire amount as per the compromise entered into between the parties before the Tribunal. The said application was contested by the appellant-Insurance Company inter alia contending that the amount agreed upon under the joint memo would include the interim compensation paid under Section 140 of the Act also. The Tribunal, having accepted the above defence of the Insurance Company as tenable, rejected, the I.A. of the claimants by its order dated 10-6-2004.
4. Being aggrieved by the above order of the Tribunal, the respondents herein preferred Writ Petition No. 33935 of 2004. Before the learned Single Judge, it was contended that the Tribunal has committed a serious irregularity and illegality in rejecting the application filed under Order 21, Rule 23 of the CPC inasmuch as sum of Rs. 7,35,000/- agreed to be paid does include Rs. 50,000/- which is paid as interim compensation in terms of Section 140 of the Act. On the other hand, on behalf of the Insurance Company, placing reliance on Sub-section (5) of Section 140 of the Act, it was contended that sum of Rs. 7,35,000/- agreed to be paid includes sum of Rs. 50,000/- paid under Section 140 of the Act as interim compensation. Learned Single Judge, having examined the relevant provisions of the Act and contentions raised before him and having noticed the fact that in the joint compromise memo, it is not specifically mentioned that sum of Rs. 50,000/- paid by the Insurance Company under Section 140 of the Act as interim compensation is also included in a sum of Rs. 7,35,000/- to be paid to the claimant opined that the claim of the Insurance Company is not well-founded and consequently allowed the writ petition and directed the appellant-Insurance Company to deposit the deficit sum of Rs. 50,000/- within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the order vide his order dated 6th December, 2000.
5. It is true that if we read the above extracted portion of the observation occurring in paragraph 4 of the judgment of the larger Bench, it would indicate that if an order made by the Civil Court or Tribunal is assailed in a writ petition not only on merit but also among other grounds on the ground that the impugned order suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record, such a writ petition could be treated as the one filed under Article 226. In the instant case, the appellant is not the writ petitioner. The writ petitioner did not attack the order of the Tribunal on the ground that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If an order made by the Civil Court or a Tribunal which is subject to power of superintendence of this Court under Article 227 suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record, perhaps, a writ petition assailing such order can be regarded as the one filed under Article 226 also by an aggrieved party. But, from that premise, it could not be said that a party who is aggrieved by an order made by the learned Single Judge under Article 226 could seek further review at the hands of the Division Bench by filing the writ appeal on the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of the order of the learned Single Judge. The larger Bench in the case of Gurushanth Pattedar, was not called upon to decide the question as to whether in a writ petition filed under Article 227, if the order of a learned Single Judge suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record, then, whether a writ appeal would lie against the order of the learned Single Judge. Such a question never arose for decision-making before the larger Bench nor did the larger Bench deal with that question otherwise. Therefore, the above extracted observation of the larger Bench in paragraph 4 of the order would in no way help the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company to sustain his argument. Alternatively, it needs to be noticed that we do not find any error of law apparent on the face of record or order of the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge, no doubt, in order to decide the writ petition, had necessarily to consider the relevant statutory provisions. Even assuming that the interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge on the statutory provisions of the Act which are relevant for the decision-making, is erroneous, even then, it cannot be said that such error tantamounts to an error of law apparent on the face of the record.
6. In the result, we hold that the office objection is well-founded and justified. Writ appeal is not maintainable and it is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable.