S.R. Nayak, J.
1. The management of HMT Limited being aggrieved by the order of the learned single judge dated, November 11 and 12, 1998, in Writ Petition No. 26334 of 1994 has preferred this writ appeal under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1964. The dispute relates to the disciplinary action taken against the respondent herein. The events leading to the filing of the writ petition be noted in the first instance briefly and they are as follows:
2. The management of HMT Limited invited applications for the post of Deputy General Manager (PR) prescribing certain qualifications and eligibility conditions. The respondent submitted an application for the post enclosing her bio-data. The management by its letter dated June 18, 1990, informed the respondent that she had been selected for the post and sought her acceptance. The respondent accepted the offer and reported for duty. The respondent was placed on probation and her probation period was extended by three months and ultimately she was confirmed in the post with effect from January 22, 1992, vide order dated May 8, 1992. Subsequently, the respondent was selected as Chief Public Relations Manager by the management and her willingness was sought. In the meantime, it appears that a pseudonymous letter dated June 14, 1993, was received by the Chairman and Managing Director of the appellant-company containing certain allegations against the respondent and requesting him to order for an enquiry. Thereafter, the coordinator, CNB of HMT wrote a letter on July 9, 1993, requesting the Director, Personnel, HMT to probe into the activities of the PR department. By a letter dated July 23, 1993, the Deputy General Manager, HMT called upon the respondent to make available certain documents and files in respect of subjects mentioned therein. It appears that at that stage, the respondent was shifted and posted as officer on special duty vide office order dated November 25, 1993. When the matter stood thus, on December 1, 1993, a charge-sheet was served on the respondent alleging that the respondent while working as Deputy General Manager (PR) committed various misconducts. The following are the heads of allegation of misconduct levelled against the respondent:
(a) misrepresentation of experience while applying for the post of Deputy General Manger (PR);
(b) while applying for the post of Chief Public Relations Manager, Air India, without routing the application through proper channel or without taking prior permission from the management;
(c) engaging in private business by starting Mentors Association for personal gain;
(d) finalising arrangements with the firm, Pushpa Enterprises, for the purpose of printing daily bulletin called 'AAJ KI KHABAR', which on investigation was found to be non-existent and the address furnished is a fictitious address apart from overwriting in the bills and other irregularities in the bills of Pushpa Enterprises;
(e) as a coordinator for Apex Forum on Women in Public Sectors opening a S. B. account in her personal name for operating WIPS accounts and subsequently opening another account in the name of HMT, collecting huge money from different HMT units towards subscription from members of WIPS, not maintaining proper accounts in this regard making suspicious withdrawals from the said account;
(f) bringing out unauthorisedly a book entitled 'RECIPE FOR HEALTHY ORGANISATION'
(g) collecting money towards the above from various private and public sector organisations, using HMT letter heads, writing to other organisations and projecting the whole matter as if it were HMT's official venture;
(h) paying a sum of Rs. 70,000 to Kumar Printers unauthorisedly i.e., without the consent of the company, collecting huge amounts from various organisations, inserting advertisements for her own book entitled IDEAL GIFT TO YOUR HUSBAND without paying any advertisement charges;
(i) paying Rs. 25,000 to Kumar Printers even before receiving the bill, on four occasions;
(j) conducting workshop on July 12, 13 and 14, 1993, and collecting participation fees from various participants, not maintaining proper accounts with regard to collection of money and expenditure, not taking permission for indulging in such activities;
(k) improper payments made to Kumar Printers, Bangalore, (specific instance mentioned), involving in unauthorised transaction of printing and sale of book on 'ROAD ACCIDENT', collecting money for advertisements from various organisations without maintaining proper accounts, misusing the official position for personal gain with regard to various transactions as mentioned in paragraph 9 of the chargesheet;
(l) in connection with 50 VHS tapes on Image Builders' produced by her at the cost of Rs. 125 for the purpose of sending to HMT units, subsequently selling the same for which no account was maintained and no sanction was obtained for fixing sale price;
(m) retaining huge amount collected out of sale proceeds in her personal capacity without maintaining account;
(n) non-issuance of cash receipts for money collected and failure to deposit the same with the company as and when collected.
The articles of charge totalling eight in number, were framed under clauses 23.1.9, 23.1.25, 6.1 read with 23.1.1, 23.1.4, 22(a) read with 23.1.1, 23.1.16, 23.1.35 and 23.1.2 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of the company (for short 'CDAR'). The above mentioned clauses of the CDAR are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:
'Clause 6.1: No employee shall directly or indirectly engage in any other occupation, employment, profession, calling etc., whether for remuneration or not except with the permission of the Competent Authority;
Clause 22(a): Every employee shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and conduct himself in a manner conducive to the best interests of the company.
Clause 23.1.1: Breach of any provision of these Conduct Rules.
Clause 23.1.2: Commission of any act subversive of discipline or of good behaviour.
Clause 23.1.4: Fraud, theft, bribery, dishonesty in connection with the business or property of the company.
Clause 23.1.9: Furnishing at the time of employment or thereafter, wrong or incomplete information or suppressing any information germane to the employment.
Clause 23.1.16: Collection of any money without the permission of the competent authority.
Clause 23.1.25: Applying for appointment to Government or any public sector/private sector undertaking without the permission of the management.
Clause 23.1.35: Any other act or omission which the company considers as misconduct.'
3. It appears that the respondent without submitting her explanation to the charge memo approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 51 of 1994 and this Court disposed of the said writ petition permitting the respondent to file her explanation to the charges on or before January 25, 1994. The enquiry officer after conducting an enquiry into the charges submitted his report dated July 25, 1994, holding that charges 3 and 6 are not proved and the remaining six charges are proved. Based on the said report of the enquiry officer, the management by its order dated August 2, 1994, dismissed the respondent from service as a disciplinary measure. The respondent being aggrieved by the above order of the management preferred Writ Petition No. 26334 of 1994 seeking quashing of the disciplinary action taken against her by the management. The management opposing the writ petition filed a statement of objections together with certain documents and the enquiry proceedings and justified the impugned action.
4. Before the learned single judge, it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the disciplinary action taken against her was based on pseudonymous letter; there was no independent application of mind on the part of the management; that the charges are very vague; the enquiry held against her was irregular and in violation of principles of natural justice; the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are perverse; the enquiry is vitiated because relevant documents are not furnished to the respondent. The learned single judge having found merit in the above contentions allowed the writ petition and quashed the disciplinary proceedings and directed the management to reinstate the respondent with full back-wages and other consequential benefits. Hence, this appeal by the management.
5. We have heard Sri K. Kasturi, learned senior counsel for the management and Smt. Chaya Srivatsa, the respondent in person. Sri Kasturi contended that learned single judge has exceeded jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 226 in reappreciating the evidence; the learned single judge ought to have seen that non-supply of non-existent, irrelevant documents would not vitiate the enquiry and, therefore, the learned judge has seriously erred in law in drawing adverse inference; the charges are not vague as held by the learned single judge; the respondent-delinquent was given sufficient opportunity to put forth her case and there was no violation of principles of natural justice or the principles of fair play in action and at any rate the learned single judge is not justified in directing reinstatement of the respondent with full back-wages and other attendant benefits. Sri Kasturi further contended that even assuming that the enquiry already held by the management was not in accordance with the Regulations and principles of natural justice, the learned judge ought to have reserved liberty to management to conduct enquiry de novo in accordance with law.
6. Smt. Chaya Srivatsa who argued her case in person, on the other hand, would support each and every finding recorded by the learned single judge and would highlight her extraordinary, meritorious services rendered to the company and encomium received by her from the management. Smt. Chaya Srivatsa would submit that every transaction in respect of which allegations are levelled was carried out by her with the full knowledge and consent of the superiors in the administrative echelon of the company.
7. It is true, as rightly contended by Sri Kasturi, learned counsel for the appellant, that by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court and High Courts the scope of judicial review of disciplinary action has been circumscribed and limited. It is now well settled that while reviewing disciplinary proceedings initiated and action taken by an employer against a delinquent employee, the Court cannot go into the question of adequacy or sufficiency of evidence on the basis of which findings are re-recorded by an enquiry officer and/or disciplinary authority. If the findings are based on some legal evidence, the reviewing Courts are not entitled to interfere with the findings. The finding of fact recorded by the, enquiry officer/disciplinary authority cannot be reversed on re-appreciation of evidence on record. The judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merit. The High Court in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct the error of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice as held by the Apex Court in Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gratnin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh, : (1999)ILLJ947SC . The High Court cannot sit over the judgment of the disciplinary authority while exercising discretion under Article 226, but it has duty to see that conclusions reached by the disciplinary authority are based on some legal evidence and they do not suffer from any patent error. Though the High Court cannot sit over the findings recorded by the enquiry officer/ disciplinary authority, while exercising the writ jurisdiction, it has a legal duty to see that the findings/conclusions recorded by the enquiry officer/disciplinary authority are based on some substantive legal evidence and they are not perverse and they do not suffer from any patent errors on the face of the record. The Court can interfere with disciplinary actions only (i) where it finds that the departmental enquiry was conducted in utter violation of principles of natural justice resulting in miscarriage of justice; (ii) where the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and/or the disciplinary authority are not supported by any legal evidence; and (iii) where the penalty imposed on the delinquent official is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct proved against him, and not on any other ground. As often held and reiterated, the judicial review is not against the decision as such, but against the decision making process. The Supreme Court in H. B. Gandhi v. Gopinath and Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, observed:
'Judicial review, it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. Judicial review cannot extend to the examination of the correctness or reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of Court. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself.'
8. Having noticed the above limitations of the judicial review of disciplinary proceedings, let us proceed to consider the contentions urged by the learned senior counsel and the party in person before us. The learned single judge has held that the charges framed against the respondents are very vague and the so- called charge sheet is not in the form of a charge-sheet. Consequently, the learned judge has held that since the charges are very vague, the enquiry conducted thereon and the report submitted by the enquiry officer on such vague charges, are wholly unsustainable.
9. It is trite that the charge sheet is the charter of disciplinary action. The domestic/departmental enquiry commences with the service of the charge-sheet. In other words, before proceeding with the departmental or domestic enquiry against a delinquent official, he must be informed clearly, precisely and accurately of the charges levelled against him. The charge-sheet should specifically set out all charges which the delinquent is called upon to show cause against and should also state all relevant particulars and details without which he cannot defend himself. The object of this requirement is that the delinquent employee must know what he is charged with and have the adequate opportunity to meet the charge and to defend himself by giving a proper explanation, after knowing the nature of the offence or misconduct with which he is charged; otherwise, it will amount to his being condemned unheard. Fair hearing pre-supposes a precise and definite catalogue of charges so that the person charged may understand and effectively meet it. If the charges are imprecise and indefinite or vague or unintelligible, the person charged would not be able to understand them and defend himself effectively and in those circumstances, the subsequent enquiry would not be a fair and just enquiry. The charged official ought to be informed of the charges levelled against him as also the grounds upon which they are based. Charge of misconduct should not be vague. The charge-sheet must be specific and must set out all the necessary particulars and details irrespective of the fact whether the delinquent knows it or not; he must be told about the charges and it was not his duty to connect the charge-sheet with his alleged understanding or knowledge of the charge. However, it is true that the charge need not be framed with the precision of a charge in a criminal proceeding. But, at the same time it must not be vague or so general as to make it impossible of being traversed. Therefore, the test is whether the charge conveys to the delinquent employee, the exact nature of the alleged misconduct in a way that would enable him to meet the charge effectively. It is well established that if a vague charge is given to a delinquent, it is a fatal defect, which vitiates the entire proceedings. It is also relevant to notice that the vagueness in the charge is not excused on the plea that the employee concerned should be deemed to have known the facts correctly. It should not be left to the delinquent official to find out or imagine what the charges against him are and it is for the employer to frame specific charges with full particulars.
10. In this case we have already referred to the material allegations in the charge memo and the misconduct alleged to have been committed by the respondent under several clauses of Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules of the company. A copy of the charge-sheet dated December 1, 1993, is produced at page 123 of the paper book. The charge-sheet runs to closely typed seven pages. There is no hard and fast test to review the validity of a charge memo/charge-sheet. The crux of the matter is that when the delinquent reads the charges framed against him he must know what he is charged with and he/she must have the adequate opportunity to meet the charge and to defend himself/herself by giving an appropriate explanation, after knowing the nature of the offence or misconduct with which he is charged. If this test is applied to the facts of this case, it cannot be said that the charges framed against the respondent are vague or imprecise. The charge-sheet supplies materials and relevant facts, figures and other necessary details which could constitute misconduct on the part of the respondent under several clauses of the CDAR, if proved. Although, the learned judge has opined that the charges are very vague, the learned judge has not pointed out how they are vague and what are the relevant material facts which are not stated in the charge-sheet. Be that as it may, it needs to be noticed that at no point of time, the respondent contended that the charges are vague and the charge-sheet lacks in any material and relevant particulars. Having carefully perused the lengthy charge-sheet, we are fully satisfied that all necessary material particulars in support of the allegations levelled against the respondent are given in the charge-sheet. In other words, the charge-sheet dated December 1, 1993, issued to the respondent by the management is valid and proper.
11. Although, the learned judge, according to us has quite rightly, held that the power of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is limited and it cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the disciplinary authority and is not entitled to reappraise the evidence, he fell into an avoidable error in doing just that under the guise of examining the evidence led by the disciplinary authority with regard to each and every charge. This Court, as pointed out supra in the premise of the binding authorities, cannot assume the role of an appellate authority, while reviewing a disciplinary action taken against a delinquent by a management and reappreciate the evidence and substitute its opinion on the merits, in the place of the opinion reached by the disciplinary authority or the fact- finding authority like the enquiry officer. Therefore, we find force in the contention of Sri Kasturi that the learned judge in reappreciating the evidence and recording a different finding has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in this Court under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution.
12. Further, it needs to be noticed that the scope of judicial review with regard to the findings of fact recorded by a fact finding Tribunal or authority is again, very much circumscribed and limited by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority on questions such as whether the respondent misrepresented to the management with regard to her experience while applying for the post of Chief Public Relations Manager; whether she applied for the post through proper channel; whether she was engaged in a private business; whether Pushpa Enterprises was a non-existent entity; and whether the irregularity committed in the name of that entity are findings on pure questions of fact. If that is so, the scope of judicial review of those findings is limited. Unless in a given case, the Court finds that the finding of fact recorded by an authority, statutory or otherwise, is based on 'no evidence', it cannot reappraise the evidence led before the authority and come to a different conclusion than the one arrived at by the authority as if the Court acts as an appellate authority over the decision taken by the authority.
13. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Sodhi v. Union of India : 1991CriLJ1947 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Vyavsaya & Co. : AIR1997SC993 are the authorities to state that the High Court, shall not ordinarily, enter into disputed questions of fact like an appellate Court. The Supreme Court in B.I Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, : AIR1957SC354 , ITO v. Seth Bros. : [1969]74ITR836(SC) , Om Prakash v. State of Haryana, : 1979CriLJ857 has opined that the High Court cannot sit as a Court of appeal over the findings of fact recorded by a competent inferior Tribunal. Further, the Supreme Court in Kochunni v. State of Madras, : AIR1959SC725 , Harbans v. Jagmohan, : AIR1986SC302 and State of U. P. v. Dharmander, AIR 1989 SC 99, has opined that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence for itself. In State of Orissa v. Murlidhar, AIR 1963 SC 404, State of Madras v. Sundaram, : AIR1965SC1103 , the Supreme Court held that the findings on fact cannot be interfered with on the ground that the evidence on which it was based was not satisfactory or sufficient. The only inquiry which the High Court can make under Article 226 while reviewing the finding of fact is whether there was any evidence at all, which if believed, would sustain the charge before the Tribunal or the finding arrived at by it, as held by the Supreme Court in Somnath v. State of Orissa : (1969)3SCC384 , Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab 1976 1 SCWR 46, and State of Madras v. Sundaram or whether the statutory authority acted upon irrelevant considerations, neglecting to take into account relevant factors or whether the decision is unreasonable that no reasonable person would have made such a decision. The Supreme Court in State of U, P. v. Dharmander, has opined that judicial review under Article 226 is directed, not against the correctness of the decision, but against the correctness of the decision making process.
14. We have perused the order of the learned single judge. The learned single judge from paragraph (11) to paragraph (19) has re-appreciated the entire evidence on record and recorded the finding in paragraph (20) that the charges framed are not attributable to the respondent and they do not constitute misconduct on the part of the respondent. Further, the learned judge in the course of examining whether the inquiry conducted against the respondent was in accordance with the prescribed procedure and principles of natural justice has again stepped out of the legitimate domain of judicial review under Article 226 and recorded factual findings in substitution of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority. In this context what the Apex Court has observed in paragraph (7) of the judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, : (1991)IILLJ269SC are quite opposite. It reads as follows at p. 272 of LLJ;
'7. The High Court while conceding that it has no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the decision of a domestic Tribunal and is not entitled to reappraise the evidence, fell into an error in doing just that under the guise of examining the evidence to ascertain if the respondent was prejudiced on account of the failure of the department to provide him with the notebooks of Desale, Wadekar, Kadam and Sakpal dated November 13, 1965, and the log-book of the jeep of even date. It is indeed true that the respondent had asked for the aforesaid documents since the commencement of the departmental enquiry and also in the course thereof. He was, however, informed that the original notebooks of the said four policemen as well as the logbook of the jeep were not traced. However, copies of the extracts from the notebooks of the said four policemen taken out earlier and sent to the Anti-corruption Bureau during the preliminary enquiry were supplied to him. As far as the logbook is concerned, evidence of the jeep driver was tendered to show that no entry about the visit from the police station to Kuwari's bungalow was actually made on account of the distance being short. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the respondent was furnished with copies of extracts from the notebooks of the said policemen and they were also offered for further cross-examination. In the course of cross-examination of police constable Desale, the witness evaded a certain question by stating that 'without seeing my original notebook I cannot say if I have made the entries regarding the duties performed on November 13, 1965, and November 14, 1965, in the note-book. He, however, admitted that the transcript from his notebook was correct but he could not say if the respondent had countersigned the entry of November 13, 1965. The High Court has attached too much importance to this evasive reply given by police constable Desale and has come to the conclusion that non-supply of the original notebooks had prejudiced the defence. If the original notebooks are missing and if the transcripts prepared by the witnesses earlier are supplied, the department cannot be accused of deliberately suppressing evidence. In such a situation the evidence has to be evaluated bearing in mind the fact that the original notebooks and the logbook cannot, in the circumstances, efface the overwhelming evidence, both direct and circumstantial, tendered during the departmental enquiry. We are of the view that there is sufficient evidence on record to return a finding of guilt against the respondent.'
15. In the above case, departmental proceedings was initiated against a delinquent Police Inspector for entering the hutment of the complainant woman and trying to ravish her. The delinquent took the plea that the woman was of easy virtue and he had raided the hutment as a measure against illicit trade in liquor. The inquiry officer came to conclusion that the charges against delinquent of perverse conduct had been proved and recommended dismissal. Order was passed in terms of recommendations. In the High Court the delinquent raised the plea that some original note books and log book were not supplied to him. It was alleged that original note books, etc., were missing. The High Court upheld the plea and set aside the order. When the matter was carried to the Apex Court, the Apex Court made the above noted observations.
16. The learned single judge has opined that the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the respondent solely on the basis of the letters addressed by Raju and others to the chairman and managing director and since in those letters the chairman and managing director has been urged to conduct departmental enquiry against the respondent, the learned judge felt that the proceedings initiated against the respondent are not the outcome of a bona fide exercise of the disciplinary power vested in the disciplinary authority, but, an instance of victimization to make the respondent a scapegoat. We do not find anything on the record to sustain such finding. Undoubtedly, a disciplinary authority, after necessary preliminary enquiry, if satisfied that there is prima facie some materials to support the allegation contained even in a pseudonymous letter, it may initiate disciplinary proceedings against the delinquent concerned on the basis of such materials. Quite often, disciplinary authorities initiate disciplinary proceedings against errant employees when their misconduct was brought to the notice of the disciplinary authorities by some third party. Therefore, simply because in this case the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the respondent in pursuance of a pseudonymous letter written by Raju and others, only on that count and without anything further, it cannot be said that the chairman and managing director of the company directed disciplinary proceedings against the respondent to make her a scapegoat and not in bonafide exercise of disciplinary power. In this case regular departmental enquiry was ordered only after conducting a preliminary enquiry into the allegations levelled against the respondent. As it is well known, the purpose of conducting a preliminary enquiry preceding a regular departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority is to satisfy the disciplinary authority whether there is any prima facie case to order a regular departmental enquiry or not. It is well settled that the evidence and materials collected in the course of the preliminary enquiry if they are not used as a piece of evidence in support of the charges levelled against the delinquent in the regular departmental enquiry, non-furnishing of preliminary enquiry report would not vitiate regular departmental enquiry or any further action that may be taken by the disciplinary authority on the basis of the report.
17. We are also, with respect, not in agreement with the learned single judge in holding that if the respondent did not possess the requisite qualification or experience required for the post of Deputy General Manager (PR), the management should not have appointed her and the application of the respondent should have been rejected in limine and having appointed her, it was not permissible for the management to take disciplinary action for not stating the correct facts with regard to her experience. When a person seeks employment in a public company like the HMT, he/she is expected to disclose in his/her application, all necessary details and particulars sought by the recruiting agency truthfully and produce genuine documents in support of the information and particulars disclosed in the application. In a given case, after appointment to a post, if it is found that appointment was secured by an incumbent by suppressing relevant facts or stating falsehood and/or by producing bogus and fictitious documents, it cannot be said that the employer cannot initiate disciplinary proceedings against such employee in terms of the conduct and CCA Regulations. Such a power is very much inherent in any employer, whether public or private.
18. The learned, single judge has pointed out certain irregularities in the conduct of the enquiry. The learned judge has also opined that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It is not that this Court under Articles 226 and 227 while exercising its extraordinary and supervisory jurisdiction should step in and nullify each and every disciplinary action whenever it finds an irregularity or illegality in the procedure followed by disciplinary authority. As quite often held and reiterated, the principles of natural justice are meant to foster justice and not to thwart justice. In other words, principles of natural justice are handmaids and not masters of justice. They should be applied and enforced to achieve and promote justice, but, they will never be allowed to be utilised for doing or promoting or perpetuating injustice. Simply because the Court finds one or the other irregularity in the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority in the conduct of the enquiry, only on that count, the Court cannot nullify the disciplinary action taken by the disciplinary authority, unless it is satisfied that on account of such irregularity, the delinquent has suffered some substantial prejudice. Technicalities cannot be permitted to overtake the cradle of justice under any circumstance. Substantial justice and fair procedure should replace unsound, justice-damaging norms in dispensation of justice.
19. In this case, nothing is produced before the Court to satisfy us that on account of the irregularities pointed out by the learned single judge, such as, the enquiry officer permitted the presenting officer to mark the documents without the consent of the delinquent and only after taking the documents on file, they were disclosed to the delinquent, the delinquent has suffered any prejudice. In Tata Oil Mills Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1963-II-LLJ-78 the Supreme Court held that failure to furnish a copy of the report submitted by witness to the concerned workman before he was called upon to cross-examine such witness would become irrelevant when it was shown that no prejudice was caused to the concerned workmen by such failure. The Supreme Court in S.B. Noronah v. Prem Kumari Khana, : [1980]1SCR281 held that:
'The parties should win or lose on substantial questions, not technical tortures and Courts cannot be abettors ......... To maintain integrity of law, the Court must 'suit the action to the word, the word to the action'.'
The dialects of the audi alteram partem has, in contemporaneous administrative law, evolved dynamically. The means-based technical View has been replaced by the holistic and effect-analysis model. Violation of natural justice is by itself, no longer sufficient to invalidate State action. A clear prejudice that has been suffered by the violation needs to be pleaded and proved. This is the current and operative doctrine as reflected in judgments in S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan : [1981]1SCR746 ; K. L. Tripathi v. SBI : (1984)ILLJ2SC ; Rajendm Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh : AIR1996SC2736 ; MC v. Union of India 1996 (6) SCC 237 and Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan : AIR2000SC2783 , to cite a few.
20. Further, in a departmental or domestic enquiry allegation levelled against a delinquent need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt and they can be proved on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur 1972-I-LLJ-l, the Supreme Court held that the standard of proof required in the departmental enquiry is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt and that a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. In the same case, the Supreme Court further held that where there are some relevant materials which the authorities have accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court under Article 226 to review the materials and come to an independent finding. The facts need not be established in the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority by producing 'evidence' to prove the facts, as per the provisions of the Evidence Act. Neither, the enquiry officer nor the disciplinary authority is a Court. The Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India Workers' Union v. Food Corporation of India : (1996)IILLJ920SC , held that in order to prove a fact in a disciplinary proceeding there should be only 'material' and not evidence as required by the Evidence Act. In Union of India v. T.R. Varma : (1958)IILLJ259SC , the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held at p. 260 of LLJ (head note):
'Now, it is no doubt true that the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the mode prescribed in the Evidence Act; but that Act has no application to enquiries conducted by Tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such Tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry, and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that which obtains in a Court of law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies; that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed.'
21. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the pleadings of the parties and the entire material placed before the Court we are fully satisfied that the enquiry does not suffer from any substantive flaw or error on the basis of which this Court could invalidate the disciplinary action taken by the management by exercise of its extraordinary and supervisory power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It is not for us to go into the question of adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence on the basis of which the findings are recorded by the enquiry officer. What we want to state is that each of the findings of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority is based on substantive legal evidence and is preceded by a thread-bare discussion of all relevant materials on record and judicious and well articulated reasoning. The enquiry report produced in Volume II of paper book from pages 666 to 718 clearly and loudly reflects proper appraisal of evidence/materials on record as well as application of mind on the part of the enquiry officer. Therefore, there is no scope for the Court to apply the 'no evidence' rule to interfere with the findings. As regards procedure followed by the enquiry officer in the conduct of enquiry, the enquiry officer has in his report stated thus:
'During the enquiry proceedings CSE was given full and fair opportunity to defend her case by cross-examining the witnesses examined by the Presenting Officer (PO), adducing evidence, and examining the documents produced by PO. She, however, chose not to produce any witness, and filed her personal defence witness statement along with certain documents. The PO examined witnesses, who were cross-examined by CSE. PO also cross-examined CSE. PO produced 49 documents in support of the charges, most of them contained several pages. These documents were taken on record marking them as exhibits M-l toM-49. A list of these documents was taken on record as M-O. During the proceedings, on CSE's request, three more documents were produced by PO, which were taken as M-50 to M-52. While examining MW-11 one more document was produced which was taken as M-53. The copies of these documents were furnished to CSE and on enquiring by EO, she mentioned that she did not have any doubt about the genuineness of those documents. The CSE filed her written statement as her personal defence witness statement (D-1). She also submitted 26 documents to defend the charges which were taken on record as D-2 to D-26.'
22. There is nothing to show that what is stated by the enquiry officer in the enquiry report extracted above is factually incorrect. Be that as it may, even otherwise, after carefully perusing the records of enquiry proceedings, we are fully satisfied that in conducting the enquiry the principles of natural justice and the doctrine of fair play in action are not violated and the respondent was given fair hearing to defend herself.
23. We do not find any merit in the contention that the disciplinary authority has not applied its mind independently to the evidence on record and the order passed by it is not a speaking order. When the punishing authority agrees with the findings of the enquiry officer and accepts the reason given by him in support of such findings, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss the evidence and come to the same findings as that of the enquiry officer and give the same reasons for the findings. Therefore, it cannot be said the order passed by the disciplinary authority in this case is vitiated being a non-speaking order. In holding so, we are fortified by the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana : (1987)IILLJ504SC .
24. In conclusion, we state with respect and humility, we cannot sustain the order of the learned single judge. In the result, we allow the writ appeal and set side the order of the learned single judge plated November 12, 1998, and dismiss Writ Petition No. 26334 of 1994 with no order as to costs.