Judgment:
N.D.V. Bhat, J.
1. This Revision Petition is preferred against the order dated 14-9-1990 passed by the Munsiff, Sagar on I.A. No. IV in O.S. No. 30 of 1989. The facts relevant for the disposal of this petition, briefly stated, are as under:
2. The instant respondent-plaintiff, Saraswathamma had filed O.S. No. 30/1989 on the file of the Munsiff, Sagar praying for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the Revision petitioner -defendant from interfering with her possession and enjoyment of suit property which is a residential house. In the course of the said suit she had obtained a temporary injunction by an order dated 18-2-1989 against the defendant - Revision petitioner. When this was so it appears, according to the case made out by the instant respondent, that the defendant (Revision petitioner) in violation of the order of temporary injunction with the aid of goondas removed the tiles of the house in question and dispossessed her from the suit house. Under these circumstances, the respondent filed the application at I.A.IV praying to restore her possession after removing the defendant from the suit house.
3. The said application at I.A.IV was resisted by the petitioner on various grounds. Among other things, he appears to have contended that the plaintiff - respondent was not in possession of the suit house at any time and that therefore the question of the former being dispossessed by the latter did not arise. He also took up a contention that since there was no decree for possession the question of directing the defendant - Revision petitioner to deliver the possession of the property to the plaintiff-respondent would not arise at all. He contended that the application at I.A.IV was untenable. On these grounds he prayed for the dismissal of the application at I.A.IV.
4. The lower Court on a consideration of the submissions made on either side and for the reasons recorded in its impugned order allowed the application at I.A.IV. Hence, the instant Revision.
5. I have heard the learned Counsels on either side. The point for consideration is as to whether the order questioned in Revision is legal and proper.
6. Before considering the submissions made on either side, it is necessary to mention here that at the time of argument a Memo along with certified copies of the two documents mentioned therein were produced by the learned Counsel for the respondent. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that such a Memo cannot be countenanced as being not in accordance with the provisions of law.
7. Sri S.R. Hegde, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the learned Munsiff has erred in directing the Revision petitioner to restore the possession to the instant respondent. In this connection, it was submitted by the learned Counsel that having regard to the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2A CPC it was not permissible for the lower Court to have recourse to any provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, even assuming for the time being that the allegation made by the respondent before the lower Court in his application at I.A.IV is correct. In this connection, the learned Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the Decision in MANCHEGOWDA AND ANR. v. M. MADAIAH, 1987(1) KLJ 119; apart from relying on the Decision in NARASIMHAPPA v. HANUMANTHAPPA, , 1976(2) KLJ Sh. N. Item No. 40 which is referred to and relied on in Manchegowda's case. Reliance is also placed on the Decision in MADEGOWDA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, , : ILR1985KAR3945 . The learned Counsel has also placed reliance on the Decision in M.S. SURESH v. K.V. SUDHAKAR, : AIR1987Kant249 . Placing reliance on these Decisions, the learned Counsel contended that Order 39 Rule 2A is a self contained provision providing for the remedy to the aggrieved party in the event of disobedience to an order of temporary injunction issued under Order 39 Rule 1 and/or Rule 2 CPC. In that view of the matter, it was submitted, that it is not permissible for the Court to have recourse to the provisions of Section 151 CPC. Dilating, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that this aspect and the Decisions of this Court on this aspect missed the attention of the lower Court with the result, the order under Revision is rendered erroneous. On these grounds in pith and substance, the learned Counsel contended that the order under Revision is liable to be set at naught.
8. On the other hand, Sri B. Veerappa, learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the remedy provided for under Rule 2A is in addition to and not in lieu of the provisions of Section 151 CPC and in a situation like the one which arose before the lower Court an order like the one under Revision is perfectly justifiable. The learned Counsel in support of his submission has placed reliance on the Decision in CENTURY FLOUR MILLS LTD. v. S. SUPPIAH AND ORS., , : AIR1975Mad270 ; the Decision in SUJIT PAL v. PRABIR KUMAR SUN AND ORS., , : AIR1986Cal220 ; the Decision in KISAN UCHATTAR MADHYAMIK VIDYALAYA SAMITI, DEORIA AND ORS. v. IIIRD ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, DEORIA AND ORS., : AIR1989All168 Support is also sought from certain observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in S.K. SHARMA v. CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALORE, , : ILR1986KAR2536 . Placing reliance on these Decisions the learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the order passed by the lower Court cannot be found fault with. Dilating on this aspect it was contended that to prevent the abuse process of law such a course of action was absolutely necessary and that therefore the order questioned in Revision deserves to be confirmed. Incidentally it was submitted by the learned Counsel that having regard to the fact that the possession is already restored to the respondent in furtherance of the order of the lower Court, the Revision Petition is liable to be dismissed in limine.
9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsels on either side.
10. It is seen that the lower Court has proceeded to pass the impugned order placing reliance on the Decision in HARI NANDAN AGRAWAL AND ANR. v. S.N. PANDITA AND ORS., , AIR 1965 Allahabad 48 the Decision in THE STATE OF BIHAR v. USHA DEVI AND ANR. and the Decision in MAGNA AND ANR. v. RUSTAM AND ANR., , : [1961]1SCR728 After going through the Decisions relied on by the lower Court and the Decisions pressed into service on behalf of the respondent before this Court on the one hand and the Decisions pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, on the other I find that there is no consensus in the two sets of Decisions. It is seen that contrary views are expressed in these two sets of Decisions. It would be indeed in fitness of things to make a reference to the view taken by this Court in the Decision in Narasimhappa v. Hanumanthappa a learned single Judge of this Court has observed as under:
'If there is an order of temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff and if the defendants violate the order of injunction, there is appropriate provision in the Code for taking action against the persons violating the order of the Court- Hence, the Court is not right in directing the police to implement the order of temporary injunction. The police are not the authorities to enforce the order of the Court.'
The same view is reflected in the subsequent Decision of this Court in Manchegowda's case. In the said case, the learned single Judge of this Court relying on the earlier decision in Narasimhappa's case has held as under:
'In view of the said decision of this Court and in view of the clear provisions contained in Order 39 CPC dealing with the disobedience of the temporary injunction, the Court below had no jurisdiction to pass an order now impugned in this revision, directing the police to act in aid of the temporary injunction order passed in favour of the plaintiff.'
In the decision in Sujit Pal's case it is seen that plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration of his tenancy and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of premises. An interim injunction was granted restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of plaintiff. However, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff and took possession thereof in utter violation of interim injunction. Plaintiff, therefore, filed two applications one under Order 39 Rule 2A and the other under Section 151 CPC praying for temporary mandatory injunction restoring the possession of the opposite party of the said room with police help. In that context when the matter came up before the Calcutta High Court, a Division Bench of the said Court observed as under:
'7. It is now a well-settled principle of law that when there is a specific provision in the Code in respect of any matter, it is not permissible for the Court to pass any order in respect of such matter under Section 151 of the Code. Much reliance has been placed on behalf of the petitioner upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Rant Sonabati Kumari, : [1961]1SCR728 . In that case, it has been held by the Supreme Court that though undoubtedly proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Code (which is somewhat similar to the amended provision of Order 39 Rule 2A) have a punitive aspect, as is evident from the contemner being liable to be ordered to be detained in civil prison, they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement of or to execute the order.
8. It may be that Order 39, Rule 2A is in the nature of an execution proceeding, but the question before us is whether the Court has inherent power to grant a temporary mandatory injunction for the purpose of granting relief to a person who has . been dispossessed despite an order of interim injunction. In the instant case, there is no question of execution of the order of interim injunction that was granted in favour of the opposite party restraining the defendants including the petitioner from interfering with the possession of the opposite party of the room in question. The petitioner has forcibly dispossessed the opposite party from the room and has taken possession thereof in utter violation of the interim injunction. If the opposite party is asked to pursue the remedy under Order 39, Rule 2A, it will be doing a great injustice to him inasmuch as under the said provision, the Court cannot grant immediately relief to the opposite party. So there is no question of execution of the order of interim injunction. The rest question is the granting of immediate relief to the opposite party by restoring his possession of the room. The analogy of Order 21 Rule 32 of the Civil P.C. in our opinion, has no manner of application for the purpose of granting relief to the opposite party. We do not also think that there is any relevance in considering the applicability of the provision of Section 51 of the Civil P.C. which relates to the powers of Court to enforce execution. The injury is grave and serious; ends of justice demands that the Court should at once take steps in granting relief to the opposite party. In this connection, we may refer to an observation from Kerr on injunctions, 6th Edition, page 41:
'But where the injury is of so serious or material a character that the restoring things to their former condition is the only remedy which will meet the requirements of the case, or the defendant has been guilty of sharp practices or unfair conduct, or has shown a desire to steal a march upon the plaintiff, or to evade the jurisdiction of the Court, the injunction will issue, notwithstanding the amount of inconvenience to the other party, and though the expense thereby caused to him will be out of proportion to any advantage the plaintiff may derive from it.'After referring to the observations of the Supreme Court in the decision in MANOHAR LAL v. SETH HIRALAL, : AIR1962SC527 the Calcutta High Court further observed at para-11 of the Judgment as under:'11. Thus it is apparent from the said observation of the Supreme Court that no technicality can prevent the Court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent power. Order 39, Rule 2A lays down a punitive measure for the purpose of compelling a party to comply with the order of injunction. The process as contemplated by the said provision may or may not be ultimately effective but, in any event, the procedure laid down in Order 39 Rule 2A is incapable of granting an immediate relief to a party who has been forcibly dispossessed in violation of an order of injunction. We do not think that in such a case the Court is powerless to grant relief to the aggrieved party in exercise of its inherent power. The very object for which Order 39, Rule 2A has been enacted will be fulfilled by the grant of a temporary mandatory injunction and restoration of possession of the aggrieved party. The inherent power of the Court as recognised in Section 151 of the Code is in addition to the power conferred on the Court under the provisions of the Code. All that the Court is concerned is to prevent abuse of the process of Court and to do justice by immediately intervening under circumstances which require such intervention by the Court.'
The Decision in Kisan Uchatta Madhyamik Vidyalaya Samiti, Deoria and Ors. v. IIIrd Additional District Judge, Deoria and Ors. is not a Decision directly on the point. However, it is pointed out in the said case that the Court has got power to order impleadment of any person suo motu as party. In the Decision in Magna and Anr. v. Rustam and Anr., it is pointed out that Order 39 Rule 2(3) is exhaustive on the aspect of imposing of penalty on the party guilty of disobedience, but that it does not provide any relief to the party in whose favour the order of temporary injunction is issued. It is also pointed in the said case that the object of such an order is to safeguard the rights of a party against a threatened invasion by the other party, if in disobedience of the order of injunction, such rights are invaded during the pendency of the suit relief can only be granted to the aggrieved party by invoking the inherent power of the Court under Section 151 CPC. In the case of Hari Nandan Agrawal, it is pointed out by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court that where the plaintiff has been dispossessed by the defendants by wilfully disobeying the interim injunction order restraining them from dispossessing the plaintiff the Court which issued the order can in exercise of its inherent power after considering the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties pass such order in the ends of justice as would undo the wrong done to the plaintiff in whose favour the injunction order had been issued. It is seen that in the said case the decision in is relied on. In the case of Century Flour Mills Ltd. it is pointed out that where in violation of a stay order of injunction against a party, something has been done in disobedience, it will be the duty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong done. It is further pointed out in the said case that the inherent power will not only be available in such a case, but it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the interest of justice.
11. On a close perusal of the different Decisions referred to hereinabove it is seen that the view taken by this Court in the Decisions cited earlier on the one hand and the views taken by the Calcutta High Court, Madras High Court, Allahabad High Court and Rajasthan High Court on the other are conflicting. The reasons leading to the conclusion with reference to the respective views reflected in the two sets of Decisions are already noted. In substance, the view taken by this Court in the two Decisions is that Order 39 Rule 2A is self-contained and that whenever an order of injunction is disobeyed recourse will have to be had only to the said provision and that exercise of inherent power under Section 151 CPC is not permissible. The view reflected in the Decisions of the four other High Courts appears to be that inherent power can be resorted to in such a situation. The detailed view reflected in the Decision of the Calcutta High Court would go to show that the exercise of power under Section 151 CPC in substance, would help accomplishing the objective for which the provisions of Order 39 Rule 2A have been enacted. Since the detailed reasons reflected in the said Decision are already alluded to earlier it is not necessary to risk a repetition here. At this juncture, however, it is indeed necessary to notice that the view expressed by Govinda Bhat, C.J., in Narasimhappa's case was not approved in a later decision of this Court of course in a Writ Petition. In the decision in S.K. Sharma v. Corporation of Bangalore a Division Bench of this Court in W.P. No. 15996/1981 has pointed out, among other things, as under:-
'35. In this behalf, it is appropriate to refer as to what the Supreme Court said while rejecting the contention that in the absence of a provision similar to Article 141 of the Constitution, the ratio of the decision of the High Court was not a law binding on the administrative authorities in the concerned States, in the case of East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (AIR 1962 SC 1898). The relevant portion of the Judgment reads:
'(29) - This raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest Court in the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Article 215, every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Article 226 it has a plenary power to issue orders or Writs for the enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Article 227 it has jurisdiction over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a Tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that Court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a Tribunal can do so, all the subordinate Courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, just like in the case of Supreme Court making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate Courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior tribunal that all the tribunals subject to its supervision should conform to the law laid down by it. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working, otherwise, there would be confusion in the administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer. We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest Court in the State is binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either by instituting a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the notice issued by the authority signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction.'On the same analogy the principle underlying the mandate incorporated in Article 144 of the Constitution applies in respect of the High Courts and therefore every civil authority in the State is under a duty to act in aid of the High Court. From this it follows that whenever a disobedience to the orders of this Court is brought to the notice of the concerned Police Authorities, the Police Authorities are in duty bound to take action to ensure obedience to such order. If they fail to do so, an application made before this Court to compel the police authorities concerned by a specific order to ensure obedience to the interim injunction or order of this Court, is maintainable. Further, if the Court finds that the Police Authorities have failed in their duty, to ensure obedience to the injunction or order issued by this Court against a party, it is appropriate for this Court to issue necessary directions to ensure obedience to the orders of this Court. Taking action for disobedience under the Contempt of Courts Act is entirely different. The former is preventive and the latter is punitive. The question of taking punitive action arises after a person has acted in disobedience to the order, but that is no ground for not taking preventive action when there is an attempt to disobey the orders of this Court is complained of. Otherwise, the protection afforded to safeguard public interest or the interest of an individual by any injunction or order granted by this Court would be on paper only bringing the orders of this Court and the Rule of Law to ridicule. In certain cases the injury caused by such violation might be irreparable. To illustrate, if in a given petition there is an order directing the respondent not to demolish the building belonging to the petitioner and nevertheless the respondent attempts to demolish the building, the Police cannot be silent spectators on the ground that for disobedience the party would be punished. If Police are aware of the order or a complaint is made in time, it is the duty of the Police to prevent the demolition and if they do not respond, an appropriate direction to the Police can and has to be issued by this Court.
36. We are aware of the view expressed by Govinda Bhat, C.J., in the case of Narasimhappa v. Hanumanthappa [1976(2) Kar.L.J. S.N.33 Item 40] that it is not right for the Court to direct the Police Authorities to implement the order of temporary injunction as there is appropriate provision in the C.P.C. for taking action against the person violating the order of the Court. The learned single Judge, who dismissed the application I.A.VI of the petitioner seeking a direction to the Chickpet Police to prevent respondent-3 from constructing the building in contravention of the injunction as misconceived, appears to have followed that view.'
The Division Bench of this Court in S.K. Sharma's case8 after having observed as above considered a Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in SATYANARAYANA v. S.H.O.P.S. SANTHOSHNAGAR , : AIR1982AP394 with reference to the legality of a direction issued by the Civil Court to the Police to ensure obedience to the injunction issued by the Civil Court. The relevant portion of the Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the said case is quoted with approval in para-37 of its Judgment. The Judgment culled out therefrom is as under:
'6. Mr. Jagannadha Rao, learned Counsel, however, contended that the said decision is an authority for the position that the Civil Courts can under inherent powers, grant such directions under Section 151 CPC but a Writ of Mandamus does not lie. We are unable to agree with this contention. Section 151 CPC reserves the inherent powers of the Court. Article 226 of the Constitution goes a step further and vests extra-ordinary jurisdiction in the High Court of a State to issue not only a Writ of Mandamus but also appropriate Writs, directions or orders for the enforcement of any of the right conferred by Part-Ill and for any other purpose. As held by the Supreme Court in Calcutta Gas Company (prop) Ltd. v. State of W.B. : AIR1962SC1044 'any other purpose' means 'the enforcement of any legal right and the performance of any legal duty'. A legal right, of course means any legally enforceable right. Nothing more can be a higher purpose than the enforcement of the orders of the Civil Court and that of the High Court which confirms or recognises the rights of a party. By any interpretation of the provisions of CPC the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to enforce its own orders or the orders of the Civil Court cannot be curtailed. As observed by the Supreme Court in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa : [1955]1SCR250 the High Court, in issuing directions, orders and Writs under Article 226 can travel beyond the contents of the Writs which are normally issued as Writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, provided the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such Writs in English Law, are not transgressed. The Supreme Court also observed that in the very language of Article 226, our High Courts need not feel oppressed by the procedural technicalities of the English Writ. The article empowers the High Court to grant appropriate relief and also to modify the form of relief according to the exigencies of each case without being obsessed by the limitation of the prerogative Writs.
7. In Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun : [1960]1SCR890 the Supreme Court reiterated this principle and went a step further that for doing justice between the parties, the High Court has absolute jurisdiction to issue such directions and orders as it may deem fit to do justice between the parties and enforce the law of the land. The only limitations on the wide powers conferred on the High Court and exercisable by it in the matter of issuing Writs are (1) that the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and (2) that the person or authority to whom the Writ is issued, is within the territories over which the respective High Courts exercise jurisdiction. None of these limitations come in the way of the High Court issuing appropriate direction to further secure the right determined and recognised by the Civil Court. The power which a civil Court has under Section 151 CPC, the High Court has in much larger measure under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have therefore no hesitation in concluding that this Court has ample jurisdiction, to issue a Writ or direction to all the authorities including the Police within the State to enforce the orders of the Civil Court as confirmed by the High Court in a Civil Revision Petition and maintain the Rule of Law. The police authorities are therefore bound to give all assistance to the appellant to enforce and see that the orders of this Court as confirmed in CRP No. 3258/1981 are implemented and any enquiry or report of any other authority, revenue or police cannot be put as an excuse for not rendering the required help to the appellant to maintain his possession. This order will be subject only to the final orders of the Civil Court in O.S. 3770/1980.
8. We therefore allow the Writ Appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge and issue the direction as referred to above.'
12. After having observed that they respectfully agree with the views expressed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Division Bench has observed that it respectfully disagree with the views expressed by Govinda Bhat. C.J., in Narasimhappa's case, for the reasons set out earlier.
13. Having regard to the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in S.K. Sharma's case, this Court will have to proceed on the basis that the view taken by the learned single Judge in Narasimhappa's case does not hold good. Similarly, this Court will have to proceed on the basis that the view taken by the learned single Judge in Manchegowda's case relying solely on the decision in Narasimhappa's case would not hold good any more. From what is stated hereinabove, the observation made in Madegowda's case also is of no assistance to the petitioner.
14. If that be so, it will have to be seen as to whether the decision in M.S. Suresh v. K.V. Sudhakar is of any assistance to the petitioner to contend that in a situation like the one leading to the impugned order under revision, the power under Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked. On a perusal of the facts of the said case and the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in that behalf it becomes clear that this Court has reiterated the well settled proposition of law. In the said case it is pointed by this Court that Order 18 CPC makes it abundantly clear as to how the trial should commence and who should commence it and in what manner it may be reopened both for the defendant as well as for the plaintiff, depending on who is required to commence the case. It is further pointed out that once it was decided that the plaintiff should commence the case and he did so commence the case. It will not be open to him to ask for recalling the witnesses for the defence to be subjected to cross-examination after having failed to cross-examine him on the date when the defendant was examined. It is further pointed out that where the excuse given by the plaintiff for his negligence to diligently prosecute the suit was that he had made a trip to foreign country on business and, therefore, he could not prosecute his suit with diligence, but as he was represented by his Counsel and nearly six months time was given for the plaintiff's appearance from the date the plaintiff's examination-in-chief was concluded it could not be said that the plaintiff did not have adequate opportunity to present his case. It is further pointed out that the question of invoking Section 151 CPC, also does not arise, as specific provision is made for the conduct of trial under Orders 17 and 18 CPC. It is further stated that when the specific provisions are made it is not possible for anyone to press into service the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 CPC and in the absence of necessary evidence to substantiate the claim made by the plaintiff, if the trial Court rejected his claim, it cannot be said that that should be rectified by the High Court, giving a second opportunity to the plaintiff to prove his case. A perusal of the observation made by this Court in the aforesaid case, makes it abundantly clear that such is not the situation here; the precise point for consideration in this case is as to whether Order 39 Rule 2A provides for effective and expeditious remedy in all situations and if not whether the power under Section 151 CPC cannot be exercised to do complete justice and prevent perpetuation of a wrong. Under these circumstances, the facts of the case in M.S. Suresh's case are clearly distinguishable. As pointed out earlier, the view taken by the learned single Judge in Narasimhappa's case did not find approval by the Division Bench in S.K. Sharma's case. It is necessary to emphasis that the observation of the Division Bench with reference to the view taken in Narasimhappa's case is with reference to the exercise of power under Section 151 of the context of the existence of Order 39 Rule 2A only, Under these circumstances, I have no hesitation whatsoever in holding that the decision in M.S. Suresh's case is not at all of any assistance to the Revision petitioner in this case.
15. From what is stated hereinabove, it is clear that the existence of Order 39 Rule 2A will not be a bar for the exercise of power under Section 151 CPC to expeditiously enforce an order of temporary injunction whenever and wherever disobedience to the same is brought to the notice of the Court and the same is established. It is also clear that the very object for which Order 39 Rule 2A has been enacted will be fulfilled by a direction for the restoration of possession obtained in violation and/or in disobedience to an order of temporary injunction. Such a course of action in respect of temporary injunction becomes all the more necessary, because temporary injunction is granted in aid of the final relief sought in the suit and also for the reasons that the same is subject to the result of the suit.
16. For the reasons stated hereinabove, I do not find any merit in the submission made by Sri S.R. Hegde that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to invoke the power under Section 151 CPC to direct restoration of possession.
17. In so far as the factual aspect is concerned, it is seen that the defendant - petitioner was prevented by a temporary injunction from interfering with plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of the suit house; it is further seen that the said order of temporary injunction was affirmed in appeal as can be seen from the body of the order of the learned Munsiff. Further, the tenor of the stand taken by the revision petitioner reflects disobedience to the temporary injunction order leading to the dispossession of plaintiff-respondent. I do not find anything wrong with reference to the conclusion reached by the learned Munsiff on the facts also.
18. It would therefore follow that the revision petition will have to be dismissed. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for this Court to make a reference to the documents sought to be produced along with the Memo before this Court.
19. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed with costs.