ORDER
Mohan, C.J.
1. The appellant has called in question the power of the respondent-Market Committee, to levy market fee on the sale of rice manufactured from out of the paddy purchased by him within the market area or from other dealers who get the paddy hulled in the appellant's rice mill.
2. The point urged before us is that under Section 65 of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1966 ('the Act' for short), it is not permissible to levy such market fee on the same commodity twice, one at the stage of paddy and later at the stage of rice which amounts to multipoint levy and therefore it will be against Section 65 of the Act. In support of the contention, reliance has been placed on the Decision in the case of RAM CHANDRA KAILASH KUMAR & CO. v. STATE OF UP, : [1980]3SCR104 . It is also urged that though this Ruling came to be considered later by the Supreme Court in the case of SREENIVASA GENERAL TRADERS v. STATE OF A.P., : [1983]3SCR843 the question came up directly in the earlier Ruling while in the latter ruling Rule 74 of the Market Committee Rules alone came up for consideration. Hence when the larger Bench, in : [1980]3SCR104 has taken a view in favour of the appellant, that should prevail, and therefore the learned single Judge was not right in rejecting the same.
3. In order to appreciate this point, we will quote the relevant portion from : [1980]3SCR104 , it was held thus:
'It is also not correct to say that the agricultural produce must have been produced in the market area in which the first levy is made. It might have been produced in another market area or even outside the State of Uttar Pradesh but if a transaction of sale and purchase takes place of an agricultural produce as defined in the Act and covered by the notification within a particular market area then fee can be charged in relation to the said transaction.'
However, this case came up for consideration in the latter ruling, viz., : [1983]3SCR843 , wherein it was held as follows:
'There is distinction between 'paddy' and Vice' and although paddy is milled into rice by the process of de-husking, they are two separate and distinct commercial commodities and have both been separately specified as notified agricultural produce in Schedule II as Items 1 and 2 respectively. On the plain language of Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, the market fee is leviable on both on purchase of paddy by a rice miller from a producer and also on purchase or sale of rice by a miller to a trader or by a trader to a trader because there is service rendered by a market committee at each of the stages.'
We are of the considered view that the above extract affords complete answer to the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant. It also requires to be noted that this very case on which the appellant relies on, had come up for consideration, because in para 39 it was observed thus:
'The submission that no such fee is payable on rice is also based on the following observations of Untwalia, J., speaking for the Court in Ram Chandra's case : [1980]3SCR104 (supra):'If paddy is purchased in a particular market area by a rice miller and the same paddy is converted into rice and sold then the rice miller will be liable to pay market fee on his purchase of paddy from the agriculturist-producer under Sub-clause (2) of Section 17(iii)(b). He cannot be asked to pay market fee over again under Sub-clause (3) in relation to the transaction of rice.'
In answering this, in para 41 it was observed thus:
'It would all depend upon the scheme of each Act. The decision in Ram Chandra's case (supra), turned on a construction of Sub-clause (2) of Section 17(iii)(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964, as amended by UP. Act 7 of 1978. It was conceded in that case on behalf of the State Government and the market committees that there cannot be any multipoint levy of market fee in the same market area.'
Therefore this makes vital distinction. Consequently, we are unable to accept the argument that the Decision in : [1983]3SCR843 related only to Rule 74 of the Market Committee Rules. Thus we conclude that the matter no longer requires interference.
4. For the sake of completion, we will also quote Section 65 of the Act-
'65. LEVY OF MARKET FEE - (1) In respect of the agricultural produce sold in a market area, there shall be levied and collected by the market committee thereof, from every seller, market fees at the rate of one per cent of the sale proceeds of the produce so sold.
(2) The market committee shall levy and collect market fee from every buyer in respect of agricultural produce bought by such buyer in the market area, at such rate as may be specified in the bye-laws (which shall not be more than two rupees per one hundred rupees of the value of such produce bought except in case of livestock where the market fee shall not be more than two rupees per head of cattle other than sheep or goat, and in the case of sheep or goat such fee shall not be more than twenty-five paise per head) in such manner and at such times as may be specified in the bye-laws.
(2A) The market fee payable under this Section shall be realised as follows, namely:-
(i) if the produce is sold through a commission agent, the commission agent shall realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to1 pay the same to the committee;
(ia) if the produce is sold by an importer to the purchaser, the importer shall realise the market fee from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the same to the committee;
(ii) if the produce is purchased directly by a trader from a producer, the trader shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee;
(iii) if the produce is purchased by a trader from another trader, the trader selling the produce shall realise it from the purchaser and shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee; and
(iv) in any other case of sale of such produce, the purchaser shall be liable to pay the market fee to the committee.
(2B) the market fee payable under Clauses (i), (ia), (ii) or (iii) of Sub-section (2A) shall be paid to the market committee within such time as may be specified in the bye-laws.'
From a reading of the above Section, it is clear that there is no bar upon the number of sales that could take place in respect of a commodity which has been notified. The conclusion of the learned single Judge in this regard, in our considered view, is correct.
The Writ Appeal shall stand dismissed.