Judgment:
ORDER
G.C. Bharuka, J.
1. The petitioner is a registered consumer of the Karnataka Electricity Board. Its electrical installation bears RR No. CP 1047/ CP3/211. The said installation was inspected on 7.12.1989 by the Technical Audit Cell staff of KEB in presence of the Factory Manager Sri Ramarao. During inspection, it revealed that the main cover seal of the meter was fake and sealing wire was found tampered with thereby providing an easy access to registering mechanism of the meter. The Inspecting Team drew a Mahazar in presence of the said Factory Manager. Subsequently, a back bill of Rs. 7,41,524/-was raised against the petitioner under Annexure-A.
2. The said bill was challenged by the petitioner before this Court in Writ Petition No. 23352/89 which suffered an adverse order. Then the matter was taken in appeal in Writ Appeal No. 3729/93. A Bench of this Court after hearing a batch of writ appeals involving identical questions inter alia quashed the back bill annexure-A by settling the law regarding back billing on account of alleged charge of electricity theft. The Judgment is reported in SHREEJEE PLASTICS v. KARNATAKA ELECTRICITY BOARD, : AIR1995Kant57 The Bench has summarised the law in the said connection in Paragraph 17 of the said Judgment which reads as follows:
'We may now summarise our Conclusions as under:
(1) If on spot-inspection of the consumer's installation it is found by the Inspection Staff that the seals on the meter have been tampered with or have been substituted by fake seals or that the consumer is found on spot inspection to be committing or to have committed any of the offences mentioned in Sections 39, 44 or any other provisions of the Electricity Act or Regulations including theft of electricity, the Board in its discretion can forthwith disconnect the installation without notice to the Consumer, as such a course is available to the Board under Regulation 44.07(c);
(2) In such a case post-action hearing can be given to the consumer seeking for restoration of power supply as permissible under second part of Regulation 44.07(c) and in such post-action hearing consumer may put forward his own version and objections regarding allegation of alleged notorious activity of the consumer and if the Board directs the consumer to take any appropriate action including payment of deterrent charges as demanded, electricity supply can be restored as laid down by Regulation 44.07(c).
(3) If the consumer is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board in this connection, a right of appeal is provided under Regulation 46.01 to the consumer and. in the said appeal, the appellate authority may issue appropriate directions including directions to reconnect the electric energy on terms and conditions different from those insisted upon by the Board initially under Regulation 44.07(c).
(4) When it is alleged that the seals of the meter at the consumer's premises are tempered with or fake seals are put up and it is alleged that the consumer is guilty of any of the offences in terms of Sections 39, 44 or any of the provisions of the Act or Regulations, the authorised Officer before taking any action under Regulation 44.07(a) and before raising the bill has to hold a summary enquiry and for the purpose atleast eight days notice should be given to the consumer concerned calling upon him to have his say in the matter and file his objections against the proposed action of raising the bill as per Regulation 44.07(a). Along with such notice, whatever, material is sought to be relied upon by the Authorised Officer, including copy of the Mahazar, if any, and report of on-spot-enquiry has to be furnished to the consumer to enable him to file objections to the proposed action of the authority. After considering the written objections of the consumer and also giving personal hearing to the consumer if the Authorised Officer so feels necessary, but there being no right to the consumer to demand any personal hearing save and except filing objections and getting them considered by the Authorised Officer, the Authorised Officer if satisfied that the case is alleged against the consumer is prima facie established and attracts Regulation 44.07(a), the authorised Officer may raise the bill as per the said provision and on receipt of such a bill, it will be open to the consumer to prefer an appeal under Regulation 46.01 and to follow the procedure laid down therein. Further it is made clear that no bill can be raised under Regulation 44.07(a) without following the aforesaid modicum of the summary enquiry wherein the consumer must be given an opportunity to have his objections filed to the proposed raising of such bills under Regulation 44.07(a) and if any bill is raised under Regulation 44.07(a) without following the aforesaid summary enquiry procedure, the bill would be ex-facie unauthorised and not competent and consumer would not be required to follow the gamut of filing appeal under Regulation 46.01 against such incompetent and ultra virus bill.'
3. Keeping in view the said Judgment and the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner has been served with the impugned notice dated 7.1.1997 (Annexure-D) requiring it to show-cause as to why it should not be subjected to back billing charges including interest amounting to Rs. 7,41,524/-.
4. Sri Paras Jain, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner assails the impugned notice on two grounds namely,
(i) The respondent Asst. Executive Engineer has already prejudged the amount of back billing charges and therefore, it will be futile to file any objections thereto; and
(ii) The impugned notice has been issued after unreasonable lapse of more than two years.
5. So far as the first ground is concerned, in my opinion, the notice itself shows that the statutory - authority concerned has proposed to levy the back billing charges upto a given amount so that/the petitioner may have a fair opportunity of demonstrating that the proposed back billing charges would be unwarranted, high or excessive. The said cause is more befitting to the requirements of principles of natural justice implying fair play, equity and justice. Notice merely spells out a proposed action. It is provisional in nature and is always amenable to rebuttals. By giving such an opportunity, the authority concerned cannot be accused of pre-determining the issues. It has to be always borne in mind that even for issuing a notice, there has to be some mental exercise and tentative mental formation.
6. For these reasons, I do not find any substance in the first ground of objection.
7. So far as the second ground is concerned, a Division Bench of this Court while quashing the first back billing at Annexure-A had not fixed any time frame for either issuance of notice or quashing of the proceedings regarding back billing. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has built up the said objection on the basis of Judgment of this Court in the case of NEW HOPE GRANITES v. LOKANATH : ILR1994KAR2936 in paragraph 9 wherein it has been stated that:
'Courts passing final or interim orders do sometimes specify the time frame within which the order is to be carried out. Where the Court indicates that it has conscientiously directed expedition or forthwith execution, that direction shall be implemented in letter and spirit. Conversely, where no such time limit is prescribed, it shall be obligatory on the part of the authority to implement the order with the least possible delay within a reasonable period of time. Since these two expressions particularly in bureaucratic circles are misunderstood to confer a licence to disobey the order for anything upto several months or a year, we need to lay down that a period of one month would be a reasonable outer limit in all such cases.'
8. A bare reading of above referred paragraph makes it clear that the Court had laid down an outer limit for compliance in case where pursuant to issuing of writ of mandamus, directions are issued for doing certain things. In my opinion, this principle has no application where pursuant to a writ of certiorari impugned orders/ notices or documents are quashed without further directions regarding any future action within or without a time frame. Even otherwise, if the person or authority against whom a direction is issued for compliance within the given time, and if it is violated, then such person can at best be proceeded against for not acting in compliance with the, orders of this Court. But such non-compliance cannot lead to ouster of jurisdiction of such statutory authorities which they are otherwise, bound to exercise as their statutory duties and legal obligations.
9. For all these reasons, in my opinion, the impugned notice cannot be interfered with. The Writ Petition is, therefore, dismissed but without costs.