ORDER
D.V. Shylendra Kumar, J.
1. Writ petition by a person who has suffered an eviction order dated 15-2-2000 passed under proviso (j) to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 ('the 1961 Act' for short), that the landlord wanted the premises for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction questioning the legality of this order on the premise that the order is one without jurisdiction; that which could not have been passed under the provisions of the Act; that the provisions of the Act were never attracted to the situation and as such the order deserves to be quashed.
2. The brief facts leading to the above petition are that the respondent claiming to be the owner of the schedule premises instituted an eviction petition in H.R.C. No. 1 of 1994 on the file of the Munsiff at Ghamiapatna under proviso (j) to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act on the premise that the premises is reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building. The petitioner was the respondent in the eviction proceedings.
3. The petitioner filed his objections pleading that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant as between the eviction petitioner and the answering respondent; that the respondent in the HRC case was in possession of the premises in his capacity as an agreement holder with the erstwhile owner one Iramma. Though he was earlier a tenant under the said person, the relationship had ceased on and after entering the agreement dated 23-9-1983 for the sale of the premises for a consideration, whereupon the answering respondent was put in possession of the premises in part performance of the agreement and the respondent had paid the full sale consideration of Rs. 15,000/- under the agreement. As the relationship of landlord and tenant itself ceases on or after 28-9 1983 any purchasers, assuming that they are so, from the said erstwhile owner subsequence to this agreement cannot, at any rate, claim the status of a landlord vis-a-vis the respondent and as such prayed for dismissal of the eviction petition.
4. The Trial Court, which examined the pleadings, very strangely, did not give due importance to the basic question as to the existence of the landlord and tenant relationship and it thought it fit to frame only one point for its determination as to--
'Whether the petitioner made out a case that petition schedule premises bona fide required for demolition and reconstruction?'
5. In the course of the order, the learned Trial Judge in fact noticed the stand of the respondent that there is no relationship of tenant and landlord as between himself and the petitioner, but, has for answering this question proceeded on an irrelevant consideration namely that while the respondent has not acted upon the agreement to acquire ownership either through a suit for specific performance or otherwise, the petitioner on the other hand has acquired title to the property and therefore cannot dispute the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the petitioner and respondent. The learned Trial Judge has also held that the petitioner had made out the ground under which she had sought for eviction and accordingly eviction was ordered.
6. It appears the writ petitioner had preferred a revision petition under the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. As during the pendency of the revision petition, the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 came to be repealed and was replaced by the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, the petitioner thought it fit to approach this Court by filing the present writ petition, even when the revision petition had not been ordered. Subsequent to the filing of this writ petition, the petitioner has withdrawn the revision petition as one of no consequence. Even otherwise the revision petition would have abated by the operation of law.
7. I have heard Sri H.C. Jayakeerthi, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Mohan Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent also.
8. Sri Jayakeerthi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner urged the ground that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act inasmuch as the Act itself was not attracted in the absence of valid relationship of landlord and tenant as between the petitioner and the respondent. Therefore, the order being one without jurisdiction should be quashed.
9. The narration of facts and findings as extracted from the order of the learned Trial Court very clearly supports the submission of the learned Counsel. What is material in a proceeding under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act is the existence of a relationship of landlord and tenant. When the relationship was specifically disputed as in the present case and in my view a bona fide dispute, it was incumbent upon the learned Trial Judge to have given a categorical finding on such an issue. Though issue or point is not framed, the Trial Court should have indicated or answered this question and perhaps even that could have been sufficient. But, nevertheless, the learned Trial Judge has gone astray even in answering this question and has while not emphatically answered the existence of the relationship, only proceeds to hold that the petitioner has made good his title. It was not the function of the Trial Court, to examine this aspect in great detail. Only for the purpose of pronouncing about the good title of the petitioner, the question was, whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed as between the eviction petitioner and the answering respondent. Even assuming for argument sake, the eviction petitioner had become the owner, if there was no relationship of landlord and tenant as between the eviction petitioner and the respondent, the eviction petitioner could not have invoked the provisions of the Act for presenting an eviction petition, but should have necessarily sought for recovery of possession.
10. What is submitted by Sri Mohan Kumar is that the very writ petition is not tenable; that the Trial Court having passed an order of eviction, there is no necessity for this Court to interfere with the order at this point of time more so, when the 1961 Act has itself been repealed and not in existence anymore; that even though no categorical finding is given by the learned Trial Judge, the respondent himself had admitted that he was a tenant once earlier under the erstwhile owner Smt. Irarmna and if he was the tenant once earlier, he continues to be a tenant and his status does not get altered. Therefore, the Trial Court was justified in passing an eviction order against the writ petitioner and in support of such submission learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D.S. Parvathamma v. A. Srinivasan, : [2003]3SCR197 . Yet another decision relied upon by the learned Counsel is Silva Uddin v. Nagaraju, : ILR2004KAR4782 .
11. These are all decisions where, on transfer of ownership even in the absence of a clause of attornment of tenancy, the tenant automatically becomes the tenant under the purchaser and the relationship continues.
12. In Parvathamma's case, the Supreme Court was examining the question more from the angle of the rights/defenses of a person in possession of a property by way of part performance of an agreement for sale of the property. Continuation of the possession by the person who was earlier as a tenant was not demonstrated to be otherwise thereafter by showing that the continued occupation of the premises was in a different capacity. In the present case, it is the specific case of the petitioner that the relationship of landlord and tenant had ceased to exist on after the agreement for sale dated 23-9-1983 Ex. R. 2 and the recital in the agreement fully supported the case of the respondent. It does say that henceforth there is no liability on the part of the tenant to pay any rent and what was required to be done was only to pay the balance sale consideration and to get the sale deed registered. It is also recited in this agreement that henceforth it was the responsibility of the petitioner to pay not only light bills but also the Municipal taxes in respect of the property. As against such convincing evidence the eviction petitioner had failed to place any material at all before the Court to show the relationship of landlord and tenant. No rent receipts, not even any evidence to show that for the period of ten years the interval between the date when he claimed to have purchased the property and the filing of the eviction petition (between 1984 and 1994) the petitioner had exercised his rights as a landlord of the premises vis-a-vis the writ petitioner as a tenant. In this regard it is necessary to observe that Courts and Tribunals conferred with special jurisdiction and under particular enactment with a definite purpose, in the instant case under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 should be aware of the scope of their jurisdiction and guard against unscrupulous litigants abusing the provisions by invoking the jurisdiction of such special Tribunals for ulterior purpose. What a person is required to make good before a Civil Court in a properly laid suit in the present instance perhaps by possibly filing a suit for ejection, cannot be permitted to be worked through a Special Tribunal with limited jurisdiction and meant for the purposes for which the Special Tribunal is created under the very statutory provision. The eviction petition was definitely not tenable in the present situation.
13. These decisions are not applicable inasmuch as in the present case, it was the specific plea of the writ petitioner that even under the erstwhile owner he had ceased to be a tenant and if that relationship of landlord and tenant had ceased as between the occupant of the premises and the petitioners' vendor from whom eviction petitioner acquired title, there is no question of attornment of any tenancy in his favour. If the relationship had continued as between the erstwhile owner and the person in possession, as a landlord and tenant, and at such time the sale takes place, then only the subsequent purchaser also steps into the shoes of the erstwhile owner and the relationship can be said to have continued. Such is not the position in the present case. It was the specific case of the respondent in the eviction petition that the relationship of landlord and tenant had ceased and it had been changed to the status of a person in possession in part performance of an agreement for sale. If that is so, such a person is never a tenant. Therefore, the submission of the Counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted and is rejected.
14. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order passed by the Trial Court dated 15-2-2000 is hereby quashed as one lacking jurisdiction as there was no relationship of landlord and tenant as between the writ petitioner and the respondent and therefore a petition under the provisions of the 1961 Act could not have been entertained. Rule issued and made absolute.
15. Sri Jayakeerthi, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that during the pendency of the petition, writ petitioner has deposited a sum of Rs. 16,000/- and the respondent was permitted to withdraw. The respondent having withdrawn the amount is hereby directed to restore the amount by red positing the amount before this Court within a period of three months from today without prejudice to any other rights the respondent may claim and without prejudice to any proceedings, the respondent is entitled to take in accordance with law as against the petitioner.