ORDER
Hakeem, J.
1. This Revision Petition under Section 115 of the C.P.C. is directed against the concurrent findings and order of the Courts below directing eviction of the petitioner-tenant on the ground under Section 21(1)(f) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 ('the Act').
2. The premises in question is a non-residential one. The tenancy is not disputed. Originally, the landlady sought for eviction of the tenant on the grounds under Clauses (h) and (f) of Section 21(1) of the Act. The trial Court, having negatived the landlady's claim for possession of the premises on the first ground, allowed the petition on the ground that portions of the premises are unlawfully sub-let in favour of respondents-3 and 4 herein. The order rejecting the landlady's claim under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act not being challenged, has become final. The tenant (petitioner herein) and respondents-3 and 4 questioned the correctness and legality of the said order of eviction on the ground of sub-letting by their joint Revision Petition under Section 50(2) of the Act. The learned District Judge, having concurred with the reasoning and finding of the trial Court, rejected the said Revision. This Revision is by the tenant alone challenging the concurrent findings and order on various grounds.
3. The landlady's case in brief is that respondent Nos. 3 and 4 who are Tailors by profession are in occupation of two portions of the leased premises as sub-tenants under the petitioner herein. As such, the statutory protection available to the tenant under the Act is more available in view of the prohibition of such sub-letting under Clause (f) of Section 21(1) of the Act. While admitting occupation of the portions of the premises by the said respondents, the petitioner-tenant contended that having regard to the nature of the business carried on by them in the premises, it is customary practice to accommodate the Tailors in order to increase the sale of cloth. It is for that reason that the said respondents being Tailors are accommodated to carry on their tailoring business in portions of the premises from the inception of the tenancy, which fact is within the knowledge of the landlady. However, it is not in dispute that the landlady has not given her consent in writing to allow respondents-3 and 4 to occupy portions of the premises. There is no direct evidence regarding the payment of any rent by respondents-3 and 4 to the tenant. Admittedly, portions of the said premises have separate electrical meters for which respondents-3 and 4 have been paying electricity charges. The said portions are also separated from the main portion from the beginning having been provided with separate access by the tenant. These facts are admitted by the tenant in his pleading and evidence. It is further admitted that one of the alleged sub-tenants has put up a separate Board to his shop and carrying on the business in the name of 'Mirjaker Tailors' and the other person has also a separate Board to his tailoring shop. Both of them have been carrying on business separately in their respective premises. It is elicited in the cross-examination that there is a separate door to enter the main portion of the premises which is in the occupation of the tenant. Further evidence discloses that respondents-3 and 4 have been taking up tailoring work from the public and carrying on their tailoring business independently. Both the Courts have found from the facts on record that the sub-tenants are in exclusive occupation of their respective portions to carry on their own business. The converted and separated shops have also been given separate municipal numbers. Since exclusive possession of the portions of the premises of respondents-3 and 4 is established and the version of the tenant as to the particulars of the arrangement with them is found unacceptable, it is permissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration. It was open for the tenant to rebut this presumption by production of its account books and ledgers to show that no rent was received from the sub-tenants. The Court was, therefore, justified in coming to the conclusion that since the tenant has kept back the best evidence, adverse inference has to be drawn regarding collection of rent from the sub-tenants. These concurrent findings have been arrived at on proper appreciation of evidence. Hence, there is no scope for interference in the Revisional Jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the C.P.C.
4. Be that as it may, Sri Datar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has urged the following two legal contentions:-
(1) That the eviction petition is barred in view of the provision of Order 2 Rule 2 of the C.P.C;
(2) That the petition for eviction on the alleged ground is also barred by limitation.
5. It is pertinent to note that both these grounds were not specifically taken or urged before the Courts below. Nonetheless, since it has a bearing on the exercise of jurisdiction by the Courts, the said points were allowed to be urged, The contention of the learned Counsel on the first ground is that in an earlier petition for eviction, the landlady having failed to seek eviction on this ground, the subsequent petition for eviction of the tenant is not maintainable. It is no doubt true that after the death of her husband, the landlady had filed H.R.C.No. 1 of 1970 on the ground that she wants to run a hotel business in the premises. No other ground had been taken in the said petition. The said petition came to be rejected. It cannot be disputed that each of the grounds under Clauses (a) to (p) of Section 21 (1) of the Act gives an independent cause of action to the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant. If eviction is claimed under more than one ground, the Court has to consider each ground independently. Hence, it cannot be said that by not taking all the grounds in the same petition, the landlady is deemed to have relinquished any portion of her claim within the purview of Order 2 Rule 2 of the C.P.C. In that view of the matter, there is no merit in the first contention and it is accordingly rejected.
6. In so far as the second contention is concerned, it is stated that even if the occupation of portions of the premises by respondents-3 and 4 is held to be sub-letting, the landlords' remedy to seek eviction on that ground had become barred by limitation. Admittedly, the premises was leased to the tenant in or about the year 1965. It is specifically pleaded by the landlords that the tenant has sub-let the portions to respondents-3 and 4 without their consent Therefore, the tenants have lost their right to continue in occupation of the schedule premises. While denying the allegation that the premises is sub-let, it is pleaded by the tenant that even if the arrangement between it and respondent Nos. 3 and 4 is construed as sub-letting, it is done with the knowledge and consent of the landlords since the commencement of the tenancy. In the evidence, the landlady has stated thus: 'It is a practice that if anybody is running a cloth shop there is a provision to make arrangements for the tailors. Accordingly the respondent No. 1 and 2 made temporary arrangements for respondent No. 3 and 4. But the arrangement so made was not at all brought to my notice nor they have taken my consent. I am residing behind the petition premises since more than 50 years'. She has stated that she was objecting to the sub-letting. The tenant in his evidence has stated that respondents-3 and 4 are working as Tailors since the beginning of his occupation to the knowledge of the landlady, but she never objected to the same.
The contention of Sri Datar is that notwithstanding the non-obstinate clause in Section 21 of the Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the instant case. No action having been taken for a number of years in spite of knowledge of the alleged sub-letting, the landlady's claim for eviction on the alleged ground is barred under Article 67 of the Limitation Act. Reliance is placed upon the Rulings of the Supreme Court in SHAKUNTALA v. HEM CHAND : [1987]3SCR306 and GANPAT RAM v. GAYATRI DEVI : [1987]3SCR539 . In the first of the said cases arising under the Bombay Rents, Hotel & Lodging House Rates Control Act, referring to the contention that for any suit by a landlord against a tenant for recovery of possession under the Rent Act, the Limitation Act was inherently inapplicable, the Supreme Court has observed thus:-
'...... We are, however, unable to accept this argument.
Recovery of possession is by a suit and there is no section in the scheme of the Limitation Act to indicate that Limitation Act was inherently inapplicable........'
In Ganpat Ram's case (supra), referring to the applicability of Articles 66 and 67 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court has observed thus:-
'...... On the facts of this case it is clear that Article 66 would
apply because no determination in this case is necessary and that is well settled now. Determination by notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is no longer necessary.'
It is further held by the Supreme Court that time begins to run from the date of the knowledge of the cause of action.
7. Sri M.S. Gopal, learned Counsel appearing for the landlady, sought to rely upon the Decision of this Court in JIVAJI v. S.R.R.R. POTE : ILR1991KAR4307 , which, according to him, is a complete answer to the contention regarding applicability of the Limitation Act urged by the other side. It is held that the non-obstinate clause contained in Section 21 of the Act gives overriding effect to the provisions over any other law. The words 'any other law' contained in the non-obstinate clause take into their fold not only the provisions contained in the Limitation Act, but also any other provisions contained in any other law which are inconsistent with or have the effect of defeating the object an intendment of Section 21 of the Act. The Decision of the Supreme Court in : [1987]3SCR306 (supra) has been distinguished by the learned Judge as follows:-
'Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Act did not contain a non-obstinate clause excluding the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act to a proceeding under Sections 12 and 13 of the 'Bombay Act'. In addition to this, it was held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision that a proceeding under Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Act was a suit by the landlord against the tenant to recover possession from the tenant. Therefore, either Article 66 or Article 67 of the Limitation Act was attracted. Hence, the period of limitation was 12 years. Thus, it is clear that the aforesaid decision cannot be applied to a proceeding under Section 21(1) of the Act which contains the non-obstinate clause. Even assuming that a proceeding under Section 21(1) of the Act is a proceeding before a Civil Court just as the proceeding under Section 16 of the Telegraph Act and Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, are not attracted to a proceeding under Section 21(1) of the Act because the Act specifically excludes the application of the Limitation Act by employing non-obstinate clause in its widest amplitude. Therefore, I am of the view that it is not possible to apply both the decisions of the Supreme Court to the case on hand.'
8. In J.S. KAROLE v. G.C. ANGOLKAR : ILR1986KAR1859 , K.A. SWAMI, J (as he then was) has taken the view that the right to seek possession on the ground of unlawful sub-letting is not a personal right. It goes with the property as it arises out of sub-letting of the premises. Section 21 of the Act does not make any distinction, whether the person who seeks eviction is the one who was the landlord at the time of letting out the premises or at the time of commission of the breach on the basis of which the eviction of the tenant is sought or whether the person has become landlord on the date of filing the petition. Section 21(1)(f) makes it clear that the tenant who has unlawfully sub-let the whole or part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner, his interest therein and where the sub-letting, assignment or transfer has been made before the coming into force of Part-V of the Act, except in respect of sub-letting, assignment or transfer to which the provisions of Section 61 of the Act, are applicable, and such sub-letting, assignment or transfer has been made contrary to any provision of law then in force. Such tenant is liable to be evicted.
9. The question may be viewed from another angle. Section 23 of the Act renders sub-letting after the coming into operation of Part-V unlawful, Contravention of the provision, on conviction, is also made punishable with fine. A statutory tenant cannot assign his tenancy right as it is a personal right of occupation under the Act and he has no estate of property therein. Hence if a statutory tenant sublets, assigns or transfers any portion of the leased property, he would forthwith forfeit the protection which the Act gives to him. Consequently, a sub-tenant under a statutory tenant cannot plead protection of his possession if his sub-tenancy is found to be unlawful.
10. In the instant case, continuation of sub-tenancy is in contravention of the absolute statutory bar under Section 23 of the Act. The sub-tenancy which is held to be in existence between the tenant and the sub-tenant is from month to month which would give a cause of action to the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on that ground.
11. Reliance is also placed on the Decision in S.R.T.LTD. v. G.I. & C. Corporation Ltd : AIR1993Kant90 (FB). It is held that if the landlord is permitted to evict the tenant even before the expiry of the lease period by resorting to the provisions of the Act, the resultant mischief will be irreparable. A law cannot be interpreted in such a way as to cause such a mischief and hardship. Such an interpretation of the law would not advance any public interest. The object of the Act is not to confer such a wide and large right on the landlord, as to enable him to recover possession of the leased premises, at a time when he possessed no such right to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground under Clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Act during the subsistence of a contractual tenancy or before determination of such contractual tenancy. The right to claim eviction on the ground under Clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Act is purely personal to the landlord for the time being; while the liability of the tenant to be evicted on the ground of sub-letting, is based on public policy. Hence, the ratio of the Decision is not applicable to the instant case.
12. It is well settled that the prohibition regarding sub-letting provided under the Rent Act is based on public policy. By enforcing the contract/arrangement between the tenant and sub-tenant, the consequence will be enforcement of an illegality and infraction of a statutory provision which cannot be condoned by any conduct or agreement of parties. In the instant case, the specific stand taken by the landlady is that she has been objecting to the arrangement allowing respondents-3 and 4 to carry on business in the portions of the premises from the beginning. In the circumstances, it cannot also amount to waiver of the landlady's right under the provisions of the Act.
13. In the instant case, unlawful sub-tenancy having been established, the question of protecting the tenant from eviction on the ground of the landlady having lost her remedy, cannot be countenanced. Hence, the contention regarding bar of limitation raised by the tenant has to fail.
14. In the result, the Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. The petitioner is granted three months' time from today to vacate the premises.