Judgment:
ORDER
A.M. Farooq, J.
1. This is a petition field under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying to quash that part of the investigation in respect of Section 3(2)(v) of S.C. & ST. (Prevention of Atrocities)Act, 1989 herein after called as 'the Act' tor short, registered by the Chickkajala Police in Crime No. 89/96.
2. Brief facts for the purpose of disposal of this crime petition are that the complainant Ravi kumar lodged a report with the Chickajala police stating that one Munikrishna, who was the deceased in the case was his elder brother. On 5.8.1996 at about 5.30 a.m. his brother deceased Munikrishna had gone to answer call of nature time one Kempanna s/o Muniswamappa and Raja s/o Byregowda, Nanjegowda, Suresha s/o Narayanappa, Manjappa s/o Oni Munishamappa, Jagadish s/o Krishnappa, S.N.Nagaraj s/o Munishamappa, Raja s/o, Gowdara Ramanna and Satish s/o Muninanjappa came there to assault the deceased Munikrishna, accused persons first threw chilly powder on the face of the deceased and thereafter assaulted on his head with clubs, crushing the head of the deceased Munikrishna. According to the complainant, the incident was witnessed by his uncle Narasimhaiah, Thereafter, the complainant and his uncle Narasimhaiah took the injured to the police station and from there he was taken to National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences, Bangalore for treatment and the injured Munikrishna died at about 3.45 p.m. on the same day. The complainant, Ravi kumar, the brother of the deceased in his complainant, Ravi kumar, the brother of the deceased in his complaint has specifically stated that the accused Persons assaulted the deceased in view of the previous enemity and vengeance.
On receipt of the complaint, the Chickajala police registered crime No. 89/96 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 307 of IPC and also under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act and started investigation.
3. It is not the investigation commenced by the police for the offences under IPC, which is challenged in this petition, but the petitioners are questioning the registration of the case under the Act. Sri C.H. Hanumantharaya, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that in the complaint lodged with the police, by none other than the brother of the deceased namely, Ravi kumar clearly specified that the motive for the commission of the offence is in view of the earlier enemity and nowhere in the complaint, it is stated that the offence has been committed by the accused persons on the ground that the deceased belonged to either Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe, to attract the provisions of the Act. It is submitted that there was no material at all in the complaint for the police officer or the S.H.O. of the Station to register a case also under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. Therefore, he submitted that the investigation being carried out by the police to make out an offence under the Act is most unwarranted and illegal and the police have no jurisdiction to investigate the same.
4. Section 154(1) of the code Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
154(1). Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer incharge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.
Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as under:
157(1). If from information received or otherwise, an officer incharge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate offers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and if necessary, to take me assures for the discovery and arrest of the offender :
Provided that-
(a) When information as to commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer incharge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot;
(b) If it appears to the officer in charge a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.
2) In each of the cases mentioned in Clauses(a) and (b) of the proviso to Sub-section (1), the officer in charge of the police station shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that sub-section, and in the case mentioned in Clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated.
5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS vs . CH.BHAJAN LAL AND OTHERS : 1992CriLJ527 has considered the scope of the above sections and enunciated the following principles:
1) At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of a Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate, subject to the proviso to Section 157. As we have proposed to make a detailed discussion about the power of a police officer in the field of investigation of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections 156 and 157 of the code in the ensuing part of this judgment, we do not propose to deal, with those sections in extent so in the present context). In case, an officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested on him and to register a case on the information of a cognizable offence, reported and thereby violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied that the information forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the manner provide by Sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the code.
2) Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used expression 'information' without qualifying the same as in Section 41(1) (a) or (g) of the Code wherein the expressions, 'reasonable complaint' and 'credible information' are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of the word 'information' in Section 154(1) unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case there on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, 'reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the said information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will incite that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ only the word 'information' without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act XXV of 1861) passed by the Legislative Council of India read that 'every complaint or information' preferred to an officer in charge of a police station should be reduced into writing which provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the Code of 1872 (Act X of 1872 which thereafter read that 'every 'complaint' preferred to an officer in charge of police station shall be reduced into writing. The word 'complaint' which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word 'information' was used in the codes of 1882 and 1955 and 190(c) of the present Code 1973 (Act II of 1974). An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which is sine quo non for recording a First Information Report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence.
3) It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information.
4. 'There is a clear-cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive thorough the police department the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to present crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end.'
5. The core of the above sections namely 156, 157 and 159 of the code is that if a police officer has reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence, he must either proceed with the investigation or cause an investigation to be proceeded with by his subordinate, that in a case where the police officer sees no sufficient ground for investigation, he can dispense with the investigation altogether; that the field of investigation of any cognizable offence is exclusively within the domination of the investigating agencies over which the courts cannot have control and have no power to stiffly or impinge upon the proceedings in the investigation as long as the investigation proceeds in compliance with the provisions relating to investigation and that it is only in a case wherein a police officer decides not to investigate an offence, the concerned Magistrate can intervene and either direct an investigation or in the alternative, if he thinks fit, he himself can, at once proceed or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed, to hold a preliminary inquiry into or otherwise to dispose of the case in the manner provided in the Code.
6. We shall now examine as to what are the requirements to be satisfied by an Officer in charge of a police station before he enters into the realm of investigation of a cognizable offence after the stage of registration of the offence under Section 154(1). We have already found that the police have under Section 154(1) of the Code a statutory duty to register a cognizable offence and thereafter under Section 156(1) a statutory right to investigate any cognizable case without requiring sanction of a Magistrate. However, the said statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence is subject to the fulfillment of a prerequisite condition, contemplated in Section 157(1). The condition is that the officer in charge of a police station before proceedings to investigate the facts and scircumstances of the case should have 'reason to suspect' the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate. Section 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act XXV of 1861) required the police officer on receipt of a complaint or information constituting any of the offences specified in column 3 of the schedule annexed to that Act should proceed with the investigation, but this Code did not require the condition of entertaining the reason to suspect the commission of an offence before commencing the investigation. Subsequently, in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1872 a provision, namely, Section 157(1) was introduced which provision required the police officer to have 'reason to suspect' the commission of a cognizable offence before he proceeded to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case. Thereafter, in the Code Criminal Procedure of 1882 a provision, namely, Section 157 which was identical to that of the present Section 157 except for some variations in the latter part of that section was introduced which provision also required the police officer to have 'reason to suspect' the commission of a cognizable offence. May it be noted that the Law Commission of India in its 41st report expressed its opinion that Section 157 did not call for any amendment.
7. The expression 'reason to suspect' as occurring in Section 157(1) is not qualified as in Section 41 (a) and (g) of the code, wherein the expression, 'reasonable suspicion' is used. Therefore, it has become imperative to find out the meaning of the words 'reason to suspect' which words are apparently clear, plain and unambiguous. Considering the context and the object of the procedural provision in question, we are of the view that only the plain meaning rule is to be adopted so as to avoid any hardship or absurdity resulting therefrom and the words are used and also to be understood only in a common parlance. We may, in this behalf, refer to a decision of the Privy Council in Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor, AIR 1939 at pages 51-52 wherein Lord Atkin said as follows:
'When the meaning of the words is plain, it is not the duty of Courts to busy themselves with supposed intentions ... It, therefore, appears inadmissible to consider the advantages or disadvantages of applying the plain meaning whether in the interests of the prosecution or accused'. 8. one should not lose sight of the fact that Section 157(t) requires the police officer to have reason to suspect only with regard to the commission of an offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to investigate, but with regard to the involvement of an accused in the crime. Therefore, the expression 'reason to suspect the commission of an offence' would mean the sagacity of rationally inferring the commission of a cognizable offence based on the specific articulate facts mentioned in the First Information Report as well in the Annexure, if any, enclosed and any attending circumstance which may not amount to proof. In other words, the meaning of the expression 'reason to suspect' has to be governed and dictated by the facts and circumstances of each case and at that stage the question of adequate proof of facts alleged in the first information report does not arise. In this connection, we would like to recall an observation of this Court made in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal J. Porwal, : 1987CriLJ1061 while interpreting the expression 'reasonable belief. It runs thus:
'Whether or not the officer concerned had entertained reasonable belief under the circumstances is not a matter which can be placed under legal microscope, with an over indulgent eye which sees no evil anywhere within the range of its eyesight. The circumstances have to be viewed from the experienced eye of the officer who is well equipped to interpret the suspicious circumstances and to form reasonable belief in the light of the said circumstances.' 9. In State West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha : 1982CriLJ819 (albeit) Chandrachud, C.J. while agreeing with the judgment of Justice A.N. Sen with which judgment Justice Vardarajan also agreed, has expressed his view in his separate judgment on the above point under discussion as follows (at p. 958 of AIR): 'the position which emerges from these decisions and the other decisions which are discussed by brother A.N. Sen is that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the FIR must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. Their right of enquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence,'
10. The next point for consideration is whether Section 157 of the Code gives the police officers carte blanche drawing no legal bounds in the province of investigation and whether the powers of the police officers in the field of investigation are wholly immense from judicial reviewability.
11. The above questions have been examined by the Courts on several occasions and they have judicial pronouncements carved out an area, limited though it be, within which the legality of the exercise of powers by police officers in the realm of investigation and yet be subjected to judicial and scrutiny and the immunity enjoyed by the police officers is only a conditional immunity. The Privy Council in Nazir Ahmed's case (AIR 1945 18) (albelit) though has ruled that it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province has provided an exception to that above observation to the effect that if no cognizable offence or no case of any kind is disclosed the police would have no authority to undertake the investigation.
12. In a perfect system of prevention and detection of crimes, undeniably the paramount duty of a police officer to whom the commission of a cognizable offence is reported, is to register a case without causing any delay and promptly commence the investigation without perverting or subverting the law. When such is the accepted principle, can it be said that the police officers in the instant case have over - zealously taken a hasty decision by misusing their positions in registering the case and commencing the investigation? To answer this query, let us recapitulate some salient facts on this aspect. The complainant, Dharam Pat, represented the complaint on 12.11.1987 before Ch.Devi Lal whose officer on special duty marked it to the DGP on the same day. The DGP sent it with his endorsement dated 12.11.1987 to the S.P. Hissar, who received it on 21.11.1987. The S.P. on the same day made the endorsement 'Please register a case and investigate'. In the affidavit filed before the High Court, the S.P. has stated that as there were serious allegations of corruption against Ch.Bhajan Lal in the complaint constituting a prima facie case under Section 5(2) of the Act, he made his endorsement on the same day and marked it to the SHO under his signature and that he, then summoned the SHO and handed over the complaint to him and the SHO also went through the contents of the complaint and was of the opinion that a prima facie case under Section 5(2) of the Act and under Sections 161 and 165, IPC has been made out and that the SHO took the complaint and left for his station for further necessary action. The SHO in his affidavit filed before the High Court has corroborated the version of the S.P. in its entirety. The conduct of the SHO indicates that he without losing any time registered the case and commenced the investigation by proceedings to the 'spot' accompanied by armed constables. The allegations in the complaint over the period commencing from 1969 and ending with 1986 as noted in the FIR. Be it noted that by June, 1987, Ch.Devi Lal became the Chief Minister. The complaint was presented by Dharam Pal nearly 5 months after Devi Lal became the Chief Minister.
13. In this connection it will be appropriate to recall the view expressed by Mitter, J. in Sirajuddin v. State of Madras : 1971CriLJ523 in the following words (at p.526 of AIR):
'Before a public servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct of the type alleged in this case and a first information is lodged against him, there must be some suitable preliminary enquiry in to the allegations by a responsible officer. The lodging of such a report against a person specially one who like the appellant occupied the top position in a department, even if baseless, would do incalculable harm not only to the officer in particular but the department he belonged to, in general .... The means adopted no less than the end be achieved must be impeccable,' 14. Madholkar, J. in a separate judgment in state of Uttar pradesh v. Bhaagwant Kishore Joshi : 1964CriLJ140 while agreeing with conclusion of Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) has expressed his opinion stating:
'In the absence of any prohibition in the Code, express or implied, I am of opinion that it is open to a police officer to make preliminary enquiries before registering an offence and making a full scale investigation into it'. 15. We are in agreement with the views expressed be Mitter, J. and Mudholakar, J. in the above two decisions.
16. Now coming to the present case, we regret to note that the SC seems to have exhibited some over-enthusiasm, presumably to please 'some one' and had directed the SHO to register the case and investigate the same even on the very first day of the receipt of the complaint from the DSP, in whose office the, complaint was lying for nearly 9 days. This unprecedented over-enthusiasm shown by the S.P. without disclosing the reasons for making an order entrusting the investigation to the SHO who is not a designated officer under Section 5A(1), about which we shall advert to in detail in the ensuing part of the judgment, really shocks ones' sense of justice and fair play even though the untested allegations made in the complaint require a thorough investigation. Still it is an inexplicable riddle as to why the S.P. had departed from the normal rule and hastily ordered the S.H.O. to investigate the serious allegations, levelled against a former Chief Minister and a Minister in the Cabinet of the Central Government on the date of the registration of the case. However, this conduct of the S.P. can never serve as a ground for quashing this F.I.R.
17. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay done by precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelisd and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of case wherein such power should be exercised.
1. Where the allegations mode in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3.Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there insufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
18. We give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice.
19. It may be true, as repeatedly pointed out by Mr. Parasaran, that in a given situation, false and vexatious charges of corruption and venality may be maliciously attributed against any person holding a high office and enjoying a respectable status thereby sullying his character, injuring his reputation and exposing him to social ridicule with a view to spite him on account of some personal rencour, predilections and past prejudices of the complaint. In such a piquant situation, the question is what would be the remedy that would redress the grievance of the verily affected party? The answer would be that the person who dishonestly makes such false allegations is liable to be proceeded against under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code namely under Section 182 or 211 or 500 besides becoming liable to be sued for damages.
20. No doubt, there was no love lost between Ch. Bhajan lal and Dharam pal. Based on this strained relationship, it has been then emphatically urged by Mr. K. Parasaran that the entire allegations made in the complaint due to political vendetta are not only scurrilous and scandalous but also tainted with matafides, vitiating the entire proceedings. As it has been repeatedly pointed out earlier the entire matter is only at a premature stage and the investigation is not yet proceeded with except some preliminary effort taken on the date of the registration of the case, that is, on 21-11-1987. The evidence has to be gathered after a thorough investigation and placed before the Court on the basis of which alone the Court can come to a conclusion one way or the other on the plea of mala fides. If the allegations are bereft of truth and made maliciously, we are sure the investigation will say so. At this stage where there are only allegations and recriminations but no evidence, this court cannot anticipate the result of the investigation and render a finding on the question of mala fides on the materials at present available. Therefore, we are unable to see any force in the contention that the complaint should be throw overboard on the mere unsubstantial plea of mala fides. Even assuming that Dharam Pal has laid the complaint only on account of his personal animosity, that, by itself will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected, in this connection, the following view expressed by Bhagawati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar : 1987CriLJ793 may be referred to;
'It is a well established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise, justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of malafides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant'. Beyond the above, we do not wish to add anything more.
(The above paras 1 to 20 are paras 30, 31, 32, 38, 40, 41, 42, 49, 52, 55, 56, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 108, 109, 110 & 114 respectively in the above citation).
6. Further, as observed by the Privy Council in EMPEROR vs. KHWAJA NAZEER AHMED there is a statutory right on the police to investigate the circumstance of an alleged cognizable offence without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities and it would be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with this statutory rights by exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Code. The functions of the police and the judiciary are complimentary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case. No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed and still more, if no offence of any kind is made out, the police will have no authority to undertake an investigation, In this case, the admitted facts of the case, clearly point out that the complainant has specifically stated that his brother has been murdered by the accused persons because of previous enemity and vengeance. The complainant has not stated a word about the accused persons committing the murder or a assaulting the deceased on the ground of his caste or community. When such a complaint is lodged before the police, the facts mentioned by the complainant do not give any room for the police or the investigating officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act as required by Section 157(1) of the Code. Further the police officer should have considered whether there is sufficient ground for entering an investigation to the offence committed under the Act. When the complainant has not given any materials in his complaint stating that the accused persons have committed an offence under the Act, or any other material to give suspicion to the Investigating Officer or the Registering Officer to suspect the commission of an offence under the Act, there was no occasion at all for the Police Officer to register a case under the Act. Proviso to Section 157(1) permits the Police Officer to satisfy himself about the sufficiency of the ground even before entering on an investigation. The Police Officer has to draw his satisfaction only on the materials, which were placed before him and in this case that material is the first information given by the complainant and it is only on the allegations made in the complaint in the first information that the Police Officer has to make up his mind before he enters on an investigation as to whether those allegations constitute a cognizable offence warranting an investigation. There is much force in the submission made by Sri C.H. Hanumaritharaya, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. There was no material at all for the S.H.O. to register a case under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act against the petitioners when the complaint does not give any materials for the Investigating Officer even to suspect the commission of such an offence. This Court is similar circumstances in Criminal Petition No. 231/96 D.D. 25.3.1996 and Crl.P.No. 390/92 D.D. 13.8.1992 has quashed the F.I.R in respect of investigation of the offence under the Act when the Investigating Officer in those cases registered a case also under Section 3 of the Act when there was no material for him to suspect such an offence. Simitar is the position in this case.
7. It is also important to note that under Section 154 of the code after receiving the information by the Officer Incharge of the Police station, it has to be entered in the Crime register and under Section 157(1), if from the information received by the Officer, the Officer has reason to suspect the commission of an offence of which he is empowered under Section 157 to investigate, he proceeds to investigate the matter and if during the course of investigation of a cognizable offence, if the Investigating Officer comes across materials in proof of the case persons committing any other offence other than the one for which he is suspected and registered the case, it is always open to the Investigating Officer to include the said offence while filling the charge-sheet, even if he had not registered the crime number for the said offence or offences. In this particular facts of the case, there is a clear averment made by the informant that the assault was made by the assailants only because of the previous enemity and not because of the caste, to which the informant or the deceased belonged, Therefore, the Investigating Officer could not have suspected the commission of such an offence.
8. For the above reasons, I have no hesitation at all to allow this petition and quash the registration of case under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act in Crime No. 89/96 by the Chickajala Police and the investigation in pursuance to the said registration of the case by the police. In the result, I allow this petition and quash the investigation entered upon by the Investigation Officer in Crime No. 89/96 of Chickjala Police Station for the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Case and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 only. The Investigation Officer shall, however, continue the investigation in respect of the offence under I.P.C. registered by him in the same crime number.