Judgment:
ORDER
The Court
1. The petitioner in this petition claims to be the owner of land hearing Sy. No. 144/1C measuring 24 cents situated in Bala Village, Mangalore Taluk, Dakshina Kannada District.
2. In this revision petition filed under Section 12-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the petitioner has called in question the correctness of the order dated 3rd December, 1988 made in No. LRA (H) 212:87 MAS by the Land Reforms Appellate Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'the Appellate Authority'), registering respondents 1 and 2 in respect of dwelling-houses situated in the said land along with the appurtenant land as its owner.
3. A few facts which may be relevant for the disposal of this petition may be stated as follows:
The respondents 1 and 2 on coming into force of Section 38 of the Act by means of Act No. 1 of 1979 filed Form No. 2-A seeking to register them as owners of the dwelling-houses occupied by them along with the appurtenant land. The application filed by the respondents 1 and 2 came to be rejected by the Mangalore Taluk Land Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') by its Order dated 2nd June, 1987 on the ground that respondents 1 and 2 were not agricultural labourers. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondents 1 and 2 had preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. During the course of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority, the parties were permitted to lead additional evidence.
4. The sons of the petitioner, one Satish Kamath and one Babu Achary and one Sri Annoji Rao who was the Surveyor attached to the office of the Tribunal and who had surveyed the land bearing Sy. No, 144/1C. referred to above, were examined on behalf of the petitioner. The respondents 1 and 2 examined themselves and examined Chandrahasa Poojary, Ramanath Alva and Venugopal Shetty as their witnesses. The ration card was also marked as evidence in the course of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority on appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties has found that respondents 1 and 2 were residing in the dwelling-houses in question as agricultural labourers and as such were entitled to be registered as owners in reaped of the houses occupied by them along with the appurtenant land. The Appellate Authority registered the 1st respondent as an owner in respect of the dwelling-house along with the land measuring 3 cents and registered the 2nd respondent as owner in respect of the dwelling- house occupied by him along with 4 cents of land. As observed by me earlier, aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed this revision petition.
5. Smt. Pushpalatha Acharya, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner challenging the correctness of the order impugned made two submissions. Firstly, she submitted that since the respondents 1 and 2were trespassers in occupation of the houses in question ever since the year 1986, the Appellate Authority has seriously erred in law in passing the impugned order. Elaborating this submission, the learned Counsel pointed out that though it is the specific case of the petitioner that respondents 1 and 2 were trespassers in respect of the dwelling-houses and the appurtenant land in question, the Appellate Authority has failed to consider the said question. It is her further submission that an agricultural labourer residing in a dwelling-house is entitled to be registered as an owner, provided he gets into the dwelling-house with the consent of the owner of the dwelling-house and not as a trespasser. Secondly, she submitted that the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority that respondents 1 and 2 are agricultural labourers is totally erroneous in law. According to the learned Counsel, the said finding has been recorded in disregard of the evidence of the son of the petitioner Satish Kamath and his witnesses Babu Achary and Annoji Rao who was the Surveyor of the Tribunal.
6. However, Sri Sripathy, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 strongly supported the impugned order. He pointed out that since the Appellate Authority on consideration of the evidence on record has categorically recorded a finding that respondents 1 and 2 were agricultural labourers and were residing in the houses located on the land in question; and the said finding being purely a question of fact it is not permissible for this Court to interfere against such finding in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Sri Sripathy strongly disputed the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that respondents were trespassers to the houses occupied by them and submitted that there is no basis for such a contention. He further submitted that the materials on record would also clearly show that the claim made by the petitioner that respondents 1 and 2 are trespassers is totally false and baseless. In this connection, he referred to me the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the parties. It is his further submission that even if the entry of a person to a dwelling-house is as a trespasser, so long as such a person is residing in the dwelling-house and such a person is an agricultural labourer and the dwelling-house is located in a village, such a person would be entitled to be registered as an owner in terms of Section 38 of the Act. He pointed out that Section 38 does not make any distinction between a person who enters the house as a trespasser or with the consent of the owner of such a dwelling-house.
7. In the light of the rival contentions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the three questions that would arise for consideration in this petition are:
(i) Whether an agricultural labourer who is in occupation of a dwelling-house as a trespasser is entitled to be registered as an owner of such a dwelling-house under Section 38 of the Act?
(ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence on record, it is possible to hold that respondents 1 and 2 had occupied the dwelling-houses in question by committing criminal trespass?
(iii) Whether the finding of the Appellate Authority that the respondents 1 and 2 are agricultural labourers is erroneous in law and therefore, is liable to be set aside by this Court?
8. Insofar as the first question is concerned, while I find considerable force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that a trespasser to a dwelling-house is not entitled to be registered as an owner in terms of Section 38 of the Act, I am unable to accede to the submission of Sri Sripathy, learned Counsel for the 1st respondent that such a person would be entitled to be registered as an owner of such a dwelling-house only on the ground that Section 38 of the Act does not, in terms, prohibit registering a trespasser as an owner of a dwelling-house. In my view, the interpretation sought to be placed by Sri Sripathy on sub-section (1) of Section 38 of the Act is totally misconceived. It is useful to refer to sub-section (1) of Section 38 of the Act, which reads as hereunder:
'38. Dwelling-houses of agricultural labourers, etc.--(1) (a) If, in any village, an agricultural labourer is ordinarily residing in a dwelling-house on a land not belonging to him, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, but subject to sub-sections (2) and (3), such dwelling-house along with the site thereof and land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for its enjoyment shall, on the date of publication of the Karnataka Gazette, vest absolutely in the State Government, free from all encumbrances- and the agricultural labourer shall be entitled to be registered as owner thereof'.
(emphasis supplied)
9. The language employed in Section 38 in my view, indicates that the occupation of a dwelling-house located in a village by an agricultural labourer should be with the consent of the owner of such a dwelling-house. Possession or occupation by such an agricultural labourer of such a dwelling-house must be a permissive possession or occupation. This is clear from the words 'ordinarily residing in a dwelling-house'. The words 'ordinarily residing' in the context must be understood, as noticed by me earlier, as with the consent or permission granted by the owner of such a dwelling-house or by anyone authorised by such an owner to give such a consent. The initial entry to such a dwelling-house must be a permissive and lawful entry. A person who commits a criminal trespass or an offence, in my considered view, is not entitled to claim the benefit of Section 38 of the Act. Such a person cannot be considered as a person ordinarily residing in a dwelling- house.
10. The object of Section 38 or for that matter the legislative intendment behind Section 38, is to confer ownership right on an agricultural labourer in respect of a dwelling-house located in a village, so that he may be provided with security from eviction for the purpose of shelter required for his residence and for the members of his family. Such a provision, which is a beneficial legislation, in my considered view, can never be construed as intended to give benefit or an advantage to persons who commit an offence of criminal trespass and forcibly occupy thedwelling-houses belonging to others by taking law into their hands, even assuming that such persons are agricultural labourers. House trespass is an offence and the status of the person who commits an offence of house trespass is immaterial. If I am to accept the submission of Sri Sripathy that the persons who get into the dwelling-house by committing house trespass, are also entitled to be registered as owners only on the ground that Section 38 of the Act does not, in terms, specifically prohibit conferring ownership on such persons, it would amount to giving premium to persons who indulge in commission of offences and rowdyism. In my view, if such an interpretation is placed to Section 38 of the Act, it would encourage anarchy and would disrupt rule of law to which this country is wedded to. Further, while interpreting a provision of law, if an interpretation to be placed encourages commission of offences and results in disruption of rule of law, Courts should never, in my considered view place such an interpretation. Therefore, I am of the view that if the respondents 1 and 2 are held to be trespassers in respect of the dwelling-houses occupied by them, they are not entitled to be registered as owners of the dwelling-houses occupied by them. Accordingly, question No. (i) is answered.
11. Now, the second question that would arise for consideration is that on the basis of the evidence on record, whether it could be held that respondents 1 and 2 have come into occupation of the dwelling- houses in question by committing criminal trespass. Since in normal circumstances, though I would have remitted this matter for consideration to the Tribunal on this question, since the Appellate Authority has not applied its mind on this question, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that the dispute has been pending between the parties for the last more than a decade, I am of the view that it would be in the interest of justice to decide the question in this petition without remitting the matter to the Tribunal. I have been taken through the evidence of the parties and their witnesses. One Babu Poojary who was examined on behalf of the petitioner does not state in his evidence that the respondents 1 and 2 had come into' possession of the houses in question by committing criminal trespass or their entry was either forceful or in any manner illegal. On the other hand, he has specifically stated in the chief examination that he does not know when the respondents 1 and 2 came into possession of the dwelling-houses in question. Sri Annoji Rao who has been examined to show that respondents 1 and 2 had given their statement before him when he went for survey of the land in question also does not state that at any time, the respondents 1 and 2 had stated before the Tribunal that they came into possession of the dwelling-houses in question by committing criminal trespass. However, the son of the petitioner in the course of chief examination has stated that the respondents 1 and 2 came into possession of the dwelling-houses in question in the year 1986 without obtaining the permission of the petitioner. The petitioner has not stepped into the witness-box and examined himself. If the respondents 1 and 2 had committed criminal trespass there would have been criminal proceedings instituted against respondents 1 and 2 for committing criminal trespass. There is no material placed to show that any criminal case was instituted against respondents 1 and 2. The evidence of respondents 1 and 2 and their witnesses - Chandrahasa Bhandary, Ramanath Alva and Venugopal Shetty clearly show that the respondents 1 and 2 have been residing in the said houses as agricultural labourers. There is no suggestion made to the respondents 1 and 2 or their witnesses in the cross-examination that respondents 1 and 2 have been in occupation of the dwelling-houses in question by committing criminal trespass or their entry into the houses in question was either forceful or in any manner unauthorised or illegal. Further, in the suit filed before the Civil Court by one Leelavathi Amma, who is the mother of the petitioner seeking recovery of possession of the houses in question from respondents 1 and 2, respondents 1 and 2 in their written statement had specifically contended that they were agricultural labourers who were in occupation of the houses in question for more than twenty years on the date of filing of the written statement. They had also specifically denied the assertion made in the plaint that they had forcibly occupied the houses in question in the year 1986. As noticed by me earlier, if respondents 1 and 2 had committed an offence of trespass and forcibly entered the houses in question, the minimum that was expected of the owner of the houses in question was to file a complaint before the jurisdictional police and prosecute respondents 1 and 2 for the offences committed. No material is placed before me to show that such an action was taken. Therefore, I am fully satisfied on the basis of the evidence already placed before the Court that there is no truth in the claim made by the petitioner that respondents 1 and 2 came into possession of the dwelling-houses in question illegally and committing criminal trespass. Under these circumstances, I find it difficult to accept the case of the petitioner that respondents 1 and 2 came to occupy the dwelling-houses in question by committing criminal trespass. Accordingly point No. (ii) is held against the petitioner.
12. Now, so far as the third question is concerned, I am of the view that there is no merit in the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that respondents 1 and 2 are not agricultural labourers. The Appellate Authority on elaborate consideration of the evidence of the petitioner and his witnesses has recorded a finding that respondents 1 and 2 are agricultural labourers. Chandrahasa Bhandary, Ramanath Alva and Venugopal Shetty who were examined as witnesses on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2, in their evidence have stated that respondents 1 and 2 were attending to their agricultural operations in their lands as agricultural labourers. The Appellate Authority on consideration of their evidence has found that nothing substantial has been elucidated in the cross-examination to discredit their evidence. The Appellate Authority has also discarded the statement stated to have been made by respondents 1 and 2 before the said Annoji Rao who was the Surveyor of the Tribunal and who was examined on behalf of the petitioner, wherein the respondents 1 and 2 appear to have stated that they are only stone cutters. As rightly pointed out by the Appellate Authority, the said Surveyor was only to survey and identify the land and he hasno power to record the evidence or statement of the parties. The respondents 1 and 2 have denied that they have made any statement before the said Surveyor stating that they are only stone cutters. Under these circumstances, if the Appellate Authority on consideration of the evidence of the parties has recorded a finding that respondents 1 and 2 are agricultural labourers, I am of the view that there is absolutely no justification for me to interfere against the said finding in exercise of my revisional jurisdiction. I do not find any error in the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority that respondents 1 and 2 are agricultural labourers. In the light of the discussion made above, this petition is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, it is rejected. However, no order is made as to costs.
13. Sri M.V. Shamanna, learned Government Advocate is given four weeks' time to file his memo of appearance.