Judgment:
ORDER
Shivashankar Bhat, J.
1. These two Writ Petitions are referred to the Division Bench by a learned single Judge of this Court, which involve the interpretation of Section 118(1A) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. 1961 (referred as 'the Act').
2. The question is, whether a decision of the Land Tribunal under Section 67 of the Act pertaining to the determination of the ceiling area is appealable to the Appellate Authority under the aforesaid Section 118(1A).
3. Till the promulgation of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985 (referred as the Ordinance hereinafter), it is an admitted fact that the decision of the tribunal under the Act was final in all respects and there was no provision for appeal against its order. However, the Ordinance which came into effect on 6th December, 1985 provided for an appeal against certain orders of the Land Tribunal. The Ordinance amended Section 48A by deleting the words 'the order of the Tribunal under this Section shall be final and', thereby removing the finality given to the orders made under Section 48A. Under Section 6 of the Ordinance, provision was made for constitution of an Appellate Authority consisting of two Members of whom one shall be an Officer in the cadre of Civil Judge and the other an Officer not below the rank of a Deputy Commissioner. By Section 7 of the Ordinance, Sub-section (1A) was introduced to Section 118, which reads as follows :-
'(1A): Save as otherwise provided in this Act, from every decision or order passed by the Tribunal (excluding an interim order or an order passed on an interlocutory application) under Section 38, 48A or 67, after the commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1985, an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Authority; and the Appellate Authority shall send a copy of every order passed by it to the Tahsildar and the parties concerned.'
By Section 10 of the Ordinance, a revision was provided to this Court against any order or proceeding of the Appellate Authority.
Section 14 of the Ordinance recognised the power of the High Court to transfer a pending Writ Petition before it, in respect of the subject matter covered by the appellate provision created by the Ordinance.
4. This Ordinance was followed by an enactment by the legislature called the 'Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1'986 (referred as the Amendment Act). This was deemed to have come into force on 6th December, 1985.
Section 3 of the Amendment Act incorporated the provision of Section 3 of the Ordinance, by removing the finality given to the order made under Section 48A by the Land Tribunal.
By Section 4 of the Amendment Act, Sub-section (3) of Section 48C was deleted. The said Sub-section (3) of Section 48C had made the order of the Land Tribunal under Section 48C, final. Thus, this finality was deleted by the Amendment Act.
Section 6 of the Amendment Act is substantially the same as Section 5 of the Ordinance.
Section 7 of the Amendment Act constituting the Appellate Authority is slightly different from Section 6 of the Ordinance, in the sense, that the Amendment Act includes a Civil Judge, to whom a reference is made under Section 116B, though this difference has no bearing on the interpretation of the provision before us.
Section 8 of the Amendment Act inserts Sub-section (1A) to Section 118, which is the subject matter of this reference, reads thus :
'(1A) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, from every decision or order passed by the Tribunal under This Act, after the commencement of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1986, an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Authority; and Appellate Authority shall send a copy of every order passed by it to the Tahsildar, the Secretary of the Tribunal and the parties concerned.'
It is not necessary to refer to other provisions of the Amendment Act, since none of the learned Counsel who appeared before us referred to those provisions.
5. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to note the functions of the Land Tribunal under the Act. The duties of the Tribunal are enumerated under Section 112(B) of the Act. Sub-clauses (a) to (bbbb) are part of the Tribunal's main function in deciding the question as to whether a person is a tenant or not and also its power to issue interim orders under Section 48C. Clause (bbbbb) pertains to the Tribunal's duty to determine the ceiling question under Section 67, and Clause (c) pertains to its function under Section 38. Clause (d) is a general provision and the duties and functions of the Tribunal contemplated by the said clause are not referred to us by any one of the learned Counsel. Therefore, broadly three functions are envisaged by the Act for the Tribunal:
(i) Determination of the status of a person when he claims to be a tenant resulting in the conferment of occupancy right under Section 48A;
(ii) Claim of an agricultural labourer for the dwelling house under his occupation under Section 38; and
(iii) The determination of the ceiling area under Section 67 and the consequential direction to surrender the excess land, if any.
6. Determination under Section 33 has not been made final under the Act. In fact, the determination of the question arising out of a claim under Section 38 is to be in the manner specified in or under Section 48A as stated under Section 38(1)(b) of the Act. The determination of the Claim for registration as an occupant by a tenant under Section 48A was made final by the original Act as per Section 48A(6) and this finality is taken away by the Ordinance as well as by the Amendment Act.
7. The determination under Section 67 of the Act by the Tribunal was declared as final by the Act under Section 67(1)(d), which reads, 'the order of the Tribunal shall be final and shall be communicated to the person concerned and also the Tahsildar.' The Amendment Act does not touch this provision of Section 67. Therefore, the finality given to an order made under Section 67 by the Act continues to be there, even though the learned Counsel for one of the petitioners, Sri Savanur, contended that by implication that finality has been removed having regard to the language of Section 118(1A) as inserted by the Amendment Act.
8. Sri Savanur contended that Sub-section (1A) inserted into Section 118 under the Ordinance categorically declares that every decision or order passed by the Tribunal under Sections 38, 48A or 67 is appealable and though the Amendment Act did not specify the aforesaid provisions specifically, the clear intendment was to continue this amendment under the Ordinance, by the Amendment Act also. To emphasis that an appeal lies against an order under Section 67, reliance was placed on the decision of Venkatachala, J., in KARIM KHAN v. ASST. COMMISSIONER, : ILR1986KAR460 . It is not necessary to refer to this decision in detail because that pertains to a situation arising out of the language of the Ordinance. The said decision has no bearing at all on the question whether an appeal lies against an order made under Section 67 of the Act, by virtue of the Amendment Act. The learned Counsel proceeded to contend that the language of Subsection (1A) of Section 118 is clear when it says that an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Authority from every decision or order passed by the Tribunal. According to the learned Counsel, the omission of three Sections referred in Section 7 of the Ordinance was only to remove superfluity from the provision in view of the wide language of the provision reflected by the words underlined by us above. According to Sri Savanur, the principle of interpretation requiring an harmonious construction of a statute demands the acceptance of his contention.
9. It is not possible to accept the contention advanced by Sri Savanur, however attractive it may be, in the background of a proposition that normally an appellate forum should be provided against the decisions affecting the rights of citizens. In the absence of any ambiguity, the Court has no choice to interpret the provisions of a law which appeals to it as advancing the cause of justice or as in consonance with the general principles of equity. The Courts are bound to give effect to the expressed language of a Statute, subject to the question as to its constitutionality which has not been argued before us. The Constitution in clear terms has entrusted the task of making the law to the legislature and the role of the Court is only to interpret the same.
10. The opening words of Sub-section (1A) of Section 118 carves out an exception to its ensuing provisions. In case there is any saving from the operation of its subsequent words, then those subsequent words in Sub-section (1A) of Section 118 cannot be attracted. In other words, if an appeal is excluded by virtue of any other provision of the Act, then the provision as to appeal under this Section is not attracted. The opening words of Section 118(1A) are part of the statute and will have to be given due meaning and cannot be ignored. There is a presumption against attributing superfluity to the words used by the legislature. The principle of harmonious construction advanced by Sri Savanur will have to be applied to the provisions of Sections 67 and 118(1A) so that both the provisions can be operative in full, without conflicting with each other.
11. Section 67(1)(d) will be meaningless if it is to be held that the order of the Tribunal is final subject to the result of any appeal. The statute has conferred finality to the order of the Tribunal and that finality will cover all situations contemplated by the statute and any forum created by the statute will have to recognise the said finality. The word 'final' has been understood as creating a finality under the particular statute and its binding nature on all statutory bodies, for a long time. To illustrate, we may refer to the decision of this Court in J. DIWAKAR HEGDE v. KARNATAKA TALUK AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING SOCIETY LTD., 1975(2) KLJ 390 wherein under the Co-operative Societies Act, the decision of the Registrar was accepted as final for all purposes under the Act.
12. The principles which govern the interpretation of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be attracted here because the jurisdiction created under Section 115 CPC is generally held as independent of the jurisdiction created under a particular statute on any Court or Tribunal and therefore the word 'final' Used under the particular statute in respect of the decisions of statutory Courts or Tribunals were held as not controlling the power of superintendence vested in the High Court under Section 115 CPC. Even here, Supreme Court has attributed a finality to the decision of the subordinate Courts if the clear intention of the statute was not to attract the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 CPC (vide VISHESH KUMAR v. SHANTI PRASAD, : [1980]3SCR32 ).
13. Therefore, when Section 67(1)(d) categorically declares order of the Tribunal as final, that clear declaration will have to be given effect to by the Courts and the said finality cannot be taken away by recourse to an implied intendment of an appeal to the Appellate Authority created by the very statute.
14. We have already referred to the provisions of the Amendment Act, which has deleted the finality clauses while providing the appellate forum in respect of orders under Sections 48A and 48C of the Act. This is also a clear indication of the legislative intent to preserve the finality under Section 67(1)(d) as otherwise, the legislature would have deleted the said finality clause from Section 67(1)(d).
15. A reference to Section 122A also indicates the legislative intention. Under Section 122A provision is made for review by the Tribunal of an order made by it under Section 67(1). In case the Tribunal is satisfied that such an order has been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation or suppression of facts or by furnishing false, incorrect or incomplete declaration review may be made within a period of two years from the date of the order. Such a power is not provided in respect of other orders of the Tribunal. An order under Section 67 will affect either the land-holder or the interest of the State and none else. There is no lis between the two private parties, unlike the cases falling under Sections 48A and 38.
16. Having regard to the above, we hold that the order of the Tribunal under Section 67(1) of the Act is final and no appeal lies to the Appellate Authority under Section 118(1A) of the Act. The aggrieved party has to take recourse to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
17. In these Writ Petitions, the petitioners have challenged the orders of the Tribunal passed under Section 67. The respective impugned orders affect the rights of the petitioners to hold agricultural lands. The Tribunal is expected to hold an enquiry in consonance with the principles of natural justice, apart from the specific provisions made under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The Tribunal will have to clearly state as to how the person holds excess land and in that process it will have to decide the claim of the land-holder regarding the quantum of area of land held by him. Any casual treatment of the subject would result in deprivation of the property of the land-holder. Utmost care and caution is required before a decision is arrived at in this regard.
18. The respective impugned orders were perused by us. Sri S.V. Jagannath, the learned Government Advocate, very fairly stated that both the orders are non-speaking orders and the Tribunal has not taken sufficient care before determining the question involved under Section 67.
19. In view of the foregoing reasons, these petitions are allowed, the impugned orders in both the petitions are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Land Tribunal concerned with a direction to determine the question afresh in accordance with law, in the light of the observations made above.
Rule is made absolute.
In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.