1. It is virtually a matter of shame that in this day and age, indiscriminate attacks and abnormally high degrees of violence are directed against married women in certain quarters and that the law is doing little to curb this type of utterly obnoxious and anti-social activity. The facts of this appeal present one of the most gory and blood-curdling instances, that have come before the Courts in recent times.
2. The deceased Tanima was a young woman of 20 and had hardly been married to A-1 for about 10 months. The prosecution alleges that on the evening of 17-10-1992, the first accused, who is her husband, accompanied by his father, who is the second accused and the brother, who is the third accused, violently assaulted Tanima. The background that is alleged is that A-1 is supposed to have demanded a dowry amount of Rs. 20,000/- which is apart from the money and the gold which was given to him at the time of the marriage. Various pious reasons were given in support of the monetary demand initially, the justification being that it was needed for construction of the house and later on, an amount of Rs. 5,000/- was demanded for purchase of a sewing machine as A-1 was a tailor. Tanima's family paid Rs. 5,000/- on one occasion and Rs. 2,000/- on another occasion virtually under duress because, they contend that Tanima was being tortured and ill-treated in order to extort the money from them. They had pointed out to A-1 that the demand made by him was beyond their capacity and the prosecution alleges that this situation infuriated A-1. On the evening of 17-10-1992, the accused are alleged to have bound Tanima's hands and feet with a rope, they thereafter gagged her with a cloth in order to ensure that she did not make any noise and this was followed by A-1 assaulting her with a metal pipe and A-3 , the brother, assaulting her with a stick or a wooden club. This was not all because, the level of brutality is amply demonstrated from the fact that A-1 was violently kicking Tanima on her stomach and chest. Tanima was a frail woman and virtually collapsed under the impact of this assault, which to say the least, is one of horrifying dimensions. When she lost consciousness, the accused are alleged to have released her hands and feet, but the effect of the injuries was so very serious that she died. The news of the her death and the fact that her body was lying in the house was conveyed to her brother, who is P.W. 1 and he immediately came to the spot. He thereafter, sent word to their mother who is P.W. 5 and she also arrived at that place early the next morning. The matter was reported to the police who registered offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 302, Indian Penal Code and placed the accused under arrest. The prosecution alleges that A-1, pursuant to a certain statement, lead the police and the panchas to his house from where he produced the rope, the metal pipe and the cloth piece. It is also alleged that A-3 , pursuant to a similar statement, lead the police and the panchas to the house and produced the wooden stick. Both these items were attached under a Panchanama. On completion of the investigation, the accused were charge-sheeted, committed to theCourt of Sessions and put up for trial. It is material to mention that this is one more of the cases where a whole series of witnesses have turned hostile. The learned Trial Judge has recorded the finding that the remaining evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on either of the two charges and he therefore, acquitted the three accused. The State of Karnataka has preferred the present appeal which is directed against the order of acquittal.
3. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor Mr. Patil has submitted that undoubtedly, the prosecution case would have virtually been on velvet had P.Ws. 2 and 3 supported the prosecution. These two persons who are neighbours of the accused, had initially deposed up to a certain point in favour of the prosecution, but thereafter somersaulted. These two witnesses, who claim to be eye witnesses, were treated as hostile witnesses and were elaborately cross-examined. As normally happens, the two witnesses were confronted virtually sentence by sentence with their police statements which they have denied. The learned Trial Judge has rejected the evidence of these two witnesses principally, on the ground that once they are declared hostile, their evidence is virtually useless. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor vehemently submitted that there is no hard and fast rule that the Court must, as of necessity, totally discard the evidence of hostile witnesses and he submitted on the basis of an analogy, that the process of assessment of evidence in criminal trials requires a degree of sifting to be done and he likened these situations to the ones where a Court is required to separate the grain from the chaff and he submitted that if the greater portion of the evidence supports the prosecution case, that the Court is certainly entitled to place reliance on it even though the rest of that evidence may be discarded. The respondents' learned Advocate himself desired to place some reliance on certain admissions made by these witnesses and he contended that only those portions of the evidence deserve to be accepted. We do agree that a hostile witness is, in a sense, not very different from a witness whose evidence is patchy or a witness whose evidence does not inspire too much confidence in certain respects only, but the fact of the matter remains that where it is clear to the Court that the witness has either been intimidated or induced to radically alter the original version which appears in the police statements, that the rule of prudence would necessarily require that a Court should be extremely cautious before placing reliance on any part of the evidence of such a witness. This in our considered view is the correct position because, it is very clear that the witness has shifted stand in respect of material particulars and it would therefore, create a high degree of suspicion with regard to even the rest of the evidence which appears to be prime facie good. It is virtually in this background that we uphold the findings recorded by the learned Trial Judge as far as these two witnesses are concerned which are to the effect that their evidence ought not to be taken into consideration at all.
4. Mr. Patil, learned Additional State Public Procecutor, has placed strong reliance on the evidence of P.W. 1, who is the brother of the deceased. This witness has clearly deposed to the fact that the accusedhad made certain demands by way of dowry at the time of marriage and that these demands had been partially fulfilled by them in so far as they had spent for the wedding expenses and that they had also given half a tola of gold and a sum of Rs. 1,500/- which was all that they could afford having regard to their economic situation. According to him, the couple started their married life satisfactorily and for about four months, there was no trouble. He states that thereafter the monetary demands were revived and that the method used to extort the money from the family was the familiar one in so far as his sister Tanima was severely harassed and tortured and she used to convey this to her family who got the message loud and clear that unless they paid up the money, that life would be a virtual hell for Tanima. According to P.W. 1, he paid a sum of Rs. 5,000/- which he was able to put together, but, this payment only brought about a respite which was short-lived. He states that the torture and harassment continued and that his sister was brought to their home by her husband, the first accused who virtually assaulted her all the way till they reached there. He states that a demand for Rs. 3,000/- was put forward on the pretext that it was required for purchase of a sewing machine out of which, P.W. 1 paid Rs. 2,000/-. He states that the situation did not improve, but only worsened and that he came to know from his mother who had visited Tanima thereafter that her life was being made miserable principally because of the unfulfilled demands. P.W. 1 states that on the night of 17-10-1992, he was informed by C.W. 18 Ramappa, who incidentally has not been examined by the prosecution as a witness, that his sister had been assaulted, that she had died and that her body, which bore several injuries, was lying in the house of the accused. He states that he proceeded on a motor cycle to that place and that he found some of the ladies from the area sitting near the body and crying. He further states that these persons gave him a description of the incident which was to the effect that Tanima had been bound hand and foot and mercilessly assaulted by accused Nos. 1 and 3. He states that he sent word to his mother who is P.W. 5 and that she was also brought there early the next morning. P.W. 1 lodged a complaint with the police in which he has briefly set out the background of the case and charged accused Nos. 1 to 3 with having made unlawful demands under the threat that Tanima would be otherwise assaulted if the demands were not given into and further that it was pursuant to such physical violence that Tanima had died. Mr. Patil has contended that the evidence of P.W. 1 is totally and completely without any blemish, that he has withstood the cross- examination perfectly, that he is the brother of the deceased Tanima who not only indicates the entire sequence of events since the time of the marriage, but furthermore that he has come on the scene immediately after the incident took place and has clearly stated that the persons whom he met at that spot told him in no uncertain terms and virtually described to him about the brutal manner in which his deceased sister had been bound hand and foot and assaulted until she died. It is Mr. Patil's contention that the evidence of this witness fully and completely brings home both the charges against the accused. He has also pointed out that the evidence of recovery is acorroborative factor in so far as the metal pipe with which the deceased was assaulted and the rope with which she was tied as also the cloth with which she was gagged and the stick allegedly used by A-3 have been recovered by the police at the instance of these two accused and he therefore, contended that if one were to further seek supportive material, that the medical evidence virtually clinches the matter.
5. We need to add a special word with regard to the medical evidence in this case which has been referred to by both the learned Advocates. The post-mortem report on the dead body indicates that deceased Tanima had sustained a series of injuries all over her body which is totally and completely compatible with the version that she was assaulted with an iron pipe and a stick. The ligature marks on the hands and feet also support the view that she had been tied up. More importantly, the internal injuries in this case were so massive, that it only indicates the abnormally high degree of violence that she was subjected to. As far as far as the chest cavity is concerned, the lungs and other internal organs were severely damaged and the whole of the chest cavity had suffered so much haemorrhage, that it was full of blood. The liver and the spleen had both been shattered. What is even more awful about the situation is that the whole of the abdominal cavity indicated that even the stomach and the intestines had been ruptured to the extent that the abdominal cavity was full of blood. The medical evidence therefore, completely supports the version that the deceased had been subjected to a merciless assault which virtually killed her on the spot. Mr. Patil emphasized the fact that even though the defence had contended that the deceased had gone out of the house to ease herself and that she had not returned thereafter and that she had suffered an assault by some unknown third parties, the submission is that the place of incident or the place where the deceased was assaulted is clearly established to have been inside the house of the accused and Mr. Patil submits that the one and only logical inference that can be drawn is that the accused were responsible for this assault. It is on this point that he placed strong reliance on the background of the case, namely the various extortionate demands and the manner in which on previous occasions physical violence had been used against Tanima in order to force her relatives to pay money. In sum and substance therefore, Mr. Patil submits that these factors establish the case of the prosecution beyond any shadow of doubt de hors the fact that the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 who claim to be eye witnesses is not available.
6. At this stage, we need to refer in passing to one submission which the respondents' learned Advocate put forward. He drew our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Bishan Dass v State of Punjab, wherein the Apex Court upheld the position in law that in a criminal trial, the accused are entitled to maintain silence, that they are not bound to volunteer explanations and that this situation cannot be used as an adverse circumstance against the accused. We do not for a moment dispute that this is a general proposition of law that applies toall criminal trials, but there are situations in which it is incumbent upon the accused to explain the circumstances that heavily point towards the guilt of the accused and in such situations, if no valid or plausible explanation is forthcoming, a Court would be fully justified in drawing an adverse inference. To this extent therefore, we find it is impossible to uphold the defence plea that when it has been established that the incident took place in the residential house of the accused that they were present there at the time of the incident and that the deceased girl had died of a severe assault that she received at that place and at that point of time, the onus virtually shifts to the opposite side to place before the Court a plausible explanation, if it is the contention that the accused were not responsible for the commission of the offence. The plea that the accused were entitled to maintain silence gets dislodged in these circumstances and non-explanation points incriminatingly towards the accused.
7. As regards the evidence of P.W. 1, the respondents' learned Advocate has submitted that he was only the brother of Tanima and that the learned Trial Judge was right when he held that if the background with regard to the demands for dowry, etc., were to be agitated, that it was essential for the father of Tanima to have been examined as a witness and the non-examination of this person must lead to an adverse inference against the prosecution. We are unable to accept this argument for the reason that P.W. 1, who is the brother, has very clearly stated that it was he who met monetary demands by paying money on two occasions and he has also referred to what his mother P.W. 5 found out when she visited the house of Tanima. P.W. 1 and P.W. 5 therefore, had personal knowledge not only of the background, but of the subsequent developments and in this situation, they were both the competent and the right persons to depose before the Court about the happenings in question.
8. Next, the respondents' learned Advocate submitted that P.W. 1 being the brother, was obviously extremely hostile towards the family of the accused, particularly after the incident took place and P.W. 1 concluded that the accused were responsible for his sister's death. He submits that the charge against the accused as far as P.W. 1 is concerned, proceeds on the basis of hearsay evidence or rumours that reached him when he came there after the death of Tanima. The learned Advocate submits that as long as the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 is disregarded, that there is absolutely no direct ocular evidence as far as the commission of the offence is concerned and that therefore, even if the Court were to accept the evidence of P.W. 1 with regard to the charge under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code is concerned, that this can never lead to a situation whereby his evidence can be taken into consideration for purposes of establishing the main charge. Also, the learned Advocate draws our attention to the fact that the conduct of P.W. 1 is not very natural in so far as he has approached the police after the lapse of considerable time and secondly, on the ground that in the complaint lodged by P.W. 1, which is treated as the FIR, that only cryptic details have been given and that the facts have not been elaborately set out as has been done by P.W. 1 in the witness box. As far as this aspect of thematter goes, we have found nothing either unnatural or suspicious about the conduct of P.W. 1 and a perusal of his complaint will indicate that the broad or salient features of the case have been set out. Neither P.W. 1 nor the scribe of the complaint are in that sense legally trained minds and therefore, the complaint has been put forward to the best of the ability of the witness. We have taken note of his status in life, the lack of education and other factors which would justify some degree of infirmity. In sum and substance however, we see no ground whatsoever on the basis of which the evidence of P.W. 1 can be discarded. In our considered view, this evidence requires to be accepted in its entirety.
9. Mr. Patil then relied heavily on the evidence of P.W. 5 - Hirabai, who is the mother, As far as the demands for dowry, the torture to the daughter and P.W, 1 paying the amounts of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 2,000/-over a period of time are concerned, Hirabai totally and completely substantiates the version of P.W. 1. This witness however, goes a stage further in so far as she points out that on the last occasion when she visited her daughter and stayed with her which was relatively close to the date of the incident, that she found her daughter to be extremely depressed because of the fact that she was being ruthlessly assaulted on the ground that the money had not been paid. She has also deposed to the fact that her daughter was quite healthy and that when she was called to the house of the accused after the incident, she noticed several injuries on the body of the deceased. Mr. Patil submits that there could not have been a more competent witness to depose about these facts and that Hirabai, like P.W. 1, has deposed before the Court about the source of her knowledge as gathered from the neighbours and the other persons present which was to the effect that the accused persons had severely assaulted the deceased and that this had caused her death. The only head of criticism levelled by the respondents' learned Advocate as far as the P.W. 5 is concerned proceeds on the footing that she was hostile to her in-laws as is common-place and furthermore that there is nothing on record to support the view that monetary demands had been made and that these had been satisfied and he contended that this entire version is fabricated. It is true that there are no letters demanding the dowry amounts and it is equally true that there are no stamped receipts for the payments in question. A Court would not expect any tell-tale evidence such as letters to reflect dowry demands and we have also noted that both the parties were agriculturists and small artisans and that therefore, there could not have been even evidence of a bank account or cheque payments. We see no ground on which the. evidence of the mother Hirabai could be rejected and the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor is therefore, justified in pointing out that this material requires not only to be taken into consideration, but that it is solid enough to base the conviction of the accused on it. At this stage, we need to deal in brief with a few of the legal submissions canvassed by the respondents' learned Advocate. On the basis of the decision reported in Karnesh Kumar Singh and Others v State of Uttar Pradesh, the respondents' learned Advocate submitted that it is demonstrated that two material witnesses, namely Ramappa, who conveyed the crucial information to P.W. 1 and who is in the position of an eye witness from the nature of the information conveyed by him, could never have been kept back without inviting a strong adverse inference. His basic contention is that this witness would have certainly been in a position to indicate precisely what had happened and the non-examination is therefore, damaging to the prosecution. He continued by pointing out that if one were to consider in this background that the father of the deceased was not examined, that it would be very clear to the Court that an effort to deliberately keep back the witnesses was present. Though the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court is the well accepted law on the point, we do not see how that principle applies in the present case where C.W. 18-Ramappa was only doing the job of a messenger and more importantly, where it is demonstrated that the brother and the mother had complete knowledge of all material aspects of the case, that the father would only be repeating what has already come on record through their evidence. It is in this background that no adverse inference can be drawn. The extension of the same proposition is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Habeeb Mohammed v State of Hyderabad, wherein the Court held that material witnesses must be examined if the prosecution is to succeed and this position has been further amplified by the later decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Uttar Pradesh and Another v Jaggo alias Jagdish and Others, wherein the Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines for prosecutions by directing that evidence is not to be withheld merely because it is inconvenient and that it is one of the basic duties of the Public Prosecutors conducting the trial to ensure that none of the eye witnesses is kept away from the Trial Court. We need to only clarify that neither of these witnesses comes within the category of an eye-witness nor for that matter, do we consider them to be material witnesses having regard to the fact that their roles were relatively inconsequential in so far as P.Ws. 1 and 5 had personal knowledge of all angles which they have deposed about.
10. Respondents' learned Advocate relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court, the first reported in Babboo and Others v State of Madhya Pradesh , where the Court held that recovery evidence alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction and another decision of the Supreme Court reported in Pohalya Motya Valvi v State of Maharashtra, wherein the Court had occasion to deal with a situation in which two versions were put forward and to hold that the recovery evidence could hardly assist the prosecution in such a situation. The recovery evidence as far as the present case is concerned, has been attacked by the respondents' learned Advocate who points out that the witness who was called to prove thePanchanama, has, towards the end of his evidence, suddenly disclaimed all knowledge with regard to the recoveries made at the instance of A-3 . We have very carefully scrutinised this evidence and we find that it is only a very small portion of it, namely the tail end of the evidence which deals with the recovery at the instance of A-3 that will have to be discarded. We have taken serious note of this infirmity and propose to give the benefit of it to A-3 .
11. Beyond this, we need to record that this is not a case in which the prosecution relies heavily or solely on the recovery evidence. In passing, We need to point out that appellant's learned Advocate submitted that the items recovered, namely a rope, a piece of cloth and a metal pipe are items which are of every day use and would normally be found in an agriculturist's house, that they were not blood stained and consequently, that this evidence is innocuous. We are unable to accept this submission because, this is a case in which the charge was that the accused had tied up the deceased and the finding of the rope therefore, assumes significance and similarly, where the record indicates that the deceased had been gagged, the recovery of the cloth with which this was done is of some importance and lastly, where the evidence is to the effect that a metal pipe had been used for the assault, the recovery of a metal pipe at the instance of the accused, even if it is from his own house, assumes considerable significance. Dealing with the legal aspect of recoveries, the respondents' learned Advocate did submit that the guilty knowledge and the nexus with the commission of the offence are both factors which can be used against an accused provided it is demonstrated that the accused had some special knowledge of the place where the implements used in the commission of the offence had been hidden and he states that in this instance, the accused is alleged to have produced them from his own house and that therefore, these two material ingredients are absent. Though the proposition canvassed is absolutely correct, it cannot be misapplied because, the incriminating aspect in such situations arises from the fact that the accused produced the weapons or the implements that were used in the commission of the offence from a particular place which may even be his own house and what really clinches the issue is the fact that the recovery at the instance of the accused points to the identity of those objects as being the very ones which fit in with the commission of the offence. It is this aspect of the matter which the law takes special note of.
12. The respondents' learned Advocate then relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Uttar Pradesh v Sukhbasi and Others, wherein the Court has reiterated the principles of circumstantial evidence and the need to have sufficient material to hold that this evidence cumulatively points to no conclusion other than one which is compatible with the guilt of the accused. Here again, we need to record that we have very carefully evaluated each of the heads, discarded the ones that do not pass the test of scrutiny and have taken note of the circumstantial and direct evidence which leads to no conclusion other than the twocharges have stood fully and completely established as against accused No. 1. In this context, the respondents' learned Advocate submitted that the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Solasa Ramachandra Rao v Maddi Kutumba Rao, laid down the very important principle applicable to Criminal Courts where the evidence falls short of the absolute requirement of conclusiveness, that suspicion cannot take the place of proof and he submitted that having regard to the total absence of eye witnesses and direct evidence in this case, that howsoever grave the needle of suspicion may be, as far as it appears to point at the accused, that the level of proof is insufficient to bring home the charges. It is precisely this principle that we have applied very judiciously in holding that whereas the evidence conclusively establishes the case against A-1, that it falls short of the requirement as far as the A-2 is concerned, but that as far as the A-3 is concerned, though there is a very high and grave suspicion that he was a participant in the incident, that the evidence does not conclusively establish the offences vis-a-vis him.
13. The last submission canvassed by the respondents' learned Advocate was that in the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v State of Gujarat, that the Supreme Court has very clearly laid down that in Criminal trial where the accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence and where at the end of the trial, the accused is acquitted, that an Appeal Court has to take careful note of the fact that the judgment should not be lightly interfered with in so far as the Court of competent jurisdiction has virtually reinforced that presumption. We are conscious of the well-settled law on the point which even goes to the extent of holding that the initial presumption of innocence, after an order of acquittal gets reinforced to the extent that the Courts have some times characterised it as a double presumption, but that does not stop an Appeal Court from doing its duty in the interests of justice and interfering with those of the decisions wherein a clear miscarriage of the law has taken place and a failure of justice has resulted. That category of cases is precisely the area in which corrective steps are imperative through an appeal against acquittal. While we do concede that where the judgment of the Trial Court which has had the benefit of a first hand evaluation of the demeanour of the witnesses and the other evidence, is a perfectly logical and justifiable view, that an Appeal Court would not substitute an adverse decision in its place merely because another view is possible. Such a procedure would fly in the face of the well-settled principle that when one of the views is in consonance with the innocence of the accused, that it is compulsory for a Court to uphold it. This case is a classic instance where the learned Trial Judge has got completely miscarried by the fact that the eye-witnesses turned hostile and has therefore, virtually soft-peddled the rest of the evidence. This Court has had occasion recently to lay down very strongly that having regard to the disastrous consequences to the prosecution and to the rule of law in general, by meekly accepting the witnesses turning hostile,that it is essential that the Trial Courts take stringent steps to investigate in the first instance as to who is responsible for the witness turning hostile which will invariably indicate that the accused who is the beneficiary, is undoubtedly responsible and if the witnesses have responded, they would invite appropriate counter action from the Courts. Unless these steps are taken in a few instances, such corrupt practices will not stop.
14. On the totality of the evidence in this case, we are of the considered view that both the charges stand established as far as accused No. 1 is concerned. That he made the demands by way of dowry at the time of the marriage and continued in persisting with them thereafter and that the numerous instances of torture and cruelty to which the deceased Tanima was subjected to by him were directly related to his extortionate demands for dowry stand conclusively established. It is in this background that we are required to consider the second charge, namely his following up the earlier atrocities by the incident which took place on 17-10-1992. We hold that there is sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence in this case to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that A-1 was responsible for tying deceased Tanima and assaulting her with the metal rod as also brutally and mercilessly kicking her in the course of this assault all of which resulted in her death. The nature of the incident and the fact that she succumbed to the cruelty would clearly bring this case within the ambit of Section 304, Indian Penal Code.
15. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has submitted that the Evidence Act and the Indian Penal Code were specially amended by Parliament for purposes of bringing to book all persons who indulge in such atrocities against women in the course of marriages. He submits that the medical evidence in this case amply demonstrates that the earlier atrocities were followed by an assault which virtually shocks the conscience of this Court in so far as it is difficult to imagine anything more atrocious than a situation wherein a young woman is virtually tied up with a rope almost like a beast and thereafter mercilessly and ruthlessly assaulted in a manner whereby she goes into a state of collapse and dies. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor submitted that a perusal of the medical evidence which establishes that almost every organ in the girl's body had been either ruptured or destroyed would invite a very deterrent sentence from this Court. On the other hand, the respondents' learned Advocate submitted that A-1 is a young man, that he is an agriculturist with no criminal background, that be also comes from a strata of society whereby he cannot be either said to be educated or enlightened and in this background, that the Court ought not to take such a rigorous view of the circumstances of the case.
16. We have taken into consideration everything that has been pointed out to us, particularly the extenuating factors put forward by the respondents' learned Advocate. We need to categorise these offences as coming under the category of the most heinous form of anti-social offences. The cruelty inflicted on the respondent's wife was motivated and it was continuous. The cruelty was also of a high order and underthese circumstances, we are of the view that it qualifies for the maximum sentence of three years R.I. that is prescribed under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code. We do not share the view that in cases where the facts establish the commission of an offence under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code, that even the slightest degree of leniency should be shown by any Court. We also need to add here that this Section has been specially incorporated in the Indian Penal Code with the specific objective or firmly stamping out atrocities against married women and if the legislative intent is to be given effect to, the Courts must make it a point to ensure that no leniency is shown in this field.
17. Coming to the charge under Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code, this section was again incorporated in the year 1986 by the Legislature for purposes of dealing with instances of dowry deaths. The Legislature, being conscious of the fact that this class of evidence is virtually on par with Section 302, Indian Penal Code, prescribed for a maximum punishment of imprisonment for life, but drew a distinction by providing for punishment which shall not be less than 7 years R.I. because, there did arise a category of cases where the gravity of the offence was not serious enough to justify a life sentence. Between these two extremes, we are required to carefully apply our mind to the facts of the present case and we do find that the medical evidence conclusively indicates that the level of brutality was abnormally high in this instance and it further establishes that it was protracted over a period of time and virtually reached its zenith at the time of the incident. We see no justification in this background in making any distinction between the punishment that is to be awarded to the accused merely because he is convicted of a dowry death under Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code and the normal punishment that he would have received had he been convicted under Section 302, Indian Penal Code which is the Section under which he was originally charged. We also take cognizance of the fact that had the accused been convicted under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, that the Court would have had no option except to award him R.I. for life. It is in these circumstances that the accused No. 1 stands convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code and that is awarded a sentence of R.I. for life.
18. The appeal partially succeeds. The order of acquittal passed in favour of original accused Nos. 2 and 3 stands confirmed. As far as the original accused No. 1 is concerned, the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the Trial Court is set aside. A-1 stands convicted of the offence punishable under Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to R.I. for 3 years. He is also convicted of the offence punishable under Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to K.I. for life, substantive sentences to run concurrently.
19. The bail bonds of A-2 and A-3 are cancelled. The Trial Court to take appropriate steps to ensure that the sentence pronounced by this Court is carried out. We clarify, that though the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor brought it to our notice that for good reason, the Legislature has prescribed a punishment of fine in cases of convictionsunder Section 498-A, that in the present instance, we refrain from awarding any separate fine for the reason that we have taken note of the economic condition of the accused and are of the view that such a fine would be virtually redundant. We also desire to place on record our appreciation for the admirable assistance to the Court from Mr. A.B. Patil, learned Additional Special Public Prosecutor as also the respondents' learned Advocate Mr. Narendara Kumar Gunaki.