ORDER
Shivappa, J.
1. These three Petitions are filed by M/S.Asian Wire Ropes Ltd., represented by Sri M.Janakiram. All these cases are clubbed and heard together and a common Order is passed.
2. The facts of the case in all the three Petitions and the offences alleged against the petitioner are stated hereunder:
In Cr.P, 1440/92, the petitioner has sought for quashing the FIR in Crime No. RC. 19(A)/90 registered on 29.6.1990 under Sections 120-B IPC read with Sections 420 and 471 IPC and Sections 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter called as the P.C.Act).
In Cr.P. 1441/90, the petitioner is seeking for quashing the FIR in Crime No. 20(A)/90 registered on 29.6.1990 under Sections 120-B IPC read with Sections 420, 468 and 471 IPC and Sections 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the P.C.Act.
In Cr.P. 1442/90 the petitioner is seeking for quashing the FIR in Crime No. 21(A)/90 registered on 29.6.1990 under Section 120-B IPC r/w. Sections 420, 468 and 471 IPC and Section 5(2) r/w. Section 5(1)(d) of the P.C.Act
M/s. Asian Wire Ropes Ltd. is a Company engaged in manufacture of steel wires and wire ropes to cater to the requirements in the domestic and export markets. It is the case of the petitioner that major customers in the domestic market were the State Electricity Boards of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra and other States, who procured their requirements of staywire, earthwire, etc. The Company had established well in the market, but due to its dependence on steel which was its basic raw material the Company required huge capital to pay the creditors. Because of certain difficulties the Company had to face blocking of working capital fund for longer periods the Company had to suspend its operations in 1985 for about a year. At that juncture the management of the Company was looking for a suitable enterprenur to take over the Company and nurse it back to health. The petitioner who evaluated the viability of the unit felt that with the infusion of suitable managerial skills and adequate working capital, the unit can be nursed to health and joined the Board of Directors in 1986 and later took over as Chairman and Managing Director during May, 1986. Thereafter the Company approached the Vijaya Bank for its financial dealings. After the change in the management, the Company did show improvement in its operations and has achieved a good turnover and wanted to use its capacities to a fuller extent and make a thrust in the international markets of the U.S.A. Germany and USSR. In order to avoid loss of business and penal steps from its customers to honour its commitments, it had to resort to additional drawats of funds and to avoid such difficulties approached the Vijaya Bank. In that process the allegation against the petitioner is that he has connived with the Bank officials for drawing funds and hatched a conspiracy with the officials of the Bank, falsely represented to the Bank that the Company was in need of working capital finance about One Crore and dishonestly induced to sanction and release of a limit of one Crore in the Open Loan Cash Credit Account of the Company in Bank Street Branch of Hyderabad by producing false stock statement etc. Certain Officials in the Vijaya Bank Head Office at Bangalore dishonestly induced the Board of Directors of the Bank to sanction a limit of Rs. 50 lakhs initially which was enhanced to Rupees One Crore by 4.1.1988 by the Head Office of the Bank without proper appraisal of the credit requirements of the Company, the officials of the Bank at Branch level released the funds to the Company without ensuring the end use of the funds and very often in excess of the permitted limits and certified false stock statements submitted by the Company to the Bank. The official at the Divisional office failed to take any action on the report submitted by the Branch Officials and the Company withdrew a total sum of Rs. 2.71 crores during 1986-88 in cash and diverted Rs. 10.5 lakhs by demand drafts to Neitore from the account and utilised the same for purposes other than meeting the working capital requirements of the Company leaving an outstanding balance of Rs. 70, 15, 824-94 in the account as on 31.5.1988. It is also alleged that the petitioner cheated the Bank by discounting certain false documentary bills and in pursuance of the conspiracy the Company dishonestly and fraudulently produced certain bills which were accommodative in nature for a total sum of Rs. 28,49,813-76 along with lorry receipts issued by M/S.Gangadhar Transport Company without actually transporting the goods as genuine trade bills for discounting at Bank Street Branch of Vijaya Bank at Hyderabad, through dishonestly induced the Bank to discount the bills. The Company discounted the bills and drew Rs. 28,49,813-76 from the Bank in July 1987 resulting in wrongful toss. It is further alleged that the petitioner in order to cheat the bank by discounting certain false bills and in pursuance of the Conspiracy the Company fraudulently or dishonestly produced 36 accommodation bills for a total sum of Rs. 1,84,99,365/- drawn on some parties at Delhi, Bombay, Hyderabad and Nellore along with lorry receipts issued by M/S.Gangadhar Transport Company and M/S Vijaya Vahini Transport Company without actually transporting any goods, as genuine, for discounting of 31 bills without any authority and 5 bills with the approval of the Head Office Officials of the Bank abusing his position and without taking proper precautions prescribed by the Bank in such cases and thereby allowed the party to draw an amount of Rs. 1,84,99,365/- from the Bank and Officials of the Bank at the Head Office did not bring to the notice of the Board of Directors of the Bank about the fact of the release of the funds by the branch officials without authority and the refusal of the IDBI to extend refinance facility in the case of the five bills discounted under the bills discounting scheme. None of the bills have been paid and are outstanding in the books of 'account of the Bank.
The Complaint was registered on 19.6.1990. The transactions are for the period between 1986 to 1988.
3. The petitioner has sought for quashing the F.I.Rs. in these cases registered for offences under the Penal Code read with P.C.Act. on the following grounds:
'By a reading of the entire F.I.R. there are no ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner, that there is a mention in the FIR 'unknown accused persons not mentioning the real persons; that the alleged conspiracy is an impossibility and there must be a definite body of persons who were parties to such conspiracy. He further contended that there is no prima facie case and the case was registered due to political rivalry and actuated by mala fides and though registered in the year 1990 two years elapsed and no progress in the investigation; that there is a delay; that the entire act took place in Hyderabad in the State of Andhra Pradesh and the complaint has been filed in the court which has no jurisdiction and that the action under the repealed Act in impermissible.
4. It is submitted by the Counsel for the C.B.I, that the allegations made in the F.I.Rs disclose that a false statement was projected without proper appraisal of the credit requirements, induced the persons, Bank officials to build up records, without ensuring the end use of the funds, utilised the same for the purposes other than meeting the working capital requirements of the Company, induced the Board of Directors to sanction the loan. So also 36 bills for a sum of Rs.1,84,365/- drawn on some parties at Delhi, Bombay, Hyderabad and Nellore along with lorry receipts issued without transporting any goods, as genuine and dishonestly induced the Bank to discount the bills to the tune of Rs. 28,49,713-76 resulting in wrongful loss to the Bank.
5. In view of these averments the learned Counsel for the C.B.I, contend that the loan was taken from the Bank by false representation and it amounts to cheating, even though some amount was subsequently repaid and there was a security for the loan obtained and the divesting of the fund raised under the OLCC limit for the purpose other than the one which the loan was sought and the Inspection report clearly discloses the design of the petitioner and the connivance of the Bank officials inducing the Board of Directors to part with the money and to act upon false bills discloses a prima facie case under Sections 120-B, 420, 471 and 468 of the Penal Code and other offences alleged against the petitioner. In support of his contention the C.B.I, has produced certain correspondences and a report. The Counsel further contended that the act of filing the F.I.R. is not bad in law and the investigation is not actuated by mala fides and there is no delay and the Court at Bangalore has jurisdiction because the Head Office of the Vijaya Bank is situated at Bangalore. An F.I.R. can be filed either at the place where the act took place or at the place where the consequences ensued and therefore prayed for dismissal of the Petitions.
6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that there is no prima facie case for offence of criminal conspiracy, relied on the Decision of the Supreme Court in BHAGWAN SWARUP LAL BISHAN LAL v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, AlR 1965 SC 682 and contended that for purpose of proving existence of conspiracy a definite body of persons must be there. Having regard to the background of this case, to prove the existence of conspiracy and to show that such a person was a party to it, the whole correspondence, the entire transaction and the background have to be taken into consideration. Conspiracy always surfaces after the crime. So, it is too early to form an opinion at this stage and at this stage what has to be looked into is anything done or written, has been done with a specific object and specific intention can be formed, if so, how far, to what extent shared that intention and whether they have acted in furtherance of such intention. In view of the correspondences produced and the nature of the act alleged against the petitioner, it cannot be said that there is no prima facie case of criminal conspiracy. The learned Counsel then relied upon a Decision in NOOR-MOHD. YUSUF MOMIN v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, 1970 SCC 274 in support of his contention that criminal conspiracy postulates an agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act which is not illegal by illegal means. In case of criminal conspiracy, it differs from other offences in that mere agreement is made an offence even if no step is taken to carry out the agreement. A conspiracy from its very nature is generally hatched in secret. It has to be proved by either direct or disinterested quarters or from utter strangers or from circumstantial evidence and in most cases proof of conspiracy is largely inferential though the inference must be founded on solid facts. Surrounding circumstances and antecedent and subsequent conduct, among other factors constitute relevant material. Therefore, at this stage, it is too early to form an opinion that there is no prima facie case. After all, the case is still at the investigation stage. Therefore, the two cases referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner regarding conspiracy are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. Here the false statement, inducement, utilisation of the amount for the purpose other than to meet the working capital of the Company and production of false bills etc., constitute relevant materials, and the subsequent conduct among other factors. In fact the Madras High Court has taken the view that a loan taken from the Bank and a false report will amount to cheating, (see: 1977 Crl.L.J. 2048, State v. Ramados Naidu and Ors.).
The Supreme Court in BIMBADHAR PRADHAN v. STATE OF ORISSA, : 1956CriLJ831 has held thus:
'It is a sufficient answer to this contention to say that the offence of criminal conspiracy consists in the very agreement between two or more persons to commit a criminal offence irrespective of the further consideration whether or not those offences have actually been committed. The very fact of the conspiracy constitutes the offence and it is immaterial whether anything has been done in pursuance of the unlawful agreement.'
7. Under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, which reads thus:
'Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.'
It is sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is committed. If there are several conspiracies so connected together to form one transaction they are equally connected together so as to form a continuing conspiracy. Conspiracy is necessarily complete or concluded immediately an agreement to the commission of the offence arrived at. Conspiracy can be proved by subsequent conduct also. In a charge of conspiracy overt act by which the conspiracy is sought to be achieved need not be given. Where there are chain of circumstances linked up with one another, Courts have to take cumulative effect of the entire material and it is not proper to take each circumstance in isolation to determine whether the conspiracy is there or not and materials regarding conspiracy, at this stage need not be weighed. Therefore the contention of the learned Counsel that there is no prima facie case against the petitioner and the same has to be quashed is not correct.
8. The petitioner has contended that the action at the hands of the C.B.I, is actuated by malafides. The averments made at para- 18 of the petition reads thus:
'That political enemies of the petitioner have engineered the case and have succeeded in prevailing upon the CBI to register a case against the petitioner to malign and destroy the political life of the petitioner.'
He contended that the averments are so vague.
9. The petitioner in his plea touching mala fides has tailed to furnish the particulars as to how and at whose instance and in what manner the influence worked on the C.B.I, to initiate action. Whenever averments are vague and devoid of particulars, such averments need not be considered and therefore this contention has no force. The Supreme Court in STATE OF HARYANA AND ORISSA v. CH. BHAJAN LAL AND ORS., : 1992CriLJ527 observed thus :
'No doubt, there was no love lost between Ch.Bhajan Lal and Dharam Pal. Based on this strained relationship, it has been then emphatically urged by Mr.K.Parasaran that the entire allegations made in the complaint due to political vendetta are not only scurrilous and scandalous but also tainted with mala fides, vitiating the entire proceedings. As it has been repeatedly pointed out earlier the entire matter is only at a premature stage and the investigation is not yet proceeded with except some preliminary effort taken on the date of the registration of the case, that is, on 21.11.1987. The evidence has to be gathered after a thorough investigation and placed before the Court on the basis of which alone the Court can come to a conclusion one way or the other on the plea of mala fides. If the allegations are bereft of truth and made maliciously, we are sure, the investigation will say so. At this stage when there are only allegations and recriminations but no evidence, this Court cannot anticipate the result of the investigation and render a finding on the question of mala fides on the materials at present available. Therefore, we are unable to see any force in the contention that the complaint should be thrown over-board on the mere unsubstantiated plea of mala fides. Even assuming that Dharam Pal has laid the complaint only on account of his personal animosity, that, by itself, will not be a ground to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. In this connection, the following view expressed by Bhagwati.CJ in Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar : 1987CriLJ793 may be referred to :
'It is well established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise, justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant.'
(underlining supplied)
The Supreme Court has taken the view that even assuming that the complaint was on account of personal animosity that by itself will not be sufficient to discard the complaint containing serious allegations which have to be decided and weighed after the evidence is collected and it is settled principle of law, criminal prosecution does not become vitiated on account of malafides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the complaint is actuated by mala fides.
10. So far as jurisdiction is concerned, the C.B.I, has taken the contention that part of the offence of criminal conspiracy was committed at Bangalore and the Head Office of the Vijaya Bank is situated at Bangalore and the decision to sanction the amount by the officers of the Bank was taken at Bangalore in collusion with the petitioner and therefore the filing of the complaint at Bangalore is not illegal. Venue of enquiry or trial of a case is primarily to be determined by the averments contained in the complaint or charge sheet. Unless the facts therein are positively disproved ordinarily the Court where the charge sheet or complaint is filed has to proceed with it. Conspiracy itself is substantive offence. Therefore, it is not the act done in pursuance of the conspiracy but the place where conspiracy formed or made or where the consequences ensued which determines the jurisdiction of the Court. In case of conspiracy there are cases in certain circumstances a conspiracy might be continuing offence. Each case depends upon its own facts. When there are several conspiracies so connected together to form one transaction they are equally connected together so as to form a continuing conspiracy both at the place where the crime was entered into and in a place where the act was completed and consequences ensued. Section 179 Cr.P.C. reads thus:
'179. When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.'
When two acts take place under different jurisdictions, constitute single offence, acts may be tried at both the places.
11. The Supreme Court in BANWARILAL JHUNJHUNWALA AND ORS. and V.A. THOMSON v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR., : AIR1963SC1620 held thus:
'(23). It has been held by this Court in Purushottam Das Dalmia v. State of West Bengal, : 1961CriLJ728 and L.N.Mukherjee v. State of Madras, : 1961CriLJ736 that a Court trying an accused for an offence of conspiracy is competent to try him for all offences committed in pursuance of that conspiracy irrespective of the fact that any or all the other offences were not committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The Special Judge, Poona, could try the appellants with respect to the offence of cheating and abetment thereof in connection with the supply of wood to places outside Kerala, and for the obtaining of the price of that wood. The charge No. 2 as framed by the Special Judge is correct. The Order of the High Court restricting the charge to the obtaining of Rs. 1,41,309/- only for the supply of 521 tons of wood is wrong.'
Thus, the Court having jurisdiction to try an accused for criminal conspiracy would be competent to try for all offences committed in pursuance of that conspiracy irrespective of the fact that any or all such offences were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. In the instant case both the act and the consequence in part are committed within the jurisdiction of the Court at Bangalore and there is no illegality in filing the complaint at Bangalore.
12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that there is unreasonable delay in the investigation and having registered the case on 29.6.1990, ought not to have kept quiet for such a long time and this is coming in the way of the political career of the petitioner, It is true, initiation of action by an organisation like C.B.I, or by any police as a matter of fact without prompt action keeps the person concerned in agony, excitement, and mental torture. Unreasonable delay is not a welcoming feature. But, in the instant case to satisfy my judicial conscience, I directed the C.B.I. Counsel to produce the files and I perused it. How and on what basis they have proceeded need not be catalogued in this order. However, the investigating agency has not slept over the matter and it has maintained the case diary in such a way and it discloses that the case is still in progress. At the investigation stage, the investigating agency has to maintain secrecy and to enable them to collect relevant materials, disclosure will destroy the clue and relevant clinching materials. Standard of delay will vary from case to case. After perusal of the case diary and the investigation papers, I am satisfied, having regard to the gravity of the offence and nature of transactions the time taken is not disproportionate as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
13. Now, the next question is whether a case of this nature, having regard to the facts and circumstances, warrant quashing of the entire proceedings in all these cases. The Counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no prima facie case as projected in the F.I.Rs. Therefore, continuation of the proceeding amounts to abuse of the process of the Court and sought for quashing the proceedings. In support of his contention he relied on a Decision of the Supreme Court in STATE OF UP. v. LUCKNOW AND ANR., : 1989CriLJ2301 The Supreme Court in that case held that if allegations made in the FIR are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute an offence, the criminal proceedings instituted on the basis of such F.I.R. should be quashed. But, in the instant case, when the averments are there projecting a false stock statement, inducing the Board of Directors on false statement and producing false bills, having regard to the correspondence produced by the C.B.I, and the conduct of the petitioner, it cannot be said that there is no prima facie case. The Decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner for quashing the proceeding, regarding scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no application to the case on hand. At this stage the Court is not concerned or would not embark upon an enquiry whether allegations in the F.I.R. are likely to be established by evidence or not. That would be the realm of investigation and for the Court during trial to decide that question. When an action was initiated in respect of a commission of offence by any person, statutory right to investigate cannot be interfered with under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The petitioner can wait till investigation is over and there is a specific provision in the Code to establish that there is no prima facie case against him after filing of the charge-sheet. When the matter is covered by an express letter of law, the Court cannot give a go-by to statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction. Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be used for quashing a proceeding in the rarest of the rare cases and the case on hand is not one such. Therefore, I decline to quash the F.I.Rs. filed by the Respondent.
14. However, having regard to the complaint made by the petitioner against the C.B.I, for undue delay, it is better for all concerned, in the sense to the complainant and the petitioner herein, to expedite the investigation so that justice need not be denied by delaying it.
With the above observation and for the reasons aforesaid, these Petitions are dismissed.