Judgment:
ORDER
Tirath S. Thakur, J.
1. The challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against an order dated 10th march 1993, passed by the Respondent, Karnataka Board of Wakf dissolving the Managing Committee constituted by it for managing the affairs of a Wakf called 'Shadi Mahal'. A show-cause notice dated 27th October, 1993, issued by the Secretary of the Board, calling upon the petitioner to hand over the charge of the Institution has also been assailed.
2. By an order dated 31st of March 1989, passed by the Respondent-Board, in exercise of its powers under Section 16 of the Wakf Act 1954, a managing Committee comprising 14 Members was constituted for the management of the Wakf aforementioned. The appointment orders specifically stated that the Committee would hold Office during the pleasure of the Board. The petitioner herein was appointed as the President of the said Committee. Four years' later, by an order dated 10th March 1993, the Board dissolved the said Committee and directed the petitioner to hand over the charge of the Institution alongwith its properties, Account Books, Records etc. Serious differences among the Members of the Committee, resulting in allegations and counter-allegations being made by the two factions were cited as the prime reason for the dissolution of the Committee. The Board it appears was of the view that on account of the said differences the Committee was in no position to deliver the goods leaving no option for it except to take over the management of the affairs of the said Wakf to itself under Section 43-A of the Act. The petitioner did not, it appears surrender the charge of the Institution pursuant to the order resulting in the issue of a notice asking him to do the needful and also to show-cause why action be not taken against him for disobeying the orders of the Board. The Notice further informed the petitioner that the Board had taken the Institution under its direct management under Section 43-A of the Act and appointed the Chairman District Wakf Committee, Bellary as its Administrator to manage its day today affairs. The petitioner did not question these orders. All that he did was to file WP.No. 19721/1995 on 27th of September, 1995, that is more than two and a half years after the committee was dissolved praying for a mandamus directing the Respondent to hold elections for the Shadi Mahal. In the objections filed by the Respondents, it has pointed out that it had no objection to the holding of the elections with the result that the Writ Petition was disposed of on 18th of September, 1995, with a direction that the elections may be held. A few days later the petitioner filed the present Writ Petition, this time challenging the showcause notice issued to him, without assailing the order of dissolution. By an amendment, the petitioner was permitted in the year 1996 to challenge the order of dissolution passed by the Board and seek a writ of certiorari quashing the same.
3. Mr. Siddappa, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that the dissolution of the Managing Committee was illegal for precisely speaking two reasons. Firstly it was contended that the dissolution was in terms of Section 43 and 43-A of the Wakf Act which prescribes the procedure for removal of Mutavalis from the Office held by them and filling up of vacancies or assumption of direct management of the Wakf by the Board in appropriate cases. It was urged that Section 43-A could be invoked only if the Board is satisfied for reasons to be recorded that the filing up of the vacancies of Mutavalis is prejudicial to the interests of the Wakf justifying take over of the wakf for direct Management by the Board. No such reasons according to the Learned Counsel having been recorded by the Board in the instant case, the take over was illegal. Alternatively it was submitted that the Board had sanctioned a scheme under Section 15(2)(d) of the Act which permitted the Members of the Managing Committee to hold office for a period of 5 years. Any removal in anticipation of the expiry of the said period was according to Mr. Siddappa, illegal and hence unsustainable.
4. Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents on the other hand contended that the Managing Committee had been appointed in terms of Section 16 of the Act and was to hold office during the pleasure of the Board. She referred to and heavily relied upon the order of appointment according to which the committee was to carry out the duties assigned to it during the pleasure of the Board. It was urged on the authority of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in ANJUMAN-E-ISLAM vs KARNATAKA BOARD OF WAKFS AND OTHERS 1990(1) KLJ 1 that the doctrine of pleasure applicable to appointments like the one made by the Board, in the instant case was not hedged in by any restriction or controls as in the case of employees holding office under the State who hold such office during the pleasure of the State subject to the safeguards provided for under Article 311 of the Constitution. She urged that the Committee was to cease and could be legitimately dissolved, the moment the pleasure of the Board ceased. It was contended that the Board had in the present case, decided to dissolve the Managing Committee on account of the differences that the Members had developed among themselves so that any such dissolution could not be said to be arbitrary or unfair. It was further contended that the provisions of Section 43 had no application to the instant case, as the same applied only to situations where a Mutavalli duly appointed under Section 42 was to be removed on one of the grounds set out in Section 43. It was urged that Section 43-A permitting assumption of direct Management of the Wakf by the Respondent-Board, was a stage later to the dissolution of the Committee which did not affect the legality of the order of dissolution.
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made at the bar. Section 16 of the Act, empowers the Board to constitute Committees for supervision of Wakfs. The Constitution, functions, duties and the term of office for such Committees has to be determined by the Board from time to time. What is important is that not only is the composition of the Committees and the nature of the functions and duties assigned to them left to be determined by the Board but even the term of it office of such Committees is left to the discretion of the Board. In exercise of the said power when the Board constitutes a Committee it is open to it to provide a specific term of office during which it would function or make any such appointment subject to its pleasure. In the instant case, the appointment of the Managing Committee was, dearly during the pleasure of the Board. This is apparent not only from the text of the order which entrusts the affairs of the Wakf to the committee, during the pleasure of the Board but even from the terms and conditions stipulated, in the same, the relevant portion whereof reads thus:-
'The managing committee shall function at the will and pleasure of the Karnataka Board of Wakfs, 'Dural Awkaf', No. 6, Cunningham Road, Bangalore - 560 052. It shall work under the general supervision and control of the District Wakf Committee, Bellary, and under the directions of Karnataka Board of Wakfs, Bangalore, given from time to time.'
6. As to whether the doctrine of pleasure as applicable to statutory appointments like the present is subject to any restrictions or control is no longer resintegra having been answered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case referred above. The Court held that the power to appoint carried with it the power to re-appoint and to dismiss not only on first principles but also under the general Clauses Act. The doctrine of pleasure applicable to such appointments was held to be an uncontrolled one in the absence of any Statutory provision analogous to Article 311 of the Constitution applicable to Civil Servants. The Managing Committees appointed under the Act, were held to enjoy no such protection against their dissolution. Reliance was in this connection placed upon the following observations made by Lord Herschell's in DUNN v. THE QUEEN 1896(1) QB 116:
'It seems to me that it is the public interest which has led to the terms which I have mentioned being imported into contracts for employment in the service of the Crown. The cases cited show that such employment being for the good of the public it is essential for the public good that it should be capable of being determined at the pleasure of the Crown.'
7. In the instant case the appointment of the Managing Committee made in exercise of the statutory powers vested in the Board specifically reserved in favour of the appointing authority the power to dissolve the Committee at its pleasure. The cessation of such pleasure was not subject to any restrictions or regulatory controls under the Statute so as to expose the same to the criticism of being in violation of any such restrictions. In the circumstances therefore the petitioner's grievance against the dissolution of the Committee does not appear to be well founded. I must however hasten to add that the dissolution of a Committee appointed to hold Office during the pleasure of the Board may not be entirely free from judicial review on the touch stone of Article 14. The exercise of any such power can be examined for the purposes of finding out whether the same is arbitrary or vitiated by such other legal infirmity as may make intervention by the Court necessary. An exercise of power which is actuated by malice or which is otherwise arbitrary would fall foul of Article 14 and would therefore be liable to be setaside. It is well settled that Article 14 strikes at any thing that is arbitrary malafide or other-wise unreasonable. It is not however the case of the petitioner that the exercise of the power by the Board was arbitrary or malafide so as to be offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution, nor has the petitioner laid any factual foundation for such a grievance in the Writ Petition. Even Mr. Siddappa did not canvass any such illegality. That apart, the exercise of the power to dissolve, does not appear to have been vitiated by any arbitrariness, considering the fact that the order of dissolution came on account of the factional fight that appears to have started among the Members of the Committee thereby frustrating the very purpose behind its constitution. The fact that there were differences among the members comprising the Managing Committee has not been disputed nor is it denied that on account of the said differences the working of the Committee and the interest of the wakf for which it was constituted was not being served in the best possible way. In the circumstances therefore the charge of arbitrariness would not even otherwise be tenable.
8. Equally untenable is the alternative submission made by Mr. Siddappa, according to whom, the validity of the order of dissolution has to be tested on the basis and by reference to Section 43 and 43-A of the Act. Section 43 provides for removal of Mutavallis and starts with a non-obstinate clause empowering the Board to remove a Mutavalli from his office in any one of the situations set out therein. The power to appoint Mutavalli is vested in the Board under Section 42. As to how an order dissolving a committee appointed under Section 16 could be tested for its validity by reference to Section 42 or 43 is difficult to appreciate. It is not as though a Mutavalli appointed by the Board under Section 42 was being removed contrary to Section 43 to give to the person removed the cause of action to make any grievance. This is true even as regards Section 43-A which permits assumption of direct Management of the Wakf in cases where the Board is satisfied that filling up of vacancies in the office of Mutavalli is prejudicial to the interest of the Wakf. An order under Section 43-A taking over the management of the Wakf is a consequence that may flow from the dissolution of the Managing Committee, No such order has however been specifically assailed by the petitioner, although the Board does not dispute that it has decided to assume charge of the Wakf under Section 43-A and appointed the Chairman of the District Wakf Committee, Bellary, as an Administrator to manage its affairs.
9. That brings me to the last submission made by Mr. Siddappa, who argued that a scheme had been formulated under Section 15(2)(d) by the Board which assured the Managing Committee and the petitioner as its Chairman, a secured term of 5 years in Office. Reliance in support was placed by him upon a single Bench judgment of this Court in GULAMALI v. KARNATAKA BOARD OF WAKFS AND ANOTHER 1985(1) KLJ 385 where Swami J, held that a scheme framed for the management of a Wakf has the force of law and that as long as there is no obstacle for implementing the scheme or appointing a committee in accordance therewith, it is not permissible for the Wakf Board to appoint an ad-hoc committee under Section 42 of the Act.
10. The scheme in the instant case is said to have been framed by an order dated 17th May 1990, a copy whereof has been produced as Annexure-D, to the Writ Petition. The scheme refers to Section 15(2)(d) of the Wakf Act and inter alia provides that the term of office of the Members of the Managing Committee shall be for a period not exceeding 5 years. The scheme does not however advance the petitioner's case for more than one reasons. Firstly because the scheme purports to have been framed under Section 15(2)(d) of the Act, which empowered the Board to frame schemes of managements for a wakf. This provision was by the Wakf Amendment Act of 1984 omitted from the Statute Book. The scheme in question is said to have been framed six years later in the year 1990 when the said provision did not exist. It is therefore difficult to see how such a scheme can still be recognised to be one which has a valid statutory sanction behind it. Secondly, because all that the scheme provides is that the term of office of the Members, shall not exceed 5 years. The scheme does not make the Committee, immune from dissolution or removal within the outer limit of 5 years. In other words the doctrine of pleasure is not watered-down by the scheme nor any security of tenure provided. Thirdly because the scheme does not indicate whether the same was retrospective in the sense that it would apply even to Committees that had been appointed earlier to the year 1990. Suffice it to say that since the terms subject to which the Committee was appointed themselves authorised the Board to wind up the Committee at its pleasure, it is difficult to see how any such order of dissolution could be said to be bad particularly when the Members of the Committee so appointed had accepted the said appointment on those terms without any reservation. In the totality of the above circumstances therefore I see no reason to interfere. The Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.