ORDER
Balakrishna, J.
1. In this Writ Petition, the petitioner has questioned the resolution passed by the 2nd respondent in Subject No. 173/87-88 dated 16-1-1988 (vide Annexure 'A') and also the order of 1st respondent passed in URA No. 98/1988 dated 4-3-1988 (vide Annexure 'B') and sought the issue of a Writ of certiorari for quashing Annexures 'A' and 'B' and further for a mandamus directing 2nd respondent to grant replacement of the vehicle as prayed for by the petitioner.
2. The facts of the case are as follows: The petitioner is the holder of a stage carriage permit authorised to operate on the route Mangalore to Malleswara and by vehicle bearing No. CTA 9878 of 1987 model having a seating capacity of 48+2+10. Thereafter, the petitioner acquired a vehicle bearing No. CRX. 9877 which is also of 1987 model vehicle having a seating capacity of 32 + 2 + 7 (Mitsubishi). The petitioner applied on 6-1-1988 for replacement of the present vehicle of 1987 model to subserve public interest.
3. The 2nd respondent vide resolution dated 16th January, 1988 in Subject No. 173/87-88 rejected the application vide Annexure 'A'. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the 1st respondent and this appeal also came to be dismissed.
4. The petitioner is aggrieved by the said orders and his main contention is that the vehicle which he seeks to introduce in the place of the old vehicle is of the latest model provided with modern amenities though with lesser seating capacity providing better service to the commuters and that the seating capacity is not the criteria for deciding whether or not permission should be granted under Section 59(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called 'the Act') r/w Rule 131 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963 (hereinafter called 'the Rules'). It is further submitted by the petitioner that the impugned orders are misconceived since the provisions of law have not been properly construed.
5. The contention of the learned Counsel for respondents-1 and 2 is that the words 'same nature' found in Section 59(2) of the Act are comprehensive enough to mean and include seating capacity also and it is relevant to consider the seating capacity while disposing of the application filed under Section 59(2) of the Act. According to the learned Counsel, since introduction of new vehicle would involve lessening of the seating capacity, it would result in reduced service to the commuters and therefore, the authorities were justified in rejecting the application.
6. It is necessary to consider the provisions of Section 59(2) of the Act. The said provision reads thus:
'59(2) The holder of a permit may, with the permission of the authority by which the permit was granted, replace any vehicle covered by the permit by any other vehicle of the same nature.'
7. The corresponding rule is to be found in Rule 131(2) of the Rules, which reads thus:
'131(2) Upon receipt of an application under Sub-rule (1), the Regional Transport Authority may in its discretion reject the application:-
(i) if it has previous to the application, given reasonable notice of its intention to reduce the number of transport vehicles of that clause generally or in respect of the route or area to which the permit applies; or
(ii) if the new vehicle differs in material respects from the old; or
(iii) if the holder of the permit has contravened any of the provisions thereof.'
8. Now, it is to be seen that the order passed vide Annexure 'A' by the 2nd respondent is based on the reasoning that from the beginning, larger capacity vehicles were being operated on the route in question and that the reasons to put the vehicle with lesser seating capacity on Ghat Section cannot be accepted as there is no statutory provision. It is, therefore, clear that respondent No. 2 rejected the application only on the basis that new vehicle has a lesser seating capacity. Similarly, the order passed by the 1st respondent is based on the reasoning that the introduction of the new vehicle would be to reduce the Seating capacity and therefore, permission should not be granted.
9. A plain reading of Section 59(2) of the Act shows that what is permissible is, replacement of any vehicle covered by the permit by any other vehicle of the same nature. The word 'nature' has been retained in Sub-section (2) of Section 59 of the Act by virtue of an amendment which came into effect from 2-3-1970 by Act No. 56/1969 and the word 'capacity' deleted specifically. Earlier to the amendment, the words employed were both 'nature and capacity.'
10. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the legislature deliberately omitted the word 'capacity' and retained the word 'nature'. To attribute the meaning of 'capacity' to the word 'nature' in such a circumstance cannot be accepted because that would be contrary to the Legislative intention. Any restriction on the rights of the applicant unless expressly provided by the statute cannot be impliedly imported. The word 'capacity' refers to the seating capacity and the word 'nature' does not mean and include capacity also and it is not permissible to read into the provisions of law a word which has been deliberately excluded by the Legislature itself. The Section has to be read as it exists. If the meaning of the words 'capacity' and 'nature' was one and the same, I do not think that the words 'nature and capacity' would have been discontinued by the amendment Act No. 56/1969. The reasonable probability would be that the object of the Legislature was to consider only the nature of the vehicle and not the seating capacity of the vehicle. In any event, it is not the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the nature of the vehicle does not warrant the grant of permission under Section 59(2) of the Act.
11. A reading of the Rules corresponding to Sub-rule (2) of Rule 131 makes it clear that none of the conditions for rejecting the application set-out in sub-rule is the basis for rejection of the application of the petitioner. It was also contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the words 'in material respects' found in Sub-rule (2) would mean and include the seating capacity also. I do not agree with this interpretation because what the Section does not provide, the Rule cannot supply.
For the above reasons, I am of the opinion that the order passed by respondents-1 and 2 are not sustainable in law and I, therefore, quash Annexures 'A' and 'B' and allow this Writ Petition and I direct respondent-2 to grant the request of the petitioner in accordance with application dated 6-1-1988 expeditiously so that the public interest shall not suffer. No order as to costs.