ORDER
1. The suit for recovery of unpaid purchase money was decreed by the Trial Court and the decree is resisted and challenged in this revision by the defendant-purchaser, which is at Ex. P. 2. Ex. P. 2 reads as follows:
'This agreement dated 29th October, 1979 in favour of M.R. Umakanth, s/o M.V. Ramaiah, residing at Door No. 2023, Mandi-mohallha, Turabali Street, Mysore by S.I. Kamaruddin Shah, s/o Late Syed Mohiddin, residing in the same number. This day i.e., 29-10-1979, I have purchased your house for consideration. In the said house, one Sri S. Narayana is residing as mortgagee and the mortgage period is one year and one month more. Immediately after vacation of the premises by the mortgagee and taking possession by me, I will pay Rs. 5,000-00 (Rupees Five Thousand only) and take an acknowledgement (shara) from you and take back this agreement. Executed the agreement accordingly'.
That being the case, the Trial Court ought to have connected those payments to the suit transaction and that conclusion contra is not correct. The suit is barred by limitation, because Ex. P. 2 is dated 29-10-1979 and within two years thereof possession was taken.
2. Heard the Counsel. On the question of limitation, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the dictum of this Court in Thomas alias Gibba D'Sa v John D'Sa, are as follows:
'The father sold certain property and directed the vendee to pay the balance of unpaid purchase money to the vendor's son as soon as he completed 24 years of age and if the vendee failed to pay the amount as mentioned, he should pay the same with interest as soon as the son demanded payment. A suit was filed 22 years after the son completed 24 years of age.
Held: (1) The suit was barred by time. The transaction cannot be considered as creating an express trust and hence Section 10 of the Limitation Act was inapplicable.
(2) As the due date for payment of the money to the vendor's son by the vendee was the date when the son attained the age of 24 years, the clause directing the vendee to pay the amount on demand should be held to be superfluous and therefore the suit did not fall within the scope of Article 60 of the Limitation Act'.
and contended that the suit filed in 1989 after the period of 10 years is clearly barred by limitation.
3. On the other hand, Sri Shastri, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the possession was really taken in 1989. There was evidence given by the petitioner herein the defendants, remained uncon troverted and unchallenged. Consequently, the suit filed in 1989 is in time. This decision do not apply.
4. On the question of possibility of different view on the evidence adduced, the Counsel submitted that in view of the different views taken by the parties, the Trial Court should have connected the payments only to the suit transactions and not otherwise. This argument has to be repelled, in the light of the dictum of this Court in Siddalingappa v M.C. Moben, wherein, the scope of revision under Section 18 of the Small Causes Courts Act is referred below:
'Before I go into the merits of the contentions urged for the parties, it is necessary to see the scope of the revision petition. Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964 confers revisional power to the High Court to examine whether the decision of the lower Court is according to law or not. It reads:
'18. Revision of decrees and orders of Courts of Small Causes.--The High Court, for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for the case and pass such orders with respect thereto, as it thinks fit'. The scope of the similar expression found in Section 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Malini Ayyappa Naicker (dead) by L.R. v Seth Manghraj Udkavdas Firm , in which it was observed that the expression 'according to law' is wider in ambit than the expression 'contrary to law' found in Section 100 of the CPC. It was also observed therein that the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at in Hari Shankar v Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, the Supreme Court while considering the expression 'according to law' found in Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control) Act, observed that it should not be equated to errors of law or of fact simpliciter; it refers to the overall decision, which must be according to law which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. It was also observed that in exercise of such power, the High Court cannot interfere with a plain finding of fact arrived at by the Court below. While dealing with the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25 of the Small Causes Courts Act, 1887, the Madras High Court in re Firm Beharilal Baldeoprasad , observed that where the evidence makes it clear that a question of fact was gone into by the Judge and his decision is apparently in accordance with the evidence, the High Court will not usually interfere, in revision merely because it is possible to take a different view the decision of the Small Causes Court should not be interfered with in revision, though it may even be erroneous unless the conclusion is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably reach'.
5. It is also seen from the dictum of the Supreme Court in M Is. Bhojraj Kunwarji Oil Mill and Ginning Factory and Another v Yograjsinha Shankersinha Parihar and Others, the Supreme Court observed that even if inference only on the ground that a different view on facts elicited was possible -- not permissible in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. At paragraph 4 at page 1890, the Supreme Court has observed as follow:
'Against this order, a revision petition was preferred which was heard by the learned Assistant Judge. We find it difficult to appreciate the approach of the learned Assistant Judge while exercising revisional jurisdiction in interfering with an eminently just order. And the High Court disposed of the matter observing that the grounds urged by the appellants for seeking condonation of delay were obviously no grounds at all. Again this approach left us unconvinced. If the Trial Court had the jurisdiction to condone delay, we find no material for holding that there was any impropriety in exercising this jurisdiction. Therefore, we are of the opinion that both the learned Assistant Judge and the High Court were not justified in interfering with the order of the Trial Court, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction on the only ground that a different view on facts elicited was possible. This approach hardly permits interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction'.
6. In the light of the above dictum, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the Court is limited sitting in revision and the contention is contra raised by the petitioners cannot be accepted. Though the circumstances may permit to be brought in a second opinion or different inference, the same is not permitted when a Court is sitting under Section 115 of the CPC or under Section 18 of the Small Causes Courts Act.
7. In this view, I find no merits. This CRP is dismissed. No costs.