Saldanha, J.
1. Heard the appellant's learned Counsel. This is an Appeal where, it is incumbent that this Court will have to clarify a rather delicate and unusual situation that is not unfamiliar before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals. The issue that is canvassed is with regard to the liability of the appellants - Insurance Company for payment of compensation awarded to the claimant who was a Bus Conductor and who died as a result of being run over by a Tempo on 26.6.1983 at Pandavapura. The claimant is the widow of the deceased who was a Bus Conductor and who had got down from his vehicle and was proceeding towards the Town Hall for some refreshments. The Tempo is alleged to have been driven at a high speed and had knocked down the deceased who died as a result of the injuries sustained. A claim petition was preferred before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Mandya, by the widow in which she cited the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd., as respondent-4 in its capacity as the insurer of the vehicle.
2. In the written statement that was filed, the first sentence of paragraph-3 reads as follows:
'It is not true that MER : 7201 Tempo Van has been insured with this respondent.'
The rest of the written statement is not material for purposes of this Judgment. The learned Trial Judge has not framed any specific issue with regard to the question as to whether respondent-4 namely the Insurance Company was established to be the insurer of the vehicle and is consequently liable. In the judgment, there is no discussion with regard to the liability of the Insurance Company except in paragraph-10 where the learned Judge after fixing the compensation has held respondents-2, 3 and 4 be liable to pay the compensation. It is against this award that the present Appeal has been directed.
3. The appellant's learned Advocate submitted that the record of this case is as clear as day light insofar as apart from merely stating that the insurer of the vehicle is the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd in the Claim Form, that no further evidence was led by the claimant to support this plea as is evident from the record. He draws my attention to the aforesaid denial in the written statement and he submits that the foisting of the liability on the Insurance Company-respondent No. 4 is a clear error and that the award requires modification as far as this is concerned. In support of his submission, he has placed strong reliance on a Decision of the Orissa High Court, reported in : AIR1993Ori48 , Divisional Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Ramakrishna Das and Anr., the Court had occasion to analyse the situation in which an Insurance Company is liable to pay the compensation. Undoubtedly, the liability is that of the owner which is indemnified by the Insurance Company. In these situations, learned Advocate submits that the contract between the owner and the Insurance Company must be established to have been in existence and therefore, that the Court cannot presume an automatic liability in the absence of this aspect of the matter being specifically established. Relying on the observations in that Judgment, learned Advocate submitted that the onus of establishing that the Insurance Company is liable, in the application filed under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act lies squarely on the claimant. This presupposes the fact that the claimant must establish the existence of the policy by furnishing details thereof and-if this is not done, that the Insurance Company cannot be held liable in law. Learned Advocate emphasises very strongly that in the present case the Insurance Company has in unequivocal terms denied its liability and that the Trial Court has not, anywhere in the judgment indicated on what basis this defence of denial has been rejected- He therefore submits that in the present incident, the award in question vis-a-vis the Insurance Company must be set-aside.
4. The other parties to this litigation have not appeared. In the course of the arguments which were conducted in some detail, this Court put a specific question to the learned Advocate who represents the Insurance Company with regard to the obligations that are cast on the Insurance Company in a situation of the present type where the Insurance Company is made a party. If the Insurance Company as it contends, is wrongly made a party the question arises as to whether the Company's defence can be upheld merely on the basis of a slightly ambiguous denial in the written statement or whether the obligation on the part of the Insurance Company can be said to have been fully and completely discharged and if not, what are the consequences. This aspect of the matter is of crucial importance insofar as situations of this type arise before the Tribunal times without number and it cannot be presumed, that the hundred per cent burden is entirely on the claimant and that the Insurance Company and its learned representatives are not obliged to do anything in the course of the proceeding. The position that arises under Criminal Law where an accused person in given situations may be entitled to contend that he is not obliged to do anything in the trial and that the total burden vests on the prosecution is altered as far as civil proceedings are concerned. I do not dispute, as pointed out by the appellant's learned Advocate, that the primary obligation does always lie with the claimant.
5. This Court is required to take a very practical and down to earth view of these Cases, the first of them being that in situations where the claimant is an illiterate villager and is heavily handicapped as far as resources and other aspects including legal assistance is concerned, that there are many lapses in the discharge of the duties. Under these circumstances, a corresponding obligation in cast on the respondents who are made parties and they cannot be heard to contend that they were required to do nothing. In the present instance, appellant's learned Advocate did point out to me, perhaps with some justification, that it is ultimately the learned Judge who is required to frame the issues and to give the decision and that no issue was framed with regard to this specific aspect of the matter, though in fairness, he did point out to me that Issue No. 7 does make a reference to the question as to which of the respondents would be liable. That issue however is too vague and it is virtually begging the question because it does not specifically deal with the aspect as to whether respondent-4 has justifiably been cited as the insurer. In this regard, I need to emphasise that the learned Advocates who appear in these proceedings and who are designated as the Officers of the Court are required to conduct their professional duties with a degree of great caution and expertise that the proceedings require. This is not a loose obligation but is a serious one and has got to be properly discharged. In a given situation, where the respondent contends that he has wrongly been made a party to the proceedings, it is his duty to apply to the Court to dismiss the proceedings as against him and if he does not do this merely by taking a contention that a denial that has been made in the written statement would not in the least bit benefit the respondent because it is well known that all sorts of denials are put in the written statement, sometimes even absurd ones. It is equally the obligation of the learned Advocates in situations where they contend that no liability accrues to bring that fact to the notice of the learned Judge when the Issues are being framed and to get a specific issue to that effect framed by the learned Trial Judge, so that aspect of the case can be specifically decided. In addition to that, where in the Claim Form the insured has been shown as the insurer of the vehicle, if that statement is false the claimant ought to have been confronted with that statement and asked as to what is the basis on which the same has been made in which case the claimant would have substantiated it and if the claimant could not do so, then the attention of the Court would have been drawn to that evidence on record, that the statement is incorrect and unjustified, and on the basis of that material the Insurance Company could have legitimately claimed immunity. The obligation on the part of the claimant in the circumstances set out by me above is therefore coextension with the obligation of the Insurance Company to perform its part during the course of the trial.
6. The question arises as to what would be the consequences of possible non-action in cases of the present type. To my mind, where the pleadings specifically point to a liability and a passing denial is put into the written statement but nothing is done in furtherance thereof and more so, in a situation where at the stage of framing of issues, at the stage of the evidence and at the stage of the arguments, the liability is not specifically disputed, the Court would be justified in holding that the original claim has gone uncontroverted and would be, justified in ignoring the passing denial merely recorded in the written statement. It is precisely for this reason that I have reproduced the manner in which the trial was conducted in this case.
7. I need to emphasise here that this Court had occasion to deal with the handicaps which a claimant may be some time faced but this would not justify the making of a false claim indiscriminately making the same Insurance Company liable. It is for this reason that the Insurance Company must effectively and adequately contest a false claim if it is made. Where there is absolutely no contest at all, the claimant would undoubtedly succeed virtually by default. To my mind, if a claim put forward is false nothing prevents the Insurance Company from pointing out to the learned Trial Judge that on the receipt of the, notice from the Court, the Insurance Company has checked its records in relation to the names of the owner particularly the motor vehicle number and that there is no such policy in existence in relation to that owner and vehicle. This is the minimum that is expected on the part of the Insurance Company and in the absence of this exercise having specifically been carried out to merely state that the vehicle is not insured with them, without substantiating the basis on which such a statement has been made to my mind, is hopelessly inadequate.
8. It is in these unusual situations, that I have refused to interfere. On the facts of the present case, the appellant's learned Advocate has advanced a fervent plea to this Court that the award must be set-aside as against the Insurance Company principally on the ground that otherwise, a wrong precedent may be created. I am conscious of this fact and it is on the special record of this case, that this Court has refused to interfere, but this does not mean that the decision will hold good in each and every other case because the facts may be dis-similar, though this has been the occasion where the Court has found it necessary to substantiate the duty that is cast also on the respondent- Insurance Company in these situations. That duty to my mind, arises out of a total sense of responsibility also. The award in this case has been stayed only vis-a-vis the present appellants. It is clarified therefore that if the award has been executed and the amount recovered from the remaining respondents, that no further action shall be taken in the matter. It is only if the claimant has not been able to recover the whole or part of the amount from the other respondents that the award vis-a-vis the present appellants shall be given effect to.
9. The Appeal accordingly fails and stands disposed of. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.