Judgment:
ORDER
Ramachandriah, J.
1. The all powerful and mighty State of Karnataka through its Additional State Public Prosecutor, Sri B.R. Nanjundaiah, has filed a petition under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. for cancelling bail granted to these 21 respondents by the Sessions Judge, Tumkur (for short 'the Sessions Judge') in SC 13/1990 by order dated 30-3-1990. These respondents are charge-sheeted by Kuniyal Police for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 341, 321, 326, 506, 307 and 302 read with Section 114 IPC. As per charge-sheet allegations, these respondents and A-9 are alleged to have made a brutal and barbaric attack on one H.B. Boralingaiah (deceased) in broad day light at about 9 a.m. on Friday the T5th September, 1989 in the heart of a village called Jodi Hosahalli in Kunigai Taluk situate at a distance of about 25 Kms. from Kunigai Police Station by making a fatal assault on him with lethal weapons just in front of the house of one Guddaiah and causing him as many as 22 grievous injuries to which he succumbed at about 4-30 p.m. on the same day when he was being brought to Bangalore Hospital for treatment of those Injuries. The said murderous assault is stated to have been made in the backdrop of longstanding ill-will and political rivalry said to be existing between the deceased and these 21 respondents as alleged by the prosecution. Except the 21st accused, who surrendered before the Court on some date in January, 1990 the remaining 21 accused were arrested on 3-10-1989 and 5-10-1989 in Crime No. 253/1989 registered at Kunigal Police Station at about 12-45 p.m. on 15-9-1989 for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 341, 321, 326, 506, 307 and 302 IPC read with Section 114 I.P.C. on the complaint lodged by Boraiah, younger brother of deceased H.B. Boralingaiah.
2. All the 22 accused had filed bail petitions under Section 439 Cr.P.C. before the learned Sessions Judge in Cri.Misc.C. No. 286/1989 and 331/1989. Bail was granted by the learned Sessions Judge to 9th accused (R-4) only on medical grounds by order dated 4-11-1989 and bail was rejected to all the remaining 21 accused, namely, to these respondents who are stated to be accused Nos. 1 to 8 and 10 to 20 as the case was still under investigation then. It appears that these respondents had filed fresh bait petition before this Court also and it was withdrawn by them in order to test their luck after investigation was completed.
3. After completing the investigation, Kunigai Police filed a charge-sheet against all the accused for the above mentioned offences in the Court of the J.M.F.C. Kunigal who promptly committed the case to the Sessions Court, Tumkur, for the trial of the accused for the above mentioned offences. Sometime thereafter, these 21 respondents-accused filed a fresh bail petition under Section 439 Cr.P.C. before the learned Sessions Judge. By Order dated 30-3-1990, learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the Investigating Agency had collected sufficient material in regard to the homicidal death of deceased Boralingaiah due to as many as 22 injuries inflicted on him and, in particular damage caused to his brain as mentioned in the P.M. report; that the materials produced by the prosecution are sufficient to believe that the accused have committed the offences alleged against them and in particular the offence of murder punishable with death or imprisonment for life and, therefore, it was not a fit case to release any of the accused on bail, much less, accused No. 21 (Respondent No. 21 herein) in view of the statements of several eye-witnesses and also the extra-judicial confession said to have been made by him and also the first accused before C.Ws.21 and 22 in Kalasipatyam bus-stand, Bangalore at about 7 p.m. on 18-9-1989. Learned Sessions Judge further observed in paragraph-7 of his order that on the face of it, there are no changed circumstances to re-consider the question of bail on merits. However, he thought it proper to grant bail to these 21 respondents on the grounds that 7th accused is an old man, 11th accused is an old and infirm person, 16th accused was a sick person as he is suffering from abdominal pain, 17th accused is also a sick person as he is suffering from T.B., 21st accused is a sick person as he is suffering from chronic abdominal pain and all the accused except A-9 were in Judicial custody for a considerable period. In coming to that conclusion, he also took into consideration the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondents-accused that Sessions Case No. 13/1990 may be treated as custody case for the purpose of trial on priority basis and the trial date may be fixed immediately after framing of charges. Therefore, he granted bail to all the 21 respondents-accused imposing on them the usual conditions in addition to the 5th condition that the Sessions Case shall be treated as a custody case for the purpose of trial on priority.
4. Feeling aggrieved by the grant of bail to these respondents, the State has filed the present petition on 24-5-1990 seeking cancellation of bail on the grounds that the learned Sessions Judge having come to the conclusion that the materials produced by the prosecution disclose a prima facie case against all the accused has slipped into an error in enlarging them on bail merely on the ground that the Public Prosecutor was unable to satisfy the Court that custody of the accused was necessary for any purpose in so far as the investigation is concerned; that he has also committed an error in enlarging the accused on bail on the ground that they were in judicial custody for a considerable period although they were in custody for a couple of months only and especially when it had been brought to his notice that in view of ill-will that was existing between the deceased and the accused there was every likelihood of the accused repeating the offences, tampering with the witnesses and even absconding in view of the seriousness of the charges made against them. The State has also urged that when a prima facie case has been disclosed by the materials produced by the prosecution arid the offence under Section 302 IPC is punishable with death or imprisonment for life and in the absence of any other compelling reasons, the learned Sessions Judge ought not to have exercised the discretion in favour of the accused in enlarging them on bail.
5. This Criminal Petition filed more than three months back came up for consideration only last week on account of the delay in serving the notices on the respondents.
6. Sri B.R. Nanjundaiah, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor and Sri H.S. Seshadri, learned Counsel for the respondents are heard at considerable length on 6-9-1990.
7. Sri B.R. Nanjundaiah vehemently argued that the learned Sessions Judge has acted improperly in granting bail to the respondents on the above mentioned grounds after having come to the conclusion that a prima facie case had been made out against all the accused for believing that they have committed offences alleged against them and in particular the capital offence of murder and further observing that no changed circumstances are made out by the respondents-accused to reconsider the question of bail on merits after having rejected their prayer of on earlier occasion. He placed reliance in support of his said contention on a single Judge decision of the Kerala High Court in SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, COCHIN v. P.V. VIJAYA RAGHAVAN AND ORS. another, 1984 Cr.L.J. NOC 111 single Judge decision of the Bombay High Court in RAMPRASAD v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. 1989(1) Crimes 50 and a decision of the Supreme Court in RAJANIKANT JIVANLAL PATEL AND ANR. v. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, NARCOTIC CONTROL BUREAU, NEW DELHI, : 1990CriLJ62 . When questioned whether bail granted to these respondents by the learned Sessions Judge as long back as 30-3-1990 can be cancelled in the absence of any allegation by the prosecution that the respondents-accused have misused the liberty of bail granted to them, Sri B.R. Nanjundaiah alternatively submitted that, in the event of this Court rejecting the petition, the learned Sessions Judge may be directed to dispose of the Sessions Case on top priority basis in the light of the above mentioned undertaking given by the learned Counsel for the respondents-accused before the learned Sessions Judge and also the observation made by the learned Sessions Judge in the operative portion of his order that the Sessions Case shall be treated as a custody case for the purpose of trial on priority basis.
8. On the other hand, Sri H.S. Seshadri, learned Counsel for the respondents, submitted that, according to him, the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge that there is a prima facie case against the respondents for believing that they have committed the offences alleged against them by the prosecution is not correct and he would be in a position to demonstrate the same. He even made repeated attempts to refer to the various infirmities, according to him, in the prosecution case and ultimately gave up his said attempt after it was pointed out to him that it would not be proper for this Court to go into the merits or de-merits of the prosecution case at the stage of considering the petition, filed for cancellation of ball. He eventually submitted that the State has nowhere alleged in the petition that the respondents have misused the liberty of bail granted to them at any time during last five months and more, and, therefore, the State petition has to be rejected. He placed reliance in support of his said contention on two decisions of the Supreme Court in THE STATE THROUGH THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION v. SANJAY GANDHI, : 1978CriLJ952 and BAGIRATHSINH JUDEJA v. STATE OF GUJARAT, : 1984CriLJ160 .
9. Therefore, the point for consideration is whether the State has made out sufficient grounds for cancellation of bail granted to the respondents by the learned Sessions Judge on 30-3-1990?
10. In addition to the above mentioned decisions to which reference was made by the learned Counsel on both sides, I consider it necessary to make a brief reference to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the matter of cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. in the following decisions:
(1) GURUCHARAN SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION, AIR 1978 SC 179;
(2) STATE v. JASPAL SINGH GILL, : 1984CriLJ1211 ;
(3) RAGHUBIR SINGH AND ORS. v. STATE OF BIHAR, : 1987CriLJ157 ;
(4) SHAHAZAD NASA KHAN v. ISHTIAQ HASAN KHAN AND ANR., : 1987CriLJ1872 ; and
(5) STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. ANAND CHINTAMAN DIGHE. 1990 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 142
in order to know under what exceptional circumstances and grounds the prayer of the State for cancellation of bail once granted to an accused is either granted or refused under Section 439(2).
11. It may be stated at the very outset that unlike under Section 437(1), no limitations are imposed under Section 439 Cr.P.C. against granting of bail by the High Court or the Sessions Court to persons accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. It is pointed out in Gurucharan Singh & Others v. State (Delhi Administration) as under:
'Even so, the High Court or the Court of Session will have to exercise its judicial discretion in considering the question of granting of bail under Section 439(1). The overriding considerations in granting bail which are common both in the case of Section 437(1) and Section 439(1) are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood, of the accused fleeing from justice; of repeating the offences of jeopardising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case; of tampering with witnesses; the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many variable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out. The two paramount considerations, viz., likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and his tampering with prosecution evidence relate to ensuring a fair trial of the case in a Court of justice. It is essential that due and proper weight should be bestowed on these two factors apart from others......'
So, tested, the grievance of the State in the instant case that the learned Sessions Judge has improperly exercised the judicial discretion vested in him in admitting these respondents to bail on the grounds of the alleged sickness of five of them under the ground of all of them being in custody for 'a considerable period', according to him, when one of them was in custody hardly for less than three months while the others were in custody since about five months only is certainly well founded. But, the question of cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. is certainly different from admission to bail under Section 439(1).
12. Before proceeding to refer to the above mentioned five decisions and the three decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents, let me refer to the three decisions on which reliance was placed by Sri B.R. Nanjundaiah.
13. In the case of Superintendent of Police, Cochin v. P.V. Vijaya Raghavan and Ors. the Sessions Court without insisting on the complainant (CBI) to produce case diary for perusal before granting bail had granted bail to the accused on the ground that the case diary and the connected records were not produced before him for perusal and, therefore, the Court had no material to make out what was the real nature of the case that was revealed by the Investigation so far done. It is under those circumstances that the learned single Judge of Kerala High Court has held that the order of the Sessions Judge for granting bail was vitiated and, as such, cancelled the same under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C.
14. In Ramprasad v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. bail had been granted to the accused concerned in that case as he had kept back from the Court that bail application previously filed by him was rejected, it was for that reason that the High Court cancelled, the bail under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C, and directed the accused to surrender to their bail bonds forthwith.
15. In Rajanikant Jivanlal Patel and Anr. v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi the accused was released under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. as charge-sheet was not filed before the expiry of 90 days from the date of his arrest. After placing the charge-sheet, the prosecution moved the High Court under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. to cancel the statutory bail to which he was admitted under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. The High Court by following the decision in Raghubir Singh's case and after considering the material on record cancelled the bail. Accused approached the Supreme Court. While considering the question whether the accused have a special right to remain on bail merely because they have been enlarged under the proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C, His Lordship K. Jagannatha Shetty, J., has held that an order for release on bail under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) may appropriately be termed as an order-on-default, and, therefore, the accused cannot claim any specific right to remain on bail if the investigation resulting in filing of the charge-sheet reveals that the accused has committed a serious offence and, in such a case, bail granted under the proviso (a) to Section 167(2) could be cancelled. In that case, His Lordship after examining the material on record came to the conclusion that the offences alleged are of serious nature and, therefore, the discretion exercised by the High Court cancelling the bail order does not call for any interference.
16. Let me now refer to the above mentioned five decisions and the two decisions to which reference was made by Sri H.S. Seshadri.
17. In the case of Gurucharan Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration) the accused were the D.I.G. of Police, the Superintendent of Police and some Police constables. They were alleged to be a party to a criminal conspiracy to kill one Sunder and they alleged to have caused his death by drowning him in the Yamuna river in pursuance of the conspiracy. During the preliminary inquiry, all the six alleged eye-witnesses did not support the prosecution case and, on the other hand, they gave statements in favour of the accused. However, during the course of investigation, 7 witnesses including six witnesses already examined during the preliminary inquiry gave statements implicating the accused. In the course of their statements on oath, recorded by the Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. six eye-witnesses, who had earlier had not supported the prosecution version explained that some of the accused had exercised pressure on them to make statements in their favour. It was in that back-ground that the Delhi Administration moved the High Court for cancellation of bail granted by the Sessions Judge alleging that there was grave apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with by the accused persons on account of their position and influence which they wielded over the witnesses. It is in the light of those facts that the High Court held that the Sessions Judge did not take into proper account the grave apprehension of the prosecution that there was likelihood of the accused persons tampering with the prosecution witnesses having regard to their status as two of them were highly placed Police Officers. The Supreme Court has declined tc interfere with the order of the High Court in cancelling bail to the accused.
18. In the then sensational and leading case of Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi on which strong reliance was placed by Sri H.S. Seshadri, it is observed in paragraph-13 at pages 965-966 thus:
'13. Rejection of bail when bail is applied for is one thing, cancellation of bail already granted is quite another. It is easier to reject a bail application in a non-boilable case than to cancel a bail granted in such a case. Cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made and can by and large be permitted only if, by reason of supervening circumstances, it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. The fact that prosecution witnesses have turned hostile cannot by itself justify the inference that the accused has won them over........'
It is then observed towards the end of that paragraph:
'It is therefore necessary for the prosecution to show some act or conduct on the part of the respondent from which a reasonable inference may arise that the witnesses have gone back on their statements as a result of an intervention by or on behalf of the respondent.'
After referring to the facts of that case, it is observed in paragraph-24 at page 968 as under:
'24. Section 439(2) of the Criminal P.C. confers jurisdiction on the High Court or Court of Session to direct that any person who has been released on bail under Chapter XXXIII be arrested and committed to custody. The power to take back in custody an accused who has been enlarged on bail has to be exercised with care and circumspection. But the power, though of an extra-ordinary nature, is meant to be exercised in appropriate cases when, by a preponderance of probabilities, it is clear that the accused is interfering with the course of justice by tampering with witnesses. Refusal to exercise that wholesome power in such cases, few though they may be, will reduce it to a dead letter and will suffer the Courts to be silent spectators to the subversion of the judicial process. We might as well wind up the Courts and bolt their doors against all than permit a few to ensure that justice shall not be done.'
In that case, the material produced by the prosecution clearly disclosed that 'Maruthi witnesses' were likely to be won over by the accused as there was clear admitted tampering of the Maruthi witnesses like Yadav and Charan Singh. Therefore, the Supreme Court cancelled respondent-Sanjay Gandhi's bail for a period of one month and directed that he be taken into custody. It is further observed that although the respondent was entitled to be released on fresh bail on the expiry of one month, he was directed not to take unfair advantage of his release on fresh bail after one month by stalling the proceedings or by asking for a stay on some pretext or the other and he was further warned that if that is clone, the arms of law shall be long enough.
19. In the case of Bhagirathsinh Judeja the main ground on which the State in the instant case has sought cancellation of bail by stating in ground No. 6 that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have seen that when a prima facie case has been disclosed by the material made available on record and when the offence is punishable with death and in the absence of any other compelling reason, the learned Sessions Judge ought not to have exercised his discretion in favour of the accused in enlarging them on bail, is negatived by the Supreme Court by observing in para-5 at page 373 as under:
'If there is no prima facie case there is no question of considering the circumstances. But even where a prima facie case is established, the approach of the Court in the matter of bail is not that the accused should be detained by way of punishment but whether the presence of the accused would be readily available -for trial or that he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence.........'
In that case, the High Court had cancelled bail granted to an accused by the Sessions Judge against whom the offence alleged was one punishable under Section 307 IPC and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. In that context, it is observed in oaragraph-6 that 'the High Court completely overlooked the fact that it was not for it to decide whether the bail should be granted but the application before it was for cancellation of the bail'. It is further observed in the same paragraph as under:
'Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order seeking cancellation of the bail. And the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material considerations in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence. The order made by the High Court is conspicuous by its silence on these two relevant considerations. It is for these reasons that we consider in the interest of justice a compelling necessity to interfere with the order made by the High Court.'
20. In State v. Jaspal Singh Gill the High Court had granted bail to one of the accused under Section 482 Cr.P.C. during investigation while refusing bail to two accused in a case involving charges relating to offence of passing on defence secrets to a foreign agency punishable under Sections 3, 5 and 9 of the Official Secrets Act read with Section 120B IPC. Supreme Court has cancelled bail holding that the High Court was not justified in the larger interest of the State in enlarging the accused on bail although the said accused had undergone a cardiac operation and needed constant medical attention.
21. The case of Raghubir Singh and Ors. v. State of Bihar relates to cancellation of bail granted to an accused who had been earlier released on bail under the proviso to Section 167(2)(a). It is in that context it is observed in paragraph-22 at page 161 as under:
'......Where bail has been granted under the proviso to Section 167(2) for the default of the prosecution in not completing the investigation in sixty days, after the defect is cured by the filling of a charge-sheet, the prosecution may seek to have the bail cancelled on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to believe chat the accused has committed, a non-boilable offence and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit him to custody. In the last mentioned case, one would expect very strong grounds indeed.'
22. In Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaqhasan Khan and Anr. the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court had granted bai I to the accused whose three successive bail applications had been rejected by a particular Judge of the High Court. While considering the fourth bail application filed by him, another Judge who had in the first instance directed the fourth bail application to be placed before the same Judge who had rejected the three earlier bail applications recalled his earlier order passed on the fourth application on a subsequent date and entertained the fourth bail application and ordered the release of the accused on bail in disregard of the prevailing practice of the High Court that subsequent bail application should be placed before the same Judge who had disposed of the earlier application. While granting bail on the fourth application, the learned Judge had not even granted time to the complainant for filing counter affidavit. Therefore, the Supreme Court has observed that had he done so, the complainant would have placed the correct facts before the Court and it would have been pointed out that apart from the inherent danger of tampering with or intimidating witnesses and aborting the case, there was also the danger to the life of the main witnesses or to the life of the accused being endangered etc. The Supreme Court has further observed towards the end of para-graph-6 at page 1616 as under:
'No doubt liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by Court, nonetheless when a person is accused of a serious offence like murder and his successive bail applications are rejected on merit there being prima facie material, the prosecution is entitled to place correct facts before the Court. Liberty is to be secured through process of law, which is administered keeping in mind the interests of the accused, the near and dear of the victim who lost his life and who feel helpless and believe that there is no justice in the world as also the collective interest of the community so that parties do not lose faith in the institution and indulge in private retribution. Learned Judge was unduly influenced by the concept of liberty, disregarding the facts of the case.'
The occurrence in that case had taken place in broad day light, in a busy market place and there were number of eye-witnesses to support the case against the respondent accused who was named as assailant in the FIR; that immediately after the occurrence the respondent could not be traced for more than a month and attempts were made on his behalf to tamper with the evidence. It is in view of those facts and circumstances that the Supreme Court has concluded that Ishtiaq Hasan Khan (Respondent No. 1) was not entitled to bail if the seriousness of the matter was realised and a judicious approach was made. Therefore, the Supreme Court has set aside the order of the High Court granting bail to respondent-1 and directed that he shall be taken into custody forthwith.
23. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Anand Chintaman Dighe the Supreme Court has recently observed as under:
'This Court would not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the lower Court in granting or refusing bail but in cases where bail has been granted on irrelevant considerations, such as the status or influence of the person accused and regardless of the nature of the accusation and relevancy of materials on record, this Court would not hesitate to interfere for the ends of justice.'
The facts in that case are that the respondent was accused of having committed offences under Section 3(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 besides the offences punishable under Sections 148, 149, 120B and 302 IPC. He was a member of the Shiva Sena Party and the Chief of the Thane District Unit of that Party. Learned Judge of the Designated Court, Pune had directed release of the respondent on bail by observing that it was a case of respectable person of a big political organisation, his freedom cannot be curtailed if he is entitled to bail and his liberty cannot be curbed if enlarged on bail and, therefore, no kind of condition is required to be imposed on him. The Judge had also observed that being a leader of the big political organisation one cannot expect that the respondent will commit any offence if enlarged on bail and he cannot be called to be a criminal. In the backdrop of repeated assertions and the statements given to the press by the respondent saying that the traitors life will be made difficult and probably they would be killed, etc., the Supreme Court has observed that the Court-below had misdirected itselfin refusing to look into such statements and concluding that it is a case for granting bail taking into account only the position held by the respondent in the party, and, therefore, it had clearly erred in disposing of the application for bail. In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court has set aside the order of the bail granted by the Designated Court and cancelled the bail granted to the respondent without prejudice to his right to move the Designated Court at any subsequent stage.
24. It is thus seen that in the above decisions, bail is cancelled not on the mere ground that a prima facie case had been made out by the prosecution against the accused concerned in the said cases but on other very strong grounds or exceptional circumstances referred to above.
25. But, in the instant case, the State has not even alleged in the petition, as rightly pointed by the learned Counsel for the respondents, that the respondents had at any time attempted to tamper with the prosecution witnesses or held out any threats to the members of the family of the deceased or attempted to jump bail by misusing liberty granted to them by the Sessions Judge as long back as 30-3-1990. Therefore, I do not find any force in the vehement submission of the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor that this is a fit case for cancelling the bail granted to the respondents by the learned Sessions Judge although I am of the view that he has exercised his judicial discretion, in granting bail to these respondents improperly.
26. It was submitted by Sri H.S. Seshadri that arguments on the point of framing charges are not yet heard in S.C.13/1990. Perhaps, the learned Sessions Judge appears to be adjourning S.C.13/1990 in the usual course by treating it as a recent case without noticing the undertaking given by the learned Counsel for the accused and the observations made by his predecessor in the impugned order that 'this case shall be treated as custody case for the purpose of trialon top priority.' Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge is directed to hear arguments on the point of framing charges and pass appropriate orders in that behalf preferably before the end of September, 1990, if possible, and, in any event, before October, 1990 and then fix the earliest date convenient to him for commencing the trial having regard to other part-heard custody cases, if any, on his file and proceed with the trial from day-to-day (de-die-in diem) as far as possible by examining all the eye-witnesses first and thereafter such other material witnesses as may be produced by the prosecution and conclude the trial as early as possible. By way of abundant caution, it is also made clear that the prosecution is at liberty to move for cancellation of bail to all or any of the accused if the accused _ seek unnecessary adjournments or resort to other dilatory tactics. The concerned police are also at liberty to keep a close watch over the movements of the respondents-accused in the village in order to deter them from offering any inducement or holding out any threats to the eye-witnesses and other material witnesses in the case.
27. In the result and subject to the observations made above the petition is dismissed.
FURTHER