ORDER
1. Heard the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner namely Sri P. Manjunath holding brief for Sri R. Gopal and Sri V.S. Biju holding brief for Sri Jagadeesh Mundargi, learned Counsel for the respondent.
2. This revision under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act arises from the judgment and decree dated 24-11-1992 whereby the learned Civil Judge while exercising the powers under Small Causes Courts Act, dismissed the plaintiff's suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 876.10 ps.
3. Plaintiffs case was that the defendant had borrowed on 29-6-1991 a sum of Rs. 6,000/- with promise to return the sum within two or three days, but did not return the same. Instead, on 29-9-1991 he further borrowed a sum of Rs. 4,000/- and the defendant assured the plaintiff-revision petitioner that he will return Rs. 10,000/- with interest at the rate of 2% per month till the date of payment. The plaintiff has further alleged that on 9-11-1991, defendant-respondent had paid back a sum of Rs. 9,400/- by cheque drawn on Urban Co-operative Bank, Vijayalaxmi Road Branch and assured to pay the balance by 11-11-1991, but did not do so. The plaintiff-revision petitioner got notice issued to the defendant and the defendant gave a false reply. The plaintiff claimed a decree for a sum of Rs. 876.10 ps. Defendant filed a written statement. He admittedto have taken Rs. 10,000/- i.e., Rs. 6,000/- + Rs. 4,000/-. He denied that he ever agreed to pay interest at the rate of 2% per month. The case of the defendant further is that the plaintiff refused to execute the agreement as per the agreed terms and conditions. The plaintiff demanded back Rs. 10,000/- saying that he would vacate the premises. Defendant's further case is that the plaintiff-revision petitioner was in need of a house. He approached the defendant for giving his house bearing No. 67/3 measuring 15ft. x 15ft. situated at Belludi Galli, Davanagere. The plaintiff agreed to occupy the house on a rent of Rs. 400/- per month and further agreed to pay an amount of Rs. 10,000/- towards security deposit. This happened sometimes on 29-9-1991. On account of that the plaintiff had given a cheque of Rs. 6,000/- on 29-9-1991, the plaintiff was given the key of the house. He performed the pooja with an intention to occupy the house. On 22-10-1991, he paid Rs. 4,000/- and further agreed to execute rent agreement as per terms and conditions. The plaintiff got the agreement typed on a stamp paper and gave a copy to the defendant. The defendant, after going through the contents of the agreement, raised objections about certain conditions in that agreement. Thereupon, the plaintiff refused to execute the agreement as per agreed terms and conditions and demanded back the advance amount of Rs. 10,000/- saying that he would vacate the premises. Thereupon, the defendant also agreed for cancellation of such agreement. The defendant further alleged that the defendant had incurred expenses of Rs. 400/- for repairs of the house and he was also entitled to receive rent of Rs. 400/- for one month rent. Later on, parties came to terms that a sum of Rs. 600/- be deducted namely Rs. 400/- towards rent and Rs. 200/- for repair charges and after deduction thereof, defendant issued a cheque of Rs. 9,400/- in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner in full satisfaction. Therefore, the defendant-respondent denied his liability to pay any further sum.
4. Trial Court framed the issues which are as under.-
(1) Whether plaintiff proves that defendant borrowed hand loan of Rs. 10,000/-as contended in the plaint?
(2) Whether plaintiff further proves that the defendant agreed to pay interest at the rate of Rs. 2% per month?
(3) Whether plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 876.10 ps. from the defendant?
(4) Whether the defendant proves that he issued cheque for Rs. 9,400/- towards the repayment of advance amount under contract of lease?
(5) What order or decree?
5. On behalf of the plaintiff, plaintiff examined himself as witness in relation to the transaction and also examined P.W. 2 to prove that the plaintiff was residing as tenant in that house. Defendant examined himself as D.W. 1. He also examined D.W. 2 and D.W. 3. The Court below after having appreciated the oral evidence of the parties, arrived at a conclusion that the case set up by the defendant appears to be reason-able and acceptable. Feeling aggrieved from the decree of the Trial Court dismissing the suit claim, plaintiff has come up in revision under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act.
6. I have heard the learned Counsels for the parties as mentioned earlier.
It has been contended by the revision petitioner's Counsel that the Court below acted illegally in relying on the evidence of the defendant witnesses and not in relying the evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiff.
7. This contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant has been hotly contested. Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that jurisdiction of this Court under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act is not the same as that of the first Appellate Court. Learned Counsel contended that jurisdiction is limited to examine whether the decision is according to law and made a reference to the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Harishankar and Others v Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury. Learned Counsel contended that the entire contention addressed on behalf of the appellant relates only to appreciation of evidence and nothing more. He contended that finding that the defendant's case is correct that the sum of Rs. 600/- were adjusted and agreed to be adjusted towards rent and repair charges is a finding of fact and therefore this Court should not interfere with the decision in the exercise of its re visional powers.
8. I have applied ray mind to the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties. The scope of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 18 is limited to the question whether the decision is according to law. The expression 'according to law' has been interpreted in the case of Harishankar, supra, with reference to Section 35 of Delhi-Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 and with reference to Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The revisional power under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and language of that section is pari materia to that of Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act. What is the meaning of expression 'according to law' their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 8 and 9 as under:
'(8) The phrase 'according to law' refers to the decision as a whole and is not to be equated to error of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall decision, which must be according to law which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which Section 115 is limited. But it must not be overlooked that the section in spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such order as the High Court might think fit, -- is controlled by the opening words, where it says that the HighCourt may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is 'according to law'. It stands to reason that if it was considered necessary that there should be a rehearing, a right of appeal would be a more appropriate remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal.
(9) The section we are dealing with, is almost the same as Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending, at the other, with a power of interference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell and Company Limited v Woman Hemraj, where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed:
'The object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at'.
This observation has our full concurrence'.
A perusal of the decision clearly reveals that the scope of the jurisdiction under Section 18 is not same as if rehearing by way of appeal and this section does not entitle the Court to interfere with a finding of fact simply on the ground that this Court can take a different view of the matter on material on record. In the present case, the question only relates to appreciation of evidence and I am called upon to interfere withthe finding recorded by the Court below. Jurisdiction or this Court under Section 18 is not that of a Court of first appeal and this Court is not entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. When I so observe, I find support from the observations made by their Lordships in Harishankar's case, supra, In para 10 also their Lordships observed:
'What the learned Chief Justice has said applies to Section 35 of the Act, with which we are concerned. Judged from this point of view, the learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with a plain finding of fact and more so, because he himself proceeded on a wrong assumption'.
In view of this decision also, in my opinion, this Court is not entitledto reverse the finding of fact.
The revision, as such, has got no merits and is hereby dismissed.
No costs.