ORDER
Tirath S. Thakur, J.
1. The petitioner claims to be a linguistic minority educational Institution established in the year 1985 at Melakodumalur in Ramanathapuram District of State of Tamil Nadu. It was, according to the petitioner, in existence as on the date the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 came into force. An application seeking recognition of the NCTE established under the aforementioned Act was filed by the petitioner before the Southern Regional Committee at Bangalore in February 1996. On receipt of the said application, the Regional Committee appears to have in terms of a communication dated 1st of January, 1999 informed the petitioner that the request for recognition could not be considered since the Institution was not functioning as on 17th of August, 1995 the date on which the Act came into force. The communication further required the petitioner to produce a no objection certificate from the State Government as required by Regulation 5(e) of the NCTE Regulations framed under the Act aforementioned. By another communication dated 27th of January, 1999, the petitioner was once again informed that since it was not included in the list of recognised Institutions furnished by the Government of Tamil Nadu, its request for recognition as an existing Institution could not be considered. The petitioner was asked to furnish a no objection certificate from the State Government besides depositing a sum of Rs. 4,000/- representing the balance of the processing fee. It was at this stage that the petitioner filed W.P. No. 4454 of 2000 challenging the constitutional validity of Regulation 5(e) of the NCTE Regulations. The said petition was allowed by a Single Bench of this Court by order dated 31-5-2000 following an earlier decision in Dr. Sri Jachani Rashtreeya Seva Peetha, Bangalore v. State of Karnatakaand Ors., 1999(5) Kar. L.J. 587 : ILR 1999 Kar. 2561 No appeal against the said direction of this Court was filed by the respondent-NCTE. An appeal was however filed against the decision of this Court in National Council for Teacher Education, Southern Regional Committee, Bangalore and Anr. v. Dr. Sri Jachani Rashtreeya Seva Peetha, Bangalore and Anr., 2001(6) Kar. L.J. 17: ILR 2001 Kar. 1148, which was eventually allowed by a Division Bench holding that Regulation 5(e) of the Regulations did not suffer from any vice of unconstitutionality. A no objection certificate, observed the Division Bench, was only one of the inputs required to be considered by the Southern Regional Committee while examining a request for grant of recognition to a new Institution offering a Course in teachers training. The following observations made in the said decision are in this regard apposite.-
'27. In fact to our repeated questioning of the Counsel for the Council, he states that the Act does not provide for throwing out of an application in the event of failure to provide no objection certificate by an Institution, On the other hand the Counsel rightly in our opinion concedes that even in the absence of the same, the Council shall consider such application in terms of Section 14(3)(b) and pass orders against which an appeal also lies under the Act. We are of the view that taking into consideration the scheme of the Act the duty cast on the Council and the power conferred under Section 32, Regulation 5(e) has to be read down as only providing for seeking a view from the State Government by way of no objection certificate or as an input for proper consideration of planned and coordinated development of teacher education. If the regulation so read it cannot be struck down as being in excess of the statutory power granted to the Council under the Act. The Council has neither surrendered or abdicated its function in the light of our finding that the no objection certificate from the State Government is nothing but an input or view for proper guaranteed development.
29. The Counsel for the respondent-Institution argued that Regulation 5(e) imposed a condition. We have already held in the earlier paragraph that the no objection certificate sought for by the Council is in the form of an input or the views, and hence the contentions of 'condition precedent' is to be rejected in the light of our finding on the issue'.
2. The application made by the petitioner was not however disposedoff by the Southern Regional Committee although the petitioner hadpaid the deficit processing fee as demanded by the Southern RegionalCommittee. In the present writ petition, the petitioner now prays for amandamus directing the respondent-Southern Regional Committee toconsider the application of the petitioner and to pass appropriate ordersin accordance with law.
3. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Sabarad submitted that the petitioner was in existence as on the date the NCTE Act, 1993 came into force. The Southern Regional Committee was not, according to the learned Counsel, justified in holding otherwise. The production of a no objection certificate as envisaged by Regulation 5(e) was not therefore necessary according to Mr. Sabarad. Alternatively, he argued that even if the Institution was not treated as an existing Institution, the petitioner's application could be treated as a fresh application for recognition of a new Institution. He urged that the Southern Regional Committee had by demanding a no objection certificate from the petitioner and the processing fee prescribed for consideration of new applications virtually treated the petitioner's application as one seeking recognition of a new Institution. Since the petitioner had deposited the requisite fee, the Southern Regional Committee was under an obligation to consider the application and pass appropriate orders having regard to the law declared by this Court that issue or refusal of a no objection certificate was only an input, which was not conclusive or binding upon the Southern Regional Committee, who had to independently examine whether the recognition prayed for could or could not be granted. Inasmuch as the Southern Regional Committee had not considered the application and disposed off the same despite considerable delay, a mandamus deserved to be issued to it to discharge its statutory obligation.
4. Mr. Devadas, Counsel appearing for the Southern Regional Committee, on the other hand raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of this petition. He urged that since the petitioner-Institution is established in Tamil Nadu and since the cause of action to file the petition has also accrued to the petitioner in the State of Tamil Nadu, the present writ petition in this Court was not maintainable. He relied upon a decision of the Single Bench of this Court in St. John's Training Institute for Women, Veeravanallur, Ambasamudram Taluk, Tirunelveli District, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India and Ors.,2002(4) Kar. L.J. 204, in support of his submission that a writ petition could be maintained only in the High Court at Chennai and not in this Court. It was alternatively submitted that even if this Court were to hold that the present writ petition is maintainable, the Southern Regional Committee can be asked to consider the application of the petitioner only in accordance with the law as declared by the High Court of Tamil Nadu at Chennai and not by reference to the decision of this Court relied upon by the Counsel for the petitioner.
5. The petitioner, it is evident from the averments made in the writ petition as also the application for recognition, claimed to be an existing Institution entitled to recognition without production of a no objection certificate from the State Government. The Southern Regional Committee having considered that aspect has come to the conclusion that the petitioner was not an existing Institution as on the date the Act came into force. The fact that the Institution's name did not figure in the list of recognised Institutions submitted by the Government of Tamil Naduand the Institution did not have any recognition from the said Government immediately before the coming into force of the Act, was according to the Southern Regional Committee sufficient to hold that the Institution was not an existing Institution as claimed by it. That conclusion of the Southern Regional Committee has not been assailed by the petitioner in the present writ petition by challenging the orders passed by the Southern Regional Committee. In that view, therefore the correctness of the said orders cannot be examined in these proceedings. The Southern Regional Committee having held that the Institution was not an existing Institution and conveyed the same to the petitioner and the petitioner having failed to assail the correctness of the said view, must be deemed to have accepted the position as stated in the said communications. I have therefore no difficulty in rejecting the contention of the petitioner that it was an existing Institution as on the date the Act came into force and was therefore entitled to recognition without production of a no objection certificate.
6. The next question then is whether the application made by the petitioner could or was in fact treated by the Southern Regional Committee as an application for recognition of a new Institution. The answer to the said question is provided by the communications sent by the Southern Regional Committee itself, according to which the petitioner had to deposit the processing fee and to produce a no objection certificate in support of its request for recognition. If the petitioner's application for recognition was not treated as a request for a new Institution, there was no room for the Southern Regional Committee to demand the processing fee or insist on the production of a no objection certificate. The fact that the Southern Regional Committee demanded deposit of the processing fee and production of a no objection certificate sufficiently shows that it had treated the application as one for the grant of a recognition to any Institution. The fact that the petitioner has deposited the processing fee is evident from the material placed on record. A Demand Draft for Rs. 4,000/-, dated 16th of September, 1999 was sent to the Southern Regional Committee under letter dated 24th of June, 2000, Annexure-C to the petition. Even assuming that the said draft has been returned by the Southern Regional Committee as was feebly suggested by Mr. Devadas, the fact that the petitioner is ready and willing to make the deposit should clinch that part of the controversy.
7. What remains then is the non-production of a no objection certificate which according to the Southern Regional Committee is necessary keeping in view the provisions of Regulation 5(e) of the NCTE Regulations. It was argued that the validity of the said regulation having been upheld by the High Court of Chennai, any application, which was not accompanied by a no objection certificate was liable to be rejected summarily. There is no merit in that contention. The submission, if I may say so is contrary to the specific stand that was taken before this Court in the case of National Council for Teacher Education, supra. A plain reading of the paragraphs extracted earlier from the said decision, would leave no manner of doubt that the non-production of a no objection certificate was not even on the NCTE's own showing considered to be of much consequence. The NCTE had argued in that case that even if a no objection certificate was not produced the NCTE was required and indeed duty-bound to consider the application filed before it. As to how the NCTE is treating production of a no objection certificate as a condition precedent even after the pronouncement of this Court and even after it has taken a specific stand that non-production of such a certificate will be of no material consequence is difficult to understand. All that can be said is that despite the pronouncement of this Court and the stand it has taken in connection with the previous round of litigation, the NCTE is not sure about the tests and the parameters that are to be applied in matters relating to grant or refusal of recognition. It is unfortunate that a statutory body constituted under a central enactment and charged with the duty of supervising development of teacher education in the country is still groping in the dark as regards the norms to be applied or the value or the weight to be given to the no objection certificates envisaged under the Regulations. Even otherwise, the fact that Regulation 5(e) has been upheld by the High Court at Chennai does not materially make any difference. That is because even this Court has in the decision referred to above upheld the constitutional validity of Regulation 5(e). While doing so, this Court has gone a step further and elaborated that the production of a NOC from the State Government is only one of the inputs that would go into consideration of the application made before the Southern Regional Committee. There is nothing before me to suggest that the High Court of Madras has taken a different view or that while upholding the constitutional validity of Regulation 5(e) it has authorised rejection of the applications simply on the ground that the same are not accompanied by the requisite NOC. The contention that the application of the petitioner shall be considered by reference to the law as declared by the Madras High Court and not that declared by the Division Bench of this Court must therefore also fail and is hereby rejected.
8. That brings me to the question whether this Court has any jurisdiction to entertain this petition and to issue a mandamus directing the Southern Regional Committee to consider the application pending before it. The fact that the Southern Regional Committee is located in Bangalore and is therefore within the jurisdiction of this Court is not in dispute. That being so, the provisions of Article 226(1) of the Constitution would clearly entitle this Court to issue an appropriate writ, direction or order to the said authority. Reliance by Mr. Devadas upon Clause (2) of Article 226 is, in my opinion, wholly misplaced. The said provision simply enlarges the jurisdiction of Courts, where the authority or person to whom a writ is being issued is not located within its ordinary territorial jurisdiction. In any such situation, a writ may issue from a Court exercising powers under Article 226 only if the cause of action to file such a petition arose to the petitioner either wholly or partially within its territorial limits. It is true that the petitioner is established in the neighbouring State of Tamil Nadu. It is also true that on account of theapplication emanating from Tamil Nadu and any rejection order conveyed to the petitioner in Tamil Nadu, the petitioner's grievance against such a rejection or even inaction of the Southern Regional Committee could have been made before the High Court at Chennai also. That is because, the petitioner could in that case argue that the cause of action either wholly or in part arose within the jurisdiction of the High Court at Chennai. That however does not mean that the petitioner could not have filed the present writ petition in this Court. There is no gainsaid that more than one High Court in this Country may be entitled to exercise jurisdiction in regard to the same subject-matter depending upon whether the authority, against whom such jurisdiction is being invoked is located within the jurisdiction of the said High Courts or whether the cause of action constituting the basis of the exercise of any such jurisdiction has accrued either wholly or partially within such jurisdictions. Just because the High Court at Chennai could also have invoked Article 226 and issued appropriate directions therefor would not by itself exclude the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this petition and issue an appropriate direction on the ground that the authority against whom the said direction is being issued is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. It is noteworthy that the present is not one such case where the petitioner has by suppression of facts tried to shift the ordinary forum of adjudication of the dispute from one place to the other with any oblique motive. It is also noteworthy that the petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the constitutional validity of Regulation 5(e). That petition as noticed above had succeeded and was allowed striking down Regulation 5(e). The Southern Regional Committee had not at that stage raised any objection regarding the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain such a petition. The objection regarding the jurisdiction of this Court or the maintainability of this petition before this Court must therefore fail and is hereby rejected.
9. In the result, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The Southern Regional Committee of the NCTE, Bangalore is hereby directed to consider the application made by the petitioner for grant of recognition under Section 14(3)(a) of the NCTE Act, 1993 for the recognition of new Institution. The petitioner shall within two weeks from today remit the balance of the process fee, if not already paid by him. The petitioner shall also be at liberty to produce such other additional material as may be considered necessary and relevant for the disposal of its application including the communication dated 27th of August, 2001 received by it from the Government of Tamil Nadu regarding the grant of a no objection certificate in terms of Regulation 5(e) of the NCTE Regulations. The Southern Regional Committee shall expedite disposal of the application of the petition, but not later than three months from the date a copy of this order is communicated to it. The petitioner shall also be entitled to costs of Rs. 2,000/-.