Judgment:
1. This is an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code from the judgment and award dated 21-4-1993 delivered by the I Additional District Judge, Belgaum (Sri S.M. Bagali) on an application for review dated 15-4-1993 in L.A. Appeal No. 56 of 1989, whereby the learned District Judge has allowed the said review application in the appeal and relief of 12% additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') which was granted in the two appeals, namely Appeal Nos. 56 of 1989 and 322 of 1989 was deleted from the common judgment and decree dated 13-4-1993 passed in those two appeals.
2. The facts of the case in brief are that the,Land Acquisition Officer acquired the land belonging to the appellants herein along with other lands and passed an award on 6-2-1979. Thereafter, a reference in L.A.C. No. 161 of 1979 came up before the Principal Civil Judge, at the instance of the owners of the land. The Civil Judge by his judgment and award dated 23-4-1983 fixed compensation at the rate of Rs. 12,000/- peracre. Apart from granting compensation, the Civil Judge granted solatium at 15% and interest at the rate of 5%. The claimants preferred Appeal No. 322 of 1989 against the judgment and award of the Civil Judge dated 23-4-1983 with reference to the portion of the claim which had been rejected. The Land Acquisition Officer also preferred Appeal No. 56 of 1989 contending that the Civil Judge was not justified in fixing the compensation at the rate of 12,000/- per acre. Both the appeals were clubbed together and were disposed of by the learned Additional District Judge by a common judgment dated 13-4-1993, by which the claimants' Appeal No. 322 of 1989 had been dismissed with modification. The Appellate Court modified the award by granting 30% solatium and interest at the rate of 9% as well as additional amount on the market value of the acquired land at 12% from the date of publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act i.e., 3-4-1975 till 6-2-1979, the date of award of the Land Acquisition Officer, under Section 23(1-A) of the Act, as amended by Land Acquisition Amendment Act of 1984. From this judgment of the lower Appellate Court the Land Acquisition Officer has filed an application under Order 47, Civil Procedure Code for review of the judgment and correction of the error which, according to the Land Acquisition Officer, had apparently crept in the order of the Appellate Court and for deletion of the 12% additional amount granted by the Court under Section 23(1-A) of the Act. The Court considered the matter and reviewed the order taking the view that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others v Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama and Union of India v Zora Singh and Others, were not brought to the notice of the Court and as such the error has crept in the order of the lower Appellate Court in awarding 12% additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Act. The Land Acquisition Officer has passed the award on 6-2-1979 and the Civil Court disposed of the reference case on 23-4-1983, i.e., prior to coming into force of the amending Act which came into force on 24-9-1984. On this basis the learned District Judge has found that the order passed in the appeal on 13-4-1993 suffered from error of law apparent on the face of the record and as such require review thereof. Feeling aggrieved from this order, the present appeal has been preferred before this Court. The appeal appears to have been filed under Order 43, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code.
3. I have heard Sri N.K. Gunaki, learned Counsel for the appellants and Sri Huleppa Heroor, learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondent.
4. Learned Counsel for the appellants has contended that no review did He from the order dated 13-4-1993 passed in L.A. Appeal Nos. 56 and 322 of 1989. He contended that the review application was misconceived and not maintainable. He further contended that if the Land Acquisition Officer had any remedy, the same ought to have been by way of appeal under Section 54 of the Act as review was not maintainable. The Counsel further contended that the order impugned is in excess ofjurisdiction because the appellate order dated 13-4-1993 did not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record and the Appellate Court had not committed any error in awarding additional amount of 12% of compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the Act which had been introduced by Act No. 68 of 1984. The learned Counsel contended that in view of the language of Section 23(1-A) of the Act, the appellants were entitled to additional amount of 12% of the compensation and that has been rightly granted by the Appellate Court by the judgment dated 13-4-1993.
5. The contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellants have been hotly contested by the learned Government Pleader appearing for the opposite party. Sri Huleppa Herur submitted that in view of Section 53 of the Act and Order 47, Civil Procedure Code, the application for review was maintainable and could be filed before the Additional District Judge to rectify the error which was apparent on the face of the record. He has further submitted that the review application was maintainable. According to him, the appellate order did no doubt suffer from error apparent on the face of the record as no additional amount could be allowed under Section 23(1-A) of the Act in view of the language of Section 23(1-A) of the amending Act since the award in the present case had already been delivered by the Land Acquisition Officer on 6-2-1979, i.e., long before 30-4-1982 and the Civil Court had also disposed of the matter on 23-4-1983 i.e., much before September, 1984 when the amending Act had received the assent of the President.
6. In rejoinder, learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the amendment had been given retrospective effect, i.e., from the date when the Bill was introduced, namely 30-4-1982 and if the proceedings were pending as on that date or thereafter, the benefit of Section 23(1-A) of the Act should have been given.
7. I have applied my mind to the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties. The first question to be considered is whether the remedy of review was available to the Land Acquisition Officer and whether the review application was filed legally before the learned District Judge and was maintainable before him. Before I proceed further, it will be just and proper to refer to certain provisions of the Act.
8. Section 53 of the Act provides that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the land acquisition proceedings before the Court. It reads as under:--
'53. Code of Civil Procedure to apply to proceedings before Court.--'Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act'.
Section 54 of the Act provides for appeals in proceedings before the Court. It reads as under:--
'54. Appeals in proceedings before Court.--Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908),applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, 'or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in Order XLV thereof.
By Act No. 17 of 1961 (Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension and Amendment) Act, 1961, for original Section 54 the following section has been substituted:--
'54. Appeals in proceedings before Court:--(1) subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applicable to appeal from original decrees, an appeal shall lie from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court in any proceedings under this Act to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decision of that Court.
(2) From any decree of a Court, other than the High Court, passed on an appeal under sub-section (1), an appeal shall be to the High Court, but only if, the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute in appeal exceeds two hundred rupees or the case involves any question of title to land;
(3) From any decree of the High Court passed on an appeal under sub-section (1), an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court, subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in Order XLV of the First Schedule to the said code'.
The definition of the expression 'Court' is given in Section 3(d) of the principal Act as under:--
'(d) the expression 'Court' means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed (as it is 'hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under this Act'.
Clause (d) of Section 3 of the Act has also been amended by the Land Acquisition (Mysore Extension Amendment) Act, 1961 and the amended clause (d) reads as under:--
'(d) the expression 'Court' means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, and includes any other Civil Court empowered by the State Government by a notification in the official Gazette, to perform the functions of the Court under this Act, within the pecuniary and local limits of its jurisdiction'.
9. It is well-settled principle of law of interpretation of a statute that ordinarily the definition given in the Act is to be followed in interpreting the provisions of the Act and the expressions defined in the Act. But, if the context otherwise requires, then we may expand that definition ordeviate from the definition given therein. In the case of K.V. Muthu v Angamuthu Animal, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have been pleased to lay down, in the context of the expression 'unless the context otherwise requires', as under:--
'11. While interpreting a definition, it has to be borne in mind that the interpretation placed on it should not only be not repugnant to the context, it should also be such as would aid the achievement of the purpose which is sought to be served by the Act. A construction which would defeat or was likely to defeat the purpose of the Act has to be ignored and not accepted.
12. Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case, is preceded by the words 'unless the context otherwise requires', the said definition set-out in the section is to be applied and given effect to but this rule, which is the normal rule, may be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition could not be applied'.
Their Lordships have further explained that the use of the expression like 'unless the context otherwise requires' means and implies that the definition, like any word in a statute, has to be read in the light of the context and scheme of the Act and also the object for which the Act has been made by the Legislature.
10. Here, the expression 'Court' has been defined as per the amending clause to mean a principal Court of civil jurisdiction empowered to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. Now, 'empowered' here is the Appellate Court where appeal has been provided under Section 54(1) of the Act to lie in a Court subordinate to the High Court and the Court has been given the authority to exercise the powers of appellate Court under the Act. The expression 'Court' can be taken to include in itself the Court of appeal also. No doubt, it means the principal Court of Civil jurisdiction but the definition using the expression 'includes any other Civil Court empowered by the State Government to perform the function of the Court and that will include the Appellate Court-herein the appeal.
11. Thus considered when I look to Section 53 of the Act, I find that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code have been made applicable to the proceedings before the Court under the Act. The remedy of appeal provided in the Act under Section 54 is also a 'proceeding' under the Act. Now, therefore, in view of Section 53 of the Act itself, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code relating to appeal shall apply to the appeals filed under Section 54 of the Act, with exception to one thing, namely, if there is any provision inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act, then to that extent the provisions of Civil Procedure Code may not apply. In case of inconsistency between the two provisions, namely the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure and of the Act, then the provisions of the Act will prevail over the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. But, where in respect of matters the provisions of the Act are silent, the provisions ofCode of Civil Procedure may apply and shall apply to the proceedings under the Act, including the appeals under Section 54 of the Act.
12. In the case of Rajamani v Collector, Raipur, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as under:--
'Section 53 of the Act envisages that save in so far as that may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under the Act. It would thus clear that so long as there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the Act and Civil Procedure Code, the provisions contained in Civil Procedure Code shall apply to proceedings under the Act'.
The question is, whether Order 47, Civil Procedure Code will apply to the proceedings under the Act before the Court. Order 47 read with Section 114, Civil Procedure Code making provision for review of the judgment of the Court which passed the decree or made the order in the circumstances specifically provided therein. Section 114, Civil Procedure Code reads as under:--
'Section 114. Review.--Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved--
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code but from which no appeal has been preferred;
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this code; or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit'.
Order 47, C.P.C. provides for review and sub-rule (1) thereof, which is material for our purpose, is being quoted hereunder.--
'(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved--
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred; or
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed; or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or an account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order'.
It will also be profitable at this stage to make a reference to Section 141, C.P.C. It reads as under.--
'Section 141. Miscellaneous proceedings.--The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction'.
13. The Civil Courts when dealing with the matters of the nature of civil disputes as to compensation and entitlement to compensation, they decide the civil rights and they Act as Civil Court. The language of Section 18 of the Act, which provides for reference, also indicates that when reference is made under that Section, it is made to the 'Court', namely the principal Court of Civil Judge. The provisions of Order 47, C.P.C. may give a substantive right to a party or to the person to approach the Court to correct its error but there are procedural rules under procedural law. Under Section 141, C.P.C. the remedy of review in procedural law may be in the form of substantive right to the party and the power of the Court to review its order, in the circumstances, can be said to be available to the Court exercising appellate power. When it has decided the appeal and pass order in the course of the appeal and the provisions of Order 47, C.P.C. in my opinion, Section 141, C.P.C. can be made applicable and may be available to a party in the course of appeal or even after decision, to file appeal. Review is not appeal. It is only an authority to the Court which decided the matter to correct the error which has crept in on the face of the record of the case, or error which has crept on account of the contingencies referred to in Order 47, C.P.C. No provision to the contrary has been cited before me to the effect that under the Act no review shall lie against an order while exercising the powers under the Act. When no provision is contained in the Act, it cannot be said that there is any provision contrary or inconsistent in the Act, to Section 141, C.P.C. or Order 47.
14. Learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that in Section 54 of the Act there is use of the word 'only', namely, 'an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court'. Provisions of Section 54 in the principle Act was enacted by the parliament with the intention of providing only one appeal to the High Court and thereafter one more appeal to the supreme Court but not to the District Court in the first instance, then to the High Court and thereafter to the Supreme Court. It only intended to provide that from the order passed by the Civil Court in a reference under Section 18 of the Act, only one appeal will lie and that will be to the High Court and not to any other Court subordinate to it. But the Legislature did not touch the remedy of review because review stands on a different footing. Review is not appeal as a blessing in disguise and therefore, there is no merit in the contention that the Act debars the remedy of review, in particular, with reference to the State of Karnataka, the amended Section 54 of the Act does not contain any such word as only and appeals have been provided even to the Courts subordinate to the High Court depending upon the valuation.
15. Learned Counsel for the appellant made reference to the decision of the Privy Council, in the case of Rangoon Botatoung Company Limited v Collector, Rangoon. Dealing with Sections 53 and 54, Privy Council held that a special and limited appeal is given by the Land Acquisition Act from the award of 'the Court' to the High Court. No further right of appeal is given. Nor can any such right be implied. Dealing with Section 54, the Court observed that the provisions of the Code, shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act and that enactment applies to an earlier stage in the proceedings, and seems to have nothing to do with an appeal from the High Court. Their Lordships further observed 'it only applies to proceedings in the course of an appeal to the High Court. Its force is exhausted when the appeal to the High Court is heard', Their Lordships cannot accept the argument or suggestion, that when once the claimant's appeal is admitted to the High Court, he has all the rights to carry an award made in an arbitration as to the value of land taken for public purposes up to this board as if it were a decree of the High Court made in the course of its ordinary jurisdiction. Section 54 of the Act, as it then existed had conferred only a right to appeal to the High Court from an award and nothing more and in that context their Lordships took the view that no further appeal was maintainable to the Board from the award or from the order of the High Court in appeal.
16. This case has well been considered and distinguished by Division Bench of the Patna High Court, with which I agree, in the ease of Sakti Narain Singh v Bir Singh, their Lordships of the Patna High Court observed as under.--
'It is finally contended that even if the application of the tenure-holders is an application for review, the provisions of Order 47, Civil Procedure Code, do not apply to a decision by the Civil Court under the Land Acquisition Act, and reliance has been placed upon the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Rangoon Bototoung Company Limited's case, supra. In that case their Lordships held that there was no appeal to the Privy Council from a decree of the High Court in a Land Acquisition proceeding.
It is contended that the same principle applies here and that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code not being applicable there can be no review. Now a right of appeal must be conferred by a statute and their Lordships held that as the Land Acquisition Act was self-contained in this matter and had made provision for an appeal only to the High Court, to allow an appeal to the Privy Council would be to contravene the terms of the statute itself. In making certain observations to the effect that the decision of the Civil Court in a land acquisition matter is in reality of the nature of an award, their Lordships, in my opinion, merely intended to show why the Act had not considered it necessary to provide afurther appeal. But these considerations do not apply to the question of a review. The Land Acquisition Act in Section 53 enacts that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply, save so far as they are inconsistent with any thing contained in the Act. We find nothing in the Act which forbids the application of Order 47 of the code, and therefore in our opinion, the District Judge had power to entertain an application under Order 47'.
17. In the case of B. Prag Narain v Uttar Pradesh Government, in paragraphs 22 to 24 of the Report, the Division Bench has laid it down as under.--
'(22) In regard to the question whether the Tribunal has power to review its own order, Section 58(b) quoted above is of importance. If says that the said Act, that is to say the Land Acquisition Act shall be subject to the further modification indicated in the Schedule. Now when we turn to the Schedule of the Town Improvement Act, we find that it modifies various sections of the Land Acquisition Act including Section 18 which, as we have already indicated, is the section dealing with reference to the Court; and other sections are also modified. It is to be noted that Section 53 of the said Act is not modified.
Now Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act is the section whereby the Code of Civil Procedure has been applied to proceedings before the Court, namely, the Court within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 53 runs as follows:
'Section 53. Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882), shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act'.
The question is whether Section 53 does or does not apply when the Tribunal-which is constituted under the Town Improvement Act, and which has been given the status of a Court as under the Land Acquisition Act, deals with a reference. In our view, inasmuch as the Town Improvement Act clearly puts the Tribunal under the Town Improvement Act on the same footing as the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, there is no reason why Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act should be deemed to have been excluded in its application to proceedings before the Tribunal constituted under the Town Improvement Act.
Section 58(b) of the Improvement Act says that the said Act, meaning the Land Acquisition Act, shall be subject to the further modifications indicated in the Schedule. This clearly means that those sections of the Land Acquisition Act which are not modified have been made applicable to proceedings taken under the Town Improvement act. It must not be overlooked that the provisions of Section 18 and other sections, which are the sections which givethe power of reference and which deal with how once a reference is made the proceeding relative thereto is to be held, are not contained in any analogous sections in the Town Improvement Act. It is clear that proceedings for the acquisition of land and for the awarding of compensation for land as to which the Town Improvement Act is applicable, have to be taken in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act, subject to any restrictions placed by the Town Improvement Act.
(23) It is however, submitted that Section 63 of the Town Improvement Act shows that the Legislature intended Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act would not apply and the Legislature expected rules regulating the procedure would be made under the Town Improvement Act and that proceedings before the Tribunal would not be governed by the Civil Procedure Code, Section 63 runs as follows:
'63(1) The State Government may from time to time make rules, not repugnant to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the conduct of business by Tribunals established under this Act (2). All such rules shall be published by notification'.
In our view, this section of the Town Improvement Act, far from making Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act inapplicable, really shows that it is applicable because the power given under Section 63 of the Town Improvement Act is only to make rules not repugnant to the Civil Procedure Code.
Inasmuch as Section 63 of the Town Improvement requires that repugnancy with the Civil Procedure Code should be avoided, It follows that Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act which applies the Civil Procedure Code to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was applicable to proceedings before the Tribunal also because of Section 58(b) of the Town Improvement Act. In our view, it is evident from the scheme of both the Land Acquisition Act and the Town Improvement Act, that the Acts have to be read as complementary to each other and that the Town Improvement Act only aimed at effecting some variation in the procedure laid down by the Land Acquisition Act, particularly in regard to the composition of the Tribunal which was to act as a Court for the purpose of determining the compensation to be awarded.
(24) Therefore, in our view, the contention of learned Counsel for the appellant, that Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act which applied the C.P.C. to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was not applicable, has to be rejected. But from that it does not follow that the provisions of review are not to be construed strictly and according to Section 14 and Order 47, Rule 1 of the C.P.C.'.
18. Thus considered in my opinion, when there is no provision, either expressly or by necessary implication coming in conflict with the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1, or when there is no provision providing innegative that no review will lie or that provisions or Order 47 will not apply, there is no question of any conflict or there is no question of inconsistency between the provisions of the Code and the Land Acquisition Act, with reference to the matter of powers of review under Order 47. Therefore, the power of review will be available. The power which is inherent in a Civil Court to rectify where an error as crept in, its order, which is apparent on record, or where the order is likely to cause injustice to any of the parties in special circumstances, such as those mentioned in Order 47. This interpretation of Sections 53 and 141 has also been placed in the context of application of provisions of Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure by this Court in the case of Smt. Pullamma and Others v Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore and Others. It will be profitable to quote the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court. The material observations reads as under: --
'20. Section 53 of the Act and Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure which are in the following terms are clear on the point and leave no scope for any doubt regarding the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to reference proceedings if these do not come in conflict with any provision of the Act either expressly or by necessary intendment.
Section 53 of the Act.
'53. Code of Civil Procedure to apply to proceedings before Court.--Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the Court underthis Act'.
Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code.
'141. (Section 647). The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil Jurisdiction'.
21. As already observed, there is no provision in the Act directly dealing with the situation where a party to the reference absents, nor there is any provision which prevents the Court to pass an order of dismissal of the reference for non-prosecution. Thus there being no bar express or implied in the Act to the applicability of any particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in general being made applicable by the aforesaid two provisions of the Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, we are led to the only conclusion that the view taken by the Reference Court and the District Judge that the application for the setting aside of the order of dismissal of the reference in default was not maintainable, was not correct'.
19. The basic principles laid down by the Division Bench in this case is with full force applicable to the present case, when the question is to the effect whether the provisions under Order 47, can be made applicable with reference to proceedings under Land Acquisition Act in Court whether Court of reference or Court of appeal. In my opinion, those provisions will apply and review application will be maintainable, provided the case satisfies the necessary ingredients and conditions of Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this view of the matter, the first contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant has got no force.
20. The other question to be considered is whether there was a case for review. The Tribunal has reviewed its order on the ground that relief of 12 per cent additional amount over the compensation amount was granted under Section 23(1-A) of the L'and Acquisition Act, which Section 23(1-A) in accordance with the opinion of the learned Additional District Judge at the stage of review, was not applicable in view of the facts of the case. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Zora Singh's case, supra, the Tribunal opined that as award had been made on 7-5-1979 and as publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act had been made on 3-4-1975, and the award by the Court had been made on 23-4-1983, that is long before the coming into force of amending Act, the claimant was not entitled to that additional amount, but as the Supreme Court decision in the case of Zora Singh, supra, had not been brought to its notice, particularly the observations of paragraph 13, the error apparent has crept in the order dated 13-4-1993 passed in the appeal and so it had modified that order deleting it after entertaining the review petition. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that really law had been laid down not in Paragraph 13, but in Paragraph 18 of Zora Singh's case, supra, which shows that the view taken by the learned Additional District judge at the time when it decided the appeal did not suffer from any error apparent on the face of record and not what has been observed in paragraph 13 of the judgment of Zora Singh's case.
21. Before I proceed to examine those cases, it will be profitable to refer to material provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Sub-section (1-A) to Section 23 has been introduced in the original Act by Act No. 68 of 1984. Section 23 deals with the matters which are to be considered in determining compensation. Clause (1-A) of the Act provides, in addition to the market value of the land, as provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. One thing has to be taken note of that the cases to which sub-section (1-A) may be applied, 12 per cent additional amount on the market value can be awarded for the period from the date of notification under Section 4 andthe other end of the period is the date of award of the Collector of date of taking possession of the land, and if two dates differ, then whichever is earlier. Section 30 of the Act of 68 of 1984, whereby sub-section (1-A) had been introduced, has provided for the retrospective application for clause (1-A) of Section 23 in certain cases and to certain extent. This Section 30 has been subject-matter of consideration in many cases by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Section 30, sub-section (1-A) of the Act of 68 of 1984 reads as under: --
'30. Transitional provisions.--(1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to.--
(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the people), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date:
(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the commencement of this Act'.
22. A reading of Section 30 of Act No. 60 of 1984 along with sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the Act, which has been inserted in the principal Act, reveals that it shall apply and shall be deemed to have been applied to the proceedings that has commenced earlier to coming into force of the enactment of sub-section (1-A), if the proceedings for acquisition are pending or have been pending from 30th day of April, 1982, which is the date of introduction of Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982. So condition is that in cases which may be covered to give retrospective effect to sub-section (1-A) are those which are provided in clause (a) of Section 30, sub-section (1) that where the proceedings have commenced earlier to 30th April, 1982 and those proceedings have been pending for acquisition on 30th April, 1982. Other essential condition sub-section (1) indicates is that the proceedings must have not reached the final stage before the Collector, in the sense that proceedings must be at a stage where the Collector has not yet passed an award earlier to i.e., before 30th April, 1982. If the award has been given before 30th April, 1982, though proceedings may continue at the stage of reference thereafter before the Civil Court, the benefit of sub-section (1-A) to Section 23 of the Act may not be available. This is exposed and disclosed by the expression used in clause (a) to Section 30 which reads as under:
(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 inthe House of the People), in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date'.
23. This indicates the necessary condition. When I so observe, I find support for this view from many Supreme Court Decisions. In Filip Tiago's case, supra, after having made reference to Section 30 of the Amending Act of 1984, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in Para 21, as under.--
'21. Entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings as on April 30, 1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date. Section 30, sub-section (1)(a) provides that additional amount provided under Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on April 30, 1982 in which he has not made the award before that date. If the Collector has made the award before that date then, that additional amount cannot be awarded. Section 30, sub-section (1)(b) provides that Section 23(1-A) shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after April 30, 1982 irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made an award or not before September 24, 1984. The final point to note is that Section 30, sub-section (1) does not refer to Court award and the Court award is used only in Section 30, sub-section (2)'.
Their Lordships further observed in this case in paragraph-22, that as the award had been made by the Collector and no proceedings were pending before the Collector on April 30, 1982, Section 30, sub-section (1)(a) was not attracted to the case and as proceedings for acquisition commenced before April 30, 1982, Section 30, sub-section (1)(b) also not applicable and therefore, Section 23, sub-section (1-A) which provided for additional amount did not become applicable to that case and the claimant was not entitled to additional amount thereunder.
24. In the present case also as the facts do stand, the proceedings for land acquisition did commence on 3-4-1975 and the Collector had given his Award on 6-2-1979, the claimants had been dispossessed in 1979, as the proceedings on the material date namely on 30th April, 1982, were not pending before the Collector and award had already been given before 30th April, 1982, namely on 6-2-1979 award had been given, benefit of Section 23(1-A) could not be extended to the claimants-present appellants. The Appellate Court had really committed the error apparent. This decision of the Supreme Court has been affirmed by a Full Bench of the Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan v State of Kerala and Others , in the majority decision delivered by S.C. Agrawal, J., in paragraph 74, it has been laid down--
'74. If sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 in construed in the light of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of theamending Act there is no escape from the conclusion that Section 23(1-A), by itself, has no application to proceedings which had commenced prior to the enactment of the amending Act and the applicability of the said provision to pending proceedings is governed exclusively by sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act. A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act shows that it divides the proceedings for acquisition of land which had commenced prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act into two categories, proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 and proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982, clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced after 30-4-1982. By virtue of clause (a), Section 23(1-A) has been made applicable to proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those proceedings before 30-4-1982. It covers (i) proceedings which were pending before the Collector on 30-4-1982 wherein award was made after 30-4-1982 but before the date of the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made by the Collector after the date of the commencement of the amending Act, Similarly Section 30(1)(b) covers (i) proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made after the commencement of the amending Act. It would thus appear that both the clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 cover proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1). If Section 23(1-A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1). If Section 23(1-A) independently of Section 30(1), is applicable to all proceedings which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) would have been confined to proceedings which had commenced prior to the commencement of the amending Act and had concluded before such commencement because by virtue of Section 15 the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act. There was no need to so phrase Section 30(1) as to apply to provisions of Section 23(1-A) to proceedings which were pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. This only indicates that but for the provisions contained in Section 30(1), Section 23(1-A) would not have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act'.
25. The five Judges constituting the Full Bench observed that they were unable to subscribe to the view taken in Zora Singh's case, to the effect that sub-section (1-A) to Section 23 of the Act would apply to allproceedings pending in reference Court on the date of commencement of amending Act irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector. Their Lordships approved the view expressed in Filip Tiago's case, that application to pay additional amount in respect of proceedings initiated before the date of commencement of amending Act is confined to matters covered by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) to Section 30 of the Amending Act.
26. This view has been followed later on and the latest case on the point appears to be in the case of State of Kerala v George Joseph. Where their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in paragraph 3.--
'The point in the case is no longer res Integra. The award of the Collector is dated 27-3-1981 and the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is of 26-9-1978. Therefore, the respondent is not entitled to the payment of the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of that Act'.
In this case also really the Collector's award has been given on a date prior to 30th April, 1982 and therefore the Supreme Court took the view that Section 23(1-A) benefit could not be extended to the claimants.
27. This ratio of cases clearly indicates that the order of the Additional District Judge in appeal suffered from error apparent on the face of record. In the order dated 13th April, 1993 passed in Appeal Nos. 56 of 1989 and 322 of 1989, granting the relief of additional amount under Section 23(1-A), learned Additional District Judge had really acted contrary to law and has committed error of law apparent on the face of record and therefore, in my opinion there was a fit case for review by the Additional District Judge. Under Order 47, Civil Procedure Code, where there is an error apparent on the face of record, it is open to the Court to review its decision on an application being made, provided no appeal has been filed there from to the Higher Court. In the present case, it is not the case of the parties that any appeal has been filed by the State or Land Acquisition Officer.
28. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the present appeal that has been filed by the learned Counsel for the appellant is without any substance and merits. The order impugned in the present appeal is hereby maintained whereby the Additional District Judge has deleted the relief which had been granted under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, taking the view that it had really committed an error apparent on the face of record, in granting and giving the benefit of Section 23(1-A), to which the claimant was not entitled, as on 30th April, 1982, no proceedings were pending before the Collector and award had already been given by the Collector on 6-2-1979, that is the date prior to 30th April, 1982. The present appeal as such is hereby dismissed.