ORDER
Tirath S. Thakur, J.
1. This petition is barred by inordinate and unexplained delay and laches. The order under challenge was issued by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes as far back as on November 2, 1983 transferring the assessment proceedings from the file of Commercial Tax Officer, Mandya and Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Tax, Assessments, Mysore, to that of Commercial Tax Officer (Intelligence), Mysore. There is no explanation let alone an acceptable one for the petitioner's silence stretching over a period of nearly 14 years. Total lack of diligence makes it too late for the petitioner to find fault with the order; at this distant point of time.
2. That apart the petition must fail even on the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. In consequence of the impugned order of transfer, the assessment proceedings were completed by the C.T.O. (Intelligence), Mysore, on March 26, 1985. Aggrieved by the assessment order, the petitioner appealed to the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), who allowed the same, set aside the order and remanded the matter back to the assessing authority for a fresh assessment. A second order of assessment was thereafter made by the C.T.O. (Intelligence) on June 14, 1991. Even this order was questioned in appeal by the petitioner and was set aside by the appellate authority with a direction to make a fresh assessment. An assessment order was then made for the third time by the assessing authority on December 19, 1991, which was sent for service upon the petitioner, but which the petitioner declined to relieve. Service of the order is said to have been effected by pasting the same on the premises of the order is said to have been effected by pasting the same on the premises of the petitioner, but which the petitioner declined to receive. Service of the order is said to have been effected by pasting the same on the premises of the petitioner in terms of a mahazar drawn in that regard. It would thus appear that the petitioner has taken three chances for securing a favourable order from the very same assessing authority, whose jurisdiction it has assailed in the present writ petition. This the petitioner is not entitled to do. Even assuming that there is any merit in the contention urged by Mr. Sarangan that the impugned order of transfer was not valid in the eye of law yet looking to the conduct of the petitioner and the fact that it had acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the transferee-assessing authority taken its chance for a favourable order before it not once but thrice, it is disentitled to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. Refusal of this Court to interfere in such cases does not imply that consent of a litigant can confer jurisdiction upon an authority or Tribunal to pass an order, which jurisdiction does not otherwise inhere in such authority but is founded on the principle that the writ jurisdiction of this Court being discretionary and equitable in nature this Court can decline to interfere at the instance of a party, whose conduct is not free from blemish or who has taken a chance to secure a favourable judgment, but having failed to do so, somersaults to assail the orders on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Ample support for this proposition is available from a Division Bench decision of this Court in C. Y. Parthasarathy v. Syndicate of the Mysore University, Mysore (1994) 4 Kar LJ 702 where the legal position on the subject was summed up thus :
'It is true, that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, of the parties where it does not otherwise inhere in the authority concerned; but it is equally true that the High Court can while exercising its extraordinary and discretionary powers under article 226 of the Constitution decline to interfere with an order of a subordinate authority if it is satisfied that an objection relating to a defect of procedure or jurisdiction which could have been and ought to have been raised at the earliest opportunity was not so raised by the party complaining before it. The rule that acquiescence of the party belatedly making a grievance about the jurisdiction of the subordinate authority disentitles him to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, does not rest on the foundation that acquiescence, confers jurisdiction but on the rationale that the High Court will be justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a person who has either by reason of lack of diligence or by design remained on the fence, allowed the authority to pass an order and seeing that the same has gone against him turned round to challenge its competence, to have done so.'
3. The argument so strenuously advanced by Mr. Sarangan that the petitioner could sit back, take its chance before the transferee-assessing authority and yet question the validity of the order of transfer or the assessment order passed pursuant thereto, because the cause of action to do so would be a recurring cause of action, does not impress me. Just because the order under challenge touches the very jurisdiction of the authority to whom the assessment proceedings were transferred would not mean that the petitioner could ignore the alleged illegality in the order or hold back its challenge to the same till it had taken its chance for a favourable order and then assail the validity thereof at its convenience. The principle stated in the Division Bench decision mentioned earlier is applicable to cases where the error sought to be pointed out touches upon the jurisdiction of the authority. As a matter of fact, the case before the Division Bench was similar to the one sought to be made out by the petitioner. There also the very jurisdiction of the enquiry officer to conduct an enquiry had been called in question but after the petitioner had taken his chance to secure a favourable order. The court did not permit that to be done, on the principle that a party, who acquiesces in the jurisdiction of the authority or sleeps over the legal objection that may be available to him but turns round to question the validity of the finding or the order passed by such authority cannot be permitted to do so, and that the court would be well within its competence to say no to a prayer for interference made by a party who has so conducted itself.
4. In the circumstances, therefore, there is no reason for this Court to interfere with either the impugned order of transfer or even the order of assessment made by the assessing authority. The writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 1,000.
5. Writ petition dismissed.