Y. Bhaskar Rao, J.
1. This batch of writ appeals are filed assailing the orders of the learned Single Judge. In all the appeals, the questions arise for consideration is the same.
2. The brief facts are that certain lands were granted to different persons on the ground that they are cultivating Government lands as lessees on temporary lease, by virtue of Rule 43-J of the Mysore (now Karnataka) Land Revenue Rules of 1960. After the grant of permanent Saguvali Chits, they alienated the lands to third parties. In some of the cases they were further alienated. Thereafter the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 came into force. (The said Act will hereinafter be referred to as 'Karnataka Act 2 of 1979'). It came into force on 1-1-1979. Section 4 of the Act envisages that any transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of the Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant, shall be null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall be conveyed nor be deemed ever to have been conveyed by such transfer. Sub-section (2) provides that no person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission of the Government. Sub-section (3) envisages that the provision of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a Civil Court or of any award or order of any other authority.
3. Section 5 of the Act empowers the Assistant Commissioner, where on application by any interested persons or on information given in writing by any person, or suo motu, after such enquiry, if he is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under sub-section (1) of Section 4, may by order, take possession of such land after evicting the person affected giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard, he can restore the land to the original allottee. Again an appeal is provided under Section 5-A to the Deputy Commissioner, having jurisdiction. Section 6 prohibits registration of such granted lands. Section 8 provides penalty of six months imprisonment or with fine, which may extend to Rs. 2,000/- or with both. Section 10 of the Act empowers the State to make rules. Section 11 provides that the Act shall have effect of overriding the other laws. This is the scheme of the Act. After the Act came into force, notices were issued to various transferees from the originalgrantees in these cases. The original authority passed orders, after conducting enquiry declaring that the transfers were null and void and directed restoration of possession to the original grantees. These orders were confirmed in appeals. Assailing the said orders, writ petitions were filed.
4. The learned Single Judge, who heard the matters, allowed some of the petitions quashing the impugned orders therein and some petitions were dismissed. Aggrieved by these orders, the present writ appeals are filed.
5. When the appeals came up for hearing, the matter was referred to the Full Bench by the Division Bench, vide reference order:
'One of the important questions that arises for consideration in these writ appeals is as to whether an authority granting land under Rule 43-J of Mysore Land Revenue (Amendment) Rules, 1960 can impose any condition at the time of making grant that the grantee, shall not alienate the land for a period of 15 years when Rule 43-J do not provide for any such condition. A further question also arise on the effect of a condition imposed in the Saguvali Chit by the Tahsildar that the grantee shall not alienate the land for a period of 15 years when such condition was not imposed by the order of the authority making the grant.
2. Section 4 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') provides that any transfer of land coming within the purview of that Act is null and void, if it is in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law providing for such grant. The Full Bench while deciding W.A. Nos. 205 to 210 of 1992 has left open that question as it was not referred to it. We feel that the question raised is an important one and arises in many case coming under the above Act and we feel that an authoritative decision by a Full Bench is required. Accordingly, we adjourn this case for being heard by a Full Bench, as per Section 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act'.
6. The above reference raises two questions:
(i) Whether the authority granting the land under Rule 43-J of the Mysore Land Revenue (Amendment) Rules, 1960 can impose a condition at the time of making a grant stating that granted cannot alienate the same?
(ii) Whether an authority including the Tahsildar can impose a condition while issuing the Saguvali Chit stating that the grantee cannot alienate the land for a period of 15 years, when the grant does not contain such condition and what is the effect of the condition imposed in the Saguvali Chit?
7. 'To appreciate the above contention, it is necessary to state the relevant Land Grant Rules framed under the Mysore Land Revenue Code.
7-A. The erstwhile Government of Mysore introduced a Scheme, with the intention of improving the food production in the State issued an order dated 11-4-1942 (clarified by Act 13 of 1978) authorising the Deputy Commissioner to grant uncultivated land, to persons who are agriculturists, for a temporary period of not less than three years with option to purchase the same at reasonable upset price which will not exceed more than the amount prescribed therein. Thus number of persons, irrespective of the caste and creed were granted lease and in most of the cases their successors are in possession of such lands. In the year 1960 the Government wanted to grant unoccupied lands to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and backward classes of people for the purpose of cultivation and also for the purpose of raising coffee gardens and other gardens and also to regularise the temporary leases, and therefore, framed the rules, known as the Mysore Land Revenue Rules, by virtue of the power under Section 233 of the Mysore Land Revenue Code of 1888, which are called the Mysore Land Grant Rules. Rules 41 to 43 came into force with effect from 10-7-1960.
8. Rule 41 contains the definitions. Rule 42 deals with the power of different Revenue Officers in respect of grant of lands. The authorities who can grant the lands are the Tahsildar, Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner having regard to the extent of land and value of the land as providedtherein. Rule 43 contains the procedure for disposal of lands for cultivation. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 43 requires persons seeking grant of land under the control of the Revenue Department, to make applications to the Tahsildar by giving the particulars required therein.
9. The grant made under Section 43-J with a condition imposed as contemplated under Rule 43-G, came up for consideration in Chikka Kullegowda v State of Karnataka and Others, wherein it is stated in para 8 thus:
'The question whether grants made under Rule 43-J were also subject to the conditions stipulated in Rule 43-G came up for consideration before this Court repeatedly, it is sufficient to refer to (i) Chikkegowda v State of Karnataka; (ii) Shivanna v State of Karnataka; (iii) Smt, Venkatamma v State of Karnataka and (iv) K. Chowdaiah v Deputy Commissioner, Mandya and the decision of the Division Bench in Smt. Siddamma v Chikkegowda, referred to above, it has been consistently held in these decisions that the conditions prescribed in Rule 43-G are applicable only to grant of land made under the rules preceding Rule 43-G, that is, Rules 43-C and 43-D and will not apply to grants under Rule 43-J. The reasoning given by the Division Bench in Siddamma's case, supra, to hold that Rule 43-G cannot be invoked in regard to grants under Rule 43-J is extracted below: 'The rules indicate that list of lands available for cultivation should be prepared and thereafter the persons desirous of applying for the grant of land are entitled to apply and when such applications are received, the concerned competent authority is required to consider those applications and select the application for grant having due regard to the merits of the applications and also bearing in mind the priority for grant prescribed under the rules. These provisions obviously have no application to the grant of land made under Rule 43-J to persons to whom the land had already been leased temporarily for cultivation. In the case of grant of land under Rule 43-J there is no question of considering the applications of other persons. The Competent Authority concerned is required to find out as to whether the land had been granted for temporary cultivation to the person concerned and secondly as to whether he had fulfilled eligibility for grant of land and once those conditions are found to have been fulfilled the authority is competent to grant the land. One special feature about the grant is the person concerned would have already been in possession and enjoyment of the land for several years even before the grant of land and he would have invested money and time and engaged in cultivating the land even prior to the grant of land under Rule 43-G. Therefore, of such a grant falling under Rule 43-J no other condition is imposed as is evident from the non obstante clause with which it begins. Rule 43-G cannot be invoked to the grant made under Rule 43-J, also for the reason Rule 43-G expressly makes it clear that the conditions prescribed in the said rule is applicable for the grant of lands made under the rules preceding it'.
10. In all the above decisions, this Court has taken the view, including the Division Bench in Siddamma's case, supra, that the condition prescribed in Rule 43-G are applicable only to the grant made under Rule 43-C and 43-D and cannot be applied for grants under Rule 43-J. The Division Bench in Siddamma's case, supra, was holding the field. The matter was again referred to the Full Bench. The Full Bench in Chikka Kullegowda's case, supra, after considering the various cases, including Siddamma's case, supra, held as follows:
'The above discussion makes it clear: (a) Rule 43-J contemplated grants to persons who were already cultivating the lands for several years, by being in possession in pursuance of temporary leases granted to them, who formed a separate and distinct class; and in such cases, there was no need to stipulate any of the conditions specified in Rule 43-G which were applicable toonly grants relating to unoccupied lands where possession was yet to be delivered; (b) in view of the non-obstinate clause with which Rule 43-J began and in the absence of any indication in Rule 43-J that the grants under that rule to persons who were already in possession would be governed by the conditions in Rule 43-G and having regard to the express provision in Rule 43-G that the conditions therein would apply only to the grants made in the preceding rules (that is, Rules 43-C and 43-D, the only inescapable conclusion is that conditions stipulated in Rule 43-G were inapplicable to grants under Rule 43-J. We are thus in respectful agreement with the views expressed in Siddamma's case, supra. We, therefore, answer the question referred for opinion in the negative'.
11. The Full Bench held that the conditions stipulated in Rule 43-G is inapplicable to grants under Rule 43-J and they entirely agreed with the view taken in Siddamma's case, supra. But, however, the Full Bench kept open the questions as to the validity of grant of land under Rule 43-J imposing a condition by the Tahsildar that the grantee shall not alienate the land for a period of 15 years.
12. Therefore, the point for consideration is, whether, after the grant order is made, whether an authority can impose a condition prohibiting alienation, and if so, what is its effect?
13. We entirely agree with the view taken by the Full Bench that the conditions stipulated under Rule 43-G are not applicable for grants made under Rule 43-J and there are no grounds for us to differ from the view taken by the Full Bench in this regard.
14. Once the conditions stipulated in Rule 43-G cannot be applied to the grants under Rule 43-J as there is no power or authority to impose any condition stating that the land granted under Rule 43-J cannot be alienated for a period of 15 years or any other period. It is a settled principle of law that the delegate cannot exceed his power and he has only to act within the power conferred on him. Therefore, the condition imposed by the Tahsildar in the Saguvali Chit, at the time of issuing the same, that the grantee shall not alienate the land for a period of fifteenyears, when such condition was not imposed by the order or the authority making the grant, cannot be sustained.
15. The second question for consideration is what is the effect of the condition imposed by the Tahsildar at the time of issuing the Saguvali Chit. The granting Authority, as well as the Tahsildar, derive their power from Rule 43-J. When there is no power to impose any condition in the Saguvali Chit under Rule 43-J, at the time of grant, the subordinate authority, i.e., the Tahsildar has exceeded his limit in imposing the condition. The Tahsildar being the delegate, has no power to impose any condition in the Saguvali Chit. Even if such condition is imposed, the same is not valid in the eye of law and it is without power and jurisdiction. Therefore, the condition imposed by the Tahsildar in the Saguvali Chit stating that the grantee cannot alienate the land for a period of 15 years or any other period is not valid. In the absence of any such condition, it is open to the grantees to enjoy the land as they like, including the right to alienate the land.
16. No other provisions are brought to our notice, authorising to impose a condition of prohibition of alienation. Therefore, in the absence of such a power, the authority including Tahsildar cannot impose any condition; so the condition imposed is not valid in the eye of law.
17. The learned Counsel for the original grantees contended that the grant is not under Rule 43-J, but it is under Rule 43-G. We have perused the orders of the original authority cancelling the grant and upholding the same by the Appellate Authority. Both the orders show that the grantees were in possession on temporary lease when they were granted the land by virtue of Rule 43-J; whereas for the grantees under Rule 43-C the unoccupied lands are given. Therefore, the grants involved in these cases are under Rule 43-J and therefore, we are not able to accept the contention of the original grantees.
18. It is also contended that the State has collected the upset price from the grantees. Therefore, the grant has to be presumed under Rule 43-C and Rule 43-D and other sub-clauses. Government has taken a policy decision to grant the lands to temporary holders on a concessional price. After Rule 43-J isframed, such lands are granted to various persons and concessional price is collected. Merely because some price is collected, it cannot be said that the collection of upset price is not correct. The impugned grant is under Rule 43-G, when it was actually made under Rule 43-J. Even on this aspect, we do not see any force in the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the original grantees.
Therefore, the reference is answered accordingly.
19. In the result, for the reasons stated above, Writ Appeal No. 1566 of 1993 is hereby dismissed. Writ Appeal No. 363 of 1992 filed by K. Kullaiah is allowed and the impugned orders are quashed; Writ Appeal No. 304 of 1992 is hereby allowed and the impugned order in the writ petition is quashed and Writ Appeal No. 493 of 1994 is hereby allowed.