Judgment:
ORDER
K.A. Swami, J.
1. In this Petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner has sought for quashing the resolution bearing No. 491 dated 3-2-1986, passed by the Special General Meeting of the City Municipal Council, Bellary.
2. The petitioner is a Councillor. He has attended the Special General Meeting in question. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner by Learned Counsel Sri Kolar that the Special General Meeting of the Council was convened on 3-2-1986 for the specific purpose of passing the resolution expressing want of confidence in the President, and there was quorum for the meeting; as such it could not have been adjourned and it ought to have transacted the business It did not transact the business and simply passed a resolution adjourning the meeting. That the resolution passed by the Special General Meeting adjourning the meeting is illegal because it is opposed to Sub-section (3) of Sections 47 and 56 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Learned Counsel has also placed reliance on a statement made by Justice B.A. Masoodkar in his book i.e. 'Law Of Companies and Meeting.'
3. On 8-1-1986 requisite number of Councillors of the City Municipal Council, Bellary, gave notice to the President of the Municipal Council requesting him to convene a Special General Meeting of the Council for the purpose of passing the resolution expressing want of confidence in the President. The notice was served upon the President on the same day i.e. 8-1-1986. The President did not convene the Special General Meeting. Therefore, the Vice-President instructed the Commissioner of the Municipality to convene the Special General Meeting of the Council for the purpose of passing a resolution expressing want of confidence in the President. Accordingly, the Commissioner of the Municipal Council issued the notices convening the Special General Meeting of the Council on 3-2-1986 for the purpose of passing a resolution expressing want of confidence in the President. Accordingly, the Councillors met on 3-2-1986 and there was quorum, as 33 out of the total strength of 35, Councillors were present. But in the meanwhile, the President had resigned his office as President on 31-1-1986 by sending resignation to the Divisional Commissioner, and as that resignation was to take effect on the expiry of ten days from the date of the receipt of the resignation by the Divisional Commissioner, the Special General Meeting of the Council in its wisdom, resolved to adjourn the meeting, pending acceptance of the resignation of the President, till 11-30 a.m. on 20-2-1986. This resolution is produced as Annexure-A.
4.1 The contention of the petitioner is, that the impugned resolution is opposed to Section 47(3) of the Act. The contention is based upon the assumption that the adjourned meeting will now take place beyond 30 days from the date of service of the notice by the Councillors to call a Special General Meeting of the Council, therefore, it is impermissible in law.
4.2 Section 47(3) of the Act States that, if the President fails to call a Special General Meeting as provided in Section 47(2), the Vice-President or 1/3rd of the whole number of Councillors may call such meeting for a day not more than thirty days after the presentation of such request and require the Chief Officer or the Municipal Commissioner to give notice to the Councillors and take such action as may be necessary to convene the meeting. It is not possible to hold that the resolution passed by the Special General Meeting of the Council adjourning the meeting to 20-2-1986 is opposed to Sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act. Section 47(3) of the Act only provides for calling a Special General Meeting in the event of failure of the President to call such a meeting on the request made by the requisite number of Councillors. In such an event, it enables or empowers the Vice-President or 1/3rd of the Councillors themselves, to call for such meeting within 30 days from the date of presentation of the request. This is all Section 47(3) of the Act provides and not more than that. In the instant case the request to call a Special General Meeting of the Council was presented to the President by the requisite number of Councillors on 8-1-1986. The President failed to call a Special General Meeting. Therefore, the Special General Meeting was convened on 3-2-1986 which was within 30 days from the date of presentation of the request on 8-1-1986.
4.3 Section 47(4) of the Act specifically provides that any meeting may be adjourned until the next or any subsequent date and the adjourned meeting may be further adjourned in like manner. Therefore, it is clear that Section 47(4) of the Act applies to both Ordinary General Meeting and Special General Meeting of the Council, because Section 47 deals with both the meetings.
5. However, learned Counsel has placed reliance on Section 56 of the Act which provides that 'subject to such rules as may be prescribed any general meeting may, with the consent of a majority, of the Councillors present, be adjourned from time to time to a later hour on the same day or to any other day ; but no business shall be transacted at any adjourned meeting other than that left undisposed of at the meeting from which the adjournment took place. A notice of such adjournment pasted in the municipal office shall be deemed sufficient notice of the adjourned meeting'.
The contention is that Section 56 only provides for adjournment of an Ordinary General Meeting and not a Special General Meeting, therefore, there being no provision in the Act regarding adjournment of a Special General Meeting, as such, it was not permissible to adjourn the Special General Meeting. It is not possible to accept this contention. No doubt Section 56 does not use the expression 'Special General Meeting', it only uses the expression 'General Meeting' which can normally be taken to mean Ordinary General Meeting of the Council and not a Special General Meeting of the Council. No doubt, Section 56 of the Act does not provide for adjournment of the Special General Meeting but on this basis it is not possible to hold that the Act prohibits adjournment of the Special General Meeting. There is no specific provision either in the Act or in the Rules prohibiting adjournment of the Special General Meeting of the Council. As it is already pointed out. Section 47(4) of the Act applies to both the Special General Meeting as well as Ordinary General Meeting and as such there is a provision in the Act for adjournment of the Special General Meeting also. Section 56 of the Act only provides that with the consent of a majority of the councillors present Ordinary General Meeting may be adjourned, but at the adjourned meeting no business shall be transacted, other than that left undisposed of at the meeting from which the adjournment took place. In the very nature of things, it is not necessary to provide as to what business shall be transacted in an adjourned Special General Meeting, because Special General Meeting is convened only for a specific purpose. If it is adjourned, it is adjourned to consider that specific purpose only. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that it is not permissible to adjourn a Special General Meeting of the council because Section 56 of the Act does not provide for it cannot be accepted. In addition to this a right is vested or inherent in every Special or Ordinary General Meeting of any statutory or corporate body or of any private or public body unless the law otherwise provides to adjourn the meeting with the consent of majority of the members present at the meeting. In other words, the right to adjourn the meeting is vested in the assembly itself unless the law provides otherwise. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the Council has acted without the authority of law in adjourning its Special General Meeting to 20-2-1986.
6. The statement contained at page 217 of the LAW OF COMPANIES AND MEETING I EDITION by JUSTICE B.S. MASOODKAR is as follows:
'Occasion may arise when the statute itself prohibits adjournment of meeting. Such meetings could be special meetings which must meet for special purpose. In such case, Chairman's power as well as the power of the meetings to adjourn itself will not be available and if for want of quorum the meetings could not be constituted, such meeting would be treated as lapsed. The Chairman in such situation would declare that the meeting has lapsed. (See: Baburao v. Collector-1983 Maharashtra Law Journal 792), where it was found that by reason of the law, the meeting could not be adjourned and when quorum was not present the meeting stood lapsed'.
In view of the conclusion reached by me, these observations are not applicable to the present case, because there is a provision contained in the Act for adjourning a Special General Meeting. No doubt, there was a quorum at the Special General Meeting as such it was possible for it to consider the agenda, but nevertheless under the special circumstances as stated above, it thought it fit to adjourn. I am also of the view, that the Special General Meeting of the Council acted very wisely in adjourning the meeting because before the Special General Meeting took place the President had already tendered his resignation. If only the resignation were to take effect immediately, the meeting would have become unnecessary because the purpose of the Special General Meeting of the Council was also to cause the President to vacate the office by passing the resolution expressing want of confidence in the President. When the President himself is vacating the office voluntarily by tendering resignation, then where is the necessity to pass the resolution expressing want of confidence in him. But, as per law the resignation of the President of the City Municipal Council is required to be tendered in writing to the Divisional Commissioner and it takes effect on the expiry of the tenth day after the receipt of the notice of resignation by the Divisional Commissioner unless it is withdrawn in the meanwhile (see : Section 40 of the Act as substituted by Karnataka Act 83 of 1976). It is to meet such contingency the Special General Meeting has acted wisely in adjourning the meeting.
7. For the reasons stated above, the petition fails and the same is dismissed at the stage of preliminary hearing.