S.B. Majage, J
1. In these appeals, a short but an important point namely, 'whether the period of limitation provided under Section 10(4-A) of the Act, is directory or mandatory?' arises for consideration.
2. Facts, which give rise to present appeals are:
The respondents, claiming as workmen under the appellant 2 filed applications under Section 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'), before the Labour Court, stating that though they were working under the second appellant from 18-2-1993, March 1992, 14-7-1992, 22-1-1992, 1-6-1991 and 1-6-1991, without any reason, notice or enquiry, they were refused employment from 1-6-1994, 24-12-1993, 1-5-1993, 1-3- 1993, 12-12-1993 and 1-3-1993 respectively in violation of the principles of natural justice, Government Order and Section 25F of the Act and hence, entitled to the reliefs claimed therein.
The appellants opposed the same stating that they (applicants) were appointed as daily wagers for a particular scheme of work and after completion of that scheme, as their services were not required, they were not called for work and hence, no direction can be given to appoint by creating posts, and they (applicants) have wrongly interpreted Government Order and sought relief even though not raised any industrial dispute and not working under any industry and consequently, challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and, even otherwise, the applications were barred by time and thus, requested to dismiss the applications.
However, after enquiry, the Labour Court allowed the applications and directed for the reinstatement of the respondents with continuity of service, but without back wages. Aggrieved by it, the appellants filed writ petitions in this Court. The learned Single Judge dismissed the same. Hence, these intra-Court appeals.
3. With consent of both sides, taken for final hearing and heard. It is submitted for the appellants that the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have wrongly interpreted Section 10(4-A) of the Act even though the applications filed were patently barred by time since filed after 6 years and as such, the impugned award and order are not sustainable. On the other hand, it is submitted for the workmen/respondents that the view taken by the Labour Court and affirmed by the learned Single Judge by detail order show that there is nothing wrong in the interpretation of Section 10(4-A) of the Act done following the dictum of an earlier Division Bench decision besides the decisions of the Supreme Court and hence, interference is not required. Perused the records carefully.
4. At the outset, it may be noted that the point in issue is no more res integra. In the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Central Office and Anr. v. Govinda Setty and Anr., ILR 1997 Kar. 983 a learned Single Judge of this Court has specifically held that the period of limitation provided under Section 10(4-A) of the Act is directory and not mandatory. So also in the case of North-West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation, Central Office, Habli v. Santmallayya and Anr., 1999(4) Kar. L.J. 654 : ILR 1999 Kar. Sh. N. 98 However, in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Khaleel Ahmed and Anr., ILR 2002 Kar. 3827 a Division Bench of this Court has specifically held as under.--
'For these reasons, we hold that the two judgments of this Court rendered by the learned Single Judges in Govinda Setty and Santmallayya's cases, supra, do not lay down the correct law and are also per incuriam for having not followed the law laid down by this Court in Indian Express (Madhurai) Private Limited v. G. Krishna Murthy, W.A. No. 2158 of 1990, DD: 10-9-1991 Accordingly, the same are overruled'.
(emphasis supplied)
Not only that, in the same decision, the Division Bench further observed as under.--
'27. In view of the above discussions, we hold that if an aggrieved individual workman do not file application within the period prescribed under Section 10(4-A) of the Act then, it will be impermissible for the Labour Court to entertain the same and the same has to be rejected as not maintainable at the very first instance after hearing the workman or his Counsel like rejection of the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC'.
Before holding so, the Division Bench took note of the decision in the case of N.H. Thippeswamy v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, W.A. Nos. 3414 and 3415 of 1995, DD: 15-7-1997 as is clear from, para 22 of its judgment.
Thereafter, the Division Bench has considered as to why Sub-section (4-A) of Section 10 of the Act was incorporated and whether the period of limitation provided therein can be taken as directory or not and referring the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways and Anr. (2001) 1 SCC 133 : 2001 SCC (L and S) 165 and Management of Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited v. Prahlad Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 2001 SC 69 : 2001 Lab. I.C. 26 (SC) besides a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Telecom District Manager, Belgaum v. A.A. Angali and Ors., 2000(6) Kar. L.J. 827 : ILR 2000 Kar. 2962 and also another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited and Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., : (2001)IILLJ1087SC concluded that it is not permissible for the Court to dilute the provisions providing time-frame on the basis of supposed legislative policy and accordingly, on the ground that the claim made therein was after 6 months provided under Section 10(4-A) of the Act, allowed the appeal filed by the Corporation and dismissed the appeal filed by the workman.
5. Still, in view of decision of this Court in the case of Govinda Setty, supra, which is specifically overruled in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, and a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of N.H. Thippeswamy, supra, besides some decisions of the Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge observed that the decision in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, as per incuriam and held that the limitation period provided in Section 10(4-A) of the Act is directory and not mandatory. So, what has been decided in the case of Thippeswamy, supra and also in the case of Sapan Kumar Pandit v. Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board and Ors., : (2001)IILLJ788SC besides in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. B.E.S.T. Workers' Union, : [1973]3SCR285 requires to be considered.
6. At the outset, it may be noted that in the case of Sapan Kumar Pandit's case, supra, though no period has been fixed under Section 4-K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act (Section 10(1) of the Act), the words 'at any time' found in it came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court that they do not mean that there is no time-limit, if cases in which lapse of time has caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute and, if nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. So, said decision could not be of any assistance while interpreting the provision contained in Section 10(4-A) of the Act, which specifically provides limitation for making an application, as directory or mandatory.
7. So also, in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, supra, the Supreme Court was considering Section 78(1)(D)(i) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act (11 of 1947), but, still, the learned Single Judge took the view that said provision is pari materia with the prescription of time provided under Section 10(4-A) of the Act, which is as under.--
'Section 10(4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act.--Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 9C and in this section, in the case of a dispute within the scope of Section 2A, the individual workman concerned may, within six months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later, apply in the prescribed manner, to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute and the Labour Court shall dispose of such application in the same manner as a dispute referred under Sub-section (1).
Note.--An application under Sub-section (4-A), may be made even in respect of a dispute pending consideration of the Government for reference, on the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987'.
Section 78(1)(D)(i) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act.--
'(D) A Labour Court shall have power to require an employer,where it finds that the order of dismissal, discharge, removal,retrenchment, termination of service or suspension of an employeemade by the employer.--
(i) was for fault or misconduct committed by the employee which came to the notice of the employer more than six months prior to the date of such order'. So, no discussion is necessary to hold that said provisions are not pari materia to each other and that the limitation period provided in them are for different persons and in different contexts. Still, the learned Single Judge has strongly relied on the decision in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, supra.
8. Now what remains is the judgment in the case of N.H. Thippeswamy, supra, decided by a Division Bench of this Court. In that case, termination of workman from service was on 9-5-1972. He had filed application under Section 10(4-A) of the Act on 6-10-1988 i.e., within six months from 7-4-1988 on which date said provision of law came in the statute book by way of amendment. So, the question, whether or not the provision contained in Section 10(4-A) of the Act was directory or mandatory, was not at all involved in that case. In fact, even in that case also, Division Bench has observed as under.--
'... It has to be kept in mind that Section 10(4-A) of the Act was intended to be a beneficial legislation for the workmen facilitating them to approach the Court directly within the time specified therein'.
(emphasis supplied)
9. Simply because it has been observed further in the said decision that said provision was never intended to curtail or limit the benefits otherwise conferred upon the workman and that the settled position of law is that for approaching the Government to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act, no period of limitation is prescribed, it cannot be said that the Division Bench held Section 10(4-A) as directory. This is because, said observations show that they were made in connection with the period of limitation for making reference by Government and not for filing an application under Section 10(4-A) of the Act, which is further clear from the following observations made therein.--
'... The Act by itself is a complete Code. No reference can be rejected only on the ground of limitation. The delay in approaching the Court however would cast a duty upon it to appropriately mould the relief...'.
(emphasis supplied)
Even further observations made by the Division Bench in that case make it clear that the stress was on the existence or otherwise of an industrial dispute for adjudication and not on the point of limitation provided in Section 10(4-A) of the Act nor it considered that provision since not involved therein.
10. It need not be said that factual contents of a decision must be kept in mind before reliance is placed on any judgment. In this connection, reference can be had to the following observations made in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State Financial Corporation (Haryana) and Anr. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr., : [2002]1SCR621 .--
'19. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid's Theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark upon lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Company Limited v. Horton, (1951)2 All ER 1: 1951 AC 737 (at page 761) Lord Mac Dermot observed (All ER page 14 C-D):
'The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge'.20. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Company, (1970)2 All ER 294 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 Lord Reid said (at All ER page 297 g-h), 'Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances'. Megarry, J., in Shepherd Homes Limited v. Sandham, (1971) 1 WLR 1062 : (1971)2 All ER 1267 observed:'One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament' '.
11. In Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972)1 All ER 749 : (1972)2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said (All ER page 761C):
'There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case'.
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases, as held in the case of State Financial Corporation, supra and in Padma Sundara Rao (dead) by L.Rs and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., 6. : [2002]255ITR147(SC) and reiterated in Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar, : 2002CriLJ2645 . So, disposal of cases of blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
12. In the case of State Financial Corporation, supra, the Supreme Court has further noted as below.--
'22. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:'Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter and entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive' '.
So, the observations made in the case of N.H. Thippeswamy have to be seen and read in the context of facts of that case, wherein the period of limitation provided under Section 10(4-A) of the Act was not at all involved in that application had been filed before Court well-within limitation i.e., 6 months' time. Further, stress in that case was on the existence or otherwise of an industrial dispute and not the period of limitation, which was not involved in it.
13. Further, it may not be out of place to note at this juncture that while interpreting a provision, the Court has to interpret the law and it cannot legislate. Even if a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary, as held in the case of Rishabh Agro Industries Limited v. P.N.B. Capital Services Limited., : (2000)5SCC515 It is also well-settled principle of law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision, which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. So also, the Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted because they are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation, as held in the case of D.R. Venkatachalam v. Deputy Transport Commissioner and Ors., : [1977]2SCR392 which has been reiterated by the Supreme Court again in the case of Padma Sundara Rao, supra.
14. When the said well-settled principles of law relating to interpretation of a statute are kept in mind with the clear language found in Section 10(4-A) of the Act, no ambiguity is found in the language used by the Legislature in Section 10(4-A) of the Act specifying timeframe within which only the application can be filed by a workman for being entertained by the Labour Court within the period provided therein as held by this Court in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra and it cannot be stretched further. In this connection, again reference can be had to the decision in the case of Padma Sundara Rao, supra, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under.--
'14. .. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka, : [1996]1SCR698 case. In State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjundaiah, : (1996)10SCC619 , the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only Clause (i) and/or Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent'.
(emphasis supplied)
15. In fact, recently, in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Hansoli Devi and Ors., : [2002]SUPP2SCR324 a Bench of 5 Judges of the Supreme Court has held as under.--
'It is not permissible to add words to a statute which are not there unless on a literal construction being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless'.
16. So also, reference can be had to the decision in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited, supra, wherein, it has been held that:
'It is a well-settled proposition of law that the function of the Court is to interpret the statute to ascertain the intent of the Legislature -- Parliament. Where the language of the statute is clear and explicit the Court must give effect to it because in that case, words of the statute unequivocally speak of the intention of the Legislature. This rule of literal interpretation has to be adhered to and a provision in the statute has to be understood in its ordinary natural sense unless the Court finds that the provision sought to be interpreted is vague or obscurely worded in which event the other principles of interpretation may be called in aid'.
17. So also in the case of Nasiruddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal, AIR 2003 SCW 908 : 2003(2) Supreme 50 the Supreme Court held that:
'The Courts' jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well-known that in a given case, the Court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that three exists a presumption that the Legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well-settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used'.
18. Not only that, it is a well-settled principle that if an act is required to be performed by a private person within a specified time, the same would primarily be mandatory, but when a public functionary is required to perform a pubic function within a timeframe, the same will be held to be directory unless the consequences therefor are specific, as held recently by the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin, supra.
19. Simply because, the 'Act' is a beneficial legislation, it does not mean that anything and everything found in the Act requires to be interpreted in favour of workman. It is for the reason that the Act is not entirely a beneficial enactment for workmen only but also for the benefit of employer and as such, balance has to be struck while interpreting provision of the Act (See: case of Nasiruddin, supra).
20. It is true that when it is a piece of social legislation intended to confer specified benefits on workman, section should be liberally construed but, at the same time, the liberal construction must ultimately flow from the words used in the section, as held in the case of Buckingham and Carnatic Company Limited v. Venkatiah and Anr., : (1963)IILLJ638SC Same has been reiterated recently in the case of Transport Corporation of India v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation and Anr., : (2000)ILLJ1SC So also, it need not be said that if the words are capable of two construction, then only question of interpretation of such section arises, otherwise not.
21. Of course, the learned Single Judge relied on the decision in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, supra and also in the case of Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited, Chandigarh and Ors. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and Ors., : (1990)IILLJ70SC to hold that the decision in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, rendered by Division Bench as per incuriam. It is noted already that the provisions contained in Section 78(1)(D)(i) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, are knot similar much less in pari materia to Section 10(4-A) of the Act and as such, not considering said decisions by the Division Bench in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, cannot render the judgment in the case of Khaleel Ahmed as per incuriam.
22. So also, neither in Sapan Kumar Pandit's case, supra nor in any decision of the Supreme Court referred to by the learned Single Judge, the question of any provision of law containing period of limitation was interpreted. In fact, what came to be interpreted in the cases of Sapan Kumar Pandit, supra and Management of Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, supra and even in Nedungadi Bank Limited v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors., : (2000)ILLJ561SC were the words 'at anytime' and what has been consistently held is that though said words ('at anytime') do not prescribe or provide period of limitation within which a reference of an industrial dispute can be made by the Government for adjudication by Tribunal, still it could be said in the facts and circumstances of a particular case that the dispute as non-existent or stale. When such was the view taken by the Supreme Court in spite of absence of limitation period under Section 10(1) of the Act and, when in the case of N.H. Thippeswamy, the Division Bench also observed that the application under Section 10(4-A) of the Act is required to be made within stipulated time, it cannot be said that the period provided in Section 10(4-A) of the Act is directory and not mandatory. According to us, the interpretation, as placed by the learned Single Judge, if accepted, does mischief to the provision of law enacted by Legislature, which is not permissible while interpreting a provision of law as noted already.
23. If, really, the Legislature intended the period of limitation provided in Section 10(4-A) of the Act as directory, then it would not have prescribed the period of limitation and it would have used the words 'at anytime' instead of using the words 'within six months'. Even the absence of words 'at anytime' in Section 10(4-A) though found in Section 10(1) of the Act, also shows that the Legislature deliberately provided limitation period under Section 10(4-A) and as such, did not employ the words 'at anytime' found in Section 10(1) of the Act and in that place, provided six months' time to a workman to apply for adjudication of an industrial dispute and as such, to interpret period of limitation found in Section 10(4-A) as directory and not mandatory, will be adding something not provided in that provision of law by Legislature.
24. It is not that the claim of workman can be adjudicated only on an application filed under Section 10(4-A) of the Act since, under Section 9C of the Act also, remedy lies to a workman to get the dispute adjudicated. So, by interpreting that the period of limitation provided in Section 10(4-A) of the Act as mandatory, his right to get the dispute adjudicated is not extinguished once for all, because still he could invoke Section 9C of the Act as well and in such a case, the principle of res judicata does not apply.
25. It appears to us that Legislature thought it proper to provide a speedy remedy to a workman under Section 10(4-A) of the Act, if he wants to get his claim adjudicated early and, if he does not want it to be so, to have recourse to Section 9C of the Act and not that he can raise his dispute under Section 10(4-A), whenever he wants irrespective of period of limitation provided therein, more so, when he could have recourse to Section 9C of the Act. It is true that in the case of Govinda Setty, supra, provisions contained in Sections 12, 14 and 17 were referred to interpret the period relating to limitation found in Section 10(4-A) as directory. But, there cannot be any analogy between those provisions and Section 10(4-A) of the Act when we apply the well-settled rule of interpretation referred to already in the case of Nasiruddin, supra, more so, when those provisions are seen carefully with purposes for which they are meant. According to us, even the use of the word 'may' and not 'shall' cannot be taken to hold the provision as directory and not mandatory since the act required to be done under Section 10(4-A) of the Act is by an individual (workman) and not by a public functionary, more so, when the Legislature has deliberately prescribed period of limitation specifically for approaching the Tribunal directly under Section 10(4-A) and omitted to provide such limitation to approach under Section 9C of the Act.
26. At this stage, we want to make it clear that the judgment in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, is not a judgment per incuriam, though held so by the learned Single Judge, because the judgment in the case of N.H. Thippeswamy, supra was taken note in that case. In this connection, reference can be had to the decision in the case of S.I. Rooplal and Anr. v. Lt. Governor through Chief Secretary, Delhi and Ors., : AIR2000SC594 wherein, it is observed as under.--
'It is hardly necessary to emphasis that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned Single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a Single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a Single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench, or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety'.
27. Even in the case of Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho v. Jagdish, : [2001]1SCR95 the Supreme Court has held thus.--
'28. As the learned Single Judge was not in agreement with the view expressed in Devilal v. Kinkar Narmada Prasad, Election Petition No. 9 of 1980, DD: 21-2-1981 (MP) it would have been proper, to maintain judicial discipline, to refer the matter to a larger Bench rather than to take a different view. We note it with regret and distress that the said course was not followed. It we well-settled that if a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction disagrees with another Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction whether on the basis of 'different arguments' or otherwise, on a question of law, it is appropriate that the matter be referred to a larger Bench for resolution of the issue rather than to leave two conflicting judgments to operate creating confusion. It is not proper to sacrifice certainty of law. Judicial decorum, no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure and it must be respected at all costs.
29. Before parting with this aspect of the case, we wish to recall what was opined in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. The Administrator General of West Bengal, : [1960]3SCR578 :
'... If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if Judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decision. If one Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench, and holding the view that the earlier decision is wrong, itself gives effect to that view the result would be utter confusion. The position would be equally bad where a Judge sitting singly in the High Court is of opinion that the previous decision of another Single Judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to that view instead of referring the matter to a larger Bench. In such a case lawyers would not know how to advise their clients and all Courts subordinate to the High Court would find themselves in an embarrassing position of having to choose between dissentient judgments of their own High Court...'.30. These statutory principles appear to have been over looked by the learned Judge deciding Jai Bhansingh Pawaiya v. Madhaurao and Ors., : AIR2000MP111 '.
28. In the above view of the matter, the learned Single Judge was not right in disagreeing with the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, which had considered the case of N.H. Thippeswamy, supra, relied on by him, and also in relying on the judgment in the case of Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Limited, supra, to hold the judgment in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, as per incuriam when, in that case also, what has been observed is as under.--
'... The doctrine of ratio decidendi has also to be interpreted in the same line. In England a decision is said to be given per incuriam, when the Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords. In the former case it must decide which decision to follow, and in the later it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords. It has been said that the decision of the House of Lords mentioned above, refers to a decision subsequent to that of the Court of appeal. However, 'a prior decision of the House of Lords inconsistent with the decision of the Court of appeal but which was not cited to the Court of Appeal will make the later decision of the Court of Appeal of no value as given per incuriam'. But, if the prior decision had been cited to the Court of Appeal and that Court had misinterpreted a previous decision of the House of Lords, the Court of appeal must follow its previous decision and leave the House to rectify the mistake'.
So, considered from any angle, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the present matters in holding the judgment in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, as per incuriam was not correct.
29. The learned Single Judge has also placed reliance on the doctrine of 'stare dedsis'. So, let us see whether it could be applied in the present matters of not. At first instance, it may be noted that the provision contained in Section 10(4-A) of the Act was introduced by way of amendment in the year 1988 only, which came into force on 7-4-1988, and the first reported decision on the point relating to limitation provided therein was in the case of Govinda Setty, supra, within less than 9 years' period and thereafter in the case of Santmallayya, supra. However, they have been expressly overruled by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, on 11-10-2001 after taking note of the decision in the case of Thippeswamy, supra.
30. When this is so, it cannot be said that the doctrine of store dedsis can be applied in the case on hand, because it is not a matter, where the field was governed for a number of years by decisions of this Court. In the cases referred to by the learned Single Judge, said doctrine was invoked since the provision of law came to be interpreted in a particular manner for more than decades, which is not so in the cases on hand. So; the said doctrine was inapplicable.
31. In view of the discussion made so far, we respectfully disagree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the present matters in holding the period of limitation provided under Section 10(4-A) of the Act as directory and not mandatory and affirm the view taken in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, which has already clarified the said position of law holding the period of limitation in Section 10(4-A) as mandatory. So, the view taken by the Labour Court and affirmed by the learned Single Judge in the matters relating to period of limitation provided under Section 10(4-A) of the Act, being contrary to the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Khaleel Ahmed, supra, cannot be sustained and consequently, the impugned awards in allowing the applications filed after about 6 years (and not within 6 months) under Section 10(4-A) of the Act should have been set aside by the learned Single Judge. Since that was not done by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order, our interference is required.
In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned awards passed by the Labour Court and the order of the learned Single Judge are set aside.
In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their respectivecosts.